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Title: History of the Late Polish Revolution and the Events of the Campaign

Author: Joseph Hordynski

Release date: December 7, 2019 [eBook #60867]

Language: English

Credits: Produced by Brian Coe,Graeme Mackreth, The illustrations
        were generously made available by Hathi Trust Digital
        Library, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
        http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images
        generously made available by The Internet Archive/American
        Libraries.)


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE LATE POLISH REVOLUTION AND THE EVENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN ***




Produced by Brian Coe,Graeme Mackreth, The illustrations
were generously made available by Hathi Trust Digital
Library, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images
generously made available by The Internet Archive/American
Libraries.)








[Illustration: KOSCIUSZKO.

 _Born in Poland A.D. 1756. Died the 15th. October 1817 near Solothurn
 in Switzerland. He and G'al. Lafayette were the only two Europeans who
 wore the Cross of the Order of Cincinnatus._

 _Dedicated to the American people._

_Entered according to Act Congress by Paulin Miedzielsky, N.-York,
1833._]




 HISTORY

 OF THE

 LATE POLISH REVOLUTION,

 AND THE

 EVENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

 BY JOSEPH HORDYNSKI,
 MAJOR OF THE LATE TENTH REGIMENT OF LITHUANIAN LANCERS.

 Fourth Edition.

 BOSTON:

 PRINTED FOR SUBSCRIBERS.

 1833.




 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1833,

 By Joseph Hordynski,

 In the Clerk's Office of the District of Massachusetts.




TO

THE GREAT AND FREE NATION

OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.


Liberated from prison, and from the prospect of a more gloomy future,
by some of your fellow citizens, I have been so fortunate as to reach
these happy shores. Providence has granted me to behold that fair
country, and that nation, which every lover of freedom desires to see
with his own eyes, and every freeman of Poland is wont to think of with
love and esteem. Your land, long since the asylum of the persecuted,
has welcomed me with hearty benevolence. From the first moment of my
arrival to the present time, I have received daily proofs of your
sympathy. Full of gratitude, and in the hope of doing you an acceptable
service, I cannot better employ the moments allowed me during my stay
among you, than by giving you a faithful account of our revolution, and
of its true causes and motives, as well as of the events of the war by
which it was followed. By a brief statement of the circumstances which
brought about that revolution, I wish to inform you of the injustice
and outrages, which my nation was compelled to endure, during fourteen
years, in which both its natural rights, and the constitution solemnly
guarantied to it, were trampled under foot. By a true account of the
events of the ensuing war, you will be enabled to convince yourselves
of the means by which small forces became victorious over a colossal
power, as well as of the causes of the final catastrophe to which
Poland has been doomed.

I am convinced that in many respects my narrative will be entirely
opposed to the representations given in the public papers; for our
land, like most countries struggling for liberty, was surrounded by
enemies rather than friends. The sources from which these accounts have
been drawn, are, first, my own recollections of events of which I was
an eye-witness; secondly, the reports of my friends and comrades who
were present; and lastly, (particularly as to the operations of the
detached corps) the official reports of the army, which have not yet
escaped my memory. The same course I have followed in the design of
the plans, which have been traced partly from my own recollections of
positions and scenes at which I was present, partly from the accurate
reports of friends, and partly from public reports, assisted by my
personal knowledge of localities.

Americans! I am neither an author nor a scholar by profession, but a
simple republican and soldier. In such a one you will forgive faults in
the form and style of writing. Do not then judge me as a writer, but
see in me an unhappy Pole, who presents to your sympathies the picture
of the fatal disasters of his unfortunate country, and of the manner
in which it strove to regain its liberty, that first and greatest of
national blessings. In this hope of your indulgence, I beg you to
accept this work as a token of my gratitude and as a memorial of my
short stay among you, as well as an expression of the great esteem,
with which I shall always remain,

 Americans, your devoted servant,
 JOSEPH HORDYNSKI.

To the gentlemen who have aided me, by the translation, the execution
of the plates, and the publication of the work, I offer the only
recompense which they will permit me to make--my heartfelt thanks; and
I assure them that in the feelings which prompt this acknowledgment,
all my comrades will participate.

 J.H.

 PRONUNCIATION.--_To the Reader._ There are difficulties in the way
 of accurate rules for the pronunciation of Polish words arising from
 the circumstance that some letters have varieties of sound which
 are indicated by signs in the Polish alphabet, and which cannot be
 represented in the English. Thus, the letter _Z_ has, in addition
 to that of the English _Z_ the sounds of _jet_ and _zet_; the first
 indicated by a short line and the second by a dot placed over the
 letter. It has therefore been thought more for the convenience of
 readers, who may wish to know the English pronunciation of the names
 which occur in this work, to subjoin an alphabetical list of them and
 their pronunciation, than to give rules which must necessarily be
 imperfect. This list will be found at the end of the Volume.

[Illustration: CASIMIR PULASKI,

_the undaunted Chief of the Poles during the Confederacy of Bar from
1768 to 1772. Born in 1746 & killed before Savannah in 1779 while
fighting for the Liberty & Independence of these U.S._

 _Dedicated to the American people._

_Entered according to Act of Congress by Paulin Miedzielsky, N.-York,
1833._]




CONTENTS.


   CHAPTER I.

   Geographical extent, population, and political importance of Poland,
   as anciently constituted.--Conduct of Napoleon in 1812.--Congress
   of Vienna.--Grand-duchy of Warsaw erected into a kingdom.--Dispositions
   of Alexander.--Zajaczek appointed Viceroy,
   and Constantine commander of the army.--Constantine encroaches
   upon the civil administration.--Acts of tyranny.--Meeting
   of the Diet.--Public debates suppressed.--The Polish Conspiracy
   of 1821.--The Russian Conspiracy of 1824.--Union of the
   Patriotic Associations.--Death of Alexander.--The Revolt at St
   Petersburgh.--Punishment of the Patriots.--Coronation of
   Nicholas.--Constantine appointed Viceroy of Poland.--Oppressions
   of the Government.--Patriotic Club.--Influence of the French
   and Belgic Revolutions.--The Quartering-tax.--Excitement in
   Warsaw.--Arrest of the students at Praga.--Day of the Revolution
   fixed upon.                                                       Page 5


   CHAPTER II.

   Principles of the Revolution.--THE FIRST NIGHT.--Attack on the
   Barracks of the Russian Cavalry.--Their Dispersion.--Attempt
   to secure the person of the Grand Duke.--Capture of Russian
   general officers and spies.--Actions with detached bodies of Russian
   cavalry.--Two companies of Polish light-infantry join the
   patriots.--Death of Potocki and Trembicki.--The Russian infantry
   attacked and dispersed.--Armament and assembling of
   the people.--Detachments sent to Praga.                               30


   CHAPTER III.

   THE FIRST DAY.--Expulsion of the Russians from Warsaw.--Choice
   of Chlopicki as Commander in Chief.--Provisional Government,
   under the Presidency of prince Adam Czartoryski.--Deputation
   sent to the Grand Duke.--Propositions and answer.--Abolition
   of the Bureau of Police.--Establishment of the National
   Guard.--Proclamations addressed to the inhabitants of the provinces
   and the distant troops.--Provision for the Russian prisoners.--The
   Academical Legions formed.--Arrival of detachments from the
   provinces.--The Grand Duke consents to leave the kingdom, and
   addresses a proclamation to the Poles.                                47


   CHAPTER IV.

   The Patriotic Club commences its sessions.--Character of that
   association.--The Grand Duke departs for the frontier.--Particulars
   of his march.--The Polish regiments which had remained
   with him return to Warsaw.--Their reception.--Krasynski and
   Kornatowski.--Deputation to St Petersburgh.--Demands to be
   laid before the Emperor.--Sierawski made Governor of Warsaw,
   and Wasowiez chief of the staff.--Order respecting the army.--Arrival
   of volunteers from the interior.--Opening of the theatre.--Religious
   solemnities at Praga.--Chlopicki nominated and proclaimed
   Dictator.                                                        Page 59


   CHAPTER V.

   The Dictator enters upon his duties.--Plans for the enrollment of
   new forces.--System of officering them.--Want of energy in the
   execution of his plans.--Fortifications neglected.--The people
   supply the deficiencies of the administration.--Discovery of the
   correspondence between the ministers Grabowski and Lubecki.--The
   march of the army delayed.--Answer of the Emperor
   Nicholas to the deputies.--His proclamation.--Its effect on the
   nation.--The Diet demand of the Dictator an account of his trust.--The
   result of their investigations.--Chlopicki deprived of the
   Dictatorial power.--The civil administration entrusted to Prince
   Adam Czartoryski, and the command of the army to Prince
   Michael Radziwil, each subordinate to the Diet.                       71


   CHAPTER VI.

   Remarks on the policy of the late Dictator.--System of operations
   adopted.--The army leaves Warsaw.--Statement of the
   existing forces.--Of the forces proposed to be raised.--Unfortunate
   consequences of the delay in the preparation of the forces.--Statement
   of the force with which the war was actually commenced.               87


   CHAPTER VII.

   Entrance of the Russian forces into the Kingdom.--Proclamations
   of Marshal Diebitsch.--Their effect.--Disposition of the Russian
   and Polish forces.--Plan of operations of the Poles.                  98


   CHAPTER VIII.

   The opening fire.--Affairs of the 10th and 11th February.--Combat
   of Stoczek.--Disposition in consequence of that battle.--Battle of
   Boimie.--Retrograde movement to Dobre.--Combat of Makowiec.--Passage
   of the Orsyca.--Combat of Dobre.--Attack on
   the right wing at Minsk.                                             109


   CHAPTER IX.

   Retrograde movement of the 18th of February.--Details of this
   movement, and of the actions which took place.--The army
   reaches the field of Praga.--Its reception at Warsaw.--Position
   of the army.--Battle of Wawr and Bialolenka.--Operations of
   general Dwernicki against the corps of Prince Wirtemberg.--Defeat
   of that corps by general Dwernicki at Swierza.--Renewal
   of the enemy's attack on the main army on the 20th.--Its
   successful resistance.--Review of the events of the preceding
   days.--Examination of the plan of operations of the Polish
   army.                                                           Page 126


   CHAPTER X.

   Proceedings of the National Government.--Marshal Diebitsch continues
   in a state of inactivity.--Negotiations are opened by him.--His
   propositions are declined.--Position of the army on the
   24th, and battle of Bialolenka.--Position on the 25th.--Great
   battle of Grochow.--Details.--State of the Russian army after
   its defeat.--Examination of the plan of the battle of Grochow.--Remarks
   upon the course adopted by prince Radziwil after that
   victory.--The Polish army crosses the Vistula to Warsaw.--Its
   reception by the national government and the citizens.--Resignation
   of prince Radziwil.                                                  148


   CHAPTER XI.

   Passage of the Vistula to Warsaw.--Disposition of the Polish forces
   on its left bank.--Appointment of general John Skrzynecki to
   the chief command.--Proclamation.--Prompt attention is given
   to the re-organization of the army, the arsenals and manufactories
   of arms, the fortifications, &c.--Deportment of the commander
   in chief towards the army.--General enthusiasm of the nation.--The
   Patriotic offers of the Polish women.--New regulations established
   for conferring orders of merit.--Disorderly state of the
   Russian army.--Attempt of Diebitsch to bribe the Polish soldiery.
   --General view of the encouraging circumstances of this epoch.--The
   insurrection in Russia under Yermolow.--View of the
   state of the Polish forces when general Skrzynecki took the chief
   command.--He presses the organization of the new forces.--Their
   distribution and that of the general forces.--Positions of
   the Polish army and the detached corps.--Russian position.           175


   CHAPTER XII.

   Operations of the corps of general Dwernicki against the Russian
   corps under the prince of Wirtemberg, in the Palatinate of Lublin.
   --Battle of Pulawy, and defeat of Wirtemberg.--Atrocities of that
   prince at Pulawy.--Pursuit of the enemy.--Battle of Kurow,
   and annihilation of Wirtemberg's corps.--Operations of colonel
   Valentin, between Modlin and Pultusk.--A detachment of the
   enemy is surprised at Nasielsk.--Transports of provisions for the
   enemy from Prussia taken.--Successful skirmishes.--Marshal
   Diebitsch demands the capitulation of the fortress of Modlin.
   Reply of colonel Leduchowski.--A detachment from the garrison
   of Modlin attacks and defeats a Russian force at Serock.--General
   Skrzynecki makes an offer of pacification on the basis of
   the concessions originally demanded by the Poles.--This proposition
   is rejected and hostilities are recommenced.--Reconnoissance
   upon the right bank of the Vistula under Jankowski and
   Gielgud.--A Russian corps under general Witt is sent against
   Dwernicki.--General Uminski is sent against the Russian guard.--First
   encounter.--The Russian guard is compelled to leave
   their position for Ostrolenka.--The guard evacuates Ostrolenka to
   join the grand army.                                                 195


   CHAPTER XIII.

   Plan of general Skrzynecki to act upon the isolated corps of Rosen
   and Gaismer.--Battle of Wawr.--Various detachments of the enemy
   are taken after that battle, and a great number of prisoners.--Battle
   of Dembe-Wielkie.--Destructive pursuit of the enemy
   by our cavalry.--View of the Russian losses in the preceding
   days.--Marshal Diebitsch abandons his plan of crossing the Vistula,
   and marches to the rescue of the remains of the corps of Rosen
   and Gaismer, and the Imperial Guard.--View of the position of
   the two armies, after the second repulse of the enemy from
   before Warsaw.--Operations of general Dwernicki.--Successes
   of a reconnoissance under colonel Russyian at Uscilog.--Effect
   of Dwernicki's victories on the inhabitants of the
   provinces.--Acknowledgment of general Dwernicki's services by the
   National Government.--The instructions for his future operations.    213


   CHAPTER XIV.

   The insurrection in Lithuania.--Dispositions of the Lithuanians at
   the breaking out of our revolution.--Their offers of co-operation
   were rejected by the dictator.--View of the condition of Lithuania
   under the Russian sway.--Scheme of the Russian government
   to destroy all Polish national feeling in that province.--The
   insurrection is brought about by the massacre of the patriots
   at Osmiany.--Capture of numerous towns by the insurgents,
   and dispersion of their garrisons.--Storm of Wilno, and delivery
   of prisoners.--Several partizan corps are formed.--Their destination
   and successes.                                                       229


   CHAPTER XV.

   Plan of operation against the two corps of Rosen and Kreutz.--Battle
   of Iganie.--Reflections on the state of the Polish cause after
   the victory of Iganie.--Review of the course of the campaign.--Condition
   of the Russian army.--Discontents in Russia.--Representations
   of the Senate at St Petersburgh to the Emperor.--Comparative
   view of the forces of the two armies at the
   present stage of the conflict.                                       238


   CHAPTER XVI.

   Position of the two armies after the battle of Iganie.--Plan of a
   simultaneous attack upon the Russian forces upon opposite
   sides.--Instructions to the different corps.--Operations on the
   enemy's front.--Unfortunate operations of general Sierawski, and the
   _first defeat_.--Details of those operations.--Operations of general
   Dwernicki.--He defeats Rudiger; but by a false operation exposes
   himself to be attacked disadvantageously by two Russian
   corps.--In the course of the action the Austrian frontier is passed
   by the combatants.--An Austrian force interposes, and general
   Dwernicki consents to go into camp.--His arms and prisoners
   are taken from him, while the enemy is permitted to leave the
   territory freely.--Reflections on the conduct of Austria.--Consequences
   of the loss of Dwernicki's corps.--The cholera makes
   its appearance in the two armies.                                    254


   CHAPTER XVII.

   The Russian commander resumes offensive operations.--Object of
   the attack of the 25th of April.--Combat of Kuflew.--General
   Dembinski evacuates the position of Kuflew and awaits the enemy
   at Bady.--Battle of Minsk.--The enemy suddenly evacuates
   his position.--Reflections on this stage of the conflict.--Positions
   of the two armies.                                                   271


   CHAPTER XVIII.

   General Skrzynecki resumes the offensive.--He decides to adopt an
   enlarged plan of operations, and to make the revolutionized provinces
   supply the place of a corps d'armee.--The corps of Chrzanowski
   is sent to occupy the Russian corps of Witt and Kreutz.--Admirable
   execution of this enterprise.--Attack on Kock.--Attack
   of Rudiger's camp.--Plan of operations by the main army
   against the Russian guard.--Forced march from Kaluszyn by
   Praga to Serock.--Advanced post of the guard attacked and defeated.--The
   corps of Saken is cut off.--The 2d division under
   Gielgud sent into Lithuania.--The imperial guard are driven
   with great loss beyond the frontier.--Retrograde movement.           283


   CHAPTER XIX.

   The Lithuanians compel two Russian corps to evacuate
   Samogitia.--Operations of general Chlapowski in the department of
   Bialystok.--Capture of Bielsk.--Defeat of a Russian force at Narewka
   and expulsion of the enemy from the department.--Recapitulation
   of the forces which had been sent into Lithuania.--Operations of
   the main army.--Attempt of marshal Diebitsch to intercept Skrzynecki
   on his retrograde march, by a diversion to Ostrolenka.--General
   Lubinski surprises the Russian advanced guard at Czyzew.--Marshal
   Diebitsch attacks the Polish rear-guard at Kleczkowo.--The
   rear-guard quits its position at night, and joins the
   main army at Ostrolenka.--Battle of Ostrolenka.                      298


   CHAPTER XX.

   Operations of the Lithuanian corps.--Battle of Raygrod and defeat
   of the Russian corps of Saken.--Importance of this first success
   in Lithuania.--General Gielgud neglects to follow up his advantages.--He
   loses time by passing the Niemen at Gielgudyszki,
   and enables the enemy to concentrate his forces in Wilno.--Entrance
   into Lithuania and reception by the inhabitants.--Position
   of the two main armies.--The Russian forces remain inactive and
   receive supplies from Prussia.--Death of marshal Diebitsch.          313


   CHAPTER XXI.

   General Gielgud advances into Lithuania.--Allows a Russian corps
   to pass within a league of him unperceived.--Operations on
   Wilno.--Enumeration of our present force.--Plan of a simultaneous
   attack upon Wilno on opposite sides by the corps in two
   divisions.--General Dembinski engages the enemy with the
   smaller part of the corps.--Being unsupported by Gielgud, is
   forced to retreat.--General Gielgud attacks Wilno.--Battle of
   Wilno.--A retreat is commenced.--Prodigious efforts of the Polish
   cavalry in protecting this retreat.--Consequences of the repulse
   from Wilno.--The removal of general Gielgud is called for.--General
   Chlapowski consents to take the virtual command of
   the corps, in the post of chef d'etat major.--Consideration on
   the state of things consequent to the battle of Wilno.--Details
   of the admirable plan of operations proposed by colonel Valentin.    328


   CHAPTER XXII.

   Operations of the main army.--Expedition under Jankowski.--General
   Chrzanowski having driven Rudiger from his position, crosses
   the Vistula, but returns to act in concert with general Jankowski
   against the enemy near Kock.--Details of general Jankowski's
   movement.--He remains inactive within sight of the fire of the
   corps with which he was to co-operate.--Other evidences of
   treason.--Generals Jankowski and Bukowski are arrested and
   ordered for trial.--View of the advantages that were sacrificed
   by this misconduct.--Discovery of a plot to liberate and arm the
   Russian prisoners at Warsaw, and to deliver the city to the enemy.
   --State of the public mind induced by these events.                  342


   CHAPTER XXIII.

   General Chlapowski arrives at Keydany, having ordered general
   Dembinski to withdraw to Wilkomierz.--The position of the two
   forces and their line of operations.--Examination of these
   arrangements.--Neglect of the important position of Kowno.--General
   Chlapowski, at Keydany, proposes to form a provisional government,
   and obtain a levy of troops.--Dispositions of the Lithuanians,
   as effected by the mismanagement of our leaders.--Advantages
   offered to the enemy by the delay at Keydany.--Brave
   defence of Kowno, by the small force left there.--Skirmish at
   Wilkomierz.--The opportunity of concentrating all the forces at
   Keydany, and repassing the Niemen, is neglected.--The enemy
   presses his pursuit.--Battle of Rosseyny.--Attack on Szawla.--Loss
   of the ammunition and baggage of the corps.--The corps
   retreats in order to Kurzany, protected by a rear guard of cavalry
   and light artillery.--At Kurzany the corps is subdivided into
   three parts.--Destination and strength of each.--Examination of
   this plan.                                                           350


   CHAPTER XXIV.

   The three subdivisions of the Lithuanian corps take their respective
   destinations.--Details of the operations of that of general Rohland.--He
   meets alone the attack of the whole Russian force.--Battle
   of Powenduny and Worna.--General Rohland, on his way
   to Polonga, learns that general Chlapowski had marched towards
   the Prussian frontier.--He presses his march to overtake and form
   a junction with him.--The greater part of the corps of Gielgud
   and Chlapowski were found to have passed the frontier, when
   that of Rohland came in sight.--Indignation of the soldiery.--Death
   of general Gielgud.--General Rohland, joined by a portion
   of the corps of Gielgud which had not yet passed the frontier,
   continues his march to Nowe-Miasto.--He declines a proposition
   from general Kreutz, to surrender.--Successful skirmish
   with the enemy's cavalry.--General Rohland takes a position at
   Nowe-Miasto, and awaits the enemy.--The Russian forces, however,
   do not continue their pursuit, but go into camp.--Propositions
   to pass the frontier are sent to general Rohland by the Prussian
   authorities.--They are submitted to the corps and accepted.          367


   CHAPTER XXV.

   Effect of the news of the Lithuanian disasters on the minds of the
   people.--Distrust of the National Government.--The Russian
   army resumes the offensive under general Paszkiewicz.--He decides
   to pass the Vistula.--Examination of the merits of this plan.--Plan
   of general Skrzynecki to act on the different detached
   corps of the enemy.--Advantages of general Chrzanowski over
   the corps of Rudiger.--The Russian forces execute the passage
   of the Vistula.--General Skrzynecki crosses the Vistula at Warsaw
   to operate against the enemy on the left bank.--An inquiry
   into the conduct of general Skrzynecki, and the appointment of
   a Council of War is demanded by the nation.--Arrival of the
   corps of general Dembinski at Warsaw.                                384


   CHAPTER XXVI.

   Operation of general Dembinski's corps.--He traverses the country
   between Szawla and the Niemen without being observed by the
   enemy.--Attacks and disperses a brigade of Russian infantry.--Passes
   the Niemen and throws himself into the forest of Bialystok.--After
   leaving that forest, is joined by the corps of general
   Rozycki.--Reaches Warsaw.--His reception at Warsaw.--View
   of the exposed situation of Paszkiewicz after his passage of the
   Vistula.--Examination of the plan of operations of the Polish
   commander.--Morbid state of the public mind at Warsaw.--Skrzynecki
   and Czartoriski deprived of their trust.--Capture of
   the city.--Documents showing the influence exercised by the
   cabinets in discouraging active operations.--Conclusion.             394


   APPENDIX.                                                            409




POLISH REVOLUTION.




CHAPTER I.

 Geographical extent, population, and political importance of Poland,
 as anciently constituted.--Conduct of Napoleon in 1812.--Congress of
 Vienna.--Grand-duchy of Warsaw erected into a Kingdom.--Dispositions
 of Alexander.--Zajaczek appointed Viceroy, and Constantine
 Commander of the Army.--Constantine encroaches upon the civil
 administration.--Acts of tyranny.--Meeting of the Diet.--Public
 debates suppressed.--The Polish Conspiracy of 1821.--The Russian
 Conspiracy of 1824.--Union of the Patriotic Associations.--Death
 of Alexander.--The Revolt at St Petersburgh.--Punishment of the
 Patriots.--Coronation of Nicholas.--Constantine appointed Viceroy of
 Poland.--Oppressions of the Government.--Patriotic Club.--Influence of
 the French and Belgic Revolutions.--The Quartering-tax.--Excitement in
 Warsaw.--Arrest of the Students at Praga.--Day of the Revolution fixed
 upon.


In the early part of July, 1812, when the victorious armies of Napoleon
had occupied Wilna, and threatened to annihilate the throne of the
Czars, the Polish nation cherished the hope of recovering its former
grandeur. The destiny of Poland was then in the hands of Napoleon, and
it may be said with truth that on the destiny of Poland depended the
security and peace of Europe.

Poland, as is well known to the reader, viewed in regard to its
geographical situation and extent, as formerly constituted, forms a
strong outwork against the Russian Colossus. Its territories extend to
the eastward as far as the Dneiper, and westward as far as the Oder.
Toward the north, they reach the Baltic and the government of Skoff,
and their southern frontiers are the Carpathian Mountains and the Black
Sea. This vast region, composed of the present Kingdom of Poland,
the Grand-duchy of Posen, of Samogitia, Lithuania, Livonia, White
Russia and Black Russia, Volhynia, Podolia, Ukraine, and Gallicia, is
inhabited by twenty-two millions of Poles of the same descent, the same
manners and customs, and the same language and religion. According to
its ancient limits, the kingdom of Poland is among the first in Europe
with regard to population and geographical extent.

The deputies, who, at the period above named, were sent from Warsaw to
the Emperor Napoleon, laid before him the most earnest solicitations
for the restoration of this state, and endeavoured to direct his
views to the future, in order to convince him of its necessity. They
concluded with the following words;--'Dites, Sire, que le royaume de
Pologne existe, et ce décret sera pour le monde l'equivalent de la
réalité.' To this he answered;--'Dans ma situation, j'ai beaucoup
d'interêts à concilier, beaucoup de devoirs à remplir. Si j'avais
regné pendant le premier, le second, ou le troisiême partage de la
Pologne, j'aurais armé mes peuples pour la defendre. J'aime votre
nation, j'autorise les efforts que vous voulez faire. C'est entièrment
dans l'unanimité de sa population, que vous pourez trouver l'éspoir
de succes. Je dois ajouter que j'ai guaranti a l'empereur d'Autriche
l'intégrité de ses domaines.'[1]

Such a reply from Napoleon, the Poles could never have expected. For,
who accompanied him so faithfully in all his expeditions as the sons
of Poland? Thousands of Poles lie buried in Italy, Egypt, St Domingo,
Spain, and Russia, who had fought for the integrity of the French
Republic and for the aggrandizement of Napoleon. His cold reception
of the deputies of Poland filled all patriots with sadness. They were
now convinced, that the good wishes of Napoleon for Poland were not
sincere, and that, through his marriage with Maria Louisa, he had come
under Austrian influence. Thus the hope of territorial enlargement and
national existence vanished away, and Napoleon, by his indifference
to the interests of Poland, accelerated his own fall. The burning of
Moscow, which was a chance that did not enter into his calculations,
became the turning point of his fate. The Poles, who had contributed
to his greatness, did not desert him in his distress; they were his
companions to the very last. Half a squadron of them followed him to
Elba, at his own request. The disasters of France decided the fate of
Poland. By the Congress of Vienna, the Grand-duchy of Warsaw was made
into a kingdom, and subjected to the iron sceptre of Russia.

At the first moment of entering upon the government of the kingdom,
the Emperor Alexander seemed disposed to load Poland with benefits.
On his return from Paris he was received by the inhabitants of Warsaw
with the most unfeigned good will, and his stay in that city was
marked by acts of beneficence. The words with which he then addressed
the representatives of the nation, are still in the memory of every
Pole.--'Gentlemen, I respect and love your nation. To these feelings
on my part, in which all Europe partakes, you are entitled by your
continual and disinterested sacrifices for the prosperity of other
nations. I swear to maintain your constitution with all the privileges
guarantied by it; and this same constitution I promise to grant to
your brethren in the provinces, which are to be united with you in one
kingdom.' The nation believed in these promises the more readily as the
affectionate deportment of the monarch seemed to confirm them. During
his stay in Warsaw, he paid visits to several of the most popular and
patriotic families and individuals, and every where expressed himself
in terms of the highest esteem for the Polish nation.

This show of benevolence, and the dreams of happiness with which it
inspired the people, were not, however of long duration. Before his
departure from Warsaw, the Emperor named as viceroy of Poland, the
old general Zajaczek,[2] raising him to the dignity of a prince, and
his own brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, as commander in chief of
the Polish army. The appointment of these persons to the supreme power
was already in direct opposition to all the promises he had made. For
Zajaczek, through the infirmities of his advanced age, was unfit for
the post of viceroy, and could be but an instrument in Russian hands;
while in Constantine, the commander in chief of their army, the Poles
received a tyrant.

Not long after the departure of Alexander, the encroachments of the
Russian cabinet began to be felt. Removals of officers took place
in all the branches of government, in particular of those known as
patriots, who were supplanted by minions of Russia, men full of
ambition and intrigue. In the first year of the Russian government,
the bureau of Police was enlarged, and filled with persons whom the
nation despised. The Polish army, which had gathered laurels in so
many countries of the three continents, and which was held in such
high estimation by the first monarch and general in Europe, was
exposed, on the very first days of the new government, to the insults
of Constantine. There was not an officer, but was grossly offended by
the Grand Duke, and more than all, those who wore military decorations
for their merits. No past services were valued; they only exposed those
who were distinguished by them to greater persecution. In the first six
months, many officers, among whom was the renowned general Sokolnicki,
committed suicide; and nearly one half the officers and generals asked
their dismission, among whom was General, the late Dictator, Chlopicki,
who preferred poverty and want to such an ignominious service. The
Polish army, those soldiers animated by feelings of honor and the love
of distinction, were to be transformed into the machines of despotism.
They who had faced death in so many battles, who were covered with
wounds, and who had been called 'brethren' by the greatest leader of
his age, were now to be beaten with the Russian knout. In the first
year, few days passed in which some of the soldiers did not commit
suicide.

This prince, who appeared not to find victims enough for his cruelty
in the army, began to meddle with all the branches of administration,
and to control them. Soon the liberty of the press was prohibited,
freemasonry was interdicted, and a bureau of spies was established. The
chief in this bureau of spies were Rozniecki, the vice-president of the
city of Warsaw, Lubowidzki, a man of the name of Macrot, and Schlee.
From the documents found upon Schlee and Macrot, it was ascertained
that there were in Warsaw alone 900 spies. In the provinces their
number amounted to 2000. The expenses and salaries of these spies,
according to accounts found among their papers, drew from the public
treasury $1,000,000, or 6,000,000 Polish gilders. Thus, our poor
country, instead of employing her resources for the happiness of her
children, was forced to pay the mercenaries hired to distress them.
Soon Warsaw and the whole kingdom became one vast prison. These spies
endeavoured to steal into every company, and were present in all
public places. They tried to catch every conversation, and distorted
every word spoken, with however innocent an intention, in regard to
the policy and administration of the country. In order to extort
money, they accused some of the most respected and honest persons, who
were thrown into prison, and many of whom were never again seen by
their families, from the midst of whom they had been dragged in the
night-time, in order to conceal the crime from the eyes of the world.
Persons who did not take off their hats in the streets before the Grand
Duke, were compelled to draw barrows of mud upon the public places.
There passed hardly a month in which some students were not arrested,
and, without any trial, at the mere denunciation of a hireling spy,
thrown into prison, where they lingered for years. Thus faded away in
dungeons many fair and hopeful youths, the flower of our nation. In
Warsaw, besides the public gaols, there were, beneath almost all of
the barracks, prisons, where the victims of tyranny were tortured. The
very orangery of the Grand Duke was transformed into a prison, from
which some persons were liberated during the revolution, who had been
confined there for years. It was in this prison that Lukasinski had
been kept for a long time, though subsequently bound to a cannon and
carried into Russia. In the gaols below the barracks of the artillery
many dead bodies were found.

At the first meeting of the Diet, when the Grand Duke Constantine was
among the deputies from the city of Praga, and debates commenced on
various subjects which concerned the welfare of the country,--such as,
the liberty of the press, the abolition of the central police and the
spies, and the deposition of several of the higher officers, for which
petitions had been sent to the monarch,--a decision was promulgated
that the Diet should act in subordination to the will of the Grand
Duke, and, in order to add force to this decision, the palace and its
galleries were surrounded and filled by guards. All public debates
during the session were prohibited, and a ticket from the police was
required for admission. These tickets were distributed among Russian
generals, officers of government and their families, and creatures of
the court. Before such an auditory, discussions of the most sacred
interest to the nation were to take place. No patriot could behold,
without tears, the senators and fathers of the nations, descendants of
Tarnowski, Zamoiski, Chodkiewicz, and Kosciusko, sitting with sad and
drooping countenances, exposed to the scoffing and laughter of those
minions of the court. The sacred halls were transformed into a theatre
for Russian spectators.

In all the different bureaus, spies held important offices, and
thus those bureaus became scenes of the most detestable intrigues.
Law and right were trampled under foot, and the constitution itself
was derided. They used to express themselves in the following and
similar terms:--'What is the constitution? It is an impediment to the
administration of the government, and the course of justice. The Grand
Duke is the best constitution.'

A few years had passed away in this wretched state of the nation, when,
towards 1821, our noble patriots, Krzyzanowski, Jablonowski, Plichta,
Debek, and Soltyk, conceived the idea of emancipating their country by
a revolution. Whilst occupied with their noble scheme, they were most
agreeably surprised by receiving information, in 1824, of a similar
patriotic union in Russia for throwing off the yoke of despotism. Their
joy was increased when they received a summons from this patriotic
union in Russia, at the head of which were Pestel, Releiew, Bestuzew,
Kichelbeker, Murawiew, and Kachowski, to join hands with them. This
junction was effected in Kiow, on the day of the great fair, when
Prince Jablonowski became acquainted with some of their members, and
was initiated into their plans. The invitation was received by the
Poles with delight. Accustomed to combat for liberty, they offered with
their whole hearts their aid in the redemption of the Sarmatic nation
from the chains by which they had been so long bound down.

Soon after this, it was agreed to meet in the town of Orla, in the
province of Little Russia, where solemn oaths were sworn to sacrifice
life and property in the cause. Resolutions were taken, and the means
of their execution were devised. The Russians promised to the Poles,
in case of success, the surrender of all the provinces as far as the
frontiers which Boleslaw-Chrobry had established. This promise, as
well as that of eternal friendship between the two brother-nations,
was sanctioned by the solemnity of oaths. The day fixed upon for
the breaking out of the revolution, was the 25th anniversary of the
accession of Alexander, in the month of May, 1826; and Biala-Cerkiew
in Volhynia was the place selected for the first blow. The reason
for choosing this place, was, that the whole imperial family and the
greater part of the army were to assemble there, on the great plain
of the Dneiper, to celebrate the anniversary of the coronation. This
occasion was to be improved, to gain over all the well-disposed
generals, and at the same time to secure the imperial family. In the
meeting at Orla, it was required of the Poles, that, at the moment
of the breaking out of the revolution, they should take the life of
the Grand Duke Constantine. To this proposition, however, Prince
Jablonowski answered in these well known words: 'Russians, brother
Sarmatians, you have summoned us to co-operate in the holy work of
breaking the bonds of slavery under which our Sarmatic race has so long
pined. We come to you with sincere hearts, willing to sacrifice our
fortunes and lives. Rely, my dear friends, on this our promise. The
many struggles in which we have already fought for the sake of liberty,
may warrant our assertions. Brethren, you demand of us to murder the
Grand Duke. This we can never do. The Poles have never stained their
hands with the blood of their princes. We promise you to secure his
person in the moment of the revolution, and, as he belongs to you, we
shall deliver him into your hands.'

The patriotic associations on both sides endeavored to increase
their party, by the initiation of many brave men in the army and in
civil life. In Lithuania, the respectable president of the nobles,
Downarowicz, and the noble Rukiewicz of the Lithuanian corps, with many
other officers, were admitted into the conspiracy, and among others
Jgelstrom, Wigielin, Hoffman, and Wielkaniec. All the plans for the
approaching revolution were arranged with the utmost circumspection,
and every circumstance seemed to promise success, when the sudden death
of the Emperor Alexander, at Taganrog, in the early part of December,
1825, darkened our bright hopes.

The news of his death had, at first, a stunning effect upon the
patriotic club in Petersburgh. Nevertheless, they resolved to act. They
hoped to profit by the troubles between Constantine and Nicholas, about
the succession. On the 18th of December of the same year, the signal
for revolt was given in Petersburgh. Some regiments of the guard were
on the side of the patriots, and with them assembled great numbers of
the people ready to fight for liberty. Yet all this was done without
sufficient energy, and without good leaders. It was unfortunate,
that at the time, Colonel Pestel, acknowledged by all to be a man of
great talents and energy, happened to be absent in Moscow. The people
assembled in their holy cause, but, being without leaders, began to
fall into disorder, and a few discharges of cannon were sufficient to
disperse them.

As the Grand Duke Constantine, on account of his marriage with a noble
Polish lady, Grudzinska, in 1825, was obliged to renounce the throne
of Russia, the imperial power was, by a written document, given to the
Grand Duke Nicholas, as the eldest in succession after him.

Some days after the proclamation of Nicholas, all the prisons of the
realm were prepared to receive their new inmates. Petersburgh, Moscow,
Wilna, Kiow, Bialystok, and Warsaw, were appointed for the places
of trial. Over the whole of Poland and Russia the sword of cruel
revenge was suspended. In Petersburgh, the martyrs of liberty, Pestel,
Muraview, Releiew, Bestuzew, Kachowski, were hung on the gallows, and
more than two hundred persons of the noblest families were sent to
Siberia. In Wilna, Kiow, and Moscow, an immense number were thrown into
prison, or transported to Siberia. In Bialystok the Russian general,
Wiliaminow, was appointed an inquisitor. This infamous character
treated the wretched prisoners with the utmost cruelty. Rukiewicz,[3]
Jgelstrom, and Wigelin, were exiled to Siberia for life.

In Warsaw, the Grand Duke himself undertook the business of
establishing an inquisition over the unhappy prisoners. This court
was composed of persons in the Russian interest, a circumstance,
the melancholy consequences of which soon became manifest. Senator
Soltyk, an old man seventy years of age, was flogged with the knout.
Krzyzanowski, unable to endure the tortures inflicted upon him,
committed suicide. General Procurator Wyezechowski, that unworthy
son of Poland, sentenced all who were condemned to death, to be hung
on a gallows, and their bodies to be exposed upon the wheel. This
horrid sentence, however, was, notwithstanding all the Grand Duke's
influence, mitigated by the supreme court of the senate, which still
contained many worthy men under the presidency of the venerable
woyewode, Bilinski. The infamous Wyezechowski was unable to oppose this
virtuous old man, whose powerful eloquence was a mirror of his noble
heart. President Bilinski, fearless of the threats of the Russians,
whose briberies he was accustomed to treat with disdain, guided by the
articles of the criminal code, altered the sentence of death to a few
years imprisonment. This mitigation of the sentence was signed by all
the senators, with one exception.[4]

After Nicholas had ascended the throne over steps of blood, he was
crowned, in 1826, Emperor of Russia. Two years after this, in 1828,
he was again crowned in Warsaw as King of Poland. This monarch at
first intended not to go through with the ceremony of the coronation
in Warsaw, in order to avoid the oath of the constitution. Yet, from
fear of revolutionary scenes, he suffered himself to be persuaded to do
it, and took the oath, like his predecessor and brother, Alexander, to
maintain the constitution and the privileges guarantied by it.

Poland may have suffered under Alexander; yet he loved the nation
like a friend, as every one of my countrymen will allow. When he was
mistaken in his measures, it was, that, surrounded by bad men and
enemies of our nation, he was prevented from knowing the truth. He was
himself too much engrossed in pleasures, to visit the hut of the poor
in order to obtain information of his condition. Poland forgave him
all his faults, in the grateful recollection that he had restored her
to a separate existence, and respected the constitution. Far different
in our eyes appeared the present emperor, Nicholas. Partaking of the
errors of his predecessor, he exhibited none of his virtues. Alexander,
with a benignant countenance, permitted every one to approach him
freely, and his features were never distorted by passion. Nicholas,
on the contrary, seemed to terrify by his very look. His lowering
and overbearing eye was the true mirror of Asiatic despotism. Every
movement was that of command; and his imperious air was in true
harmony with the ruling passion of his mind. Such a sovereign, acting
through the instrumentality of a brother like himself, the Grand
Duke Constantine, must needs bring distress upon our country. Whole
volumes might be filled with the relation of the atrocities of this
government. The daily increasing host of spies in its employ, among
whom even females were found, regarded nothing as sacred, and mocked at
the most holy institutions. They lavished away millions of the public
funds. Everything was permitted to them. In short, the intention of
this government seemed to be to plunge our country into the deepest
distress, in order to force us to the abandonment of every national
feeling, and to make us slaves of the Russians. Yet in this hope they
were deceived. The more the nation was oppressed,[5] the more its
energy of character was steeled, and the more the love of country
developed itself.

Two worthy sons of Poland, Wysocki and Schlegel, mourning over
the martyrdom of Krzyzanowoski, Soltyk, Dembek, and Plichta, and
meditating on the distresses of their country, resolved to attempt
its deliverance. By these two young champions of Poland, the first
idea of the revolution was conceived. They communicated their hopes
to several other patriots, and thus was formed the Patriotic Club.
This association, nourishing in their secret breasts the holy spark
of liberty, increased it soon to a flaming light, by which the whole
nation was led to honor and glory. These heroic men fearlessly
persevered in their endeavors, during five years, exposed to the
greatest dangers and amidst thousands of spies. Witnesses of the
continually aggravated oppression of their country, they became more
and more animated to risk every thing for their holy object.

While this tyrannical government was exulting in the success of its
measures, and the honor and morals of our country were fast declining,
the revolution of France occurred, and it instantly roused every mind
to a comparison of our state with that of the French, who had thrown
off the yoke of a Machiavelian dynasty. The three days of July were
days of joy, not only to every brave son of France, but to every
patriotic heart in Poland. How much were they enraptured, who hitherto
in secret had been labouring for the redemption of their country! The
happy result of those glorious days was a peal of terror to the Grand
Duke Constantine, and to the whole swarm of agents in his tyrannical
sway. It gave them a presage of their approaching retribution. Yet,
instead of adopting milder measures, and endeavouring to propitiate the
nation, their cruelties went on as before. The government had, indeed,
advanced too far in its barbarous system to draw back. The activity of
the spies was redoubled. From the first reception of the news of the
French revolution, there did not pass a day on which some persons were
not imprisoned in Warsaw or the provinces. On the night of the 7th of
September, forty students were seized in their beds and carried to
prison.

Again, the new revolutionary eruption of Belgium cheered and encouraged
the heart of every patriotic Pole. The hour for throwing off the
yoke of tyranny was fast approaching. The leaders of the revolution
succeeded in communicating their sentiments to continually increasing
numbers. Many officers of the 4th regiment of the line and of the
sappers were initiated. Yet at this very time, when the revolution was
every moment expected to break out, the Russian despot, in concert
with Prussia and Austria, commenced his preparations for a war against
France and Belgium. The Polish army was destined to serve as the
vanguard of this expedition, and Modlin and Warsaw were stored with
large quantities of arms and ammunition from Russia. All the regiments
were completed, and the order for marching was momentarily expected.

These circumstances attracted the notice of our patriots, and they
decided to accelerate the revolution, in order to anticipate the march
of the army. The eruption was hastened by the following event. The
citizens of Warsaw were obliged to furnish quarters for the officers of
the army. To lighten this burden, and to avoid various inconveniences,
as well as to accommodate the officers,--by an understanding with the
inhabitants, it was determined, that instead of furnishing quarters, a
quartering tax should be paid. It was intended in this regulation to
proportion the tax to the size of the houses, and consequently to the
profit which the proprietors would derive from letting them. The tax
would in this way be equalized, because, wherever levied, it would be
attended by a proportionate compensation, and it was satisfactory to
the inhabitants. This regulation, however, was executed in an entirely
different manner. In many cases the heavier taxes were paid by the
poorer inhabitants, and indeed they had sometimes to provide quarters
in addition to the payment of the tax. All the persons employed by the
police as spies, and who had by vile means acquired immense fortunes
and kept the finest houses in Warsaw, were exempt both from the tax
and the providing of quarters. The money collected for the tax was
purloined by the commissioners for quartering, who thus amassed
millions of gilders.[7]

A short time before the revolution, the gross impositions of this
commission were discovered. The inhabitants of Warsaw began to murmur
against it, and addressed the government for the removal of the persons
employed, and the substitution of others in their places, who should
be deserving of the confidence of the citizens. Among others, the
deposition of the president of the city, Woyda, was demanded; and when
the government refused to comply with the request, he was publicly
insulted and flogged in the streets. The discontent of the citizens, in
particular of the poorer classes, continued to increase, and of this
discontent the patriots made use in endeavouring to propagate their
views of the necessity of a revolution. Public opinion was from day
to day expressed more boldly. Papers were pasted up in the streets,
with inscriptions such as these:--'The dwelling of the Grand Duke
will be let from next new year's day.'--'Away with the tyrants! Away
with the barbarians to Asia!' A great concourse of citizens assembled
one evening before the city hall, and demanded the punishment of the
quartering commissioner, Czarnecki, who, in his desperation, committed
suicide.

The holy moment was now fast approaching, and Warsaw was in anxious
expectation. Fear and terror was painted in the faces of the spies,
while, on the other hand, all true patriots were in raptures of joy,
and waited impatiently for the moment to strike the blow. For several
nights the whole garrison of the city had been under arms, by the
orders of the Grand Duke, who, tortured with the consciousness of so
many crimes, had no rest, and surrounded himself with large bodies
of guards. A hundred gens d'armes were on horseback for many nights,
constantly bringing in their victims. Strong patroles of Russian
soldiers traversed the streets. All was in vain. His mercenaries could
not protect the tyrant. The word was given, the oath was sworn, to
fight for our sacred rights and the freedom of our country.

An event which served to irritate all minds, and hasten the revolution,
was the arrest and imprisonment of eighty students. These brave young
men were assembled in a private house, in order to pray to God in
secret for the souls of their murdered ancestors, on the anniversary
of the storming of Praga, by the bloody Suwarrow, in 1796, when none
were spared, and Praga swam with blood, and was strewed with the
corpses of 30,000 of its inhabitants. Neither old men, women, children,
nor pregnant mothers, were spared by the barbarous Russian soldiers.
In memory of this event, the patriots had every year met for secret
prayer, since public devotions on the occasion had been forbidden
by the Grand Duke. The abovementioned students, with some priests,
were in the act of worship, praying to the Almighty, and honoring the
memory of their forefathers, when the doors were broken open with
great violence, and a number of gens d'armes, under their captain,
Jurgaszko, with a company of Russian soldiers behind them, entered
the apartment. Our brave youths continued their prayers upon their
knees about the altar, and in that position suffered themselves to be
bound, and dragged away to prison. But this was the last act of cruelty
the Russian government was permitted to perpetrate, for it exhausted
the patience of the nation. The measure was full, and the hour of
retribution was at hand. The news of this outrage was spread through
Warsaw with the quickness of lightning, and it thrilled every heart.
This was the occasion for fixing upon the 29th of November, as the day
for commencing the revolution, on which day the 4th Polish regiment,
many of the officers of which were among the initiated, were to mount
guard in Warsaw.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: 'Say, Sire, that the kingdom of Poland exists, and that
declaration will be, in the eyes of the world, the equivalent of the
reality.' To this he answered;--'In my situation, I have many interests
to conciliate, many duties to fulfil. If I had reigned during the
first, the second, or the third partition of Poland, I would have armed
my people to defend her. I love your nation; I authorize the efforts
which you wish to make. It is alone in the unanimity of your population
that you will find the hope of success. I ought to add that I have
guarantied to the Emperor of Austria the integrity of his dominions.']

[Footnote 2: Zajaczek commenced his military career in the time of
Kosciusko, continued it among the Polish legions, and accompanied
Napoleon to Egypt, where he served with distinction. He was present in
all the later campaigns of Napoleon, till 1809, when he returned, on
account of his advanced age and the loss of one of his legs.]

[Footnote 3: This nobleman (Rukiewicz) had two beautiful sisters,
Cornelia and Theresa, whose heroic behavior deserves to be recorded.
He was secretary of the Patriotic Club in Lithuania, and kept the
records and papers of the society in the village where he lived, near
Bialystok; and in order to do this business without disturbance, he
had prepared a little summer-house in the garden near his mansion.
He happened to be from home when arrested, and immediately after his
arrest, the police sent a Russian officer with gens d'armes to his
village, in order to take possession of his papers. His sisters, who
were ignorant of the event, were quietly at home when they beheld the
officer with his suite riding into the court-yard. A presaging fear
of the truth seized them, but gave place immediately to an heroic
resolution. The younger remained in the room in order to receive and
detain these agents of tyranny, whilst the elder, Cornelia, carried
in haste some combustibles to the summer-house, which was soon on
fire, and more than two hundred persons, whose names were contained in
the register, were thus saved by the presence of mind of that heroic
lady. She returned to the parlor with the noblest and most delighted
mien, and, on the officer's enquiring as to the cause of the fire,
she answered with a smile, 'Gentlemen, I only wanted to save you the
trouble of some farther brutalities. I have burnt the papers and
documents of my brother. You may be sure not to find anything left;
and now I am your prisoner. Drag me along with you, to increase the
number of your victims.' Both the ladies were carried to prison, and
treated in the most unworthy manner during three years. When these
noble sisters were dismissed from prison, they found themselves bereft
of every consolation. They had no parents left. Their only brother,
who had been both parent and brother to them, was now gone. They
could not endure the thought of leaving him to pine away so far from
them in chains, and they resolved to partake and thus to relieve his
sufferings. Regardless of the remonstrances of their friends, they left
everything, and, travelling in the humblest manner, mostly on foot
or upon the wagons of the peasantry, they undertook the journey to
Siberia. It is not known whether Providence granted them to reach their
beloved brother or not.]

[Footnote 4: To this court, which was called the Supreme Court of the
Diet, and which was established in order to try these prisoners of
state, was appointed general Count Vincenti Krasinski, a man of great
merit, a brave soldier as well as a good citizen, and on this account
very much beloved by the nation. The soldiers, indeed, regarded him
as a father. Yet this man could so far forget himself as to take up
the bloody pen to sign the death of his fellow citizens--the only one
of his nation. It is with painful feelings that I name him in this
narrative as the enemy of his country, after having been faithful to it
for fifty years, and after having made for it the greatest sacrifices.
Vincenti Krasinski, whom his country has erased, as a lost son, from
the register of her children, is a strong example of the great power of
Russian seduction.]

[Footnote 5: As already remarked, it would be impossible to describe
the various kinds of cruelty exercised by the Russian government. Yet,
in order to make the reader acquainted with some of them, I shall
here state a few facts.--In our country, the distilling and brewing
of spirituous liquors, and the planting of tobacco, as well as the
sale of these articles, was a privilege of the landed proprietors.
Warsaw, as the capital and the most populous city, was the best
market for these productions, and all the noblemen endeavoured to
bring their produce to Warsaw for sale. In this manner they supplied
themselves with money and enhanced the value of their grain, while
their liquors, as well as tobacco, could be sold at very low prices,
to the pecuniary benefit of all the laboring classes and the soldiery.
These advantages, however, soon became an object of attention to the
government agents. One of their number, the Jew, Nowachowiez, who, by
the greatest impositions, had acquired an immense fortune, devised a
plan for monopolizing the production and sale of every kind of liquor
and of tobacco. He obtained the exclusive right of selling them, and
all the noblemen were forbidden to dispose of these articles without
his permission, for which a duty was to be paid. For this monopoly
he paid to the government 2,000,000 of Polish gilders ($333,333 1/3)
for which he more than doubly indemnified himself by the enormous
taxes levied upon the consumers of these articles. This innovation,
so oppressive to the poorer classes, and invented merely to enrich
this Jew and his partners, irritated all the land proprietors, and
still more the laboring classes, who were suffering by it. For two
years in succession petitions were made for the reformation of these
abuses, but the government only insisted upon the prohibition with
the greater severity. Nowachowiez, indeed, employed a guard, who wore
uniforms. All the environs of Warsaw were filled with these guards,
and the greatest excesses were committed by them. A poor day-laborer,
after having purchased at some distance from the city, some brandy and
tobacco, carried these articles at evening to Warsaw. On his way he was
stopped by these men. They took all from him, and demanded a heavier
fine than the articles were worth. As the poor man was unable to pay
the fine, they abused him, and were about to carry him to prison.
He succeeded, however, in making his escape, and, as it was in the
vicinity of the residence of a nobleman by the name of Biernacki, he
sought shelter on his estate. The guards in pursuit entered the mansion
of this nobleman. Biernacki heard the tumult of the guard seizing and
roughly handling the poor man, and, ascertaining the cause of the
disturbance, he censured them for their inhumanity about such a trifle.
In order, however, to save the man from farther insults, he retained
him, with the intention of sending him the next day with a note to
Nowachowiez for his exculpation. The very moment that Biernacki was
occupied in writing the letter, an officer of the gens d'armes, with
four privates, stepped in. Biernacki inquired the cause of this visit,
and was told in answer, that he was arrested for having protected a
defrauder. Thus, surrounded by four soldiers, this man was publicly
carried through Warsaw to the prison of the Carmelites. Not satisfied
with this, Nowachowiez succeeded in obtaining from the Grand Duke, who
hated Biernacki as a patriotic Pole, a squadron of Russian Hulans,
consisting of 200 horse, to quarter for a whole week on his estate,
_in execution_, as it is termed. The Russian soldiers took possession
of all the buildings on the estate. In the apartments which they used
for barracks, they broke all the furniture, lustres, pianos, &c, and
carried in their straw for sleeping. In the court-yard they made a
fire, for which they used the pieces of furniture for fuel. They took
the wheat from the barns to feed their horses, and butchered the
cattle. In short, the most shameful depredations and excesses were
committed by officers and soldiers, regardless of the situation of
the lady of this nobleman, who was confined in childbed, and who for
a whole year was in danger of her life from the consequences of her
terror. This barbarous order of the Grand Duke ruined the fortune of
that unhappy man, and the amount of his property destroyed may be
estimated at least at from 70,000 to 80,000 gilders. Biernacki was
imprisoned for a whole year, after which he was dismissed to weep over
the sufferings of his wife, and his ruined fortune. The poor offender
was punished with 800 blows of the knout, of which he died in a few
days.

The second story perhaps surpasses the former in cruelty, and would
suit the times of Nero. General Rozniecki, and the vice president
of the City of Warsaw, Lubowiecki, had their agents, who travelled
through the country in order to superintend the services of the secret
police. Among them was a Jew, named Birnbaum, whose crimes surpass
conception. He travelled through the whole country, and every where
found pretexts for accusations against the noblemen, who had to pay
him fines to secure themselves from prison. He took up vast sums,
that were never accounted for to his superiors. They were divided
with Rozniecki, Lubowiecki, Macrot, and Schlee, with some Russian
generals, and the servants of the Grand Duke, Kochanowski and Trize,
all of whom, like this Jew, made immense fortunes, some of them to
the amount of hundreds of thousands. When, in order to encourage the
manufactures of the country, the importation of all broadcloths, cotton
and linen goods were forbidden, Birnbaum, in secret understanding with
his superiors, found out the way of drawing to himself the greatest
advantages from this decree. He persuaded two other Jews, by the
promise of a part of the gain, and of his protection, to smuggle these
articles and to sell them among the gentry of the country. A place
on the frontiers was selected for a depot of these contraband wares,
which the country noblemen purchased in ignorance of their unlawful
importation, and induced by their low prices. On a sudden, Birnbaum
visited these districts, examined the warehouses of the noblemen, found
the contraband goods, and forced them to the alternative of either
paying him a large sum of money or going to prison. Many, for the sake
of peace, paid the fines imposed; others, who refused, were imprisoned.
By such means, this Jew, as was found afterwards by the records and
documents of the police, brought to prison more than a hundred persons,
who were treated in the most barbarous manner. They had no food given
them but herrings without water, and many of these unfortunate persons
died in consequence. At last Birnbaum fell out with his accomplices, on
occasion of the division of profits. He had them, likewise, thrown into
prison to perish there. Their families, however, accused him at their
Kahal,[6] or Council of the Jews, and by means of money contrived to
have him arrested. He was poisoned in his prison, as many persons of
consequence were found to be implicated in his impositions.]

[Footnote 6: Kahal is a Jewish court of administration, composed of the
elders, who are responsible to the government for their nation, and are
of great authority.]

[Footnote 7: One man of the name of Czarnecki, a commissioner of the
quartering bureau, in a short time made by these means two millions of
gilders; and this robber of the poor carried his luxury so far as to
make use of bathing tubs lined with silver.]




CHAPTER II.

 Principles of the Revolution.--THE FIRST NIGHT.--Attack on the
 Barracks of the Russian Cavalry.--Their Dispersion.--Attempt to secure
 the person of the Grand Duke.--Capture of Russian general officers
 and spies.--Actions with detached bodies of Russian cavalry.--Two
 companies of Polish light-infantry join the patriots.--Death
 of Potocki and Trembicki.--The Russian infantry attacked and
 dispersed.--Armament and assembling of the people.--Detachments sent
 to Praga.


It is undeniable that the history of our nation abounds in heroic
acts and glorious passages. Need we instance the times of Boleslaw,
Casimir, Jagelo, Augustus of Warna, and Sobieski; or the deeds of
our renowned generals Czarnecki, Chodkiewicz, Tarnowski, Sapieha,
Kosciusko, and Poniatowski? Yet, in our whole history, nothing
transcends this last revolution; and indeed few more memorable events
have ever occurred. Its plan was based on the purest motives, and this
constitutes its peculiar character. Those true sons of Poland, Wysocki
and Schlegel, had no other design than to regenerate public morals and
the national character, which had already begun to deteriorate under
Russian influence; though, perhaps, there may have mingled with these
another impulse--that of vengeance for the ignominy to which we were
subjected. These feelings were shared by the whole nation--certainly a
rare instance in history. Inspired by the example of the brave, even
the wavering joined in upholding the good cause to support which the
sword was drawn. It was this unanimity which emboldened us, small as
our numbers were, to meet that colossal power dreaded by all Europe.
We were not animated to this unequal struggle by any vain desire of
conquest, but by a resolution to shake off a yoke so disgraceful,
and by the wish to preserve our civilization, and to extend it even
to Russia. In drawing the sword, every Pole had in view not only
the freedom of his own country, but that of his Sarmatian brethren
also. The Poles believed that Russia still remembered those martyrs
of liberty, Pestel, Bestuzew, Morawiew, Kachowski, and Releiew, who
suffered an ignominious death, and more than five hundred others who
were sent in chains to Siberia. We believed they would bear in mind,
that, in 1824, they themselves summoned us to fight, side by side, with
them against despotism. Their words were still in our memory--'Poles,
help us in our holy cause! Unite your hearts with ours! Are we not
brethren?' Unworthy nation--soothed by the momentary blandishments of
the autocrat, who scattered his decorations with a lavish hand, they
forgot their own past sufferings and the future that awaits them. They
suffered themselves to be led against those who were in arms for the
liberty of both nations. At the very time when the funeral rites of
those who had died in battle, Russians as well as Poles, were being
celebrated in Warsaw and all the provinces, they burned our villages,
and murdered our fathers and brothers. Russians! You have covered
yourselves with eternal shame, in the eyes of the whole world. Even the
nations you consider your friends and allies contemn you!


THE FIRST NIGHT.

The patriots assembled early in the morning of the 29th of November, to
renew their oaths and ask the blessing of the Almighty on their great
undertaking. The moment approached. Seven in the evening was the hour
appointed for the commencement of the revolution. The signal agreed
upon was, that a wooden house should be set on fire in Szulec street,
near the Vistula. The patriots were scattered over the city, ready to
stir up the people on the appearance of the signal. Most of them were
young men and students. Some hundred and twenty students, who were to
make the beginning, were assembled in the southern part of Warsaw. All
was ready. At the stroke of seven, as soon as the flame of the house
was seen reflected on the sky, many brave students, and some officers,
rode through the streets of that part of the city called The Old Town,
shouting, 'Poles! brethren! the hour of vengeance has struck! The time
to revenge the tortures and cruelties of fifteen years is come! Down
with the tyrants! To arms, brethren; to arms! Our country forever!'

The excitement spread through this part of the city with incredible
rapidity. The citizens flocked together from all quarters, shouting
'Down with the tyrants! Poland forever!' At the same time a hundred and
twenty students left their barrack (which is called the Hotel of the
Cadets, and is situated in the royal gardens of Lazienki) under their
gallant leaders, Wysocki and Schlegel, and marched to the quarters of
the Russian cavalry, cuirasseurs, hulans and hussars. It was resolved
to take immediate possession of all the chief gates. The issuing out
of the Russian troops was thereby rendered very difficult and bloody,
as the barracks were surrounded by a wide and deep moat, over which
there were few bridges. On their arrival, the cadets found the soldiers
in the utmost confusion. Some were saddling their horses, some were
leading them out, and others were occupied in securing the magazines,
&c. In short, panic and disorder pervaded officers and men; each sought
his own safety only. Our young heroes took advantage of this confusion,
and after firing a few rounds, rushed with the _hurrah_ through the
gates. This charge sufficed: a hundred and twenty of these young
Poles, after having killed forty or fifty men with ball and bayonet,
dispersed some eighteen hundred Russian cavalry. Cuirasseurs, hulans
and hussars mingled together, joined in the cry of terror, and began to
seek concealment in garrets, stables, cellars, &c. A great number were
drowned in attempting to cross the canal in order to escape into the
adjoining gardens. As the barracks were closely connected with wooden
buildings filled with hay, straw, and other combustible articles, not a
man would have escaped had they been fired. The young Poles refrained
from this, in mercy. The Russians might all have been made prisoners;
for so great was their panic that they were not ashamed to beg for
quarter on their knees. But these advantages were, for the time,
neglected. The cadets abandoned the attack, and hastened into the city,
where their presence was more necessary.

While their comrades were attacking the barracks, some ten or twelve
students traversed the gardens towards the palace of the Grand Duke
(called the Belvidere) in order to secure his person.[8] Some of
them guarded the passages on the side of the gardens, while others
penetrated to the tyrant's apartment. But he had escaped through a
secret door.

On the failure of the party of cadets sent to secure the person of the
Grand Duke, they left his apartments without in the least disturbing
the repose of his lady. As they reached the foot of the stairs, they
met Lubowicki, the vice-president of the city, coming to the Grand Duke
for instructions. As soon as he saw them, he began to cry for aid,
but the next moment fell on his knees and begged for his life. They
took him with them, intending to extract from him all the information
he was able to give. In the court-yard they met the Russian general,
Gendre,[9] aid-de-camp of the Grand Duke, with some ten or twelve armed
men. They resolutely attacked him. Gendre fell under their bayonets,
and his followers fled. The party meeting with no farther obstacles,
returned to their friends, whom they found at the bridge of Sobieski.

The company of cadets, after having finished their attack upon the
barracks of the Russian cavalry, marched along the high road which
traverses the Park, over the bridge of Sobieski, towards the main
avenue between the terraces of the hospital Ujasdow on one side, and
those of the Botanical Garden on the other. After having arrived at
this bridge, they heard the noise of horses in front, as of cavalry
advancing. It was in fact a company of Russian cuirasseurs, who were
on guard in this part of the park, and who were now hastening to
save the barracks. Immediately a plan was formed to receive them. The
cadets, forming in a line, concealed themselves in the Park near the
street. The cuirasseurs came up; they were permitted to advance, and
were then received with a brisk fire. The heavy cavalry, who could not
turn in this narrow road, suffered severely. Sixty bodies were found
on the spot. The rest fled in the greatest disorder. From this bridge,
that handful of brave young men passed the street of Wieyska, and,
after arriving at the barracks of Radziwil, they met a squadron of
Russian hussars returning from a patrol. At the same time they heard
the Russian cavalry in pursuit, who had gained time to mount at their
barracks. This was a critical moment, but it was met with resolution.
One half threw themselves into the ditch in order to receive the
hussars; and the others formed a platoon, and with hurrahs and the
shout of 'Poland forever!' discharged their pieces and attacked the
cuirasseurs in their rear, at the point of the bayonet. The Russians
were thrown into disorder, and fled with the greatest precipitaion,
leaving many dead behind them.

The cadets, not having lost a single man in all these skirmishes,
arrived at the part of the city called the Nowy-Swiat, (or the New
World,) and the Trzy Zlote Krzyze, (the Three Golden Crosses.) Here
they found two companies of Polish light infantry, and with them the
two Polish generals, Stanislaus Potocki and Trembicki, who were giving
commands for restoring order by force, and for arresting the assembled
inhabitants. The company of cadets arrived, and hailed the light
infantry with the following words:--'Brothers! Are you here to shed
the blood of your brethren? Have you forgotten the Russian tyranny?
Come to our embrace, and hand to hand let us attack the tyrants. Poland
forever!' This address was enough. They disobeyed the commands of their
unworthy generals, and joined the cadets and the populace. When the
two generals had the madness to reproach the soldiers, some of the
cadets went to them and told them in a few words the state of affairs,
and on their knees and with tears intreated them not to forsake the
cause of their country. To Stanislaus Potocki the command of the army
was offered. At the same time they were both warned of the fatal
consequences of their refusal. It was of no avail. These infatuated
men could not see the justice of the cause, and began to insult the
students. Upon this the cadets left them, and they fell victims to
the indignation of the populace.[10] In this place some gens d'armes
who undertook to disperse the citizens, were killed. After the union
with the two companies of light infantry, it was decided they should
both march to the street of Szulec, on the left bank of the Vistula,
endeavor there to assemble the citizens, and establish a degree of
order, and after that to take possession of the bridge, for the purpose
of maintaining the necessary communications between Praga and Warsaw
during the night, and to defend it to the last against any attack of
the enemy.

The cadets marched directly into the city through the Nowy-Swiat,
singing patriotic songs and shouting 'Poland forever!' Every where the
citizens answered their shouts with the greatest enthusiasm, and joined
the ranks of those brave youths. Both old and young men, and even
women, left their dwellings in order to increase the numbers of the
liberators of their country. In their passage through that street this
company made prisoners of many Russian generals, officers, &c, who were
on their flight. After advancing as far as the palace of the Viceroy
they met the Polish general Hauke, and colonel Mieciszewski. These
worthless men, accompanied by some gens d'armes, were on their way to
the Grand Duke in the Belvidere. Some cadets stepped in their way,
and exhorted them to dismount and surrender themselves. Instead of
answering, general Hauke drew a pistol and wounded one of them, which
act cost him and his companion their lives.[11]

In the same manner general Siemiontkowski, with some gens d'armes and
soldiers, endeavored to disperse and arrest the citizens assembled in
the Saxon-platz. He likewise was a Russian instrument, and was hated by
the nation.

Whilst this company of cadets was engaged in the south part of the
city, the 4th regiment, a battalion of which had mounted guard, were
active in another quarter. This regiment, as soon as the signals were
given, revolted. The battalion on guard beat the alarm-drum at every
guard-house, and the two other battalions formed for the attack of the
Russian infantry in their barracks called the barracks of Sapieha. The
shouts of the soldiers and citizens advancing to the attack mingled
with the noise of the drums on every side. A great number of Russian
general officers and spies were taken in their flight, in the street of
the Little Theatre, and the street of Napoleon.

As soon as the numbers assembled would admit of it, divisions were
detached to liberate the prisoners, especially those in the Franciscan
and Carmelite prisons. These prisons, always guarded by Russian troops,
were stormed. The Russian soldiers were driven in, and a massacre
commenced in the corridors, where a great number of them fell by
the bayonet, together with many police officers and turnkeys. The
doors were broken down--and an indescribable scene took place, when
the victims, already sentenced, perhaps, to death, or reserved for
tortures, were set at liberty. With tears in their eyes, they fell into
the arms of their deliverers. Here, a father found a son--there, a
son a father. Many of the emaciated captives could only creep to meet
the embraces of their brethren. But what was most shocking, was the
appearance of four ladies who had been incarcerated for having resisted
the brutal advances of certain Russian generals. They were reduced to
mere skeletons. There was not one of the spectators who did not shudder
and weep at the sight, and swear to avenge them. A hundred and seventy
students, and from forty to fifty older persons, Polish soldiers and
citizens, all innocent victims of the system of espionage, were rescued
from these two prisons.

The above mentioned battalions of the 4th and the battalion of sappers
marched to attack the Russian infantry in the barracks of Alexander and
Stanislaus. On their arrival there, they found some companies under
arms, and summoned them to surrender. Instead of complying, they began
to fire, and our soldiers fell instantly upon them, with the 'hurrah.'
They were dispersed in a moment, and many officers and soldiers were
made prisoners. So panic struck were many of the officers of the
Russian guard that they did not hesitate to creep head-foremost into
the cellars, whence they were dragged out by the legs. The Russians
fled from the barracks and the city in the utmost disorder, and took
refuge beyond the Powonzki barrier.

After all these successes, the northern, eastern, and western parts of
the city were occupied, at about noon, by divisions of patriot soldiers
and citizens.

A small part of the south side of the city only was now in possession
of the enemy's cavalry, who had at last left their barracks. A few
houses opposite the Lottery Buildings were set on fire, as a signal for
assembling. Strong patrols were sent to the western part of the city,
and by them all the public treasures and the bank were secured. One of
these parties, composed of sappers, met the Russian colonel, Sass,[12]
in his flight. As he did not stop at their challenge, he was shot.

When the city had been nearly freed of the Russians, great multitudes
hastened to the arsenal for arms and ammunition. Here they found the
Polish general Blummer, who was rash enough to resist. He ordered his
soldiers to fire on the people, but they refused to obey, and joined
their brethren. This general was slain,--a just punishment for his
murderous intentions. All the apartments were immediately opened, and
more than 80,000 muskets, pistols, sabres, and carbines were obtained.
They were distributed with admirable good order.

The people, being now armed, were arrayed in divisions, under different
commanders, and sent to various parts of the city. Parties were
appointed to patrol the streets and arrest all spies[13] and Russian
officers who might attempt to fly. They arrested upwards of three
hundred. One of these patrols went to the office of the secretary
of spies, Macrot, to seize his person and papers. This man had hid
himself in the cellar, with some of his satellites, and fired upon the
patrol. The consequence was that Macrot and his people were massacred.

Toward two in the morning, the quiet of the city was restored. Most
of the patriots assembled in the Ulica Dluga, (or Long Street,) to
consult on the measures to be adopted on the following day, and the
manner in which the nation should be addressed by the patriotic
party. They called to memory the cruelties of the Russian government,
and urged the necessity of a revolution to prevent the decay of all
moral and national feeling. They implored the people to aid in this
holy cause, yet at the same time besought them never to violate the
dictates of humanity. 'Dear brethren,' they said, 'let no one have a
right to accuse us of cruelty. May the sanctity of our cause never be
polluted by barbarious passions. Having a single end in view, national
freedom, and justice, may we prove lions in battle, mild and indulgent
to defenceless foes, and repentant apostates. Brethren, let unity,
love and friendship be ours! Let us forget private rancor and selfish
interest; Children of one mother, our dear Poland--let us save her from
ruin!'

These addresses were received by the people with the most fervent
enthusiasm, and with cries of 'Poland forever!' They swore to fight for
her while a drop flowed in their hearts, and never to forsake the field
of valor or the path of virtue. The assembled multitude then knelt
down before the Almighty, to thank him for a deliverance accomplished
with so little bloodshed, and to implore a continuation of his mercies.
It was a scene which no description can equal. In the depth of the
night the immense crowds of people kneeling, their figures illuminated
by the glare of the fires lighted in the streets, praying to God their
deliverer, presented a sight to have touched even tyrants, could they
have witnessed it.

When prayers were over, plans were adopted for the defence of the
city. Some of the barriers were barricaded, and fortified with cannon.
Officers were sent to Praga with detachments to reinforce the garrison
at the bridge. Wagons were also sent to Praga for ammunition.

As the detachments approached the bridge, they perceived that their
way was obstructed by a body of Russian cavalry. This cavalry were not
aware of the presence of the two companies of light infantry who had
been sent thither by the patriots. As the cavalry advanced upon the
bridge the light infantry gave them a volley and charged. At the same
time the detachments fell on from the Border Street, and compelled them
to retire with severe loss. Some companies formed by the populace,
had already taken possession of Praga, and all was quiet. Many wagon
loads of cartridges, balls, and barrels of powder, were taken from the
magazine to Warsaw before morning.

These are the details of the first night of our revolution. The
order which prevailed in all these tumults and during the fight, was
truly admirable. The foreigners then in Warsaw declared that they
could not enough praise the behavior of the troops and populace in
the very height of a revolution. The utmost forbearance was evinced
toward persons and property. No individual was slain or abused without
provocation, nor was any house or store entered without the consent of
the owner. From the open windows of many houses even ladies witnessed
our deeds, and waved their handkerchiefs, without fear of danger or
insult. They were quiet and delighted spectators of the crowds, who,
after expelling the Russians, moved through the streets in perfect
order, shouting songs of joy. These were moments in which the heart of
every good patriot rejoiced, and traitors alone hid their heads.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 8: The enemies of our country have endeavored to persuade
the world that this party was sent to take the Grand Duke's life. It
is an infamous calumny. The order to seize the Grand Duke, was given
with the noblest intention;--to secure him from the dangers attendant
on a revolution, and to prevent farther bloodshed by his captivity.
The Poles magnanimously intended to requite his long continued cruelty
with the kindest treatment. He would have been placed in safety,
and supplied with all the comforts of life in the palace of Bruhl,
which was expressly named for the place of his abode. The persons
sent to seize him were selected for their habitual moderation and
self-restraint. By his flight, Constantine accused himself. The just
man fears nothing; the guilty conscience anticipates danger. The Grand
Duke injured himself as well as our cause by his flight. His melancholy
end is well known.]

[Footnote 9: Gendre was one of the Russian generals, who was among
the chief spies. He was dismissed by the deceased emperor, Alexander,
on account of impositions and even accusations of theft, nor was
he allowed to show himself in Petersburgh during the life-time of
Alexander. He arrived, in 1829, in Warsaw, when it was the pleasure
of Constantine to associate and surround himself with the outcasts of
society; and he made him his master of horse, and afterwards general
and aid-de-camp. The swindling of this general and his wife, in Warsaw,
surpassed all imagination. They cheated and robbed the noblemen, the
merchants, the Jews, and their own master, the Grand Duke. According to
the accounts found during the revolution, their debts, in gaming and
otherwise, amounted to more than a million of Polish gilders.]

[Footnote 10: Every Pole lamented the melancholy fate of Stanislaus
Potocki. He was one of the most honest of men, and beloved by the
army and the whole nation. He always kept aloof from all familiar
intercourse with the Russians, and his house was a true Polish
dwelling. He had always scorned Russian protection; and, to every
patriot, the end of this man, who had become gray in the service of his
country, is a sad recollection. Yet every one must confess his death
was just, and cannot be a reproach to his countrymen, since he listened
neither to the advice nor the intreaties of his brethren, and thus
publicly avowed his adherence to the cause of despotism.--As to General
Trembizki, he had always been a creature of the Russians, and a proud
and mischievous man.]

[Footnote 11: The early part of the career of general Hauke was not
without merit, but it was tarnished by his later conduct. He was born
in Germany, and came to Poland, under the reign of Stanislaus, as a
poor mechanic. After leaving his trade he was enrolled in the army, and
advanced rapidly in the revolutionary war under Kosciusko, in which he
distinguished himself by military skill. In the wars under Napoleon
he defended the fortress of Zamosc with great valor. But, from the
beginning of the Russian sway and the arrival of the Grand Duke at
Warsaw, this man became one of his chief minions, and by fawning and
intrigue obtained the post of Minister of War. In the same year he was
raised to the nobility, and was made count, senator, and wayewode.
In the whole history of Poland the rapidity of this advancement
is unexampled. Hauke received these dignities as a reward for his
oppression of his inferiors, and for acts of injustice of every kind.
As for Mieciszewski, he had always been a villain.]

[Footnote 12: This bad man was one of the principal instruments of our
oppressors. He was one of the chiefs of the spies, and his particular
business was to observe all foreigners coming to Warsaw. He invited
them to his house to ascertain their characters, and was assisted at
his soirees in his base designs, by the female spies. Under the show
of the utmost cordiality, by presents, and by means of love affairs,
he was wont to endeavor to draw them to the Russian interest, in order
to use them as spies in their own countries. He often succeeded, and
several foreigners might be named, who came to Warsaw on the most
innocent business or to gratify their curiosity, but who, after having
frequented the parties of Sass, and handled Russian gold, returned to
their own country to betray it. Such are the means by which Russia
steals deeper and deeper into the heart of Europe.]

[Footnote 13: The chief of spies, general Rozniecki, escaped. He was
one of the most vicious characters imaginable: his crimes surpass
expression. He was the oldest general in the Polish army, in which he
had served forty years. He entered the service under king Stanislaus.
Under Napoleon he commanded a brigade, and subsequently a division
of cavalry. Of his character, while in the service of Napoleon, not
much is known. Under the government of Russia, this man, already sixty
years old, degraded himself irredeemably by becoming one of the most
atrocious and detestable tools of tyranny. A volume might be filled
with the history of his intrigues, swindlings, and other crimes. As
chief of the secret police, he had under him many agents whom he sent
throughout the land to extort money for him on unjust pretences. Wo to
the unhappy man who refused compliance with any of his demands! He was
sure to find his fate in a prison. In the army, those who bribed him
were promoted. Rozniecki was the intimate friend of the Grand Duke.
The following anecdote may serve to give the reader some idea of his
consummate art in fraud.

It was a part of Rozniecki's business to pay the spies, and they
received their salaries at his house. He divided the delators into
several classes, and rewarded them according to the quickness and
importance of their information. By his arrangement of this business
he cheated the very spies! In the room where he received their
denunciations he had a chest of drawers placed, behind which a clerk
was concealed. This clerk wrote down their reports as he heard them,
taking care to date them somewhat earlier. When the spy had ended his
story and applied for his reward, Rozniecki would declare that he
recollected having heard the whole affair the day before. He would then
leave the room and return with the forged record. Thus would he defraud
the spy of his shameful earnings. Accounts of immense sums received by
him were found in his house during the revolution. He was more than
once accused of murder by poison, and other enormous crimes, but the
proceedings against him were suppressed. On the first evening of the
revolution this man happened to be in an assembly of spies in the City
Hall. He was there to give his instructions. On hearing the tumult, his
conscience smote him, and he stole away without saying a word. Finding
a coach at hand, he offered the coachman money to permit him to drive
himself whither he pleased. He made his escape in the coachman's cloak.
His effigy was exhibited on the gallows seven days, decorated with a
dozen Russian orders.]




CHAPTER III.

 THE FIRST DAY.--Expulsion of the Russians from Warsaw.--Choice of
 Chlopicki as Commander in Chief.--Provisional Government under the
 Presidency of Prince Adam Czartoriski.--Deputation sent to the
 Grand Duke.--Propositions and answer.--Abolition of the Bureau of
 Police.--Establishment of the National Guard.--Proclamations addressed
 to the inhabitants of the provinces and the distant troops.--Provision
 for the Russian prisoners.--The Academical Legions formed.--Arrival of
 detachments from the provinces.--The Grand Duke consents to leave the
 kingdom, and addresses a proclamation to the Poles.


The first day of freedom, after so many years of oppression, was
hailed with shouts of 'Our country! Poland forever!' At about six in
the morning the drums beat for the assembly of the troops in all the
parts of the city in our possession. Crowds flocked from all sides to
the public places. It was a scene never equalled. The whole people
assembled, without distinction of rank, age, or sex. Old men who were
past the use of swords, brandished their sticks and crutches, and
recalled the times of Kosciusko. Clergymen, civil officers, foreigners,
Jews, even women and children armed with pistols, mingled in the ranks.

The multitude, thus assembled, marched to the northern and southern
parts of the city, to drive the Russians out. The fourth regiment and
a body of the inhabitants marched into the northern quarter of Warsaw,
to attack two regiments of infantry who occupied the _Champ de Mars_
and the whole district thence to the barrier of Powazko. This division
had with them two small pieces of cannon. As soon as they reached
the point of attack they fired a few rounds, raised the 'hurrah,' and
threw themselves upon the Russians, who made no resistance, but fled in
disorder beyond the barrier above mentioned, where the pursuit ceased.

In the mean while, the battalion of sappers had marched through the
suburb of Cracow and the street of Wirzbwa to the southern part of the
city. They met the enemy's cavalry, at the Place of Saxony, a short
distance from the Church of the Cross. The Russians discharged their
carbines, and a brisk fire was kept up until the cry to cease firing
and attack with the bayonet was heard on all sides. They gave way
before the charge, and fled in the greatest confusion, as the infantry
had done before them. They were pursued beyond the barriers of Mokotow.
The whole city was cleared of the Russians before nine o'clock. The
walls opposite the Russian troops were manned by soldiers and armed
citizens.

While this expulsion was being effected, some of the patriots were
employed in the city in choosing a military chief. They agreed to offer
the command to Chlopicki.[14]

Towards eleven, General Chlopicki was led by the people, with
acclamations, to the hotel of the Minister of Finance, where many
senators and other persons were assembled to take measures respecting
a provisional government, the security of public order, &c. Chlopicki
was received with acclamations by the chiefs of the nation; and after
all had declared their consent, he was proclaimed Commander in Chief.
He was addressed on this occasion by Professor Lelewell, one of the
patriots, who, after drawing the picture of our past sufferings, and
comparing it with our hopes of the future, concluded with the following
words, addressed directly to Chlopicki. 'Brother--take the sword of
your ancestors and predecessors, Czarnecki, Dombrowski, and Kosciusko.
Guide the nation that has placed its trust in you, in the way of
honor. Save this unhappy country.' This ceremony concluded, Chlopicki
was shown to the assembled people from the balcony. They received him
with shouts of 'Our country and our liberator Chlopicki forever!' Many
cried, 'Chlopicki, rely on us, and lead us to Lithuania!' The general
thanked them for their confidence in him, promised never to abuse it,
and swore that he would defend the liberty of Poland to the last moment.

The patriots now proceeded to choose members of the provisional
government. Prince Adam Czartoriski,[15] Radzivil,[16] Niemcewicz, and
Lelewell were elected, and one of the old ministers, Lubecki, was
retained to assist them. This arrangement was made public about noon,
in order to tranquilize the people.

The first step taken by the new government was to send deputies to the
Grand Duke. They were instructed to demand whether he meant to depart
peaceably, or to attack the city. Among the deputies were Lubecki and
Lelewell. They found the Grand Duke encamped, with his army, in the
fields of Mokotow.

The deputies represented to Constantine the consequences that would
result from an attack on the city, as well in regard to himself as to
the nation. They informed him that the army had already joined the
people, and proposed to him that he should depart unmolested, on a
prescribed route. They promised that he should find every possible
accommodation provided on that route, for himself and his troops. The
Grand Duke demanded some time for reflection, and finally gave the
deputies the following answer in writing.

ART. I. The Grand Duke declares that it was never his intention to
attack Warsaw. In case he should find himself under the necessity of so
doing, he will give the authorities notice of his intention forty-eight
hours before the attack.

ART. II. The Grand Duke will entreat the Emperor to grant an amnesty
for the past.

ART. III. The Grand Duke declares that he has sent no orders to the
Russian forces in Lithuania to pass the frontier of the kingdom.

ART. IV. Prisoners will be exchanged.

The deputies returned to Warsaw with this answer, at three o'clock.
It was immediately published, but did not satisfy the people. They
demanded to know the day and hour of the Grand Duke's departure. If
he should refuse to obey, they declared that they would attack him.
It was finally concluded to allow him two days for his necessary
arrangements, and then to send a second deputation to insist on his
instant departure.[17]

The provisional government immediately set about restoring order to
every department of the administration. The Bureau of Police was
abolished, and a council of citizens was substituted in its place,
under the direction of the aged and worthy Wengrzecki. This man
had been president of Warsaw in the times of the grand duchy. He
was compelled to leave this office, by certain persecutions, which
he brought upon himself by not being sufficiently in the spirit of
the Russian government. At the same time the national guard was
established, and placed under the command of Count Lubinski. The guard
began their service on the very same day. They mounted guard at the
bank and the public treasury, and their patrols maintained order in
all parts of the city. Their duties were performed with the utmost
punctuality. All the shops were opened, and the city wore as peaceful
an aspect as if there had been no army before it.

At the same time the provisional government sent proclamations into all
the provinces, to inform the nation of these events. They began with
the following beautifully figurative expression: 'Poles! The eagle
of Poland has broken his chains, and will soon have burst through the
clouds into those purer regions in which nothing shall shut from him
the light of the sun.' The military government issued proclamations
to the troops at all the distant stations, ordering them to repair
forthwith to Warsaw. The divisions of chasseurs received orders in
case of an attack from the Grand Duke, to fall on his rear and cut off
his retreat. The city itself was put in a better state of defence; the
barriers were fortified, and guarded by strong detachments; all was
prepared for an attack. The government made proper provision for the
care of the Russian prisoners, of whatever rank, as well as of the
ladies of the Russian civil and military officers who had left Warsaw.
The royal palace was assigned for the residence of the officers and
ladies; the privates were lodged in barracks. At a later period they
were permitted to go about the streets and earn money by their labor,
in addition to their usual allowance. The Russians were so touched by
this generous treatment, that they swore, with tears, never to forget
it.

These details of the first day of our revolution, for the correctness
of which I pledge myself, may serve to answer the accusations of some
journalists, who have stated that the commencement of the national
struggle was marked with the greatest atrocities, and that more
than forty field officers, many subalterns, and large parties of
privates were butchered for declining to engage in the cause. These
impeachments of the Polish nation are unjust and false. As has been
said before, the foreigners in Warsaw could not sufficiently praise
the admirable order with which our first movements were conducted. Our
enemies accuse the people of having robbed the public treasuries.--I
affirm that not a gilder was lost--neither public nor private property
was pillaged.

As the enemy was still encamped before the city on the first and second
of December, and had as yet given no decisive answer respecting the
time of his departure, the people, as well as the army, were still
under arms and upon the walls. At this time the twelve companies
of students, called the Academical Legions, were organized. It was
heart-stirring to see these noble youths assembled in arms to defend
their country. Many of them had just been rescued from prison, and
could not walk without difficulty. This did not damp their ardor; the
hope of fighting successfully for the liberty of Poland renewed their
strength. The Academical Legions requested to be sent to the posts
nighest the enemy. These two days passed in entire quietness.

In the afternoon of the second of December, general Schenbek arrived
from Plock with the first regiment of chasseurs. At the same time came
colonel Sierawski from Serock, with his regiment. Both were received
with great enthusiasm. New detachments from the provinces marched into
Warsaw every day. A truly affecting sight it was to see more than a
thousand peasants, and about fifty peasant girls from the country about
Warsaw, marching into the city with clubs, scythes, and weapons of
every description. They were escorted by the shouting populace to the
Bank, and there welcomed by the national government. At the request of
the people, another deputation was this day sent to the Grand Duke,
to urge his departure, and to inform him that an attack would be the
necessary consequence of his refusal. The Grand Duke saw the necessity
of compliance, and decided to commence his march on the following
day, by the prescribed route of Pulawa. He issued a proclamation to
the Polish nation, wherein he promised never to fight against those,
'whom,' to use his own expression, 'he had always loved.' He adduced
his marriage with a young Polish lady as a proof of his affection
for the nation. At the same time he promised to entreat the emperor
to grant an amnesty, and to take, in general, the mildest measures.
He begged the Poles to deal gently with the Russian prisoners, their
families, the ladies, and in short with all Russian subjects remaining
in Warsaw.[18]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 14: General Chlopicki, a man of rare merit, began his
career in the struggle for liberty under Kosciusko. In 1807, he was
colonel commandant of the first regiment of the legion of the Vistula,
under Napoleon. He had the command of a brigade, and afterwards of
a division, of the same legion in Spain. This general distinguished
himself at the storming of Saragossa, where the Poles performed
prodigies of valor, as well as at the battle of Saginta. Under the
Russian government of Constantine, Chlopicki left the army, not being
able to endure his commander's brutal deportment. The Grand Duke
censured the general on parade, in an unbecoming manner, saying that
his division was not in order. Chlopicki replied, 'I did not gain my
rank on the parade ground, nor did I receive my decorations there.' He
asked his discharge the next day. In later times the emperor Alexander
and the Grand Duke himself endeavored to induce him to return to the
service, but Chlopicki never consented. He preferred a retired life
to the splendor of Russian slavery. This gained him the esteem of the
whole nation.]

[Footnote 15: Prince Adam Czartoriski was born on the 14th of June,
1770. He is the oldest son of Prince Casimir Czartoriski, Palatine
of Russia, and Princess Elizabeth Fleming, daughter of Count George
Fleming, first treasurer of Lithuania and Palatine of Pomerania. The
Czartoriski family are descended from the Gedamines, who reigned over
Lithuania in the thirteenth century, a descendant of whom, Jagelon,
reigned long and gloriously in Poland. At the last partition of
Poland, Adam Czartoriski and his brother Constantine were sent to St
Petersburgh as hostages. While residing in the Russian capital, Prince
Adam was on terms of friendly intimacy with the Grand Duke Alexander.
This friendship influenced, perhaps, his political career. He was sent
as an ambassador to the court of Sardinia, and when Alexander ascended
the throne, he was recalled, and entrusted with the portfolio of
foreign affairs. He declined this charge for a long time, and at last
accepted it at the earnest entreaty of Alexander, on condition that he
should be allowed to retire as soon as the discharge of his official
duties should militate against the interests of his country. At the
same time, he was appointed Curator of the university of Wilna, and yet
another important duty devolved on him, which was the establishment of
schools in all the Russian provinces of Poland. Though the Russians
cannot see a Pole in so honorable a station without jealousy, the
conduct of Prince Adam was so noble as to win the hearts of all. He did
not surround himself with parasites; his course was plain and upright,
and he scorned the idea of receiving rewards from government. He would
not even accept a salary.

In 1808, Czartoriski resigned his ministerial office, but retained
his place over the university, hoping to do more good in it. He
increased the number of elementary schools and those of all classes of
instruction. He reformed the antiquated institutions of the university,
and gave the whole course of instruction a more simple and convenient
form, which was also better adapted to the wants of the middle classes
of the people. By these means he hoped to develope and elevate the
national character, in these classes.

The events of 1812 showed but too plainly that the misfortunes which
then befell France was owing to the same cause to which the previous
distress of Russia was attributable; viz. the non-existence of Poland.
If Poland had remained independent in her original extent, the two
gigantic powers could not have come in contact, and the equilibrium
of Europe, now entirely lost, would have been preserved. It was,
then, a true and necessary policy to bring forward the question of
the independence of Poland again. This was the object Prince Adam
Czartoriski kept in view during the war between France and Russia, and
it was in the hope of effecting it that he accompanied Alexander to
Paris in 1814. He was not anxious without reason. The Emperor Alexander
satisfied him, in part, and proposed to the Congress of Vienna to erect
the grand duchy of Poland into a Kingdom. This kingdom received a
constitution and several other national institutions. An entire freedom
of trade with the remaining Polish provinces under Russia, Austria,
and Prussia, was assured to it. All these promises were published and
confirmed by Alexander at Warsaw in 1816. Yet, in the very act of
confirmation, several privileges which the Emperor had promised to
Czartoriski were retracted; and this was owing to the influence of the
other powers, and the principles of the Holy Alliance. Russian policy
made these restrictions more and more sensibly felt, and unfortunate
Poland beheld, one after another, the institutions so solemnly
guarantied to her, vanishing away.

Indignant at these breaches of promise on the part of Russia, Prince
Czartoriski resigned the Curatorship of the university of Wilna,
in 1824, in which he had been the means of effecting much good,
particularly in the cause of patriotism and liberty; and in order to
free himself from all connection with the intriguing cabinet of Russia,
he went, with his whole family, on a journey to foreign countries.

This prince was proprietor of the beautiful town of Pulawa, which
Nature and Art have united to make one of the finest in Europe. The
reader will, perhaps, be pleased with a short description of this
place, which no traveller in the north of Europe will fail to visit.
The little town of Pulawa is situated about eighteen leagues south of
Warsaw, on the main road to Lemberg in Gallicia, on the right bank
of the Vistula. The windings of this noble stream are so happily
turned as to present a prospect of both its sides, till it reaches
the horizon. The breadth of the river near this town is nearly three
English miles. Its shores are broken into little hills covered with
wood, in the intervals of which fine villages meet the eye, and in the
distance are seen the picturesque ruins of Casimir. The town of Pulawa
itself is situated on the declivity of a high bank, which declines
toward the river in the form of an amphitheatre. This declivity is laid
out as a garden in the purest taste, terminating, toward the river,
in extensive meadows, planted with groves of oaks and poplars, and
enlivened by herds of Tyrolese cattle, cottages, shepherds' cabins, &c,
in various styles of building. This garden surrounds Pulawa, and is
itself surrounded by great parks, which extend several leagues beyond
it in every direction. These are intersected by beautiful avenues of
linden trees. Among the many works in marble, statues, obelisks, &c,
the temple of Sibylla, with its magnificent statue of alabaster, is
distinguished, as is also the statue of a nymph in one of the grottos,
a masterpiece of sculpture. The palace, consisting of a main building
with two wings, is a noble piece of architecture. Its apartments are
rich and splendid. Prince Czartoriski has the largest library in
Poland, and the greatest private library in Europe, which is open to
the public.

Czartoriski happened to be in Pulawa when the revolution broke out.
Summoned to the helm of the state by the nation, he hastened to devote
his exertions to his country. Laudable as his previous career had
been, it was excelled by his conduct during the struggle, in which he
represented the _beau ideal_ of virtue and patriotism. Through all the
stormy changes of popular opinion he continued firm and unwavering,
having but one view, one aim, the good of his country. He carried
to the chief magistrate's seat the same calmness, the same mildness
which had characterised his private life. He was never actuated by
passion. He considered all Poles as brethren. Though in the sixtieth
year of his age, he did not shrink from the fatigues of war, but
constantly accompanied Skrzynecki, to whom he was much attached, in his
marches, and was at his side in many battles. His whole character was
essentially noble.]

[Footnote 16: Prince Michael Radzivil was born in Lithuania, on his
family estate called Nieswiez. He is nephew of Prince Anthony Radzivil,
governor-general of the grand duchy of Posen, and brother-in-law of the
king of Prussia. This prince was commander of a brigade in the time of
Napoleon, and distinguished himself at the siege of Dantzic. He retired
from service under the Russian government, and lived privately in
Warsaw. He was a man of quiet character, and a sincere patriot, but not
of eminent military talents.]

[Footnote 17: The Grand Duke's army at Mokatow, consisted of the
following regiments.

                                        |Infantry.|Cavalry.|Artillery.
 1. Infantry grenadiers, two battalions |  2000   |        |
 2. Light Infantry                      |  2000   |        |
 3. Battalion for instruction           |  1000   |        |
 4. Cuirasseurs of Podolia 4 squadrons  |         |   800  |
 5. Hulan, Cesarowicz 4 '               |         |   800  |
 6. Hussars of Grodno 4 '               |         |   800  |
 7. Battery of Horse Artillery          |         |        |12 pieces.
 8. Battery of Foot Artillery           |         |        |12   "
                                        +---------+--------+----------
 Total,                                 |  5000   |  2400  |24   "
                                        +---------+--------+----------

Of Polish soldiers, he had six companies of grenadiers of the foot
guard, and one regiment of chasseurs of the guard. These regiments,
however, returned to Warsaw and joined the nation on the second of
December. The true cause of the Grand Duke's demand for time was, that
he hoped to exert a secret influence on those of the Polish troops who
had not yet joined the people. This fact was confirmed by two captured
spies, one of whom he had despatched to the light-horse in Lowicz,
and the other to the division of hussars of Siedlec. The letters they
carried to the commanders of these forces urged them, with promises of
great rewards, to join the Grand Duke.]

[Footnote 18: These proclamations, which were immediately published
in the Warsaw papers, contain clear proof that the Grand Duke had no
injuries on the part of the Polish nation to complain of, and that he
himself felt that the Poles were constrained to revolt.]




CHAPTER IV.

 The Patriotic Club commences its sessions.--Character of that
 association.--The Grand Duke departs for the frontier.--Particulars
 of his march.--The Polish regiments which had remained with
 him return to Moscow.--Their reception.--Krazynski and
 Kornatowski.--Deputation to St Petersburgh.--Demands to be laid before
 the Emperor.--Sierawski made Governor of Warsaw, and Wasowiez chief
 of the staff.--Order respecting the army.--Arrival of volunteers from
 the interior.--Opening of the theatre.--Religious solemnities at
 Praga.--Chlopicki nominated and proclaimed Dictator.


On the third of December the Patriotic Club began its session, under
the guidance of very worthy persons. The object of this society was,
to watch over all the departments of the administration, to see that
the measures adopted were congenial with the wishes of the people, and
in the spirit of the revolution; and to promote fraternity and union
throughout the nation. They desired to repress all manifestations of
selfishness or ambition, to discover and bring before the people the
persons best qualified for public offices, and, in short, to promote
the best interests of the nation with unwearied zeal. If this club was,
at times, led by the fervor of patriotic feeling to adopt measures
considered rigorous by many, their acts were never inconsistent with
the love of country, or their own views of the national honor. At this
time, a committee was also appointed for the trial of the spies.

On the morning of the third of December, the Grand Duke commenced his
march towards Pulawa, according to agreement,[19] and the Polish
regiments which had remained with Constantine up to this time, now
returned to Warsaw. These troops were at first regarded by the people
with feelings of indignation. Such feelings were, however, soon
dissipated by the explanations which were given. They had been misled
by their generals, Krasynski and Kornatowski. As to general Zimyrski,
who commanded the grenadiers, he was entirely blameless. He had
intended to join the patriots at first, but was detained as a prisoner
by the Russians. The other two generals persuaded their men that the
revolutionary movements were only disturbances of the mob, excited by
the students, and would quickly come to an end. They ought not, they
told them, to forsake their legitimate government and the Grand Duke.
It was impossible afterwards for these regiments to learn the truth,
as they were closely surrounded by the Russians, and cut off from all
communication with others.

Early on the third of December, when the Grand Duke had resolved to
depart, he visited these troops in person, and declared before them
that he left Warsaw only to avoid useless bloodshed, and that order
would soon be restored. He requested them to go with him, as they were
regiments of guards, in whom the emperor had peculiar confidence.
'Soldiers,' he said, 'will you go with us; or stay and unite with those
who have proved faithless to their sovereign?' With one voice the whole
corps exclaimed, 'We will remain--we will join our brethren and fight
for the liberty of our country. We are sorry that we could not do so
from the beginning, but we were deceived.'

The people who had assembled to gaze at these unfortunate men,
with unfavorable and unjust feelings toward them, were disarmed of
their resentment at the very sight of them, and rushed into their
embraces. They were surrounded by the multitude, and taken, with
joyful acclamations, to the Place of the Bank. But though the people
forgave the soldiers, their indignation remained unabated against
their generals, and the greatest efforts of the leading patriots were
required to save Krasynski and Kornatowski from their rage. It was
dreadful to behold these generals riding with downcast looks, not
daring to look on those whom they had intended to betray. Death would
certainly have been preferable to thus meeting the curses of a justly
incensed people. Mothers held up their children, and, pointing at the
two generals, exclaimed, 'See the traitors!' Arriving at the Bank,
the people demanded that Krasynski and Kornatowski should give their
reasons for having acted as they had done; and as the wretched men
could say nothing in their own defence, a general cry arose of 'Death
to the traitors!' Nothing but the love of the people for Chlopicki and
Schembeck, who interceded, could have hindered them from carrying their
wishes into immediate execution. Several excited individuals made their
way toward the culprits with pistols in their hands, and, after aiming
at them, fired their weapons into the air, crying, 'You are unworthy
of a shot from a Polish hand. Live--to be everlastingly tortured by
your consciences!' The unfortunate men entreated that they might be
permitted to serve in the ranks, as privates. They were immediately
deprived of their commissions, and from that time they lived in
retirement during the war.[20]

The people were this day informed that prince Adam Czartoriski had been
nominated president of the national government; that the eighteenth
of December was appointed for the opening of the Diet; that till that
day the rights of the Emperor Nicholas would be acknowledged; and that
Lubecki, Osvowski, and Jezierski would be sent to St Petersburgh, as a
deputation, to inform the emperor of all that had happened. They were
also to lay before him the following demands:

1st. That all Russian troops should be withdrawn from the kingdom
forever, that a perpetual conflict between the two nations might be
avoided.

2d. That the privileges of the constitution should be again confirmed
in their fullest extent.

3d. That all the ancient Polish provinces incorporated with Russia
should partake in the privileges of the constitution, as Alexander had
promised.

The deputies were also instructed to entreat the emperor to come to
Warsaw and open the Diet, in order to satisfy himself respecting the
actual state of affairs.

The deputies left Warsaw that very evening.

The commander in chief appointed general Sierawski governor of the
city of Warsaw, and colonel count Wonsowicz chief of the staff. These
officers were both beloved by the people, and proved themselves able
and zealous defenders of their country through the whole campaign.
The commander in chief also published an order, that the army should
consist of 200,000 men. Each wayewodeship (principality) was to
furnish 9,000 infantry and 11,000 horse. There are eight wayewodeships
in Poland. The army already existing, the volunteer forces, and the
regiments raised and equipped by some of the noblemen, were not
reckoned in this estimate, nor did it include the volunteers which
were to be expected from the Polish provinces under other foreign
governments.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth of December were remarkable days in the
history of our revolution. Soldiers and peasants flocked in from all
sides--from all quarters of the country. In a short time, more than
five thousand peasants, armed with scythes, axes, and other weapons,
were counted. Among them were more than two hundred peasant girls, with
sickles. These were days of real joy, when all united in the defence
of Poland, without distinction of rank, age, or even sex--when rich
and poor, nobles and peasants, met, as friends escaped from common
sufferings, and embraced. Tables were spread with refreshments for
those who arrived, in the streets. The fourth was remarkable for the
opening of the theatre.[21] Religious solemnities took place in Praga
on the fifth, and on the sixth a Dictator was nominated.[22]

When, on the sixth of December, the national government notified
Chlopicki of his nomination as generalissimo, he replied, that they
had no power to place him in that station; that in such critical times
the civil and military power ought to be vested in one person, and that
he felt himself entitled, by his long services, to nominate himself
Dictator. His powers, he said, he would lay down on the assemblage of
the Diet. In the afternoon of the next day he was proclaimed Dictator
in the Champ de Mars, amidst the acclamations of an immense multitude.
After this, he took a public oath to act in accordance with the spirit
of the people, and to defend the rights and privileges of Poland.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 19: The details of the Grand Duke's march may not be
uninteresting to the reader, and at the same time they will serve to
refute the false report that he was pursued by the Poles.

Early in the morning of the third of December, the Grand Duke left his
camp at Mokotow, and marched on the route of Kosienice and Pulawa.
Agents had been sent in advance in this direction, to procure for him
every convenience, which he found uniformly prepared. In a village
between Kosienice and Graniza, where he halted with his troops, he met
intendant general Wolicki, who was on his way from Lublin to Warsaw.
Wolicki waited on the Grand Duke, in the hope that he might render
him some service. Constantine had quartered himself in the house of
the curate of the village, and received the intendant general in the
parlor, where the Grand Duchess Lowicz was present. Wolicki requested
his orders with regard to the accommodation of the troops. Constantine
coldly thanked him, and immediately began to complain of the Poles;
in which he was joined by his lady. He reproached the nation with the
benefits he had conferred on them, and seizing Wolicki violently by the
hand, added, 'And for all this they wanted to assassinate me!' When
Wolicki, in the most delicate manner, represented that his residence
had been entered with the best intentions toward his person, the Grand
Duke, with yet greater exasperation and fury, exclaimed, 'They have
chased me out of the country--but I shall soon return.' In his rage
he again seized Wolicki's hand, saying, 'You shall stay with me, as
a hostage for my generals retained in Warsaw.' Notwithstanding the
expostulations of Wolicki, he was arrested and detained. He however was
not long a prisoner, for he soon found means to regain his liberty. The
Grand Duke passed that night at the village of Graniza, some of the
inhabitants of which Wolicki knew. He found opportunity to speak with
one of them in the night, told him what had befallen, and desired him
to raise a false alarm, as if the Poles were at hand. It was done. The
citizens began to shout in the streets, and Wolicki, profiting by the
fright and disorder of the Russians, escaped.

He arrived at Warsaw on the following day, and related his adventure,
which was published as an illustration of the Grand Duke's perfidy and
inconsistency. This conduct, together with his threats, would have
justified the Poles in pursuing and taking him, with his whole army,
prisoners. But the nation generously suffered this opportunity for
revenge to pass by, and adhered to the promise of a free passage.

On his arrival in Pulawa, Constantine was received by the princess
Czartoriska in the most friendly manner, as he also was in Lubartow
by the princess Lubomirska. In the latter place, general Rosniecki,
who accompanied the Grand Duke, demanded an apartment in a pavilion
adjoining the palace, which was designed for the suite of Constantine.
The princess answered, in the presence of the Grand Duke, 'There is no
room for traitors to their country in my house.'

On the way to Lenczna, the Russian army met a division of Polish
lancers, marching to Siedlec. They halted in order to go through the
ceremony of saluting. The Grand Duke, with his suite, approached them
with an air of perfect friendship, shook hands with several, and
endeavored to persuade them to return with him. 'Hulans,' said he, 'do
not forget your duty to your monarch, but set your comrades a good
example.' He then offered them money and other rewards. Indignant at
his proposals, the lancers replied, 'Prince, we thank you for the money
and promises you offer us, but there is no command more sacred in our
eyes than the call of our country; no greater reward than the privilege
of fighting in her cause!' With this, they wheeled, and continued their
march past the Russian troops, singing patriotic songs.

The Grand Duke passed the frontier with his forces on the thirteenth of
December, and crossing the Wadowa, entered Volhynia, an ancient Polish
province, now incorporated with Russia.

I cannot forbear to record the noble conduct of colonel Turno, a Pole,
and aid-de-camp to the Grand Duke. This officer had been fourteen years
with Constantine, and was one of the few honest men in his suite. His
long endurance of his chief's follies and rudeness could have had no
other motive than the hope of doing good to others, and preventing
mischief. Constantine loved him, valued him highly, and was firmly
convinced that Turno would remain with him. What was his surprise,
when, at the frontier, Turno rode up to take his leave! At first, he
was unable to answer. After some time he said, with an expression of
heartfelt grief, 'Turno, and will you leave me--you, upon whom I had
placed my greatest hopes--whom I loved so much--who have been with
me so long?' Turno answered, with dignity, 'Your Highness may be
assured that I am sorry to part with you. I have certainly always been
your friend, and I am so still. I should never leave you in another
cause--no, not in the greatest distress: on the contrary I should be
happy to share every misfortune with you. But, your Highness, other
circumstances and duties call me now--the highest and weightiest
duty--the duty a man owes to his country. Your Highness, I have
done all that honor and duty commanded as your aid-de-camp--I have
accompanied you to the frontier, that I might be your guide as long
as you should remain on Polish ground, and preserve you from every
possible danger. _Now_ you need me no longer. You are in your own
country, and my duty as your aid-de-camp being at an end, it is now my
sacred duty as a Pole to return at the summons of my country.'

The Grand Duke marched with his corps towards Bialystok, where he
remained till the beginning of the campaign. In the war, he was not
ashamed to accept the command of a corps of the army, and to fight
against those who had treated him so generously, his promises to the
contrary notwithstanding.]

[Footnote 20: These Polish regiments and generals are, doubtless,
the same who were reported by the Berlin State Gazette to have been
butchered. So far from that, the nation received them kindly, and
forgave them. Prussians! you know little of the Poles, or of their
feelings. The time may come when we shall know one another better.]

[Footnote 21: This was the first time the theatre was opened during
the revolution. A patriotic piece was performed, viz. 'The Krakovians
and Guralians,' or 'The Union of the two Tribes.' This play had been
prohibited before. As early as six, P.M. the theatre was crowded.
No distinction was observed in regard to places. Before the play
began, one of the patriots addressed the audience with a speech, in
which he called to memory all the outrages by which the revolution
had been rendered necessary, and informed them what measures the
National Assembly had taken to insure the success of the good cause.
'Poles! Brethren!' he said, 'we have sent deputies to the Emperor, to
represent our sufferings for fifteen years--our oppressions--which
drew neither attention nor relief from Russia, while our rights were
trampled upon, and our innocent brethren tortured. Perhaps the Emperor,
surrounded by bad men, has been kept in ignorance of our wrongs, and
will be astonished to hear of all this injustice from the mouths of our
deputies. Perhaps he will take measures to redress all these villanies
without delay. If the grace of God has granted him to reign over
Poland, he may follow the steps of our good kings of old; of whom no
one ever tarnished the throne with tyranny. As for us, brethren, let
us forget past dissensions, and unitedly and patiently strive with one
accord for the redemption of our country.' After this speech, which was
joyfully received, the orchestra played Kosciusko's march, which had
not been heard for fifteen years. At first, the music was drowned in
the shouts of the audience--'Hail, our country--our father Kosciusko!
France, and Lafayette the friend of Kosciusko, forever!' After this,
the Marseilles hymn was played, and then the Mazur of Dombrowski.
The play was full of patriotic songs, and the audience joined their
voices to those of the actors. But when, at the end of the play, three
standards, with the armorial bearings of the ancient provinces of
Poland, were brought in, and were folded into one in the embraces of
the actors who represented the three chief tribes, the exultation of
the audience surpassed all bounds. One of the favorite actors addressed
the spectators in these words--'The monster tyranny, terrified by the
sudden light of liberty, which he could not endure, has left the den
from which he has hitherto spread death and affright. Oh that, scared
by this light, he may be driven farther and farther, nor be suffered
to rest on any of the fields of Poland. May he retire to the dark, icy
regions of the north, whence he came, and God grant that he may never
return to us.'

After this, those of the patriots who had been most actively
distinguished on the first night of the revolution and after, and those
who had suffered in dungeons for their love of country, were presented
to the assemblage. They were received with infinite joy, and carried
about on the shoulders of the people with shouts. Many ladies were then
brought forward, who had followed the patriots in arms on the first
night, or had sacrificed their wealth on the altar of patriotism. At
first sight, these beautiful and noble beings might have been taken for
angels sent down for the redemption of unhappy Poland.

These scenes surpass description--they can only be felt by hearts
truly free. These were moments to unite the whole nation. Persons who
had shunned each other for years, each fearing a spy in the other,
explained themselves and embraced. These scenes will live eternally in
the memory of every Pole. Beholding his countrymen in this ecstasy of
joy, there was none who did not weep--none who did not feel ready to
die on the morrow, having seen them thus happy. The prisoner condemned
to death, when unexpectedly rescued, and permitted to breathe the free
air, laughs, weeps, endeavors to express his gratitude, and cannot.
Such was the feeling of Poland in these blessed moments.]

[Footnote 22: On Sunday, the fifth of December, prayers were offered
up in all the churches of Warsaw by the people from the provinces as
well as the inhabitants. The blessing of the Most High was implored
on our arms. Of all the religious solemnities, those of Praga were
the most edifying and affecting. A mass was said in the open air, at
an altar erected on the spot where the victims of Suwarrow had been
buried. This altar was surrounded by more than 50,000 men, who sent up
one voice to God. The twelve academical legions formed the innermost
circle, among whom those who had been imprisoned for assisting on a
similar occasion were conspicuous. In the intervals of divine service,
and after its termination, several speeches were delivered, one of
which was by one of the liberated prisoners. Recalling the cruelties
perpetrated by Suwarrow, as well as those which we had lately suffered,
he observed, 'Brethren, we were lately forbidden--nay, it was accounted
a crime, to pray for our unfortunate murdered ancestors. To-day, under
this free vault of heaven, on the grave of our fathers, on the soil
moistened with their sacred blood, which cries to us for retribution,
in the presence of their spirits hovering over us, we swear never to
lay down our arms till we shall have avenged, or fallen like them.' The
assembled multitude then sung a patriotic hymn.

The sixth of December was remarkable for the nomination of Chlopicki to
the dictatorship;--the union of the supreme civil and military powers
in his person. The authority of the provisional government was thus at
an end; every thing was referred to the Dictator. In the afternoon,
more than 100,000 persons assembled in the Champ de Mars and the space
around it. The greater part of the army, too, were present. Chlopicki
came with the senators, and was received by those who had entrusted
him with their defence with shouts of joy. His aspect was, indeed,
venerable. His silver head, grown white in the service of Poland,
bespoke the confidence of all.

The people were informed by one of the senators that all the powers of
government had been delegated to Chlopicki, in order that operations
might be conducted with greater energy and despatch; yet with this
restriction--that his authority should cease on the eighteenth of
December. This, it will be remembered, was the day fixed for the
opening of the Diet, to which body all farther dispositions were
referred. The proclamation made, Chlopicki himself addressed the people
thus: 'Poles! brethren! The circumstances in which our country is
placed demand strict unity of purpose, and therefore I have thought it
best to accept the supreme power. But this is only for a time. I shall
resign it on the meeting of the Diet. Rely on my experience, which
is the fruit of long service, and on my age, which has taught me the
knowledge of mankind. Be assured that no selfish feeling has impelled
me to this step, and that I have consented to take it only to promote
the welfare of Poland. The truth of this I call God to witness.--May
he assist me to make my promises good. Hail to our dear country!' The
last sentence was clamorously echoed by the people, with the addition
of, 'and its brave defender Chlopicki!' Many in the assembly exclaimed,
'Lead us to Lithuania, Chlopicki!']




CHAPTER V.

 The Dictator enters upon his duties.--Plans for the enrollment of
 new forces.--System of officering them.--Want of energy in the
 execution of his plans.--Fortifications neglected.--The people
 supply the deficiencies of the administration.--Discovery of the
 correspondence between the ministers Grabowski and Lubecki.--The
 march of the army delayed.--Answer of the Emperor Nicholas to the
 deputies. His proclamation.--Its effect on the nation.--The Diet
 demand of the Dictator an account of his trust.--The result of their
 investigations.--Chlopicki deprived of the Dictatorial power.--The
 civil administration entrusted to Prince Adam Czartoryski, and the
 command of the Army to Prince Michael Radziwil, each subordinate to
 the Diet.


On the seventh of December, the new Dictator took possession of the
residence which had been prepared for him. A guard of honor was
assigned him, consisting of a company of the Academical Legion. The
twelve companies of which this legion was composed mounted guard in
succession.

The nation had conceived the highest hopes of Chlopicki; they expected,
above all, the most energetic measures in regard to the armament and
organization of the forces. These hopes were not fulfilled. At the
very commencement of his administration, it began to be seen that this
man, either from his advanced age or the original inadequacy of his
talents to the demands of such a situation, would fail to satisfy the
wants of the nation. Indeed, the union of so many different duties in
the hands of one individual demanded abilities of no ordinary strength
and compass. As might have been expected, the evident incapacity of
Chlopicki early became the occasion of dissension in the patriotic
association already referred to, accusations being preferred, as a
matter of course, against those who had been active in procuring his
investment with such high powers. The succeeding events will enable the
reader to decide for himself of the justice of such accusations.

On assuming his post, the Dictator adopted the following arrangements
in regard to the enrollments of the new forces, and other objects of
military administration. He estimated the army already in existence at
25,000 men, and sixty-two pieces of cannon. This army was constituted
as follows:--The infantry was composed of nine regiments, of two
battalions each, and a battalion of sappers, making a total of 19,000
men. The cavalry was also composed of nine regiments, each regiment
consisting of four squadrons, 7,200 men in all. The artillery was
divided into nine battalions, of eight pieces each, in all seventy-two
pieces, exclusive of the artillery in the fortresses of Modlin and
Zamosc.

This force the Dictator proposed to augment in the following
manner:--Each existing regiment was to receive a third battalion; and
he intended to form fifteen new regiments, of three battalions each.
This would have increased the total of infantry to 54,000 men, without
taking into the account the National Guard of Warsaw and the other
cities, amounting to 10,000 men. The cavalry was to be augmented by
8000, making a total of 15,200. To the artillery were to be added
twenty-four pieces of cannon, making a total of ninety-six pieces.

In this estimate the Dictator did not include the aid that might be
calculated upon from the provinces of Prussian, Austrian, and Russian
Poland, the volunteers of every kind, and the regiments raised and
equipped by the large landed proprietors.

For each of the eight palatinates into which the kingdom was divided,
an officer was appointed, whose duty it was to superintend the
organization of the military forces, of which from seven to eight
thousand infantry, and one thousand cavalry, were to be furnished by
each palatinate. These officers were subordinate to two others, who
had the supervision of four palatinates each, and bore the title of
_Regimentarz_. These last had the power of appointing all the officers
of the new forces.[23]

The augmentation of the army was to have been completed by the
twentieth of January, 1831. But all these arrangements were made on
paper only--the government did not press their execution. In fact,
such a degree of negligence existed, that in some places where the
people assembled to be enrolled, they found no officers to receive
them, and, after waiting some time, they returned to their homes.
It was, in truth, only by the energy of the nation, which supplied
the deficiencies of the administration, that our forces were ever in
any degree augmented. The volunteer force was in an especial manner
liberally furnished by the people. A similar state of things existed
with regard to the fortifications; and here again the energy of the
people atoned for the negligence of the administration. This was
especially the case at Warsaw and Praga, where all the citizens labored
on the works of defence, without distinction of age or sex.

The construction of barricades in the different streets of Warsaw,
and of mines in several parts of the city, was commenced by the
citizens. The Dictator, however, instead of occupying his attention
with these warlike preparations, devoted it to diplomatic negociations,
and despatched emissaries to the neighboring courts, charged with
propositions made without the knowledge or the wish of the nation, and
even, in some cases, incompatible with its honor, and inconsistent
with the design of the revolution. All the measures, indeed, of the
Dictator, however well intended they might have been, indicated much
weakness and indecision.

Such was the state of affairs when an event occurred that seemed
to augur well for our prospects. This was the discovery of the
correspondence between the ministers Grabowski and Lubecki, the
former being Secretary of State for Poland and a member of the cabinet
at St Petersburgh, the latter Minister of Finance at Warsaw. This
correspondence afforded the clearest evidence that Russia had intended
to declare war against France, and that she was prepared to commence
that war in December following.[24]

These letters were sent to Paris in the early part of December, by an
express, and ought to have convinced the French government of the
hostile intentions of Russia. They should have satisfied France that
our revolution, and the war that was to follow, were a part of the
great struggle in which her own existence was concerned.

The existing army was, through the activity of the general officers,
brought into such a state, by the middle of December, that it could
then have taken the field against the enemy. The soldiers were eager
for the struggle, but the delay of their march gave color to the
supposition that an answer from the Emperor was waited for. It was
even rumored that the Emperor was coming to Warsaw in person. All
this tended to damp the excitement of the moment. What, then, was
the astonishment of the nation, when it was found that the monarch,
far from admitting the severity of the oppression under which we had
suffered fifteen years,--far from giving a paternal audience to the
deputies which the nation had sent to him, and who, in its name,
had presented the most moderate demands, (limited, in fact, to the
ratification and observance of the constitution granted to us, and
the union of the Polish provinces under one government, as had been
promised by Alexander,)--far from consenting to repair to Warsaw, as
the deputies had entreated him to do, as a father among his children,
to hear their complaints and satisfy himself as to their justice,--far
from all this,--in a word, discarding all paternal feelings, he applied
the term 'infamous' to the sacred effort we had been forced to make by
the oppression under which we had so long suffered.[25]

The Russian generals Benkendorf and Diebitsch, in a conversation, of
which our revolution was the subject, and which took place in an
interview with colonel Wielezynski who was one of the deputies sent to
the emperor, spoke of a general war as impending after Poland should
be crushed.[26] Colonel Wielezynski returned from St Petersburgh in
the latter part of December, bringing with him the proclamation which
has already been given to the reader, and which, being published, was
received by the people with the utmost indignation. It was an insult
to the honor and character of the nation, which demanded vengeance.
The day of the promulgation of this document was a day of terrible
agitation. The cry of 'To battle! To battle!' was heard in every
quarter. The nation demanded to be led against the enemy at once.
The word had gone forth 'there is no hope of peace.'[27] It was with
difficulty that the people could be restrained from rushing at once
to the field and be persuaded to wait for a convocation of the Diet
fixed on the 17th of January. This delay was another error, for the
time which intervened was uselessly employed. This Diet in the opinion
of the nation could decide upon nothing short of war. Upon a just
interpretation of the spirit of the Emperor's proclamation, no other
course could be taken consistently with the national honor. It was in
consequence of this proclamation, of so criminatory, so unjust, so
insulting a character, that Nicholas Romanoff and his successors were
declared to have forfeited all claims to the throne of Poland, and that
that throne was declared vacant. The Poles could no longer submit to a
King, who, far from being willing to hear their complaints, far from
guarantying the rights secured by the constitution, went the length of
insulting that national honor to which all history has borne testimony.
To what a future must Poland, under such a king, have looked forward.
Better were it to risk the bloodiest conflict, nay, to be buried under
the ruins of our country, than to remain the vile slaves of a man,
who, relying on the force which he could control, was willing to take
advantage of his strength to be unjust.

The Diet demanded of general Chlopicki an account of his trust, in
regard to the military and civil administration generally, and in a
particular manner in regard to the preparation of the forces. The
result of this inquiry was to satisfy them that there had been a
general negligence of his duties, especially in regard to the increase
and organization of the army. On examining the military reports, it
was found that only the fifth part of the amount of force ordered
to be levied, was as yet enrolled. Two months had been wasted. The
Dictator, as has been already stated, occupied himself principally with
diplomatic affairs, and seemed to forget that the country was to be
defended. The Diet saw that general Chlopicki was hoping to finish the
war by conferences, and that his eagerness for peace was betraying him
into a forgetfulness of what was due to the national honor. In fine, a
correspondence with the Emperor Nicholas was found to have been carried
on by him.[28]

The Dictator, it was seen, had been equally neglectful of the different
fortifications. Except at the principal points, Praga, Zamosc, and
Modlin, no works of defence had been constructed. The important places
of Serock, and Zegrz, the former on the Narew, and the latter below
the confluence of the Narew and the Bug, were forgotten, as were all
the positions on the great road which leads from Warsaw to Brzese,
upon which, or in its vicinity, our principal operations were to be
executed. No point on the frontier was strengthened. The country was
left entirely open. The Diet, considering all these circumstances,
resolved to send a deputation to the Dictator, to demand of him, for
the last time, what his intentions were, and to require of him to
take the field forthwith. As the Dictator would not submit himself to
this expression of the will of the Diet, and even opened to prince
Adam Czartoriski, who was one of that deputation, propositions deemed
inconsistent with the national honor,--the Diet deprived him of his
trust.

The affairs of the civil administration were confided, as before
the dictatorship, to the senate, under the presidency of prince
Czartoriski, and the command in chief of the army was given to the
prince Michael Radzivil. All these powers were subordinate to the Diet.
In this manner ended the dictatorship of Chlopicki, who afterwards took
a place in the suite of prince Radzivil, and was admitted into the
counsels of the administration of military affairs.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 23: A very important circumstance, which either escaped the
notice of the Dictator, or was wilfully neglected by him, respected the
nomination and rank of officers. As the army was to be considerably
augmented, a proportionally greater number of officers was requisite.
All arrangements upon this subject were confided to the Regimentarz,
with whom the important power of making these appointments was
entirely left. This course soon led to trouble. The Regimentarz, not
having the power to transfer the older officers of the existing army,
excepting in cases where the offer was made by those officers, were
compelled to appoint new officers to newly formed regiments. These
newly levied soldiers were thus placed under officers who were but
learners themselves. The evil effects of this injudicious system were
indeed sensibly felt in the first actions of the campaign. Besides the
evil here alluded to, a degree of jealousy between the old and new
officers resulted from the operation of these arrangements. It was
natural for those who were old in service to see with dissatisfaction
recently commissioned officers placed above them in rank. Instead,
then, of studying to preserve the utmost harmony between those who were
going forth together to shed their blood in the cause of their common
country, that course was in fact taken, which if it had been designed
to disturb this harmony, would have been deemed the most efficacious.

Arrangements for officering the army might have been made in such a
manner as the following, to the satisfaction of all parties. After
dividing the officers into three classes, the first, consisting of
those actually in service, the second of those who had been in service,
but had given up their commissions and were in retirement, and the
third, of the newly commissioned officers; a military commission might
have been formed, who should have before them lists of officers showing
their periods of service. This commission could have designated the
rank of each upon an examination of these lists, placing the retired
officers in the grades in which they stood at the time of their
retirement. The new regiments should have been officered from the two
first classes, advancement being made in the grade of each officer. The
third class, or the new officers, should have been appointed to the
vacancies thus left in the old regiments. Besides the justice which
such an arrangement would have done to the officers of older standing,
it would have this good effect: the experienced officers would have
been more widely distributed through the army, and the new regiments
would have advanced more rapidly in organization and discipline.
General Skrzynecki clearly saw the defects of the actual arrangement;
but once made, it was difficult to reform it. He took, however, every
opportunity that offered, to transfer the older officers to advanced
grades in the new regiments.]

[Footnote 24: _Letter to Prince Lubecki, Minister of Finance at Warsaw,
dated St Petersburgh, the 18th of August, 1830._ 'My Prince,--His
Majesty the Emperor and King directs me to inform you that the Polish
troops being now in marching condition, you are requested to provide
the necessary funds, without delay, upon which the public treasury may
count as occasion may require, to support the expenses of the movement
of the army, and of the approaching campaign.'

 (Signed)      'Turkul, _Secretary of State_.'

In an answer to this letter, dated the third of September, Prince
Lubecki renders an account of the means at his command. 'Poland,' he
says, 'has 8,000,000 gilders in its treasury, and 1,000,000 in the bank
of Berlin. She is then ready to undertake the necessary preparations.'

_Extract of a letter addressed to Prince Lubecki by Count Grabowski,
Secretary of State for Poland, at St Petersburgh._ 'The official
correspondence which, by the order of his Majesty, I have the honor
to communicate to you, my Prince, and which directs the placing of
the Polish army on the war establishment, was, undoubtedly, even
more unwelcome to you than to myself. I suffer, truly, in seeing the
progress of our financial arrangements thus arrested. Our treasury
would have been in the most perfect condition, but for the expenses
of this war, which will absolutely exhaust its coffers; for on this
occasion our geographical position places us in the front line.'

'Dated St Petersburgh, 15th October, 1830.

 (Signed)      'Grabowski.'

From the same to the same. _Dated October 18th, 1830._

'Having been this day informed by his excellency, the aid-de-camp of
his Majesty, Czerniszew, that orders have been given to his royal
highness the Cæsarowicz, to place on the war establishment all the
troops under his command, without excepting those of the Polish
kingdom, and that these orders are to be carried into effect by the
22d of December, I have the honor, my Prince, to communicate this
information to you, by his Majesty's order, so that the necessary
funds may be furnished without delay to the Minister of War. And I
farther request you, my Prince, by the order of his Majesty, to have
the goodness to assign to his imperial highness the Cæsarowicz all the
funds for which he may have occasion in the execution of his orders.

 (Signed)      'Grabowski.'

From the same to the same. _Dated 20th November, 1830._

'The return of Marshal Diebitsch will determine what measures it will
be necessary to take. He has received orders to pass through Warsaw, on
his return from Berlin, with the view to consult with the Grand Duke
Constantine, in an especial manner upon subjects connected with the
movement and subsistence of the army. The Emperor wishes that you would
see the Marshal, as soon as possible after his arrival in Warsaw, in
order to consult with him on all these subjects; and he authorizes you
to execute all the arrangements which may be determined upon by Marshal
Diebitsch and the Grand Duke, without waiting for farther orders from
his Majesty. You will conform strictly to the wishes of his imperial
Highness. His Majesty, in conclusion, orders me to invite you to repair
to St Petersburgh as soon as the army shall have commenced its movement
and the war shall have been declared, so that you may receive in person
the orders of his Majesty. We are now in the month of November, the
distances are great, our armies cannot be ready before the spring,
and events follow each other so rapidly that God only knows what may
happen before that time. The rapidity of their succession has made it
impossible to receive intelligence of events in season to influence
their course. It is this which has caused the unfortunate state of
affairs in regard to Belgium. And here, again, is opened a train of
events, in reference to which it is useless to act, for the next
courier may bring us intelligence of an entirely new state of things.']

[Footnote 25: The proclamations of the Emperor on the 17th and 24th of
December were in effect the same. There was a perfect correspondence
between them in severity of language and spirit. We will give the last.

 'By the grace of God, we, Nicholas the First, Emperor and Autocrat
 of all the Russias, make known to all our faithful subjects that
 an infamous treason has convulsed the kingdom of Poland, which is
 united to Russia. Evil-minded men, who had not been disarmed of their
 bad passions by the beneficence of the immortal emperor Alexander,
 the generous restorer of their country, under the protection of
 the laws he had given them, have secretly concerted plots for the
 subversion of the established order of things, and began to execute
 their projects on the 29th of November last, by rebellion, effusion
 of blood, and attempts against the life of our well beloved brother
 the Cæsarowicz Grand Duke Constantine Paulowicz. Profiting by the
 obscurity of the night, a furious populace, excited by these men,
 precipitated themselves upon the palace of the Cæsarowicz; while,
 spreading throughout the city of Warsaw the false report that the
 Russian troops were massacring the peaceable inhabitants, they
 collected the people about them and filled the city with all the
 horrors of anarchy. The Cæsarowicz, with the Russians who were about
 his person, and the Polish troops who remained faithful to their duty,
 determined to take a position in the vicinity of Warsaw, and not to
 act with hostility, in order that, avoiding all occasion of shedding
 blood, they might prove in the clearest manner the falsehood of the
 report which had been circulated, and give the authorities of the city
 time and means of bringing back to their duty, in concert with the
 well-intentioned citizens, those who had been misled, and to restrain
 the discontented. This hope was not fulfilled. The council of the city
 were unable to re-establish order. Incessantly menaced by rebels,
 who had formed some illegal union among themselves, and had gained
 an influence in the council by separating from it some members named
 by us, and filling their places with others named by the chiefs of
 the conspirators, there was no course left to it but to beseech the
 Cæsarowicz to send back the Polish troops who had left Warsaw with
 him, to protect the public and private property from new pillage. Soon
 after this council was entirely dissolved, and all its powers were
 united in the hand of one general. In the interval, the news of the
 revolt was spread through all the provinces of Poland. Everywhere the
 same means were employed. Imposture, menaces, falsehood were used to
 inveigle the pacific inhabitants into the power of the rebels. In this
 unfortunate and serious state of things, the Cæsarowicz considered it
 indispensable to yield to the request of the government. He permitted
 the small body of Polish troops which remained faithful to him to
 return to Warsaw, in order to insure as far as possible the security
 of persons and property. He himself quitted the kingdom with the
 Russian troops, and entered on the 13th December the town of Wlodawa,
 in the government of Volhynia.

 'Thus was executed a crime which had been resolved upon, probably,
 for a long time before. After so many misfortunes, and when at least
 in the enjoyment of peace and prosperity under the protection of our
 power, the people of the kingdom of Poland have plunged themselves
 again into the abyss of revolt and misery, and multitudes of credulous
 men, though already trembling in fear of the chastisement which
 awaits them, dare to think, for a moment, of victory; and propose
 to us the condition of being placed on an equality with ourselves!
 Russians, you know that we reject them with indignation! Your hearts
 burn with zeal for the throne. Already you appreciate the sentiments
 we feel. At the first intelligence of the treason, your response was
 a new oath of unshaken fidelity, and at this moment we see but one
 movement in the whole extent of our vast empire. But one sentiment
 animates all hearts; the desire to spare nothing, to sacrifice all,
 even life itself, for the honor of the Emperor and the integrity of
 the empire. We witness with deep emotion the strong manifestation of
 the love of the people for ourselves and for their country. We might,
 indeed, answer you with tranquillity, that new sacrifices and new
 efforts will not be necessary. God, the protector of right, is with
 us, and all-powerful Russia will be able, with a decisive blow, to
 bring to order those who have dared to disturb her tranquillity. Our
 faithful troops, who have so recently distinguished themselves by
 new victories, are already concentrating upon the western frontier
 of the empire. We are in readiness to punish the perjured; but we
 wish to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, and to pardon the
 weak, who, from inconsiderateness or fear have followed the current.
 All the subjects of our kingdom of Poland, all the inhabitants of
 Warsaw, have not taken part in the conspiracy and its melancholy
 consequences. Many have proved by a glorious death, that they knew
 their duty. Others, as we learn by the report of the Grand Duke, have
 been forced, with tears of despair, to return to the places occupied
 by the rebels. These last, together with the misguided, compose, no
 doubt, a great part of the army and of the inhabitants of the kingdom
 of Poland. We have addressed ourselves to them by a proclamation on
 the 17th of this month, in which, manifesting our just indignation
 against the perjured men who have commenced this rebellion, we gave
 orders to put an end to all illegal armaments, and to restore every
 thing to its former footing. They have yet time, then, to repair
 the fault of their compatriots, and to save the Polish kingdom from
 the pernicious consequences of a blind criminality. In pointing out
 the only means of safety, we make known this manifestation of our
 benevolence toward our faithful subjects. They will see in it our
 wish to protect the inviolability of the throne and of the country,
 as well as the firm resolution to spare misguided and penitent men.
 Russians! the example of your Emperor will guide you, the example of
 justice without vengeance, of perseverance in the combat for the honor
 and prosperity of the empire, without hatred of adversaries, of love
 and regard for the subjects of our kingdom of Poland who have remained
 faithful to the oath they have made to us, and of an earnest desire
 for reconciliation with all those who shall return to their duty. You
 will fulfil our hopes, as you have hitherto done. Remain in peace
 and quietness; full of confidence in God, the constant benefactor
 of Russia, and in a monarch who appreciates the magnitude and the
 sacredness of his duties, and who knows how to keep inviolable the
 dignity of his empire, and the honor of the Russian people.

 'Given at St Petersburgh the twenty-fourth of the month of December,
 1830.

 (Signed)      'Nicholas.']

[Footnote 26: The following is part of a conversation, in presence of
the Emperor, between generals field marshal Diebitsch and Benkendorf,
and colonel Wielezynski, (one of the deputies sent by the Polish
Dictator,) at the close of a short interview, which took place at a
council on the affairs of state to which those generals had been called
by the Emperor.

'Well, gentlemen of Poland,' said marshal Diebitsch, 'your revolution
has not even the merit of being well timed. You have risen at the
moment when the whole force of the empire was on the march toward your
frontiers, to bring the revolutionary spirits of France and Belgium to
order.'

When the colonel observed that Poland thought herself capable of
arresting the torrent long enough to give Europe the alarm, and to
prepare her for the struggle, marshal Diebitsch answered,

'Well, what will you gain by the result? We had calculated to make our
campaign on the Rhine; we shall now make it on the Elbe or the Oder,
having crushed you first. Consider this well.']

[Footnote 27: According to the testimony of colonel Wielezynski,
the proclamation of the Emperor was in entire contradiction to the
sentiments he expressed in the conversation above mentioned. The tone
of that conversation was anything but severe. He even conceded that
the Poles had just reason to be discontented, and admitted many of the
barbarities of his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine. He promised
colonel Wielezynski that he would act with the strictest justice, and
would consider it a duty to inquire scrupulously into, and carefully
distinguish all the circumstances of the case, in regard to which a
manifesto should shortly be published. As he took leave of the colonel,
in presence of Diebitsch and Benkendorf, he declared that he loved and
esteemed the Poles, and that these his feelings should be the basis of
his course with regard to them. How inconsistent such language with
that of the proclamation!]

[Footnote 28: Some letters of the Emperor Nicholas were found among the
papers of Chlopicki, in which the Emperor expressed his thanks to him
for having taken the Dictatorship, and for the service which he had
done to him, by the preservation of public tranquillity. The emperor
exhorted him to follow 'the conditions which had been prescribed to
him.' The conditions here referred to could not be found. The reader
will permit me to dwell, for a moment, upon the mode of conduct, on the
part of the Emperor Nicholas, which is here indicated.

What conditions could Nicholas propose to the Dictator, which the
nation should not know of? If those conditions were compatible with
justice and with the honor of the nation, why was all this secrecy
necessary? If they were incompatible with justice and our honor, the
Dictator certainly could not have it in his power to make the nation
accept of them. On the contrary, the nation who had given him its
confidence, the moment that it should have been convinced that the
Dictator had intended to compromise its honor, would have despised him
as a traitor, and he would have fallen a sacrifice to its indignation.
To wish to induce him, on his own responsibility, to commit acts
contrary to the honor of the nation, is to be willing, for selfish
ends, to induce him to do that which would render him infamous in
history.

Is this a course becoming a King? A conduct so insincere, Machiavelian,
and even malignant, is based on the system of intrigue, and is in
correspondence with the accustomed policy of the Russian cabinet,--a
policy which has always brought divisions and misery upon the nations
who have been under her power. Such a system, however, is far from
being ultimately favorable to the interests of Russia herself, for it
can never lead to a sure result. Sooner or later duplicity will be
discovered, and the more a nation has been deceived, the deeper will be
its determination of vengeance.

The letters referred to, which, I believe, are now in the hands of
some of our countrymen, will be, in the eyes of the world, a new
justification of our revolution.]




CHAPTER VI.

 Remarks on the policy of the late Dictator.--System of operations
 adopted.--The army leaves Warsaw.--Statement of the existing
 forces.--Of the forces proposed to be raised.--Unfortunate
 consequences of the delay in the preparation of the forces.--Statement
 of the force with which the war was actually commenced.


The dictatorship had exercised a most unpropitious influence upon our
affairs.[29] Every movement had been retarded, and the most invaluable
time was lost. Instead of offensive operations, the defensive was now
necessarily taken. We awaited the enemy on our native soil, and exposed
that soil to his insults and outrages. Even, however, at this point,
the patriots called on the government to take the offensive, but it was
too late. An immense Russian army was concentrated upon our frontiers,
and was ready to pass them. Our forces were not strong enough to
defend every point against the enemy's entrance. It was decided to
keep our troops concentrated, and presenting to him always a narrow
and recurvated front, to lead the enemy to the environs of Warsaw, and
to give him a decisive battle there. On about the 20th of January, the
prince Radzivil renewed the orders for the most rapid organization of
all the different corps, and directed those corps which were already
organized to hold themselves in readiness for marching. A division
of lancers which was in the environs of Siedlce, augmented by some
regiments of newly raised light cavalry, occupied, as a corps of
observation, all the country between Wlodawa and Ciechanowiec, and were
ordered to watch every movement of the enemy in that region. On about
the 25th of January, the troops began to leave Warsaw and the other
towns of the department, and to concentrate themselves upon a line
embracing the towns of Siedlce, Ostrolenka, and Lukow.[30]


STATEMENT OF THE EXISTING ARMY, AND OF THE NEW FORCES PROPOSED TO BE
LEVIED.

The whole Polish force under the Russian government, consisted, of
_Infantry_, nine regiments of two battalions each, 19,000 men, and
a battalion of sappers of 1,000 men, in all 20,000; _Cavalry_, nine
regiments of four squadrons each; in all, 7,200; _Artillery_, six
batteries of eight pieces each, and two batteries of light artillery,
also, of eight pieces each; in all, sixty-four pieces. According to
the plans of the Dictator, the infantry was to be augmented in the
following manner. To each of the existing regiments was to be added a
battalion of 1,000, making a total of 9,000 men. He then proposed to
form fifteen new regiments, thus increasing the number of regiments
of infantry to twenty-four. Each one of the new regiments was to be
composed of three battalions of 1,000 men each. The total of these new
regiments would then have been 45,000 men, and the grand total of the
new levy would be 54,000 men. This body of recruits was to be made up
from those of the exempts (their term of service[31] having expired)
who were yet under the age of forty, and from all others under that
age, and above that of sixteen.

Of this force, six thousand men was to be furnished by Warsaw, and an
equal number by each of the eight palatinates. Besides this force, the
enrollment of a national guard at Warsaw of 10,000 men was ordered;
and in forming this body, no exemption was admitted except from age or
bodily infirmity. Each of the eight palatinates was also to enroll a
national guard of a thousand men. Thus the whole national guard was to
consist of 18,000 men.

The cavalry was to be augmented as follows. From the whole
gend'armerie, it was proposed to form a regiment of carabiniers,
consisting of two squadrons of two hundred men each. To the nine
existing regiments of cavalry it was proposed to add, as a reserve,
four squadrons of two hundred each, making, in all, eight hundred. Ten
new regiments were to be formed, of four squadrons each; so that the
whole number of old and new cavalry would be twenty regiments. The
whole augmentation of this army would amount to 9,200. The raising of
this force, as in the case of the infantry, was to be equally divided
between Warsaw and each of the eight palatinates.

The artillery was to be augmented by four batteries, of eight pieces
each, making a total of thirty-two pieces.

RECAPITULATION.

                            Infantry.  Cavalry.  Artillery.
 New forces,                 54,000     9,200    32 pieces.
 Existing forces,            19,000     7,200    64
                             ------    ------    --
     Total,                  73,000    16,400    96

 If we should add to this
 number the regiments
 formed by the land
 proprietors at their own
 expense, detachments of
 volunteers, foreigners,
 and detachments of
 partizans, amounting
 perhaps to                   6,000     2,000

 The total might be          ------    ------     --
 increased to                79,000    18,400     96

This force, although it would seem to be disproportionate to the
resources of the kingdom, it was certainly possible to have raised;
for the energy and spirit of the people were at the highest point, and
every one felt the importance of improving the favorable moment, which
the general state of Europe, and the weakness of Russia, presented.
If the reader will anticipate the course of events, and remember what
a struggle, against the Russian force of more than 200,000 men, was
sustained by the 40,000 only which we actually brought into the field,
he may conjecture what advantages might have been expected from twice
that number, which we should certainly have brought to the field, had
the energy of the government followed out its plans. But from the
incapacity of the Dictator for the energetic execution of his trust,
these forces were never raised, and it was soon seen that Chlopicki,
by assuming a duty to which he was unequal, gave the first blow to the
rising fortunes of his country. The Dictator, as we have seen, had not
even taken a step towards the organization of these forces, and one
would have thought that he had thrown out these plans merely to blind
the eyes of the nation, without having entertained the thought of
taking the field. Two months passed away, the inevitable moment of the
conflict arrived, and the nation was obliged to march to the fight with
half the force which, under an energetic administration, it would have
wielded. If we add to this unfortunate state of things, that, besides
the threatening forces of our gigantic enemy, Prussia and Austria,
at this late moment, and especially the former, had began to take an
attitude of hostility towards us, and thus all hope of sympathy from
her neighbors was lost to Poland, the perilous nature of the crisis
to which the delay of the dictatorial government had brought us, thus
unprepared, may be imagined. But Poland did not suffer herself to be
discouraged by all these unpropitious circumstances. Trusting to the
righteousness of her cause, she went forth to the contest, determined
to fall or to be free.


STATEMENT OF THE FORCES WITH WHICH THE WAR WAS ACTUALLY COMMENCED.

A great exactitude in the computation of these forces would be
obviously impracticable, as the precise number of the detachments of
volunteers, occasionally joining the army, serving in a particular
locality only, and often perhaps for a limited period, cannot be
ascertained; but it will not be difficult to make a pretty near
approximation to the truth.

At the beginning of the campaign, the forces were divided into four
divisions of infantry, four of cavalry, and twelve batteries of
artillery, of eight pieces each.

The whole infantry consisted of:

 The nine existing regiments, enlarged
   by one battalion to each regiment,
   making in all,                         27,000
 One battalion of sappers,                 1,000
 A tenth regiment, of two battalions,
   called 'The Children of Warsaw,'        2,000
 A battalion of volunteers, added to
   the 4th regiment,                       1,000
 Different detachments of volunteers, as
   the detachments of Michael Kuszel,
   and the Kurpie or Foresters, &c.,       1,600
                                          ------
         Total of infantry,               32,600

The four divisions of infantry were nearly equal, consisting of from 7
to 8,000 men each. To each of these divisions a corps of 250 sappers
was attached. The divisions were commanded as follows; 1st division
by general Krukowiecki; 2d division, general Zymirski; 3d division,
general Skrzynecki; 4th division, general Szembek.

 The cavalry consisted of the nine existing
   regiments,                                   7,200
 Four squadrons, added to these as a reserve,     800
 Two squadrons of  carabiniers,                   400
 Two regiments of  krakus or light  cavalry,
   of Podlasia and  Lublin,                     1,600
 Two regiments of  Mazurs,                      1,600
 Six squadrons of Kaliszian cavalry,            1,200
 Two squadrons of  lancers of Zamoyski,           400
                                               ------
         Total of  cavalry,                    13,200

This cavalry, which was composed of 66 squadrons, was divided into four
nearly equal bodies. They were commanded as follows. 1st division,
by general Uminski, consisting of 15 squadrons; 2d division, general
Stryinski, 15 squadrons; 3d division, general Lubinski, 15 squadrons;
4th division, making the reserve, under general Pac, 17 squadrons.
Besides those divisions, four squadrons were designated for the corps
of general Dwernicki.

The artillery was divided into 12 batteries of eight pieces each,
making in all 96 pieces.

The general statement of the forces with which the campaign was
commenced is then as follows:

_Infantry_, 32,600. _Cavalry_, 13,200. _Artillery_, 96 pieces.

This incredibly small number marched to the combat against a Russian
force of at least 200,000 men and 300 cannon. In fact, by the reports
of field marshal Diebitsch, found after his retreat, and the detailed
statements confidently made in the Berlin Gazette, the Russian forces
amounted to 300,000; but we reject one third on the supposition that
the regiments had not been entirely completed. If the very thought
of commencing a war with such disproportionate means, against so
overwhelming a force, should seem to the reader to be little better
than madness, he will appreciate the energy and courage with which it
was supported, when he learns that in _twenty days_, from the 10th of
February to the 2d of March, _thirteen_ sanguinary battles were fought
with the enemy, besides twice that number of small skirmishes, in
which, as we shall see, that enemy was uniformly defeated, and a full
third part of his forces annihilated.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 29: The dictatorship may be said to have been the first of
our misfortunes. The Dictator, acting in contradiction to the spirit
of the revolution, did not take advantage of that enthusiasm with
which the revolution commenced and by which prodigies might have been
achieved. But not only did he neglect to make use of that enthusiasm,
or to foster it, he even took measures which had a tendency to repress
it. The first fault with which he was reproached by the Patriotic Club,
was his having given permission to the Grand Duke to leave the kingdom
with his corps, taking with them their arms and accoutrements, which
were really Polish property. The retaining of the Grand Duke would have
been of the greatest importance to us. No historian could have blamed
such an act; for if the justice of our revolution be once acknowledged,
every energetic and decisive act which would favor its happy result
must also be justified in the view of history. The Russians indeed have
regarded our conduct on this point as an indication of weakness and
timidity rather than as an act of delicacy and magnanimity, in which
light Chlopicki intended that it should be considered. That same corps,
attached to the Grand Duke, consisting, as we have said, of 7,000 men
and 24 cannon, with the Grand Duke himself, did not regard it in this
light, for they fought against us in the very first battle. Another
fault of general Chlopicki was, not to have taken immediately the
offensive, passed the Bug, and entered the brother provinces which had
been incorporated with Russia. The Russian troops, especially those in
Lithuania, were not in a state to resist the first impetuosity of our
national forces. The Russian soldiers, as the reader probably knows,
are not, except in the large cities, concentrated in barracks, as in
other states of Europe, but are dispersed in quarters throughout the
country, in small bodies; so that sometimes a single regiment may
be spread to a circumference which may embrace eighty to a hundred
villages, with perhaps from ten to thirty soldiers only, in each. In
fact, the soldiers of a company may have often from six to twelve
miles march to reach the quarters of their captain. All this made the
concentration of these forces an affair of time and difficulty; and
one regiment after another could have been fallen upon, and their
whole forces annihilated in detail, and that without much effusion of
blood. Besides this, the Russian corps of Lithuania was composed, in
part, of our brethren enrolled in that province, and even commanded, in
part, by officers natives of that province. They would of course have
united themselves with us, and the revolution would have spread, with
the rapidity of lightning, to the very borders of the Dwina and the
Dnieper; and after this, not four millions alone, but sixteen millions
of Poles, would have been united in one cause. At a later period, all
this was no longer possible. Russia began to become alive to the danger
of the occurrence of such a state of things, and all the regiments with
Polish soldiers in their ranks were withdrawn into the interior, and
three hundred Polish officers in the Russian service were sent to take
commands in regiments posted in the regions about the Caucasus, in Asia.

The Dictator, who gave as a reason for not having taken the above
course, that the neighboring cabinets would have taken umbrage at
it as a violation of a foreign territory, can with difficulty be
conceived to have really felt that this would have been the case. Even
if such apprehensions were well founded, are diplomatic formalities
to be regarded, on an occasion like this? Should we, in such a cause,
forbear, from apprehensions of this kind, to press on to the delivery
of our brethren from the despotism under which they were suffering?
But, in fact, the true interests of those cabinets were to be found
in, what every sagacious observer of European history has pointed out
as the great safeguard of Europe, the establishment of the Polish
kingdom as a barrier against the threatening preponderance of our
barbarous enemy. It was indeed ridiculous to require of the Poles that
they should regard, as their only limits, the little kingdom into
which the violence and fraud of the combined sovereigns had contracted
them. The Poles, in entering those provinces, would have been still on
the soil of their ancient country; and, in fact, the revolution was
equally justifiable at Wilna, Kiow, and Smolensk, as at Warsaw. The
patriots, indeed, who began the latter, did not think of their own
sufferings alone, they bore in mind also the even greater sufferings
of their brethren who were more absolutely in the power of despotism.
It was indeed the great end of the patriots and of the nation, the
union of all the provinces of ancient Poland, which was abandoned by
the Dictator. Nothing else, in fact, but the forcing of the frontiers,
would have subdued the arrogance of the Emperor, and forced him to
listen to our claims. The unanimous voice of sixteen millions of Poles
could not have safely been despised. This compulsory amelioration of
our condition would have also spared Nicholas the remorse with which he
must reflect on the sacrifice of nearly 200,000 lives, and the death or
suffering to which he has condemned, and is still condemning, the best
spirits of Poland.]

[Footnote 30: I cannot forbear to dwell for a moment upon the occasion
of the departure of our troops from Warsaw and the other towns. It was
one of the fine and touching moments of our revolution. Every friend of
liberty would have desired to have brought together all the autocrats
of the world to witness the animation with which our national troops
went forth to engage in the combat for liberty. Perhaps they would
have been involuntarily struck with the conviction that this liberty
must be a blessing when men will sacrifice themselves so cheerfully
to achieve it. When the march was commenced, all the inhabitants of
the neighboring country left their homes to witness the departure,
and all the plains about Warsaw and the road sides between Warsaw and
Siedlce were covered with people. The soldiers, in marching through
the streets of the city, passed between lines of people composed of
senators, officers of the government, the clergy, children from the
schools, the members of the national guard, and in short an immense
assembly of both sexes, reaching even to two miles beyond Praga. All
the regiments passed in review before the general in chief, and each
regiment took the oath to defend their country to the last drop of
their blood. Exclamations such as these were constantly uttered: 'Dear
General, if you see us turn from before the enemy, point the artillery
against us, and annihilate our ranks.' The fourth regiment, the bravest
of the brave, knowing that our magazines were ill provided with powder,
refused at first to receive any cartridges; but on the remonstrance of
the chief, they agreed to take thirty each man, (half of the complement
for one battle,) saying that they would furnish themselves afterwards
from the Russians. They then entreated the commander in chief never to
send them against a smaller body of the enemy than a division, and to
use them wherever a decisive blow was required. 'Forget, dear general,'
said they, 'that we have no powder; but trust to our bayonets!'

It was truly affecting to witness the parting of the soldiers from
their friends and relatives,--fathers taking leave of children,
children of fathers, husbands of wives,--and to hear the cries of
sorrow mingled with animating shouts and patriotic hymns. These are
moments of which I am unequal to the description; but which every
freeman will form a conception of,--moments of the struggle between
domestic happiness and public duty; moments which show that the love
of country is the most powerful of all sentiments, and that men will
sacrifice every thing under its impulses.]

[Footnote 31: A service of ten years in the army, in person, or by
substitute, was required by law of every citizen.]




CHAPTER VII.

 Entrance of the Russian forces into the Kingdom.--Proclamations of
 Marshal Diebitsch.--Their effect.--Disposition of the Russian and
 Polish forces.--Plan of operations of the Poles.


The Russian forces, simultaneously with the Polish, began to
concentrate themselves on the frontiers of the kingdom, (_See Plan No.
1_) particularly at Bialystok (11) and Grodno (10). Four general points
were designated for the entrance of this enormous force, viz. Zlotoria
(12), Ciechanowiec (9), Brzesc (8), and Wlodawa (7).

Marshal Diebitsch, on entering the kingdom, published a proclamation to
the Poles, a copy of which is given in the note.[32]

[Illustration: _I_]

Those proclamations were published in the latter part of January.
The people were disgusted with their promises and their menaces,
and rejecting all idea of reconciliation on such terms as these
proclamations set forth, they entreated to be led to the struggle in
which they had once decided to engage, preferring every sacrifice to
so degrading a submission. They demanded that an answer should be
sent to Diebitsch, informing him that they were ready to meet him, and
called upon the government to commence hostilities without a moment's
delay.[33]

The Russian forces, [_See plan No. 1_, (_a_)] consisting, as we have
already mentioned, of about 200,000 men and 300 pieces of cannon, had,
on about the 5th of February, passed the Polish frontier at the four
general points above named (7, 8, 9, 12). Their different commanders,
besides the marshal Diebitsch, were, the Grand Duke Constantine,
generals Rosen, Pablen, Geismer, Kreutz, prince Wirtemberg, and
Witt. The chief d'etat major was general Toll, the most skilful of
the Russian generals. The space designated for the entrance of the
different detachments of the Russian corps embraced an extent of
ninety-six English miles. This space was almost wholly occupied by
either small or large detachments. General Diebitsch, meaning to attack
our centre at Siedlce with a part of his army, intended to outflank us
with the rest, and to march directly upon Warsaw, and thus, following
the plan of Napoleon in the campaign of Prussia, in 1806, at Jena and
Auerstacdt, to cripple our front, and to put an end to the war in a
moment. The plans of this renowned commander were well understood by
our general officers, and to resist them, it was determined to contract
our forces (_b_) into a line of operations, narrow, but concentrated
and strong; a course which our inferiority of force seemed to require.
This line was posted as follows. Our left wing, consisting of the
fourth division of general Szembek and a division of cavalry under
general Uminski, was in the environs of Pultusk (14). This wing sent
its reconnoissances towards Ostrolenka (4). In the environs of the
town of Jadow (16) was the division of general Krukowiecki; and in the
environs of Wengrow (15), the division of general Skrzynecki, with
the division of cavalry commanded by general Lubinski. The centre of
our position was about half way between the two latter places. Our
right wing was at Siedlce (2), and was composed of the 2nd division of
infantry under general Zymirski, and the 2nd division of cavalry under
general Stryinski. To cover the right wing, a small corps under the
command of general Dwernicki was posted at Seroczyn (17). That corps
consisted of 3,000 infantry, 800 horse, and three pieces of cannon.
Different patrols of cavalry were employed in observing the enemy along
the whole space between Sokolow, Miendzyrzec, and Parczewo. The rivers
Narew (N), Bug (B), and Liewiec (L), covered the whole line of our
operations, and made it sufficiently strong. Our centre, especially,
was well posted between Jadow (16), Wengrow (15), and Siedlce (2). It
was protected by the great marshes formed by the river Lieviec (L).
Excepting in a few points, which were well fortified, these marshes
were wholly impassable. It is to be regretted that this position was
not made still stronger by more ample fortifications. Besides making
the passage of this point cost a more severe loss to the enemy, such
fortifications would have enabled us to spare one whole division for
other purposes. Fortifications of positions should always be the more
freely combined with tactics, in proportion to the inferiority of a
force.

In the above mentioned position we were to await the first shock of the
enemy, after which the army was to retire slowly towards the environs
of Praga, and in such a manner that each corps should always be on the
parallel with the rest. In this retreat each corps was required to
profit by every opportunity, to cause the utmost loss to the enemy,
and to harass him as much as possible. By a retreat of this nature, it
was intended to draw the enemy on to the walls of Warsaw, and, having
weakened him during such a retreat, to give him a decisive battle
there.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 32: _Proclamation of the Field Marshal Count Diebitsch
Zabalkansky to the Poles._

POLES! His Majesty the Emperor and King, our august sovereign, has
confided to me the command of the troops destined to put an end to
the deplorable disorders which afflict the kingdom of Poland. The
proclamation of his majesty the Emperor and King has already apprised
you that the Emperor has wished, in his generosity, to distinguish
his faithful subjects who have respected their oaths, from the guilty
instigators of disorder who have sacrificed to their odious ambition
the interests of a happy and peaceful community. Nay, more, he wishes
to extend his benevolence and his clemency to the unfortunate persons
who through weakness or fear have lent themselves as the accomplices
of a deplorable enterprize. Poles! Hear the voice of your sovereign
and your father, the successor of the august restorer of your country,
who like him has always desired your happiness. Even the guilty will
experience the effects of his magnanimity, if they will trust to it
with confidence. Those only who have dipped their hands in blood, and
those who still more guilty perhaps, have excited others to do this,
will meet the just punishment to which the law condemns them.

1. At the moment of entering with the troops which I command into the
kingdom of Poland, I wish to convince you of the principles which will
guide all my steps. A faithful soldier, and a conscientious executor
of the orders of my sovereign, I will never depart from them. The
peaceful inhabitants who shall receive us as friends and brothers, will
find their friendly dispositions reciprocated by the troops placed
under my orders. The soldiers will pay a fair price for every thing
which shall be furnished to them, and if circumstances require that
the troops shall be provisioned by the inhabitants, or if we shall be
forced to make requisitions (which we shall endeavor to avoid as far
as possible,) in such cases the inhabitants will receive payment in
printed certificates, which will be taken as money at the offices for
the payment of imposts. Prices will be established for the provisions
furnished according to the current value of the articles in the
different districts.

2. On the approach of the Russian troops, the inhabitants of the towns
and villages, who have taken arms in obedience to the orders of the
government which has been illegally instituted, will be required to
surrender their arms to the local authorities, if those latter shall
have returned to their duties. In other cases, they will be required to
give up their arms upon the entrance of the troops of his majesty the
Emperor and King.

3. Every inhabitant, who, forgetting the duties which he owes to his
sovereign, shall persevere in the revolt, and shall be taken with arms
in his hands, will have to meet the utmost rigor of the law. Those
who shall attempt to defend themselves against the troops, shall be
delivered over to a council of war. The towns and villages who shall
dare to resist his majesty the Emperor and King, will be punished
according to the degree their resistance shall have been carried, by
an extraordinary contribution, more or less heavy. This contribution
will be principally levied upon those who shall have taken part in a
criminal defence, either by carrying arms themselves, or by exciting
others to that crime. In case of relapse from a return to duty, and of
rebellion in the rear of the Russian army, the insurgent places shall
be treated with the utmost military rigor. The principal instigators
shall be punished with death, and the others exiled; but the greatest
care will be taken to distinguish and protect those who shall have had
no part in the crime.

4. To prevent such evils, I invite all the authorities, civil as well
as military, who may be in the towns and cities, to send deputies to
the commanders of the Russian forces, when these forces shall arrive.
Such deputations will bring with them as a sign of submission to their
legitimate sovereign, a white flag. They will be expected to announce
that the inhabitants submit themselves to the benevolence of his
majesty the Emperor and King, and that their arms have been deposited
in some place which shall be designated. The Russian commanders will
then take the necessary measures of security. They will maintain the
civil authorities, which existed before the revolt, as well as those
which shall have been instituted afterwards, if they have taken no
active part in the rebellion. The sedentary guard of veterans will
be continued, if they have not engaged in the resistance, or given
manifest proofs of treason towards their legitimate sovereign. All
those authorities, civil as well as military, will be required to renew
their oaths of fidelity. Conformably to the orders of his majesty the
Emperor and King, an amnesty and pardon for the past will be given to
all of those who shall submit without delay, and shall comply with the
conditions which have been above mentioned.

5. The Russian commanders shall organize, as circumstances may require,
in the places where no Russian garrisons may remain, a civil and
municipal guard, who shall be chosen from among the most faithful of
the veterans, and the inhabitants shall be entrusted with the interior
police, as far as may be necessary to secure order and tranquillity.

6. The organization of the administration of the palatinates,
arrondissements, and communes, will remain upon the footing on which it
was before the insurrection. It will be the same with all the direct
and indirect taxes. The authorities will remain in their places after
they shall have complied with the above conditions. In other cases,
new authorities will be established by the choice of the commanders
of the Russian forces. That choice will fall principally upon the
individuals who may unite, with the necessary capacity, an established
moral character, and who shall have given proofs of their fidelity to
their legitimate sovereign. All those will be excluded who shall have
taken any part whatever in the rebellion, as well as those who after
the entrance of the Russian troops into the kingdom shall persist in
an organized opposition against legal order. The proprietors of land
and houses who may remain tranquil in their habitations, and shall
submit to the conditions above announced, will be protected in their
rights, as well by the local authorities as by the Russian troops.
In other cases, the property of all those who shall remain in the
revolutionary ranks will be sequestered, as well as that of those who
shall have continued to exercise the functions entrusted to them by
the illegal government, or in some who shall have openly taken part
in the revolt. Such are, Poles, the principles which will direct the
army which his Majesty has deigned to confide to my command. You have
to choose between the benefits which an unqualified submission to the
will of our magnanimous sovereign assures to you, and the evils which
will be brought upon you by a state of things without object as well as
without hope. I hold it an honor to have been called upon to make known
to you these resolutions, emanating from the generous intentions of the
Emperor and King. I shall execute them scrupulously, but I shall not
fail to punish criminal obstinacy with inflexible severity.

 (Signed)      The Marshal Count Diebitsch Zabalkansky.


_Proclamation of the Count Diebitsch Zabalkansky to the Polish troops._

GENEROUS POLES! Twenty-five years since, your country was implicated
in the wars which the gigantic plans of a celebrated conqueror had
kindled. The hope, often awakened, and always disappointed, of an
illusory regeneration, had connected you with his fortunes. Faithful,
although unfortunate, you answered those deceptive promises by the
sacrifice of your blood. There is scarce a country, however distant it
may have been, that has not been wet with that blood which you have
prodigally shed for interests altogether foreign to the destiny of
your country. Great events brought at last, at a remarkable epoch, an
end to your misfortunes. After a contest, forever memorable, in which
Russia saw you among the number of her enemies, the Emperor Alexander,
of immortal memory, obeying only the impulse of his magnanimous heart,
wished to add to all his other titles to glory, that of being the
restorer of your country. Poland recovered her name, and the Polish
army a new life. All the elements of national welfare, of tranquillity,
and of prosperity, were miraculously united, and fifteen years of
uninterrupted progress prove, to this day, the greatness of the
benefits for which your country is indebted to the paternal solicitude
of the sovereign who was its restorer, and to the no less earnest
concern of him who has so nobly continued the work of his predecessor.

POLISH WARRIORS! His Majesty the Emperor and King has trusted to
your gratitude and your fidelity. A short time since he gladly did
justice to your devotedness and your good will. The exemplary conduct
of all the Polish officers, without exception, who partook with our
armies the fatigues and the glory of the Turkish war, had given a high
satisfaction to his Majesty. We accepted with pleasure this fraternity
of arms which became a new bond between the Russian and Polish troops.
The best hope of reciprocal advantages should connect with that union,
which was founded upon all that is sacred in military honor. Those
hopes have been cruelly deceived. A handful of young men, who have
never known the dangers of battle, of young officers who had never
passed through a campaign or even a march, have shaken the fidelity of
the brave. The latter have seen committed in their ranks the greatest
of crimes, the murder of their commanders; they have not arrested the
revolt against their legitimate sovereign. What unhappy blindness, what
criminal condescension has been able to induce these veterans to permit
the consummation of the greatest of offences, and to join themselves
with those whose hands were stained with blood! Can it be possible
that the design of rendering a service to their country has been made
for a moment a pretext for such conduct? That country can answer that
for a long period she had never enjoyed so much happiness. She had
attained much, and she could still hope much from her fidelity, and the
support of public order. She exposes herself to the loss of all these
advantages by engaging in an unequal struggle, in revolting against
a sovereign whose firm and energetic character is well known, and in
braving a power which has never been defied with impunity.

Polish Warriors! Rebellion would stamp upon your front the stain of
dishonor. Put away from you such an ignominy. History will one day
relate, that, in the hope of serving your country, you have been
faithful and devoted to the man who promised you every thing, and
kept his promise in nothing. Shall it also say that, paying with
ingratitude and perjury, the sovereign who has generously granted you
every thing which you had any right to hope for, you have drawn down
upon your country new misfortunes, and upon yourselves an indelible
disgrace? If some grievances existed, you should have had confidence
enough in the character of our august sovereign to have laid before
him your complaints, in a legal manner, and with that frankness
which characterizes the true soldier. And I too, Poles, I speak the
sincere language of a soldier; I have never known any other. Obedient
to the orders of my sovereign, I reiterate, by his wishes, all the
propositions which, in his clemency, he has already made to you
by his proclamation of the 17th of December. Our august sovereign
has witnessed, with marked satisfaction, the fidelity of the brave
light-cavalry of the guard, of the greater part of the grenadiers of
the guard, and of the sub-officers of the cavalry. He does not doubt
that the greater part of the troops cherished the desire to remain
faithful to their oaths, and that many others were hurried away only
by the impulse of the moment. Let each one hasten to execute the
orders which are contained in the proclamation of his majesty. But
if unforeseen circumstances do not permit you to follow the course
which has been pointed out to you; at least, on the approach of the
faithful armies of our common sovereign, remember your duties and
your oaths. It is not as enemies that the troops placed under my
command enter the kingdom of Poland. It is on the contrary with the
noble object of re-establishing public order and the laws. They will
receive as brothers all persons, either in civil or military life,
who shall return to their duties; but they will know how to subdue,
with the constancy and courage which they have ever manifested, the
resistance which evil-minded men may attempt to oppose to them,--men
who, trampling under foot the sacredness of their oaths and the laws
of honor, sacrifice to their ambitious and even criminal projects the
dearest interests of their country. It is to you especially, generals
and colonels of the Polish army, that I address myself with confidence;
to you, whom I have been accustomed to regard as my worthy brothers in
arms. Return from the momentary error to which you have been capable of
surrendering yourselves, that you may, in joining the rebellious, bring
them back to their duties, and serve your country without violating
your oaths. Experience will have disabused you of your error: return
to the path of fidelity, and you will by that restore the happiness of
your country. You know the clemency of our august sovereign: return to
him. Weigh well the immense responsibility which you will take upon
your heads by a criminal obstinacy. Join yourselves to your brothers
in arms. Show that you are still worthy to be the commanders of the
troops which your sovereign has entrusted to you. You will be received
as brothers. An amnesty of the past is assured to you. The troops which
I command will fulfil with loyalty the intentions of our sovereign,
and the gratitude of your country, restored to tranquillity, will be a
delightful reward for your return to your duty. But if there are found
among you men hardened in crime, who cannot be persuaded to trust in
magnanimity, because they know not the elevated sentiments in which
it has its origin, let all the bonds of military fraternity between
you and them be broken; the all-powerful hand of God, the protector of
the good cause, will bring down upon their heads the punishment due to
their crimes.

 (Signed)      The Marshal Diebitsch Zabalkansky.]

[Footnote 33: To the proclamations of general Diebitsch, one of our
countrymen made a reply, in the form of a letter, which was published
in the gazettes, and which, as far as my memory serves me, was in
nearly the following terms: 'General, your proclamations, which breathe
the spirit of injustice, arrogance, and cruelty--the menacing tone of
which is backed by the colossal force you have led to the invasion
of our territory, and which you are to wield as an instrument for
establishing a new tyranny and inflicting new sufferings upon a country
of freemen,--these proclamations, general, prove that the favorable
opinion which Europe entertained of you was ill-grounded, and that
you too, like the rest, are willing to lend yourself an easy and vile
instrument in the hands of the oppressor. Diebitsch! Can it be you who
so recently passed the Balkan, to deliver a nation from the yoke of
barbarism,--an action which gained for you so great a name in history?

'Do you remember the proclamations which you published on that
occasion, how different from these, filled with noble thoughts, and in
which you felicitated yourself on being placed in command of an army
destined to deliver the unfortunate Greek nation from the barbarism
which was oppressing it. What a contrast! There you went to deliver
the unfortunate; here you come to increase the sufferings of a nation
which has for fifteen years been oppressed in a manner which was well
known to you, and which it is horrible to think of. General, have you
forgotten how you were received at Warsaw, after your return from the
campaign of Turkey? Have you lost the recollection of those looks
of welcome and of joy at the sight of the man who had effected the
deliverance of an unfortunate and oppressed nation? You were then
touched, for the sentiments of the Polish nation were in harmony with
those which you yourself then entertained. All those recollections you
have turned away from. Dazzled by false ideas of greatness, arrogance
has driven from your heart those noble sentiments which would have made
you truly great. Diebitsch! Poland once had confidence in you. Many
Poles had hoped that you would act as a mediator between your monarch
and us. No one could be in a more favorable situation than yourself to
set before that monarch the nature of our sufferings, and the claims
which we had upon his justice. You would have been in a situation to
persuade him that the time had come to aid the cause of civilization,
and to promote his own happiness, by conceding to a nation those rights
which are essential to its happiness and prosperity. Poland had such
expectations of you. You alone, who are so near the person of the
monarch, and to whom his character is so intimately known, you could
have done this. Such conduct would have added indeed to the glory you
had already acquired. Who then would have equalled you? But, for your
misfortune, you have chosen another course, and by acting as a servile
instrument of tyranny you have tarnished all your former glory. Know
then, Diebitsch, that the Poles despise you. Spare both your promises
and your menaces; for with neither will you effect anything. They long
for the approach of your colossal masses, that they may give you an
example of what freemen can do.']




CHAPTER VIII.

 The opening fire.--Affairs of the 10th and 11th February.--Combat
 of Stoczek.--Disposition in consequence of that battle.--Battle of
 Boimie.--Retrograde movement to Dobre.--Combat of Makowiec.--Passage
 of the Orsyca.--Combat of Dobre. Attack on the right wing at Minsk.


The tenth of February, 1831, was the first day, after an interval of
fifteen years, of the encounter between the Russian and Polish arms.
Mendzyrzec (18) was the place in which the first fire was given; and
the little skirmish which took place there was of good presage. On
the morning of that day, two regiments of Cossacks showed themselves
upon the plain before the town, on which were posted two regiments
of krakus, or light cavalry, and the 4th regiment of lancers, as an
advanced guard. Our cavalry were impatient to engage with the enemy,
and begged of their commander to be allowed to attack him. When it
was seen that this body of the enemy was detached from his larger
force, permission was given to one of the two new regiments of light
cavalry, supported by a squadron of the old cavalry as a reserve, to
throw themselves upon the enemy. In a moment our cavalry were among the
ranks of the Cossacks. Both of the enemy's regiments were dispersed,
and one squadron with six officers were taken prisoners. The enemy was
not pursued, our troops being satisfied with this successful attack,
and with having excited the first consternation in the enemy's
ranks. After this skirmish, our cavalry, in obedience to previous
instructions, retired to the environs of Siedlce (2). In this town
was a little garrison consisting of a regiment of light infantry and
a detachment of riflemen, formed and commanded by Michael Kuszel. On
the 11th, at about mid-day, the whole of the advanced guard of the
Russian centre, which was commanded by Diebitsch in person, reached
the environs of Siedlce (2), and took position there. Before the night
set in, other Russian columns began to place themselves upon the same
plain. Their advanced guard then recommenced the march, throwing their
tirailleurs forward, who began a warm fire, which was answered by our
own light troops, who were placed in the faubourgs and the sides of
the town. The brave detachment of Kuszel's riflemen, who were finely
trained and equipped, caused a great loss to the enemy. The Russian
artillery, to protect their tirailleurs and the columns of infantry
which followed them, commenced a heavy fire upon the faubourgs occupied
by our infantry. This fire of the Russian artillery was ineffectual;
but our own fire, as the Russians were exposed in an open plain, was
very destructive. The action continued until dark, when our infantry
began to evacuate the town, and marched to rejoin the divisionary camp,
which was about a mile in the rear.

[Illustration:

_II Steizel._ ]

At 8 o'clock, general Zymirski, supposing that the enemy had taken
possession of the town, determined to make an attack, with two
regiments, upon the town and the Russian camp, at the point of the
bayonet. The 7th regiment of the line and the 4th regiment of light
infantry, which were designated for this object, fell with impetuosity
upon the enemy, whom they found in an wholly unprepared state. A few
hundred prisoners were the fruits of this attack, after which our
forces evacuated the town. These little advantages gained in those
two days, retarded the advance of the enemy. He remained inactive on
the 12th and 13th. On the 14th, the Russian corps under the command
of general Kreutz, composed of 15,000 men and 24 pieces of cannon,
attacked the small corps of observation on our right, under the command
of general Dwernicki.


COMBAT OF STOCZEK. [_See Plan_ II.]

General Dwernicki, although aware of the vast superiority of the
enemy's force, yet, trusting in the strength of his own position,
determined to meet his attack, and give him battle. The position
of Stoczek (_a_) was strong in several respects; first, from its
commanding elevation; secondly, from the circumstance that the town
is protected by the river Swider (_b_), which forms marshes that are
not passable but by a dyke (_m_) at a short distance from the city,
in the direction in which the Russian army was approaching. That
dyke was defended by the whole artillery of our corps, consisting
of three pieces (_e_); and the declivity descending toward the dyke
was occupied by two companies of light troops dispersed in favorable
positions as sharp-shooters, and in such a manner as to act on the
dyke. General Dwernicki divided his forces into the smallest possible
bodies, to give an appearance of extent to his line, and thus mask his
inferiority of force. Leaving a battalion of infantry (_d_) to protect
the artillery and prevent the passage of the dyke,--which passage, he
was sure that the enemy could not possibly execute rapidly, and that
this small force was sufficient, if not to prevent at least to retard
it,--he took the two battalions (_d_) which made the remainder of his
force, and throwing them upon the right bank (A) of this river, in the
forest, where an easier and safer passage was open to the enemy, he
there awaited the enemy's movements. The first step of the Russians
(_g_, _h_) was to place all their artillery (_f_) at the nearest
possible point to our position, and to commence a warm fire upon the
town. Under this fire they thought to effect the passage of the dyke.
General Dwernicki ordered his artillery not to fire, until the Russian
columns should make their appearance on the dyke, and then to open a
fire of grape upon them. In this manner some hours passed, during which
the Russian artillery kept up an ineffectual fire, and the Russian
corps executed various manoeuvres in attempting to force the passage
of the dyke, and in pushing their attack in the direction of the
forest. General Kreutz, seeing that his attempts to force the dyke were
attended with severe loss, and thinking that in the other direction,
the passage would be much more easy, decided on a general attack in
that quarter. He divided his corps, leaving one part before the dyke,
and with the remainder advanced to the attack of our right (A). Strong
columns of Russian infantry and cavalry marched against it. As soon
as this manoeuvre was observed by Dwernicki, the idea was conceived
by him of preventing the attack, by throwing himself with the utmost
impetuosity upon the enemy before he had taken a position, and while on
the march. He renewed his orders to defend with the utmost firmness the
passage of the dyke; and, taking all the cavalry with him, he passed
over towards the forest; and, with the united force of this cavalry
and the infantry who were concealed in the forest, he threw himself
upon the Russian artillery, and the cavalry which was protecting it.
In a moment both artillery and cavalry were completely overthrown
and dispersed, and seven pieces of cannon remained in our hands. The
disorder communicated itself to the columns which were on the march,
who thought no longer of following up their attack, but retreated
as fast as possible, and in fact a general and disorderly retreat
commenced. The ruin of their left wing caused a consternation in the
forces composing their right, who, not knowing what had happened,
ceased their fire, quitted their position, and joined in the general
retreat. Besides the killed and wounded, more than 1,000 prisoners,
with twenty officers, were taken, together with a great quantity of
ammunition, baggage, &c., among which were several voitures containing
the chapels of the camp.[34]

The enemy was followed a short distance only, as the inferiority of our
force would not of course admit of an extended pursuit, and it was an
important object also with general Dwernicki not to permit the enemy to
discover that inferiority. He contented himself therefore with having
destroyed nearly a third part of the enemy's corps, and with having
thrown his whole force into the greatest consternation. This brilliant
affair was the commencement of the remarkable career of general
Dwernicki; and it was a propitious opening for our campaign.

General Dwernicki resumed his former position at Stoczek, where
he awaited the orders which the commander in chief might issue on
receiving the report of what had taken place. To make this position
more strong, he ordered a barricade of trees to be made at the
termination of the dyke and at the other points where the approach was
easy, and, in order to keep a close observation upon the enemy, he sent
patrols in the direction of Kock and Zelechow. While thus occupied, he
received orders to leave his position immediately by a rapid march in
the direction of Zelechow and Macieiowice, then to pass the Vistula and
meet the Russian corps under the command of the Prince Wirtemburg, who,
after having crossed that river at Pulawa, had made a demonstration on
its left bank, and was approaching Warsaw.

On receiving these orders, general Dwernicki left Stoczek on the same
night.

In consequence of the enemy's attack upon Dwernicki's corps, which
covered our right wing, that wing was inclined and withdrawn towards
Kaluszyn, in order not to be exposed to the enemy's demonstrations upon
its flank or rear. The town of Minsk was also occupied by a detachment.
On the 15th the Russians made a simultaneous attack on Wengrow and
Kaluszyn. But the principal attack was intended to be directed against
Kaluszyn, or rather the village of Boimie adjoining it. At Wengrow
the attack was masked. By a strong attack upon our right wing, the
enemy had the design of gaining the great road to Warsaw, a plan which
it was of the utmost importance for us to defeat; for, if he should
have succeeded in forcing our right wing, he would have cut off our
communications with the corps of general Skrzynecki, and Krukowiecki,
which were in a more advanced position. Our generals saw the necessity
of the most determined defence of the position, and general Zymirski
resolved to resist to the last extremity.


BATTLE OF BOIMIE. (_See Plan_ III.)

The battle of Boimie consisted of a persevering effort on the part of
the enemy to force the passage of a dyke (_k_), under the protection
of the fire of a strong battery of artillery (_e_). On our side, every
effort was directed to the making of the passage of that dyke as
destructive as possible to the enemy. For this object our arrangements
were made as follows. On the night of the 14th, we destroyed the
bridges (_m_) over the small river of Kostrzyn, which traverses the
dyke or main road in two places. Not far from the nearest bridge, a
defence of branches of trees (_n_) was thrown together, which having
been well placed, made a good cover for our marksmen, and for a
battalion of infantry (_o_), which were concealed behind them. The fire
of grape from the enemy's artillery was rendered ineffective to a great
degree by this mass of trees. Upon the nearest elevations of ground
(B), general Zymirski placed eighteen pieces of cannon (_a_), the fire
of which was concentrated upon the dyke. By this means every attempt of
the enemy to re-construct the bridge was made to cost him a severe
loss, and was rendered ineffectual. The main body of our forces was
placed without the reach of the enemy's artillery. On the left of our
position, at the distance of about half a mile, a small road (_p_)
led to Dobre, and that road was intersected by the small river above
mentioned. The bridge which continued the road over this river was
destroyed by us, and a small detachment placed there to prevent its
reconstruction and its passage by the enemy.

[Illustration:

 _Boimie_ III]

Such was the distribution of the small force which, profiting by the
strength of its position, was able to meet the attacks of the numerous
body of the enemy commanded by marshal Diebitsch in person, and which
were renewed during the whole day.

The details of the action are as follows:--At about 9 o'clock on the
morning of the 15th, the Russian force commenced debouching from the
forests which border the main road, between Mingosy and Boimie, and
deploying to the right and left, took position. In a short time the
field was covered with the enemy's masses. His force consisted of
twelve regiments of infantry (_f_), six of cavalry (_g_), and sixty
pieces of cannon. It was at about noon that the enemy placed his
artillery upon the heights (A) above the bridge and commenced his fire.
After continuing for some time this fire, which was but occasionally
answered by our artillery, the enemy sent several battalions in column,
upon the bridge, a part of which force engaged in the repair of the
bridge, and the rest attempted to make the passage. Every approach
of the enemy was met with a warm fire from behind the defence of
trees above mentioned, and our artillery at the same time opened a
destructive fire of grape upon the bridge. The attempts of the enemy
were renewed for some hours, in vain.

Finding the impossibility of forcing this passage, he directed his
efforts to that on his right (D), and sent a cloud of light infantry
and cavalry to attempt to pass the marshes, and ford the stream. But
this passage was equally impossible, and several Russian regiments,
who were engaged in the attempt, exposed themselves to a severe fire
of platoons from our troops, and several staff officers of the enemy
were killed at the head of those regiments. In these renewed and bloody
attempts, the day passed away, and as the night approached, our troops
quietly evacuated their position, and took another a few miles in the
rear.

As to the affair at Wengrow, it was only an engagement with the rear
guard of the corps of general Skrzynecki. That general, knowing his
position to be too far advanced, decided to retire as far as the
environs of Dobre. This retreat was so orderly that it seemed rather
an evolution than a retreat. All the movements were executed with
perfect coolness, and the alternate retreat and fire of the different
battalions, the displaying and closing of the columns, the change of
front, &c, were executed with such precision that it impressed the
enemy with a certain degree of respect, and though three times superior
in force he did not attempt to push his attack. In this manner the
corps arrived at the village of Makowiec, where it took position. On
the next day, with the exception of a few light skirmishes between the
outposts, nothing of importance took place. The right wing received
on that day the order to fall back as far as Minsk, some miles in the
rear of their former position. On the evening of that day the line of
operation of our army was as follows:--Our left wing was at Zegrz, the
centre in the environs of Dobre, and the right wing at Minsk.

On the 17th, the enemy attacked our centre at Dobre and our right at
Minsk. It was a day of great bloodshed along our whole line, but, like
the preceding, highly honorable to our arms.


BATTLE OF MAKOWIEC AND DOBRE. (_See Plan_ IV.)

This battle is generally known by the name of the battle of Dobre; but
as it was fought in two different positions, and with two different
plans of operation, I have given the name of the two general positions,
in speaking of the battle. General Skrzynecki was, as we have already
remarked, in a position too far in advance of our right wing; and as
the enemy on that day had attacked, as we have also stated, the right
wing and the centre simultaneously, and could have made, as will be
seen by the plan, a demonstration on Stanislawow, and thus have acted
on the rear of Skrzynecki, which was nearest to him, that general
had two objects to effect. First to make the attack of the enemy as
costly to him as possible, and next to arrange his retrograde movement
in such a manner as to be able to reach Stanislawow by night. Both
of these designs were exceedingly well executed. Upon each of his
positions he was master of his own movements, and quitted them at his
own time. This affair of the 17th of February was the occasion of
the first development of the remarkable talents of this commander.
It was then that he first awakened the high expectations and gained
the confidence of the nation, which soon after committed to him the
trust so honorably and faithfully executed by him. In regard to the
first position at Makowiec, the reader will observe, on examining the
plan, that the Polish forces were principally engaged in defending a
triangular space embraced between the two roads (_f_) which lead from
Wengrow and Kaluszyn and meet behind Makowiec (_h_). This space, over
which small elevations covered with brush-wood were scattered, afforded
good positions for artillery as well as infantry: but the principal
advantage of this peculiarity of the ground was, that it concealed the
inferiority of our forces. In this position, the village of Makowiec
was made a _point d'appui_ upon our left wing, and it was defended
by five companies (_d_), under the command of colonel Dombrowski.
Six pieces of artillery (_e_) placed in the rear of this village,
reached with their fire the village and the plain in front of it. The
Russian position was an open plain.

[Illustration:

_IV Makowiec 104._ ]

[Illustration:

V. _Dobre p. 104._ ]

The enemy commenced by an attack upon the two roads from Wengrow and
Kaluszyn; and as the attack was met with a strong resistance, he began
to deploy upon the plain between the two roads, and to take order of
battle. Nearly 30,000 Russians, with fifty or sixty pieces of cannon
(_c_), in a short time were seen upon that plain, and commenced a
terrible fire of artillery and musquetry along their whole line,
directed principally against the village and the wooded ground. Several
battalions (_a_), in column, attempted an attack upon these points.
Those attacks were witnessed by colonels Dombrowski and Boguslawski
with perfect indifference. They even ordered our artillery not to
fire. Our tirailleurs, and all the infantry in that position, formed
themselves into detached columns (_k_) of half battalions, and the
Russian columns approached. Our artillery then commenced a fire of
grape, and this fire was a signal for our columns, with the brave
colonels Boguslawski and Dombrowski at their head, to leave their cover
and to throw themselves upon the enemy. The 4th regiment immortalized
itself in that attack. One of its columns threw itself upon three of
the enemy,--the fire ceased, and a terrible carnage at the point of the
bayonet commenced. The enemy repeatedly renewed his attacking force,
but he found it impossible to move our position. At about mid-day,
having suffered so much from loss and exhaustion, he discontinued the
attack. General Skrzynecki, profiting by the cessation of the enemy's
fire, took the opportunity to pass the Liwiec, and ordered a light
fire of tirailleurs to be kept up, under cover of which his columns
commenced executing the passage. When the greater part of the corps had
passed, the tirailleurs began to make a retrograde movement, and were
undisturbed by the enemy. Six squadrons of cavalry (_e_), left as a
rear guard, protected the passage of the river by the light troops. In
this manner the position was slowly evacuated, the bridge destroyed,
and by about two o'clock the whole corps were on the march for Dobre.
The six squadrons abovenamed, to which were added nine pieces of light
artillery (_m_), prevented for a long while the reconstruction of the
bridge by the enemy, and did not quit their position until the corps
was at a safe distance, after which they followed rapidly and overtook
the corps at about four o'clock, and with it took position in order of
battle near Dobre.


BATTLE OF DOBRE. [_See Plan_ V.]

The position of Dobre was more advantageous for us than the former.
It was protected in front by two ponds of considerable size, which
lost themselves at their extremities in marshy ground. The only
passage which led between those two ponds was easy of defence, and
general Skrzynecki posted upon it twelve pieces of artillery of large
calibre (_a_). The remaining part of this position was, like the
former, covered with scattered clumps of brush-wood. The principal
circumstance, however, which made this position eligible, was the
declivity of the ground, inclining towards the marshy ponds above
mentioned.

General Skrzynecki collected all his cavalry upon his right wing, to
hinder the enemy from gaining the road that leads to Minsk (A). The
left of his position (B) he laid open to the enemy. The position in
that direction was surrounded by marshes, upon which, if the enemy
should advance, it would be impossible for him to extricate himself
without being exposed to fight on the most disadvantageous terms.

On this oblique front, general Skrzynecki awaited the approach of the
Russian force. In about half an hour after our position was taken,
the enemy arrived, and began to debouch between the two ponds, which
he was allowed to do, under a very light fire of our artillery. Every
manoeuvre, however, upon our right was met with desperate charges of
the bayonet, and the fire of our whole artillery. All his attempts in
that quarter were ineffectual. In the repulses of these attacks, two
of our bravest colonels, Boguslawski, commander of the 4th regiment of
infantry, and Ziemiecki, commander of the 2d regiment of hulans, (the
former fighting on foot with his carbine in his hand at the head of
his regiment,) were severely wounded. At last, after these ineffectual
attempts on our right, the enemy fell into the plans of general
Skrzynecki, and began to act on our left, when our commander hastened
to take all the advantage of the situation in which the enemy were
about to expose themselves, that the lateness of the day permitted.
General Skrzynecki passed down the front of our line, and addressed the
soldiers in a few animating words, to prepare them to make a general
attack on the enemy. Our forces were divided into two parts, the
smaller of which occupied, by their attack, the main body of the enemy,
while the larger threw itself upon the enemy's right wing, which was at
some distance from the rest of his forces, and was apparently intending
to act on our right wing and to turn it. In a moment this body of the
enemy's force was completely broken up. The fury of the attack was
such, that some Russian battalions were entirely destroyed. It was
only the near approach of night, and the inadequacy of our force for a
pursuit, which saved the whole of the enemy's corps from destruction;
for his entire right wing took to flight, and a general consternation
ensued. The enemy lost on that day, according to his own reports, more
than 6,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. On our side the loss
amounted to about 800.

Thus ended the memorable battle of Dobre. General Skrzynecki left
his position, and arrived on the same night at Stanislawow. Marshal
Diebitsch and the Grand Duke Constantine were with the Russian forces,
in person, on that day, according to the report of the prisoners. The
former, to whom this commencement of the withering of his laurels had
led to a state of the greatest exasperation, often led the columns in
person to the fire--but all in vain.

On the same day, as we have already remarked, our right wing was
attacked at Minsk. The enemy supposed that our main force was there,
and it was for that reason that he chose to attack Dobre, being more
confident of piercing our line at that point. The Russian corps under
general Rosen, which attacked our right wing, satisfied themselves with
keeping up a fire of artillery on Minsk, and the day passed without any
attempt to force the position having been made. Our troops were in the
same position at night as in the morning, and nothing of importance
occurred, although occasionally severe losses were sustained on both
sides.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 34: It was in this battle that the celebrated Matuszka (in
Russian Mamyuika,) or the image of the Holy Mother, fell into our
hands. This image was held in great veneration by that superstitious
people. In the campaign of Turkey, many of their successes were
attributed to the Mamyuika. Its loss occasioned a general sensation
in the Russian army, and was regarded by them as a most unfavorable
presage. We often heard the prisoners whom we afterwards took,
attribute all their misfortunes to the Holy Mother having abandoned
them.]




CHAPTER IX.

 Retrograde movement of the 18th of February.--Details of this
 movement, and of the actions which took place.--The army reaches
 the field of Praga.--Its reception at Warsaw.--Position of the
 army.--Battle of Wavre and Bialolenka.--Operations of general
 Dwernicki against the corps of Prince Wirtemburg.--Defeat of that
 corps by general Dwernicki at Swierza.--Renewal of the enemy's attack
 on the main army on the 20th.--Its successful resistance.--Review
 of the events of the preceding days.--Examination of the plan of
 operations of the Polish army.


On the 18th, our whole line was ordered to make a retrograde movement.
[_See Plan_ VI.] The utmost order and tranquillity was to be observed
in this movement. The several corps were required to preserve a
constant communication with each other, and to keep themselves
uniformly on the same parallel. General Zimirski, commanding the right
wing (A), and who remained on the main road, received orders to take
advantage of every good position which he should meet with between
Dembe-Wielkie (13) and Milosna (12). Three points in particular were
recommended to his attention, Dembe-Wielkie, (14), and Milosna. Nature
presents at those points commanding positions surrounded by forests.
In each of those positions, the enemy would be exposed to the fire of
our artillery, on debouching from the intervening forests; and it was
designed to make the attack of those positions as costly as possible to
the enemy.

[Illustration: _VI. p. 100_]

The centre (B), which was commanded by generals Skrzynecki and
Krukowiecki, was to retire upon the road which leads from
Stanislawow (9) to Okuniew (11). Upon this winding road, which
traverses thick forests, the means of defence was easy.

The left wing (C), commanded by Szembek and Uminski, which was in
the environs of Zegrz (4), received orders to gain Jablonna (16),
and Zombke (15), on the same night. The great bridge over the Narew
at Zegrz was to be destroyed, and a small detachment to be left at
Zagroby, for the purpose of observing the enemy.

Conformably to the above orders, our entire line commenced the
evacuation of its position, and an incessant fire was kept up
throughout the line, during the whole day. In the morning, two
squadrons of light cavalry, which were sent from Minsk to Stanislawow,
met a regiment of cossacks, who were making a reconnoisance, after
having traversed the forest of Jakubow. The cavalry threw themselves
upon them, dispersed them, and took two hundred prisoners with their
horses. Upon the position of Dembe, our cavalry threw themselves upon
some Russian artillery which appeared upon our right, and were marching
in a direction from Ruda. Six chests of ammunition were taken, and
four pieces of cannon were spiked. At Stanislaus, the 2d regiment of
hulans and the 4th of the line performed prodigies of valor, throwing
themselves continually upon superior masses of the enemy. The division
of general Zimirski repelled two successive attacks from a superior
force of the enemy at Konik, upon the road between Dembe-Wielkie and
Janowek. Twelve pieces of artillery, placed upon the elevated points
of the road, poured an incessant fire of grape upon the masses which
were advancing to the attack, and which were enclosed by forests on
both sides, as well as impeded in their progress by the trees which had
been placed across the road to obstruct them; and, although the enemy
constantly renewed his attacking columns, he was not able to force our
position, which indeed was not evacuated, until the movement of the
general line required a corresponding withdrawal of this division.

Our left wing fought with equal advantages at Nasielsk. From this town,
which was entirely in flames, the attacks of the enemy were repeatedly
repulsed. Our artillery distinguished themselves by acts of daring
valor. They drew their pieces into the midst of blazing streets, in
order to pour a more effective fire upon the masses of the enemy, who
had entered at the opposite extremities.

The first regiment of light infantry, having at their head the brave
Szembek, threw themselves upon a part of the town occupied by a whole
division of the enemy, and drove them out. Even in the midst of the
burning town, our chasseurs fell upon and destroyed the different
parties of the enemy. The enemy, on quitting the place, were exposed
to continual attacks from our cavalry, under the command of general
Uminski, who took on that day some hundred prisoners, and among them
several officers.

Our right wing in its last position at Milosna (12), held the enemy in
check before that town. General Zimirski placed his artillery upon the
heights behind the town, from which the town and the adjoining plain
was commanded. Every attempt of the enemy, every debouchment from the
forest, cost him a severe loss. The enemy in vain took positions with
his artillery to act upon us. He was not permitted to occupy Milosna
until night approached.

At Okuniew, the road passes a marshy forest for more than half a mile.
The enemy was imprudent enough to push his columns upon this road.
General Skrzynecki awaited them at a point not far distant on the
opposite side. The advanced guard of the enemy, imprudently composed of
several regiments of cossack cavalry, had already passed the dyke, when
the 4th regiment threw themselves in columns upon them.

These forces of the enemy were thrown into the utmost consternation.
Their only escape was into the marshes on either side, where some
hundreds of them were taken prisoners without resistance. The arrival
of the night terminated the scene, and saved this advanced guard of the
enemy from total destruction. Thus ended a sanguinary day, on which, in
every part of our line, our troops were victorious, and the enemy was
subjected to immense losses. Our generals had made the best choice of
their positions, and had profited by them to the utmost.

The enemy's loss on that day, in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
amounted to at least 10,000 men. On our side the loss did not exceed
1,000.[35]

On the night of the 18th our army took the following position. [_See
Plan_ VII.] Our left wing was between Jablonna (16) and Zombki (15),
and sent out its reconnoisances as far as Zagroby (4), upon the Narew
(N), the bridge over which at that place they destroyed. Our centre was
between Okuniew (11) and Zombki (15). Our right wing was at Wavre (17).

After two such bloody days, as the preceding had been for the Russians,
we cannot sufficiently express our astonishment that marshal Diebitsch
should have allowed his army no repose, but should have again pushed
his attack, without any new plan, on the 19th and 20th. These
operations of Diebitsch, without an assignable end, indicated a blind
confidence in numbers, or the headlong fury of a man inflamed by the
renown which he had acquired, and who was determined to make the event
bear out as nearly as possible, whatever sacrifice it might cost, the
rash boast which he is said to have made, that he would finish the war
in twenty-four hours. But he sacrificed his thousands in vain.

On the 19th an action took place, not only with the grand army under
the walls of Warsaw, or on the fields of Praga, but also on the left
bank of the Vistula at Swierza [(7) _Pl._ VI], forty miles from Warsaw,
where general Dwernicki beat prince Wirtemberg, who, as we have already
mentioned, had passed the Vistula at Pulawa [(6) _Pl._ VI], and was
approaching Warsaw [(1) _Pl._ VI].


BATTLE OF WAVRE AND BIALOLENKA. [_Pl._ VIII _and_ IX.]

At the break of day, upon every point, the right wing, the centre, and
the left wing, our line was attacked. We might remark in regard to the
positions of the two armies on that day, that our right wing, (A) which
was at Wavre, was unprotected, while on the other hand the left wing
(C) of the enemy, opposite to it, was very advantageously placed on
heights covered with wood, between Milosna and Wavre. Our centre (B)
was better posted at Kawenzyn. It occupied this village, (which was in
a commanding position,) and the declivity descending from it to the
plain of Zombki. Our left wing at Bialolenka was also advantageously
covered by little wooded hills, having two dykes in front leading
toward them.

The Russians on that day directed their strongest attack upon our right
wing, which occupied the weakest position. With the view of carrying
this position, they sent against it some forty battalions of infantry
and some thirty squadrons of cavalry, supported by seventy pieces
of artillery. Our position was defended by a division of about ten
battalions of infantry and fifteen squadrons of artillery, supported by
twenty-four pieces of artillery. This enormous disproportion did not
discourage our soldiers. Their energy supplied the place of numbers.
The enemy commenced his attack by a warm fire of light troops and
a fire from his artillery, which commanded the plain. The skilful
manoeuvres of general Zimirski, in displaying his front, contracting
it, dividing it into small parties, and withdrawing or advancing, as
the direction of the enemy's artillery required, and thus avoiding
the effect of his fire, prevented the loss which it would else have
occasioned. In this way several hours were occupied, when the enemy,
trusting to the impression which he supposed his fire to have made, at
about ten o'clock sent forward twelve or more battalions (D) to the
charge. General Zimirski, anticipating this movement, withdrew, in
order to lead them on to the plain between Wavre and Grokow, sending
to general Skrzynecki an aid-de-camp to inform him of this manoeuvre,
and to engage him to send a force of cavalry to act upon the enemy's
columns in flank. General Skrzynecki, who occupied, as we have stated,
the heights of Kawenzyn, was also warmly engaged with a brigade of the
enemy, and had already observed this imprudent advance of the enemy
in his attack, who had indeed gone beyond the line of Skrzynecki's
position. In a moment the order was given for the brigade of general
Kicki to throw themselves upon the enemy's flank; and as general Kicki
approached with the ten squadrons (E) which composed his command,
general Zimirski gave orders for a general charge both upon the enemy's
cavalry (F) and infantry (D). The columns of the enemy were carried
away before these charges, and their attack was wholly paralyzed.
This onset, which was so successfully made, forced the enemy (H) to
incline his position back from Kawenzyn to Milosna. That manoeuvre
was decisive of the enemy's fate, and it was well understood by our
generals. General Skrzynecki, by pushing forward the left of his
division, cut off the right wing of the enemy from all communication
with his centre, and at about mid-day our right wing and centre
occupied their former position at Wavre, including the small forest
of elders which was between the enemy's left wing and centre; and, in
fact, general Skrzynecki occupied a part also of the Great Forest.
This state of things was to be profited by, and the right wing of the
enemy, thus separated, was to be attacked before the enemy should be
able to renew his attack upon Kawenzyn, and the forest of elders, and
our right wing. To execute this plan, the two divisions of Krukowiecki
and Szembek, composing our left wing, which was fighting at Bialolenka,
[_See Plan_ IX] received orders to push a strong attack against the
enemy's front, at the same moment that a brigade (B) of Skrzynecki's
division, supported by some pieces of cannon, operated upon the road
(_a_) leading from Kawenzyn (_b_) to Zombki (_k_). By this manoeuvre
the enemy was menaced with being taken in the rear.

The left wing, as we have said, was warmly engaged with the superior
force of the Russians; who, by placing some fifty pieces of cannon
(_f_) behind the two dykes (_e_) above named, kept up a sweeping
fire of grape upon our artillery (_d_) and infantry (_c_), which
were defending the passage of the dykes. A considerable body of the
enemy had already reached the hither side of the dykes, when general
Uminski, with a brigade of cavalry (D), advanced to the charge, and
at the same time communicated the orders to the two divisions to
commence the general attack. Under a warm fire of grape, our cavalry
threw themselves upon the enemy's infantry, which had debouched over
the dykes. A general charge commenced, and our cavalry penetrated the
enemy's masses. The 2nd and 3rd regiments of chasseurs distinguished
themselves by their feats of bravery. The enemy was repulsed, and began
to fall back and crowd upon the dykes, and at this moment their rout
was effected. A brigade (B) from general Skrzynecki's division arrived,
and commenced a fire of grape upon the dykes, over which the enemy was
flying in the greatest disorder. Their ranks were in the utmost
confusion; they crowded with precipitation upon the dykes, exposed
continually to our destructive fire. By this repulse the whole of the
enemy's right wing was broken, and they commenced a general retreat,
leaving a great number of prisoners, who either had not reached the
dykes or could not get from them, amounting to perhaps a thousand men,
besides another thousand killed and wounded. The enemy also lost two
standards, four pieces of cannon, several chests of ammunition, and
many horses.

[Illustration: _VII. p. 114._]

[Illustration: _VIII. p. 116._]

[Illustration: _IX. p. 119._]

[Illustration: _X. p. 122._]

In this manner ended the attack upon that wing; and indeed the general
attack might be said to have ended here. Towards night the enemy
renewed his attacks upon our centre and right, but they were feeble.
Thus closed another day, which, like the preceding, was most propitious
to our arms.


BATTLE AT SWIERZA. [_See Plan_ X.]

On this same day, as we have mentioned, general Dwernicki, with a
detached corps, fought the enemy at Swierza. The reader is already
aware that this general, having gained a victory over the corps of
general Kreutz at Stoczek [_Plan_ VI, (18)], on the 14th of February,
received orders to pass the Vistula, in order to defend the palatinate
of Mazovie, to check the operations of the enemy there, and to obstruct
his demonstrations upon Warsaw.

On receiving this order, general Dwernicki, on the night of the same
day, quitted Stoczek, traversed Zelechow (19) and Macieiowice, and on
the 17th passed the Vistula near Ryczywol (7). On the 18th he commenced
his operations against the corps of prince Wirtemberg, which was on its
way from Radom, and the advanced guard of which begun to show itself
upon the plain of Ryczywol.[36]

General Dwernicki harassed the enemy on that day [_See Plan_ X,] by
continual charges of cavalry, in which the krakus of Krakowie were
particularly distinguished. His only plan upon that day was to keep
the enemy upon the plain of Ryczywol. During the night he intended to
pass, with the chief part of his force, the river Radomierza above
Ryczywol (_f_), and by this course to present himself to the enemy
upon the road which leads from Radom to Ryczywol, the same road in fact
upon which the enemy had advanced, and attack him both on his flank
and rear, the Vistula being on his front. In executing this movement,
general Dwernicki left two squadrons of cavalry (A), one battalion of
infantry (A), and two pieces of cannon, at the side of the river, under
the command of colonel Russyian. He then quietly left his position,
and crossed the river in its fordable places (_f_) about half a league
above. Colonel Russyian, who as we have said remained on the position
at Ryczywol, was ordered to commence a light fire of skirmishers at
break of day, but to retrograde constantly, and to allow the enemy an
easy passage over the bridge. On the 19th, the enemy (D), who had no
suspicions of the manoeuvre, commenced in the morning his debouchment
upon the bridge, having the expectation of engaging with our whole
force in a decisive battle upon the field of Ryczywol. His astonishment
may be imagined, when, as the day commenced, he found both upon his
flank and his rear a force marching against him to the attack (B). The
enemy stopped passing the bridge, and attempted to turn and meet the
attack, but this was not permitted him. Our cavalry threw themselves
with impetuosity upon that part of his forces which were attempting
to place themselves in position; and our artillery, which was boldly
brought near the enemy's columns, poured a terribly destructive fire of
grape upon them. The utmost consternation ensued, and a general and
disorderly flight was commenced in the direction of Nowawies (N), to
which place our corps continued the pursuit of the enemy (R).

This day, which may be called one of the most brilliant in our war,
cost the enemy, besides his killed and wounded, two thousand prisoners,
with more than twenty officers, four standards, ten pieces of cannon,
some hundred horses, and about thirty chests with ammunition, with
officers' baggage, &c. The prince Wirtemberg with the remains of his
corps retreated by forced marches to the small town of Granica, where
he repassed the Vistula and reached Pulawa. Thus, by a single battle,
the whole country on this side of the Vistula was cleared of the
presence of the enemy.

General Dwernicki permitted to his corps, who were really much
exhausted by fighting and marching, to repose by a slow march as far
as Kozienice, where he remained stationary, sending out, however, his
reconnoisances as far as Pulawa.

On the 20th of February our main army was engaged with the enemy the
whole day upon the same position as on the preceding. This repetition
of his attack, without a change of plan or position, was a great
weakness in the enemy. On that day, feeling sensibly the loss of a part
of the great forest opposite Kawenzyn, as well as that of the small
forest of elders, the enemy commenced his attack upon those points.
Some twenty battalions were incessantly pushed forward to the attack,
against which eight battalions on our part kept an effectual stand
for several hours. This day, although uninteresting and indecisive
in manoeuvres, was bloody. No important blow was attempted by us,
but every attack of the enemy was met with a vigorous and sanguinary
repulse. It was a day of glory for the 4th regiment--the day on which
that celebrated regiment, though already distinguished, began to take
its high place in our reports; and on which it fought with a degree
of valor that could never have been surpassed. Without even waiting
for orders, this brave regiment was seen constantly pushing itself
towards the points of the greatest danger; and its companies were often
fighting singly in the very midst of the thickest masses of the enemy.

By the unsuccessful and costly attacks of the enemy the whole day was
occupied, and at its close, after the loss of thousands of men, he had
not gained a foot of ground.

Thus ten days had passed in continual and bloody actions upon the same
position, during which the Polish army had been uniformly successful,
and at the end of which the enemy discontinued his attacks, thus giving
the most convincing proof of the extent of the losses he had suffered
on all points, during that period, amounting, in fact, in killed,
wounded and prisoners, to full 30,000 men. In this space of ten days,
the whole Russian army had been engaged, and that army amounted, as
we have already said, and as will be confirmed by all the official
reports, to more than 150,000 infantry, 50,000 cavalry, and 300 pieces
of cannon. To this force was opposed a handful, comparatively, of
Poles, consisting of 30,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 96 pieces of
cannon; a sixth part, in fact, of the Russian force.

This memorable commencement of our war will show to the world what can
be effected by a nation fighting in defence of its liberty and to throw
off an oppressive yoke. Those bloody combats, and that enthusiasm,
to which my feeble pen cannot render justice, but which some better
historian will present to the world in their true colors, should
convince men that the immense mercenary forces which a despot may lead
on, and by which he trusts to enforce his will, may avail him little.
His enormous masses are like a heap of sand, which a little stone can
pierce. Without animating motives, and therefore without energy,--a
machine scarcely to be trusted,--that army itself, upon the slightest
change of circumstances, may become terrible to the despot, of whom and
of whose creatures it was to have been made the unhappy sacrifice.

The reader will pardon me, if I fatigue him with farther reflections
upon this stage of our affairs. I shall not exaggerate in saying that
this enormous mass of the enemy's forces would in an equal period
have been absolutely annihilated, if we had then had a commander in
chief of greater talent, and a general plan of operation differently
arranged,--for the different operations in detail were, generally
speaking, perfectly executed. The commander in chief, prince Radzivil,
was an individual of the most estimable character, but as he afterwards
himself avowed, not possessed of military talent. General Chlopicki,
who was always near him, and who in fact virtually commanded, if he
had in the early part of his life exhibited military talent, in his
present advanced age had certainly lost much of his energy, and was
unfit to undertake things which demanded the most active intellect, and
the most absolute devotedness of mind and body to the cause. We cannot
too strongly express our astonishment that general Chlopicki, who had
formed the plan, and a very judicious one it was, of drawing the enemy
on to the walls of Warsaw, to give him there a decisive battle, should
have neglected to fortify the natural positions upon his route, by
which the enemy's loss would have been doubled or even trebled. Serock
and Zagroby (4), [_See Plan_ VI], situated upon points of the greatest
importance, especially the first, were evacuated by our forces, for
the want of proper defences. Not the slightest fortification was
constructed at the different passages of the Narew (N), the Bug (B),
the Liewiec (L), and the Swider (S), nor upon the region between those
rivers, which was full of forests and impenetrable marshes, and in
which proper fortifications would have presented the most important
obstructions to the enemy's passage. No concealed passages or by-roads
through those forests were constructed, as they should have been, by
which a body of troops could be led in ambuscade and brought to act
suddenly on the enemy's flanks or otherwise, in critical moments,
and with decisive effect. Such works would have required but little
expense, and could have been made by the Jewish inhabitants, of whom
there are some millions in Poland, (twenty thousand in Warsaw alone,)
and who could have no claims for exemption, for they render no service
to the country, but on the contrary lead a life of profitable fraud
and deception, practised upon the inhabitants. The Jews, indeed, with
some very few exceptions, did not in the least aid in the war, but
often frustrated our exertions by their espionage; and there are in
fact instances of their having fought against us,--against those who
had given them an asylum upon their soil. In the towns of Nasielsk and
Makow this occurred. This part of our population, who had an equal
interest with us in the protection of the country, as far as property
was concerned, could have been thus employed with perfect justice and
propriety. If, by such arrangements, a system of fortification had been
properly united with tactics, and all the plans directed by a man of
talents and energy, of which examples were certainly to be found in
our ranks, with such troops to command, the reader will admit that the
Russian forces could have been soon driven back to the frontiers.

The succession of victories which we have described were not the
results of any general system:--they were victories of detail, executed
with energy and rapidity, and for which we were indebted to the
generals of divisions and brigades, the colonels of regiments, &c.
These successes were isolated, but, had they been made to bear upon
each other, their advantages would have been much greater. For example,
the battle of Dobre, which was so brilliantly gained by Skrzynecki,
would have caused the total ruin of the corps opposed to him, if the
11th division of Krukowiecki, which was in the environs of Jadow, had
come to the aid of Skrzynecki during that action. And indeed this
was the expectation of Skrzynecki when he remained so long upon the
position of Makowiec. But this division, instead of acting upon the
rear of the enemy, as it might have done, having no orders to this
effect, continued its retrograde march, although within the sound of
the cannon of that action.

On the 18th there was not enough of harmony in the operations of the
several divisions. On that day, if those operations had been directed
from one point as from a centre, the enemy, who had been guilty of
extreme imprudence in the advance which he had made into the marshy
and wooded region between Stanislawow (9), Okuniew (11), and the great
road, could have been completely hedged in. [_See Plan_ VI.] The
manoeuvres of general Zimirski, when the enemy made his rapid attack
on the morning of the 19th, were executed at hazard, no general order
having been given in anticipation of such an attack. These manoeuvres
were well executed by general Zimirski: but if the case had been thus
anticipated by the commander in chief, and, at the commencement of the
action, our right wing had been withdrawn to Grochow, [_See_ (A) _Plan_
VIII,] an obstinate defence of the commanding position of Kawenzyn
(B) being kept up, and the enemy had been thus allowed to follow our
right wing with his left; by the same method of operation which was in
fact executed by Skrzynecki and Zimirski, in concert, but with much
larger forces; the enemy could have been attacked on his flank, and
instead of the annihilation of his sixteen battalions, the same fate
would have attended twice or thrice that number;--for, when a force
is taken by surprise in flank and rear, numbers avail comparatively
little in resistance;--indeed, the greater the number, the greater is
the difficulty of changing position, and the greater the disorder and
consternation which follows.

The Russian army was thus early inspired with terror at the resistance
which it had experienced, and the immense losses to which it had
been subjected. It was of the utmost importance to profit by this
consternation; but the vast advantages which might have been gained
under such circumstances, by some general plan of offensive operations
of bold and decisive character, were let pass.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 35: I cannot pass over this occasion of describing the manner
in which the nation received that army, which had but a month before
left the walls of Warsaw, and had, after so many glorious actions,
returned to give there a decisive battle to the enemy, and to fall or
conquer there before the eyes of the nation. Those were moments rare in
history, and should be handed down to posterity, to demonstrate to what
a height the feelings of the nation were exalted, and what a unanimity
was felt in the great cause that warmed all hearts. The thunder of the
cannon which, during the 15th, rolled over the fields of Milosna and
Okuniew, was heard at Warsaw, and announced the approach of the army.
At nightfall, when our first detachments began to show themselves from
the forests of Milosna and Jablonna, and to deploy upon the plains of
Wavre and Bialolenka, the whole population of Warsaw began to leave
the city, and go forth to meet and hail their defenders. The senate,
whose estimable president, Czartoriski, was with the army, left the
city also. In a short time the fields were covered with an exulting
multitude. When the army took its position, and all was quiet under the
protection of night, the people drew near and entered the camp. What
a touching scene was there presented! Here a father and mother seek
their son, who meeting them, presses them to his bosom. There a wife,
leading her children, finds her husband and their father, and throws
herself into his arms, while the children cling around the knees of
their delighted parents. A melancholy contrast was presented by those
who sought in vain for son--husband--parent. But no complaint was
heard. The tears falling for those who were no more, were checked by
the thought that they had died for their country.

The senate, in the name of the nation, and in the most touching
language, thanked the commander in chief and his officers for the
services which they had rendered to their country, and requested them
to communicate these sentiments to the whole army. They finished their
address in nearly the following terms: 'Preserve, brave compatriots,
this noble energy, and in a short time the throne of despotism will
fall, and upon its ruins civilization and public happiness will rise.'
The people continued with the army, furnishing them with every comfort,
and regardless of the fire which was commenced the next day from the
enemy's artillery. Under this fire, vehicles with provisions and
ammunition were continually arriving from the city, and some of them
were destroyed by the enemy's shot. During the actions before Warsaw,
the inhabitants made it a duty to be at hand, to bear off and succor
the wounded; and among those who engaged in these offices were some of
the most distinguished ladies of Warsaw. The strangers who were then
there, and who witnessed the enthusiasm which animated the people, and
seemed to unite them into one family, exclaimed that such a nation
could never, and ought never be conquered.

The following days, the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd of February, in which no
action took place, were devoted to thanksgiving to God, for his favor
in protecting the Polish cause thus far. In all the churches the people
assembled to offer prayers for the welfare of the country; and the army
employed this period of repose in the same manner. On that field, over
which the three hundred cannon of the enemy were pointed in battle
array; while the first line was in position, the rest of the army were
engaged in these devotional exercises. At each assemblage of troops,
the ministers of religion administered patriotic oaths, and animated
the soldiers to perseverance in the holy struggle. Those sacred
ceremonies were followed by hymns, which were sung along the whole
line, and which, mingling with the solemn sounds of the bells of Warsaw
tolling for the assembly of the people in the churches, produced an
indescribably impressive effect. These exercises ended in the general
shout of 'Poland forever!'

To convince the Russians that the Poles were not blindly fighting
against them as Russians, but for that cause of civilization and
happiness which was of equal moment to themselves, several hundred
white flags were prepared with inscriptions in the Russian language,
in terms such as follows: 'Russians! brother Sarmatians! we march to
combat not as your enemies, but to fight for your welfare as well as
our own.' Each regiment received from ten to twenty of those flags,
which, during the combat, were to be distributed among the tirailleurs
and flankers. They were directed to throw them, as occasion might
offer, among the Russian ranks. Many of those volunteers, in rushing
forward to plant those flags among the Russian skirmishers, met their
death at the hands of those whom they wished to save from tyranny. Thus
the Poles had done all that their duty required of them in this holy
contest, to convince the world that the general cause of civilization
and happiness was the great end of their struggle. They sought not
their own aggrandizement by conquests from the territory of another
nation, for their ancient boundaries are wide enough for them. They
fought for that liberty which they had for ages possessed; and that
ancient liberty and those ancient limits they will sooner or later
regain.]

[Footnote 36: The prince Wirtemberg, who commanded the corps against
which general Dwernicki was sent, had served in the Polish army as
brigadier-general. He was cousin to the present king of Wirtemberg,
and nephew of the late Emperor Alexander, who married his aunt. This
prince commanded the 2d and 4th regiment of hulans, of the first
of which regiments general Dwernicki was colonel. In this way the
prince was perfectly well known to general Dwernicki, and was held
by him in very low esteem, as a man of vanity and pretension, and
a tyrant over his subalterns. The vices of his character developed
themselves sufficiently during our revolution. At the breaking out of
the revolution at Warsaw, this man was at Krasny-staw, a small town
in the palatinate of Lublin, in which his brigade was posted. On the
arrival of the news of the revolution, his first care was to secrete
himself. Afterwards, finding that it was impossible to keep concealed,
he began to tamper with the brigade, and tried to persuade his soldiers
to adhere to the service of the Grand Duke, and to refuse to join the
cause of their country. These false persuasions, coming from him, a
general in the Polish service, in open defiance of the will of the
nation, and in opposition to its holiest efforts, afforded a sufficient
ground of accusation against him, to have brought him to judgment as
a traitor. Besides all this, by his tyrannic conduct as a general, he
had deserved severe treatment. But all these offences were forgotten,
and the nation spared him, merely ordering him to quit the country.
He exhibited his gratitude for this delicate treatment, by departing
for Russia and the Polish provinces, and pointing out for arrest some
of the most respectable citizens, who were known for their patriotic
sentiments. He passed several days at Wlodawa, a small frontier town
between the Polish kingdom and the government of Grodno. There he was
guilty of the mean act of intercepting the correspondence between the
different patriotic individuals.

This was not enough. In the campaign, he took the command of a
Russian corps destined to act in the very palatinate of Lublin where
he had held his Polish command for fourteen years, and where all the
proprietors had treated him with the greatest kindness and delicacy.
Arriving there with his corps, he left at every step the traces of his
tyranny. On reaching Pulawa, the estate of the beloved Czartoriski, the
president of the national government, the residence of that family from
which he had himself received so many kindnesses, and in which every
virtue reigned, he did not scruple to give orders to burn the town;--he
did not scruple to take the name in history of 'the devastator of
Pulawa'--of that beautiful spot on which the labor of ages had been
expended, and which was so celebrated for the charms with which nature
as well as art had enriched it. His cruelties were carried to such a
height, that he actually caused to be beaten with the knout, a young
lady, a friend of the princess Czartoriski, who had manifested her
patriotic sentiments by the sacrifice of her jewels to aid the cause
of her country. Even the princess Czartoriski, who was already at an
advanced age, was not spared the insults of this gross man, who, to
put the finishing stroke to his barbarity, on his second visit to
Pulawa, directed a fire of artillery upon the palace, which he knew
was occupied only by the princess and her ladies. Even the Russians
themselves regarded these actions with abhorrence. In regard to his
military talents, they were of the lowest order. General Dwernicki
promised that in a few weeks he would despatch him; and he in fact kept
this promise to the letter.]




CHAPTER X.

 Proceedings of the National Government.--Marshal Diebitsch
 continues in a state of inactivity.--Negotiations are opened by
 him.--His propositions are declined.--Position of the army on the
 24th, and battle of Bialolenka.--Position on the 25th.--Great
 battle of Grochow.--Details.--State of the Russian army after its
 defeat.--Examination of the plan of the battle of Grochow.--Remarks
 upon the course adopted by prince Radzivil after that victory.--The
 Polish army crosses the Vistula to Warsaw.--Its reception by the
 national government and the citizens.--Resignation of prince Radzivil.


Whilst the army was thus gloriously fighting, the national government
were laboring for the happiness of the people. Among other valuable
institutions, it adopted a paternal guardianship over the defenders of
the country by designating an allotment of lands for each soldier. Many
of the most wealthy families contributed of their landed property for
that object. Another act was to free the peasantry from the Corvee,
by purchasing the rights of the landholders over them. Each peasant
was made a proprietor, and for the landholders an arrangement of
compensation in the form of annual instalments for a period of years,
was made by the government. Other institutions for the public welfare,
as the establishment of schools, &c, received also the attention of the
government.

When, after so many battles, the Russian commander discontinued
his attacks, it may be supposed that besides the repose which his
army required, he had another object, viz. to wait the arrival of
new corps, consisting of 20,000 men, and 36 pieces of cannon, under
prince Sczachowski. He evidently wished to concentrate all his small
detachments and all his reserves, in order to strike, with his whole
force, a decisive blow; and the attempt was, in fact, soon made.

Our army, which in the ten preceding days had lost about six thousand
men, was reinforced by three regiments armed with pitchforks,
amounting to about the number we had lost. Our whole army, infantry
and cavalry, may have amounted to 40,000 men, and, with the pieces
taken from the enemy, 100 cannon.--The Russian army, with the new corps
of Sczachowski, amounted to 188,000 men and 316 pieces of cannon,
deducting the artillery which had been lost or dismounted.

Marshal Diebitsch, before commencing hostile operations, opened
negotiations, and, for this purpose, sent a general of division,
Witt, with a flag of truce to our head-quarters. This general was
stopped at our advanced post, whither general Krukowiecki was sent by
the commander in chief, with full powers, to meet him. General Witt
commenced with expressions of the greatest sensibility, and enlarged
much upon the friendship which ought to exist between the Poles and the
Russians as brother nations. He then spoke in very flattering terms
of the heroism of the Poles, lamenting that it was not displayed in a
better cause. After much complimentary language, he insensibly passed
to the ideas of duty and obedience to the monarch. General Krukowiecki,
who understood perfectly well all these professions, which he knew
to be insidious, answered nearly in the following laconic terms:
'General, after the sad circumstances which have taken place, after the
bloody combats to which we have been forced by the tyranny of fifteen
years, by the refusal of justice, and in fine by the violation of our
frontier, and the laying waste of our territory,--upon this territory
we can make no arrangements. You know well what are the frontiers of
Poland. Upon the banks of the Dnieper, four hundred miles hence, we may
enter into negotiations.'

Thus all was ready for the sanguinary battle of two days, which
followed, and one memorable in the annals of war. It commenced by a
combat on the 24th at Bialolenka, and ended on the 25th on the plain of
Grochow.


POSITION ON THE 24th, AND BATTLE OF BIALOLENKA

The position of the two armies, on the 24th, was as follows. The
Polish army occupied the same ground as when they ceased firing on the
20th; but the force was disposed in a different manner.--The right
wing was reinforced by the division of general Szembek; and although
Bialolenka, Kawenzyn, and Wavre composed the line of combat, there was
this difference, that, while before, the centre was at Kawenzyn, and
the left wing at Bialolenka, at present the left wing was at Kawenzyn;
the forces which were at Bialolenka were posted as a detached corps,
and the centre of the army was at the forest of elders. The right
wing occupied the space between the great road and the marshes of the
Vistula, called the marshes of Goclaw. This arrangement made our line
more concentrated. The first division under Krukowiecki, which was at
Bialolenka, with the division of cavalry under Uminski, was directed to
observe the great road from Jablonna, and all the roads leading from
Radzimin and Zombki to Warsaw. Between Kawenzyn and Bialolenka the
debouchment of the enemy was prevented by extensive marshes.

The Russian army was upon the same points as on the 20th. Their
greatest force was opposed to our right wing at Wavre.

On the afternoon of the 24th, the enemy attacked with impetuosity the
first division at Bialolenka. The corps of the enemy which made this
attack was that of the prince Sczachowski, which had recently joined
the main army, and for which marshal Diebitsch was supposed to have
waited. This corps, as was afterwards ascertained, had missed their
road, and became unintentionally engaged with our forces on that
day. The orders of that corps were to traverse the forests between
Radzimin and Zombki, and to join the army without being observed by our
forces. It was the false direction which they took that brought on the
engagement at Bialolenka.

This battle consisted, like the former actions at this place, of an
attempt by the enemy to force the passage of the dykes, which were
defended on our side by about eight battalions, protected by some
twenty pieces of cannon. This small force repulsed the enemy in three
successive attacks upon the dykes. At about 5, P.M. another Russian
corps, under general Pahlen, came to the succor of Sczachowski, and
as the first corps attempted to pass the road leading from Radzimin,
the latter attempted to force the passage of the two dykes leading
from Zombki, and at both points under the cover of a terrible fire
of artillery. If the reader will consider that our small force,
consisting of only eight battalions and fifteen squadrons, stood their
ground against two Russian corps of nearly 40,000 men and 60 pieces of
cannon, the efforts which were made on that day may be appreciated.
Our plan of action consisted chiefly in allowing a part of the enemy's
forces to pass the dykes, and then falling upon and cutting them up by
successive charges of cavalry and infantry, supported by an effective
fire of artillery. By such efforts this handful of brave men repulsed
the attacks of the enemy until night, when his attacks ceased. At
the approach of night, general Krukowiecki sent small reconnoitering
parties upon the roads from Radzimin and Zombki. These patrols, pushing
as far as, and even beyond Zombki, saw nothing of the enemy, and in
fact learnt, to their astonishment, from the marauders whom they took,
that the two Russian corps had quitted their position, and were on
their march across the forest of Kawenzyn, to join the main army. This
sudden withdrawal of the enemy's corps was an indication that they had
received orders to join the grand army, and that a general attack was
in contemplation for the next day. In expectation of this attack, a
body of men was sent, during the night, to obstruct, by defences, the
three roads leading from Radzimin and Zombki. Small detachments were
left on those roads, and the forces which were at Bialolenka quitted
their position, to reinforce the larger corps upon the plain of Wavre.

The following was the position of the two armies on the 25th, the day
of the memorable battle of Grochow. [_See Plans_ XI _and_ XII]. The
Russian army was distributed into eight divisions of combatants, and
three divisions of reserves. Those eight divisions consisted of 126,000
infantry (_a_), 42,000 cavalry (_b_), and 280 pieces of cannon (_c_).
The three divisions of reserve (E) were composed of 16,000 infantry,
4,000 cavalry, and 32 pieces of cannon. This enormous force, which
occupied the space between Kawenzyn (A) and the marshes Goclaw (B),
a distance of about three English miles, was arranged in two lines
of combatants (C, D) and a third of reserve. Their position was as
follows: Their left wing was between Wavre (_r_) and the above marshes
of the Vistula, and was composed of four divisions of infantry, of
47,000 men, four divisions of cavalry, 15,700, and 120 pieces of
cannon. The centre, opposite the forest of elders, consisted also of
four divisions of infantry of 57,000 men, three of cavalry of 10,500
men, and 108 pieces of cannon. The right wing, opposite the village of
Kawenzyn consisted of three and a half divisions of infantry of 31,000
men, four divisions of cavalry of 15,750 men, and 52 pieces of cannon.
Upon the borders of the great forest opposite the forest of elders, was
placed the reserve, commanded by the Grand Duke Constantine.

Against this force our inconsiderable army was posted in the following
manner. The right wing (G), formed by the division of Szembek,
consisting of about 7,000 infantry (_d_) and 24 pieces of cannon (_f_),
occupied the space between the road and the marshes above mentioned.
The centre (H) occupied the forest of elders, and touched upon the
great road. It was composed of two divisions commanded by Skrzynecki
and Zimirski, composed of about 15,000 infantry (_d_) and 60 pieces
of cannon (_f_). The left wing (T) occupied Kawenzyn, consisting of
the first division, commanded by Krakowiecki, composed of 6,500 men
(_d_) and 12 pieces of cannon (_f_). Four divisions of cavalry (_g_),
consisting of 9,500 men, commanded by Uminski, Lubinski, Skarzynski,
and Jankowski, were not posted on any fixed point, but stood in
readiness to act wherever occasions might offer. Besides these, was a
small reserve (K) of four battalions and eight squadrons, in all about
5,400 men, under the command of general Pac.

[Illustration:

XI. _Grochow p.139_ ]


BATTLE OF GROCHOW.

On the 25th, at break of day, the fire commenced on our left wing,
on the position of Kawenzyn. The enemy pushed forward all the forces
which were collected on his right wing, and commenced a terrible
fire of artillery and musquetry, with the apparent determination to
carry our wing by a single overpowering effort. Nearly fifty pieces
of artillery opened their fire upon Kawenzyn, and numerous columns of
infantry, under the protection of this fire, pressed forward to carry
the position. But our forces prepared to meet the attack. Small as they
were, consisting only of seven battalions with twelve pieces of cannon,
they had formed the determination to die or conquer upon that ground.
They could hope for no succor, for the whole line was in expectation of
a general attack.

The brave generals Krukowiecki and Malachowski made every effort to
sustain the perseverance of their troops, and each of them, at the head
of their columns and on foot, threw themselves upon the enemy's ranks.
Our artillery did not answer that of the Russians, but directed its
fire of grape wholly upon the columns which were approaching. By the
unparalleled bravery of our wing, of which every soldier seemed to have
formed the resolution to fall rather than yield a foot of ground, this
tremendous attack of the enemy was sustained for several hours, till at
last he was obliged to slacken it.

During the whole of this attack upon our left wing, the centre and the
right remained still in their positions, awaiting the expected attack.
It was near ten o'clock when the fields of Wavre became, as it were,
in one moment, covered with the forces of the enemy, which issued out
of the cover of the forests overhanging the plain. Looking over that
plain, between the forest of elders and the Vistula, one would have
thought it was an undivided mass of troops which was in motion; for in
that comparatively limited space, the eye could not distinguish the
different divisions from each other.

Two hundred pieces of cannon, posted upon that plain, in a single
line, commenced a fire which made the earth tremble, and which was
more terrible than the oldest officers had ever witnessed. After
having prolonged for some time this tremendous fire of artillery, the
enemy made an attempt to carry our right wing; but in a moment all our
cavalry were collected there, and fell upon and overthrew his columns,
and his efforts were as fruitless here, as they had been against our
left.

Having been unsuccessful in these two attacks on the wings, and hoping
that he had weakened our line by the terrible fire of artillery, which
he constantly kept up, the Russian commander collected the greater
part of his forces opposite the forest of elders, and it was there
that an attack was commenced which presented a scene unheard of in
the annals of war. It could with more propriety be called a massacre
of nearly four hours duration. The Russians brought together at this
point one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, posted in the rear and
on the sides of that forest. Some fifty battalions were incessantly
pushed to the attack, with the view to get possession of that forest.
Had they been able to effect this, they would have divided our army
into two parts, and thus could not but have ensured its destruction.
It was the consideration of this important fact which prompted the
horrible attack, and the desperate resistance which it met. The brave
Skrzynecki, Zimirski, Boguslawski, Czyzewski, and Rohland, defended
this forest with fourteen battalions, whose admirably executed
manoeuvres, the change of front, the arrangement of the attack in
columns and escalon, the concentration of force upon the points in
which the enemy's line seemed to waver, a fire which was never lost,
but was always reserved for the closest approach of the enemy--all were
executed with an activity, order and coolness never surpassed. It was
only by such conduct that the tremendous attack of the enemy could have
been sustained for four hours, and that, after having nine times gained
possession of the forest, he was as often repulsed with an immense loss.

Like the infantry, our artillery performed prodigies. All the
batteries, protected by cavalry which never abandoned them, pushed
themselves in advance even of the line of the skirmishers, and
approached sometimes within a hundred feet of the enemy's columns,
in order to give their fire with the most infallible execution. The
battery of the brave colonel Pientka, which defended the border of the
forest, was so far advanced that it was sometimes surrounded by the
enemy, who, in his own disorder, did not become aware of the advantage.
All the different operations indeed, of our artillery in this battle
were truly admirable. Batteries, now concentrated upon one point,
were in a moment hurried to another and distant one, where the enemy
was wholly unprepared for them, and was thrown into disorder by their
sudden attack. In the early part of the afternoon, when the enemy,
after having been several times repulsed, renewed his attack with the
greatest determination, and our 2d division began to give way, the four
batteries of artillery of the brave Adamski, Maslowski, Hilderbrand,
and Bielak, in concert with that of colonel Pientka, advanced like
cavalry to the charge, and, approaching close to the Russian columns,
opened a fire of grape, which spread destruction and disorder in their
ranks. Our infantry, thus animated to the contest, rallied, and threw
themselves again upon the enemy, who then yielded before them.

Like the artillery and infantry, our cavalry, besides the different
charges which they executed with so much bravery, was manoeuvred with
the utmost skill by our generals, and was made to fill the voids
occasioned by the inferiority of our forces, so as always to present
to the enemy an unbroken line.

By such manoeuvres of the three arms, executed with the greatest
determination, in which every commander performed his duty to the
utmost, the enemy's plans were continually disorganized, and his
enormous force, which at first sight would have been supposed capable
to have absolutely crushed the small army opposed to it, was in effect
only a great mass, making a continual oscillation, and which seemed
to trust to do every thing by a terrible fire of artillery, which was
always kept up, whether necessary or not.

Thus it was that fifty battalions of the enemy, amounting to over
40,000 men, supported by 120 pieces of artillery, in a concentrated
attack upon one point, the forest of elders, the decisive point of the
position, were nine times repulsed from that forest, which was left
literally covered with their dead.

From eleven o'clock until three, these attacks continued through
the whole line, (the most powerful being in the centre), and the
destruction of life was immense. At the last named hour, our generals,
each of whom we may remark had had their horses shot under them, and
several of whom were severely wounded, formed the plan of giving the
enemy a decisive blow. Their plan was to withdraw from the fire the
2d and 3d divisions, which had suffered most, and to make a general
retrograde movement in such a form as to have the wings considerably
in advance of the centre, which was to be drawn back as far as the
Obelisk of Iron (_k_), at which there was a position more commanding.
This plan had the following objects:--The first was, to draw the enemy
upon the open plain; the second was, to concentrate our force still
more, and to place it in two lines, the inner one to be composed of the
whole of the 2d and a part of the 3d division, which were withdrawn
for repose. A third object was, to lead the enemy to believe that a
retrograde movement was forced upon us by our losses, and that we felt
ourselves too weak to continue the defence of the forest.

To execute this manoeuvre, and to enable the 2d division to retire
without being molested, the artillery was left with some twenty
squadrons of cavalry to protect the retrograde movement. This artillery
and cavalry were ordered afterwards to evacuate their positions
gradually, and the former to take post in the centre under the
protection of the whole of the cavalry, which were in escalon, and
prepared for a general attack. The manoeuvre was as admirably executed
as it was conceived. The enemy had no suspicion of its object, but,
presuming it to be a flight, undertook to profit by it. It was at this
moment that marshal Diebitsch, as if sure of victory, saw himself
already at Warsaw, and, on the field of battle, he allowed these words
to escape him: 'Well, then, it appears that after this bloody day, I
shall take tea in the Belvidere palace.'

It was about three P.M. that our 2nd division, in conformity with the
plan adopted, began to retire by an escalon movement. To hasten the
execution of this movement, it was ordered that the columns, retiring
in succession, on reaching a considerable distance from the enemy,
should quicken their pace as they proceeded, in order to form the
second line as soon as possible, and to give space for the operations
of the artillery and cavalry. It was at this moment that general
Zimirski, who had lost several horses under him, and had just placed
himself upon a fresh horse, to superintend this movement, was struck
with a twelve pound ball in the left shoulder, which carried away his
arm, and caused his death in a few hours. The melancholy loss of this
general was most deeply felt by the whole army, and particularly by
his own division, but it did not interfere with the execution of these
orders. The brave general Czyzewski immediately took command of the
division, and continued the orderly movement of the division towards
the rear, and he received great support from generals Rohland and
Zaluski. As soon as the last columns of this force quitted the forest,
[_See Plan_ XII] the Russian troops began to debouch from it, and our
artillery commenced a terrible fire. The brave colonel Pientka, who
was still far in advance, checked the debouchement from the forest
near him. Seated with the most perfect sangfroid upon a disabled
piece of artillery, this brave officer directed an unremitting fire
from his battery. The artillery and cavalry, after having protected
the retrograde movement of the centre, still continued to keep their
ground, to enable the wings also to retire undisturbed. All our forces
were then in movement, and the enemy pressed on. The Russian columns
had already advanced beyond the position of colonel Pientka, but that
brave officer still kept up the defence.[37] By this time, however, the
2nd division had already reached their destined position, and their
battalions had commenced forming. Such was the state of things, when,
between Kawenzyn and the forest, a cloud of Russian cavalry was seen
advancing to the attack, having at their head five regiments of heavy
cuirassiers; a force in fact of some forty squadrons, or between
eight and nine thousand in all. Colonel Pientka, with his artillery,
supported only by a single regiment of Mazurs, still held his post,
to give yet another effective fire upon this advancing cavalry, which
was already between him and Skrzynecki's division; and then, to save
himself from being cut off, he quitted at full gallop a post which he
had occupied for five hours under the terrible fire of the artillery of
the enemy. This rapid movement of Pientka's battery and the regiment
of cavalry which attended him, animated the Russian cuirassiers in
their advance, and the infantry and artillery of the enemy followed
their cavalry. At this moment Chlopicki was wounded by a grenade, and
the army was without a head; but generals Skrzynecki and Czyzewski had
already formed their divisions into squares, and awaited the attack of
the enemy.

The Russian cavalry advanced upon the trot, and came in a direction
perpendicular to the line of our battery of rockets, which was posted
between the 2d and 3d divisions (A). Suddenly a discharge from this
battery was poured into their ranks, and enveloped them with flame and
noise. Their horses, galled to madness by the flakes of fire which
were showered over them, became wholly ungovernable, and, breaking
away from all control, spread disorder in every direction. The enemy's
ranks were soon in the most utter confusion, and in a short time
this enormous body of cavalry became one disordered mass, sweeping
along towards the fire of our squares. In a very few minutes that
cavalry was almost annihilated. So nearly complete, in fact, was their
destruction, that of a regiment of cuirassiers, which was at the head
of the attacking force, called the regiment of Albert, and which also
bore the designation of the 'Invincible' inscribed upon their helmets,
not a man escaped. The few who were not left dead upon the field were
taken prisoners. In fact, some hundred horse of that regiment were
whirled along through the intervals of our squares, and were left to be
taken prisoners at leisure. The wrecks of this routed cavalry, closely
pursued by our lancers, carried along in their flight the columns of
infantry which were following them, and a general retreat of all the
enemy's forces commenced. The battle was gained. The cry of 'Poland
forever!' arose along our line, and reached the walls of Warsaw, to
cheer the hearts of its anxious inhabitants. Nothing was wanting but a
skilful commander in chief to our forces, to have insured the entire
destruction of the Russian army.

Two thousand prisoners, among them twenty officers of different grades,
five pieces of cannon, and upwards of a thousand horses, were the
trophies of that immortal day, the memory of which will be forever
terrible to tyrants.

It was nearly five P.M. when the Russian army commenced a general
flight, and even evacuated its first position, which it had occupied
in the early morning. It is to be regretted that the order to
follow up the pursuit was wanting. Szembek alone threw himself, at
times, with his division, among the Russian ranks, and took a great
number prisoners, baggage and chests of ammunition. According to the
declaration of general Szembek, if, during the retreat of the enemy, a
charge of cavalry and artillery had been ordered between the left wing
and the centre of the enemy, a great part (P) of that wing, which was
considerably detached from the centre, would have been cut off. This
could have been easily done, for no part of our little reserve was
brought into action during the day, and they were eager to be permitted
to make the charge.

The prince Radzivil, after the withdrawal of general Chlopicki from the
army in consequence of his wound, found himself without council; and
not feeling himself sufficiently capable to risk any bold manoeuvre;
seeing too that the army was much exhausted by the fighting of that
day and the preceding; and fearing also that the Vistula might become
impassable, and the bridges be endangered by the melting of the ice;
in fine, being unwilling to take upon himself the great responsibility
of attempting to pursue his advantages, decided to give the army an
interval of repose, and to occupy the time in re-organizing it.

Some farther details, and remarks upon this important battle may
not be unacceptable to the reader. 1st. In regard to position: On
examining critically the position of the Polish army, we notice some
great faults. The right wing was upon a plain entirely uncovered,
and exposed to the commanding fire of the enemy's artillery. All the
talents of the brave Szembek were required to prevent this wing from
being unprofitably sacrificed. This same wing, if it had been withdrawn
a thousand paces farther to the rear, in such a manner as not to have
leant on the marshes of the Vistula, but have occupied the small wooded
hills on the right of the main road, and on a line with the village
of Grochow, would have been then in a commanding position, and safe
from the tremendous fire of the enemy. The enemy would probably have
then occupied the plain, and thus been disadvantageously exposed to
our fire. His loss would have been doubled, and all the charges of our
cavalry and infantry would have been much more effective. But what was
above all unpardonable, was that, with a full knowledge of the enemy's
intention to attack us, together with a consciousness of our own
inferiority of force, and the nature of our position, which was wanting
in strength, no fortifications whatever were erected, although four
days and five nights were passed in that position, during which the
national guard of Warsaw, and all the unenrolled population, who would
have cheerfully volunteered for the purpose, could have been employed
in the construction of works to any desired extent.

In regard to the centre, we may remark, that it was indeed covered by
the forest of elders, of which it occupied a part, but the attack of
this forest by the enemy was thus made necessary, and their repulse
cost us too great sacrifices. But besides the sacrifices which the
support of such a position required, our troops were so incessantly
occupied with repulse of the successive attacks of the enemy, that
it was impossible to attempt any decisive manoeuvre. It was not
there, in fact, as we have seen, that the battle was decided, but at
the Obelisk of Iron, and by other means. The centre, like the right
wing, should have been withdrawn so far as to have been on a line
with the village of Grochow, and in such a manner as to profit by all
the commanding positions between Targowek and Grochow, upon which
our artillery (which, as the case was, were upon a low and exposed
position opposite the forest), would have been very advantageously
posted. In general, our whole position was too extended, reaching from
Kawenzyn to the marshes of the Vistula at Goclaw. It ought to have been
from the beginning more concentrated, and supported on the outermost
circumvallations of Praga (B). It could thus have profited by the
advantageous positions which adjoin those defences. In consequence of
this too great extent of position, our forces remained in a single line
for five hours in succession, in most dangerous exposure.

In regard to the evolutions, although the details were admirably
executed, it is to be remarked that the left wing did not yield a
sufficient support to the other bodies. The communications with that
wing were not well sustained--another effect of the too great extent
of the position. The line of the enemy was encumbered with artillery,
and there were favorable moments for a general attack on that artillery
by our cavalry. Such opportunities were perceived by our generals of
cavalry, and the attack suggested by them to the commander in chief,
but nothing was done. The greatest fault of all, however, and that
which perhaps saved the Russian army from entire destruction, was the
neglect to follow up the enemy in his retreat, and by a judicious
manoeuvre to cut off his right wing, as was perfectly practicable;--by
such a manoeuvre, as it will be seen was, in fact, afterwards
successfully practised by Skrzynecki at Wavre, where a great part of
that same force were taken prisoners.

The battle of Grochow cost the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
according to the reports published by the Russians themselves, 20,000
men. On our side the loss amounted to 5,000. But to give the reader an
idea of the terrible fire of that day, it may be remarked that there
was not a single general or staff officer, who had not his horse killed
or wounded under him. Full two thirds of the officers, and perhaps the
same proportion of the soldiers, had their clothes pierced with balls,
and more than a tenth part of the army were slightly wounded, though
not unfitted for service. In this battle the 2d and 3d divisions of
infantry suffered the most, and twenty of their officers were mortally
wounded with grape-shot. I would not desire to present a revolting
picture of the horrors of a battle-field, yet to impress upon the
reader how great a scourge tyranny is to mankind, I could wish to
point out to him, along the whole road from Kawenzyn to the marshes of
Goclaw, hillocks of dead at every step, especially in the forest of
elders, where rank upon rank was seen prostrate upon the earth. Indeed,
so strewed with bodies was this forest that it received from that day
the name of _the forest of the dead_.[38]

With the twilight, our whole army began to evacuate their position,
and to cross the Vistula to Warsaw. The passage of the river occupied
the whole night. On the morning of the next day, all that remained of
our forces upon the right bank, were two battalions of infantry, and
thirty-six pieces of cannon, which were at the bridge-head of Praga.
The Russians were well satisfied with our passage of the Vistula, for
they felt the need of repose. It was at first presumed that in a few
days the enemy would storm Praga. This, however, was soon found not
to be their intention; and, for what cause we cannot conjecture, they
continued in a state of complete inaction.

Such then was the end of the grand operation of marshal Diebitsch, with
his colossal forces, by which it was his purpose to put an end to the
war in a few days! The boasted Crosser of the Balkan, with from 180,000
to 200,000 men, and 316 pieces of cannon, was not only unable to crush,
as he proposed to do, an army of scarcely 40,000 men and 100 cannon,
but was beaten by that small army, and only escaped a total ruin from
the absence of a competent leader to the Polish forces. Such facts, so
rare in history, cannot be too frequently impressed upon the mind of
the reader, and they should be held up to the view of every despot,
to teach him upon what a frail foundation his confidence in numbers
may rest, and to convince him that his masses must melt away and be
dispersed, before a people, who, on their own soil, are resolved to
throw off the yoke of despotism, and who fight for liberty with the
energy of despair.[39]

The nation and the army occupied this interval of repose in giving
thanks to Providence for the successes of the preceding day. In all
the churches Te Deums were sung, as well as in the chapels of the camp
near Warsaw. The army was received by the people with solemnities. The
senate, accompanied by the inhabitants, repaired to the camp, where
patriotic addresses were delivered, and a public fete given to the
army. For three successive nights, Warsaw was illuminated, and the
inscription 'To the defenders of their Country,' was every where seen.
Unequal to the description of these moments of exultation of a people
animated with the recovery of their freedom, I can only say that they
were moments which will live forever in the heart of every Pole, and
will satisfy him that a nation so united will be always capable of
great efforts.

On the day after the religious ceremonies, the provisional government
met in the National (formerly the Royal) Palace, where all the general
officers of the army were also assembled to deliberate upon the
measures to be adopted both in regard to military and civil affairs. It
was on that occasion that the prince Michael Radziwil, actuated by the
noblest impulses, and having a single view to the good of his country,
abdicated the chief command, surrendering his trust into the hands of
the national government, with the avowal that he did not feel himself
sufficiently capable to continue to hold so responsible a post. This
step, which showed a great elevation of character, impressed the nation
with feelings of gratitude, and has given to prince Radziwil a name in
history.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 37: Admirable as was the conduct of all our artillery, every
man in which deserved a decoration, yet among this artillery, the
battery of colonel Pientka must be distinguished. Without yielding a
step of ground, that battery held its place for five hours, and it
often happened during the battle, that this single battery was left
exposed alone to the fire of thirty or forty of the enemy's pieces.
It was computed that this battery alone caused a greater loss to the
enemy than the entire loss that his whole artillery caused in our
ranks; and I do not exaggerate in saying, that the fire, chiefly of
grape, which Pientka kept up for five hours, and at the distance often
of a few hundred paces only, must have cost the Russians from one to
two thousand men. What is most remarkable, this battery itself, during
the whole of the fire, did not lose more than one officer and six men
killed, six wounded, and ten or twelve horses, two of which were killed
under colonel Pientka, whose clothes were pierced through and through
with grape, and his casque torn in pieces, while, as if providentially
preserved, his person was not in the slightest degree injured.]

[Footnote 38: Up to the 10th of March, when a reconnoisance was made,
as far as the plain of Wavre, the dead were not yet interred, and all
the confusion of a battle-field remained, proving that the enemy was
too much occupied to give the ordinary attention to these duties. On
that day several wagons filled with Russian cuirassiers were sent to
Warsaw. Many ruined caissons of ammunition, many gun-carriages, three
deserted cannons, and several hundred carbines, sabres, and pistols,
knapsacks, and helmets in considerable numbers were strewed over the
field, and indicated the disorder in which the enemy had made his
retreat. To prevent an epidemical malady, our government made a request
to general Diebitsch to send a body of his men to aid in the interment
of the dead, which was in fact done.

Contemplating these masses of Russian dead, the victims of a horrible
despotism, what reflections were awakened! Those unfortunate men
were dragged to the combat to be sacrificed. Not one of that mass of
victims could see the justice of the cause for which they were thus
sacrificed. What consolation could there be in the last agonies of
suffering incurred in such a cause? There could be none. How different
must have been the death of the Polish soldier, who felt the sacredness
and importance of the struggle on which he had entered. His last
moments were consoled with the thought that his life was sacrificed
for the good of his country. If the deaths of the Russian and the
Polish soldier were thus different, their lives are not less so. What
reward awaits the Russian soldier? Is it a service of twenty-five years
under the terror of the knout, in which service he most generally
dies, or if he survives, is too much broken down to be able to gain a
subsistence afterwards? The Russian soldier, besides the fatigues of
the general service, is subject to a private service under any one of
his superiors, the merest subaltern perhaps, who, far from rewarding
him for such services, abuses him but the more freely. The full pay of
a Russian soldier is a groat a day; and even out of this little pay his
superiors exact a profit. The consequence is, that the degree of his
misery is excessive, and he would be in extremity if the proprietors of
land where he is quartered did not succor him. What other recompense
is given to these wretched men, who are thus led to the sacrifice of
their lives for the self-will of a despot, who, while the soldier,
covered with wounds, is groaning under his sufferings, spends his time
in luxurious enjoyment, and perhaps mocks at the abjectness of men who
are thus willing instruments of his pleasure? What other recompense for
all this? Perhaps to this soldier is given a medal of brass, which, if
his commander in a moment of good humor, as he passes down the line,
may have addressed him with the title of 'Staryk' or 'old soldier,'
he receives as a token of his having been through a campaign. Compare
this with the recompense which awaited the Polish soldier on his return
from the campaign. He was received by his countrymen with the warmest
demonstrations of joy. Mothers lifted their children in their arms, and
pointed him out to them as one of the defenders of their country. No
anxiety for the future weighed upon him, for his country had made ample
provision for him. It was at his will to remain in the service, or to
go to occupy the land designated for him by the national government.
He would find there all that his wants might require. Remaining in the
military service, he enjoyed the respect of those about him. All were
his brothers, and the greatest delicacy of intercourse was observed
between him and his superiors. His service was an agreeable duty, in
which, besides gaining an honorable subsistence, he received each day
some new mark of friendship and esteem.]

[Footnote 39: The courage of our forces that day, was no doubt much
animated by the vicinity of Warsaw, for the battle was fought within
view of the inhabitants, who covered the fields about Praga. Many of
the equipages of the wealthy families attended to receive the wounded
from the field of battle, and all the inhabitants, without distinction
of rank, pressed forward to remove and succor them. Those of the
wounded who could not be led to the carriages, were carried in the arms
of the citizens, and among those who performed this office were the
highest members of the national government, ministers of religion, and
even ladies. How then could such an attachment of the nation to her
defenders, fail to be answered by an enthusiasm in her defence which
knew no bounds. The wounded soldiers, in order not to draw upon this
sympathy, conquered their sufferings, and stifled their groans; and to
check the tears of those who bore them, they even forced themselves to
raise the patriotic shout, and sing the national hymn.

To the details illustrating the courage which was displayed upon that
field, I may add the following:--In one of the attacks upon the forest
of elders, when the enemy had gained possession of it, there was an
interruption to our advance from a ditch which had been cut across
the road, and which it was necessary to pass. The Russian artillery,
observing the effect of this obstruction, poured a heavy fire of grape
upon the spot to add to the confusion. Lieutenant Czaykowski, who
commanded a platoon of grenadiers of the 7th regiment, in the attacking
columns, had passed with his platoon this small ditch, when he received
a grape shot in the leg, which threw him down. As he fell, he cried,
'Grenadiers, advance!' and continued this cry, regardless of his
suffering, as he lay prostrate on the ground. Those brave grenadiers,
animated by this noble spirit, pushed their attack with such fury that
they drove the enemy from his position.

Our artillery, which had so bravely fought, and which had to answer the
terrible fire of the numerous artillery of the enemy, as well as to
check the strong attacks of the Russian columns, were obliged often to
change their place, to concentrate, and disperse, as occasion required.
It was in one of those evolutions, that a battery, posted near that
commanded by captain Hilderbrand, was required to change its position.
The bombardier Kozieradzki was sent to give orders to this effect. He
was on his way to execute this commission, when a ball carried away his
arm. That brave man, however, continued his way, thus severely wounded,
reached the battery, executed his commission, and then fell from the
loss of blood.

The following incidents of this battle-field deserve to be mentioned,
as indicating how little of national animosity mingled with the
feelings of the combatants. It was often seen that the wounded soldiers
of the hostile forces who happened to be thrown in each other's
vicinity, would drag themselves towards each other for mutual relief,
and engage in friendly conversation. 'Why,' would a Polish soldier say
to the Russian, 'why are we shedding each other's blood? The cause for
which we have taken arms is that of your happiness, as well as our
own.' The Russian soldier could only answer, with tears of shame, 'We
have been driven to march against you.' No stronger example could be
given, of the kindest dispositions of the Poles towards the Russians,
than the treatment of the latter in our hospitals. They were nursed
and fed, like our own wounded, by the hands of those benevolent and
patriotic females who had devoted themselves to these holy duties. On
leaving those hospitals, the Russian soldiers swore never to forget the
kindness they had experienced.]




CHAPTER XI.

 Passage of the Vistula to Warsaw.--Disposition of the Polish forces
 on its left bank.--Appointment of general John Skrzynecki to the
 chief command.--Proclamation.--Prompt attention is given to the
 re-organization of the army, the arsenals and manufactories of arms,
 the fortifications, &c.--Deportment of the commander in chief towards
 the army.--General enthusiasm of the nation.--The patriotic offers
 of the Polish women.--New regulations established for conferring
 orders of merit.--Disorderly state of the Russian army.--Attempt
 of Diebitsch to bribe the Polish soldiery.--General view of the
 encouraging circumstances of this epoch.--The insurrection in Russia
 under Yermolow.--View of the state of the Polish forces when general
 Skrzynecki took the chief command.--He presses the organization
 of the new forces.--Their distribution and that of the general
 forces.--Positions of the Polish army and the detached corps.--Russian
 position.


After the memorable battle of Grochow, fought on the 25th of February,
before the walls of Warsaw, a day on which we had defeated a force
three times superior to our own, the prince Radziwil made the passage
of the Vistula to Warsaw and the left bank. The objects which he had
in view in that movement we have already detailed. Two battalions of
infantry, with thirty-six pieces of artillery, were left to defend the
fortifications of Praga, on the right bank of the Vistula opposite to
and separated by a bridge from Warsaw, and which were in the form of a
horn-work, supported on each wing by the river.

The army was disposed in the following manner upon the left bank. The
cavalry were posted in positions a few miles above and below Warsaw.
The infantry and the artillery were either concentrated in Warsaw,
or were encamped near the city. Upon receiving the resignation of
prince Radziwil, the national government proceeded to the choice of his
successor, and on the 27th of February, 1831, elected, by an unanimous
voice, to the chief command of all the national forces, the hero of
Dobre, general John Skrzynecki, a man of the most devoted patriotism,
of great decision of character, and uncommon military talent. He was,
above all, eminently possessed of that rapidity of _coup d'oeil_,
that capacity of seizing conjunctures, which enabled him, in the
midst of the most complicated movements, to perceive, and instantly
to profit by, every advantage which offered itself. This general was,
in the time of the Russian government, and at the commencement of our
revolution, colonel of the 8th regiment of infantry of the line, a
regiment by which he was regarded with an almost filial attachment. On
the enrollment of new forces, after the revolution had taken place,
he was made general of brigade. In the month of January, before the
commencement of the campaign, he was advanced to the rank of general of
a division, and the command of the 3d division of infantry was confided
to him, at the head of which division, as the reader already knows, he
gained laurels in several brilliant actions.

On the 27th, at mid-day, proclamation was made of the abdication of
the prince Radzivil, and the appointment of general Skrzynecki, as
commander in chief of the army. The nation to whom the great merit of
this officer was already so well known, received this annunciation
with the greatest satisfaction. No dissentient voice was heard. Even
the oldest generals in the service warmly applauded the choice. General
Skrzynecki, on receiving the chief command, addressed to the army, on
the 28th of February, the following proclamation:--

 'Soldiers and brethren! God has willed that, through your choice, I
 should be made the instrument of his providence in the important trust
 to which I have been designated. The Senate, the Chamber of Deputies,
 and the National Government have honored me with a difficult task,
 which I cannot worthily execute, but as your valor and constancy shall
 second me. Soldiers! we have before us an enemy, proud of his former
 successes, of his strength in numbers, and of the influence which he
 exercises in Europe. But if, in one point of view, his power appears
 formidable, on the other hand, the outrages with which the Russian
 government have oppressed us, render that enemy so guilty in the eyes
 of God and of man, that, full of confidence in Providence and the
 sacredness of our cause, we can boldly measure our strength with him.
 We have only to swear in our hearts that we will be faithful to that
 motto which we so often repeat, "To conquer or die for our country,"
 and we shall surely serve as an example, in the annals of the world,
 of encouragement to the defenders of the sacred rights of the people.
 If we do not succeed in conquering our powerful enemy, we will not
 live to submit to him--to him who has violated in regard to us every
 obligation of good faith. There is enough of glory in the sacrifice
 which I call on you to make; and in this heroic career, and so full of
 danger, I offer you crowns of laurel. We shall be sure to gain them,
 if you will support me by your valor, your union, your subordination,
 and your promptitude in performing the orders which will be given you.'

The first object upon which the attention of the general in chief
was fixed, was the state of the army. Even from the first hour of
his investiture with the chief command, prompt and energetic orders
and instructions were issued, to form new forces, to complete those
which were already in a state of formation, and to fill up the ranks
of the regiments which had suffered in the late engagements. During
the dictatorship of Chlopicki, and under the command of the prince
Radziwil, all the arrangements of the military administration were
sluggishly attended to, as the reader is well aware. At the time of
the battle of Grochow there had been only ten thousand new infantry
levied, and even this infantry was neither well organized nor armed;
the only armament of the greater part of them consisted of pikes
or pitchforks. It was the same with the new cavalry, of which the
number at the time of that battle did not amount to more than three
thousand six hundred: and even these forces were not formed by the
exertions of the government, but were volunteers. In the arsenals
the works were not conducted with promptitude. This department of
the military administration had been made great account of on paper,
but was in reality neglected. As we have before remarked, the time
was occupied in useless diplomatic discussions, while the subject of
the greatest importance--the armament of our forces, was lost sight
of. General Skrzynecki was well aware of this neglect, and soon gave
a new aspect to these matters. From the 1st of March, in which he
commenced the inspection of the arsenals, he was daily occupied with
this duty, entering into all the details, (with which he was familiarly
acquainted,) and infusing a new vigor and promptitude into this
essential department of the military administration. In fact in the
several manufactories of arms, six hundred musquets per day were soon
made.

The soldiers, who before had but rarely seen their commander, and to
the greater part of whom indeed the former commander was personally
unknown, were elated to meet their chief often among them, and their
enthusiasm was augmented by the frequent words of encouragement with
which he took every occasion to address them. General Skrzynecki
established a new regulation in respect to the conferring of orders
of merit, which was, that none should be given either to the officers
or the soldiers, but upon the expressed consent and approbation of
the latter. By thus submitting the conferring of these honors to the
judgment of the soldier, he encouraged his self-respect, destroyed the
power of the personal influence of the generals, and added much to the
value of those honors as a motive for exertion.[40]

The time at which Skrzynecki received the chief command, was indeed
a happy period with us, and enthusiasm was then at the very greatest
height. No stronger evidence of this could be given, than the fact
that the women of Poland actually formed three companies of infantry,
composed from their own sex.[41]

Our army was victorious and full of energy, and being then at Warsaw,
it enjoyed all the conveniences which could be required by an army
in a state of war. Their arms of every kind were well constructed,
and in good order. The Russian army, on the other hand, was in a most
disadvantageous situation. Their number had been sensibly diminished,
and was diminishing every day, from the difficulty of subsistence and
shelter, situated as they were in the environs of Praga which had been
sacked and burnt by themselves.

Marshal Diebitsch and his army began to be convinced, by the victories
which had been gained over them, and the firm resistance which they had
uniformly met, that they were fighting with a nation which had resolved
to sacrifice every thing for liberty and independence, and that this
war, which Diebitsch expected, and even promised, to finish in a few
weeks, would be long protracted, and presented to him as yet no hope
of a fortunate issue. A certain degree of disorder also began to take
place in the Russian army, caused by the physical wants and the severe
treatment to which the soldiers were subjected. Their wounded and sick
were left neglected, and were accumulated in great numbers in the
ruined buildings of the half-burnt villages, exposed to the open air in
the severe month of February. Desertions too began to take place. Every
day, indeed, small parties of deserters, and among them even officers,
arrived at Warsaw. Those men assured us that a smothered discontent
pervaded the army. They stated that the soldiers had marched under the
expectation that they were to act against the French and Belgians,
and not against the Poles, whose revolution had been represented to
them as merely the revolt of one or two regiments; and that, seeing the
true state of things, great numbers of them desired even to unite with
us, when a favorable moment should offer. These unfortunate men, who
were in the most deplorable state, with tears in their eyes, addressed
themselves to our soldiers in terms like these: 'Dear Poles, do you
think that we willingly fight against you? what could we do? We were
compelled to march against you by the force of blows. Many of our
brethren gave out, and, falling from exhaustion on the road, have died
under the blows of the knout.' These deserters stated also that such
a severity was exercised in the regulations of the camp, that some
officers were shot, merely for having spoken on political subjects;
and that it was strictly forbidden to any persons to assemble together
to the number of three or four. Such information satisfied us, that,
although the Russian army was strong in numbers, morally speaking, it
was weak. Our own army began soon to conceive high hopes, and to dream
of victory under its brave chief.[42]

At this period, with the exception of Prussia, who had publicly
manifested her hostility to our cause, none of the great powers had
directly injured us. Austria was occupied with Italy. From France
and England the Poles had even cherished hopes of a favorable
interposition. From the former, especially, after the intelligence
derived from the correspondence of the two ministers, Lubecki and
Grabowski, found among the papers of Constantine, which has been
presented to the reader, (giving satisfactory evidence that Russia was
in preparation for a campaign against her, and showing that our cause
was the cause of France,) we had certainly the right to cherish the
strongest hopes. But more important still than all these circumstances,
was the intelligence received of a revolution which had broken out in
the Russian department of Orenburg, under the famous Yermolow, and the
point of concentration of which was to have been the town of Samara,
situated on the frontier of Europe and Asia. The highest expectations
were entertained of the results of this movement, from our knowledge of
the character of this celebrated general, and of his great influence,
as one of that distinguished family of Yermolow, perhaps the most
influential in the empire, (which, in fact, cherishes pretensions to
the throne,) and of the distinction which he had acquired as a bold and
firm leader, in a service of many years.

His proclamations to the Russians, of which a few copies were found
on the persons of their officers who were killed in the battle of
Grochow, were full of energy, and breathed the sentiments of a true
republican--of one who calmly and dispassionately aims at the good of
his country. These proclamations were published in all the gazettes of
Warsaw on the first of March.[43]

This general was for a long while governor of the provinces beyond the
Caucasus, Abassia, Migretia, Imiretia, and Georgia, provinces which
were conquered from Persia and Turkey. Besides possessing a great
degree of military knowledge, Yermolow was familiar with the duties
of the civil administration. Those provinces were happy under his
government. He ameliorated the state of the commerce by which they
were enriched. The city of Tiflis, under him, rapidly increased to
a great extent. That city became in fact a general depot of all the
trade of Armenia, Persia, and Turkey in Asia. This general, who could
have held a post of greater distinction, and nearer the throne, asked
for this situation with the view to be removed as far as possible from
that court which he despised, and the intrigues of which excited his
abhorrence. Out of the reach of its influence, he could follow the
impulses of his heart, and labor for the happiness of his fellow men.
But this separation was not enough; those intrigues passed the barrier
of the Caucasus to interrupt him in his benevolent labors. Several
commissions were sent to make inquiries into his administration in
various departments. Yermolow, to avoid these persecutions, sent in
his resignation. General, now marshal Paszkewiczh, filled his place.
Yermolow, on quitting his post, retired to his own estates in the
government of Orenburg, and lived there quietly in the bosom of his
family. The breaking out of the revolutions of France, Belgium, and
at last that of Poland, filled his heart with joy. He hoped that the
time was near at hand, when the people would have security for their
rights, and would emerge from the darkness into which despotism had
plunged them. He commenced the revolution in his part of the empire,
and (as we learnt at Warsaw) sustained himself for a long while against
the superior forces which were sent against him. He was not, however,
sufficiently supported by the people, and was too isolated to continue
hostilities. It is to be regretted, that he did not commence this
movement in the provinces which border upon Poland.


A VIEW OF THE STATE OF THE POLISH FORCES AT THE PERIOD OF SKRZYNECKI'S
APPOINTMENT TO THE CHIEF COMMAND.

After the battle of Grochow, the Polish grand army was composed, as
at the commencement of the war, of nine regiments of infantry, each
consisting of three battalions. They amounted, after deducting the
losses sustained during the campaign, to about 25,000. The newly formed
infantry, which was in the battle of Grochow, amounted to about 6,000;
from which are to be deducted about 500, lost in that battle. The whole
force of infantry, then, amounted to 30,500 men. The cavalry was also
composed of nine regiments, each comprising four squadrons; making,
after the deduction of the losses by that battle, about 6,000 in all.
The newly-formed cavalry, consisting of eighteen squadrons, can also
be estimated, after the losses at Grochow, at about 3,000; making, in
all, 9,000 cavalry. The artillery was composed of ninety-six pieces of
cannon.

Total of the grand army:--_Infantry_, 30,500. _Cavalry_, 9,000.
_Artillery_, 96 pieces.

The detached corps of general Dwernicki consisted, at the beginning
of the campaign, of one regiment of infantry, composed of three
battalions, numbering, after the losses of the campaign, 2,800 men. The
cavalry consisted of six squadrons, making, in all, about 1,000. The
artillery, consisting at first of but three pieces, augmented by seven
pieces taken from the Russians, amounted then to 10 pieces.

The small partizan corps under the command of colonel Valentin,
operating in the environs of Pultusk, consisted of 600 infantry and 100
cavalry.

The garrison of Zamosc consisted of 3,000 infantry and eighty-four
pieces of cannon. That of Modlin, of 3,500 infantry and seventy-two
pieces of cannon; and that of Praga, of 2,000 infantry and thirty-six
pieces of cannon.

The total amount then, of disposable forces, (excluding, of course, the
garrisons,) on the 1st of March, the day on which Skrzynecki took the
command, was,--_Infantry_, 33,900. _Cavalry_, 10,100. _Artillery_, 106
pieces.

General Skrzynecki renewed the arrangements of the dictator Chlopicki,
in regard to the organization of new forces. These were, that each
department should furnish from 6 to 8,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.
When this arrangement was first made, four departments on the right
bank of the Vistula, were occupied by the enemy; viz. Augustow,
Podlasia, Lublin, and Plock. Besides the forces which these departments
should furnish, general Skrzynecki proposed to the nation, that in
the other departments, on the left bank of the Vistula, viz. Mazovia,
Kalisz, Sandomierz, and Cracovia, a general levy should be made. These
arrangements were executed with such promptitude, that six regiments
of two battalions each, the formation of which had begun in December,
and were but half formed on the 1st of March, were, by the 10th, in a
complete state for service. Those regiments were distributed among the
four divisions of the grand army. In addition to these, four regiments
of cavalry, of four squadrons each, were also formed; and in this
manner, the army received a reinforcement of 12,000 infantry, among
which were 2,000 volunteer chasseurs, and of 3,200 cavalry. These newly
levied forces, besides being well equipped and in fine condition, were
full of spirit and energy. When Skrzynecki made the inspection of these
new troops, they entreated of him to be led to the first fire.

In addition to the above forces, general Skrzynecki ordered the
formation of eight regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, to be
kept as a reserve to fill the ranks of the army as they should be
wasted by the campaign. From this last body, was afterwards, (on the
1st of May,) formed a fifth division. The infantry of the grand army
was distributed into four divisions. They were formed and commanded as
follows:--

The 1st division, under general Rybinski, consisted of four regiments.
The 2d division, under general Gielgud, three regiments. The 3d
division, under general Malachowski, four regiments. The 4th division,
under general Muhlberg, four regiments. The total of the four divisions
was about 45,000 men.

In this number are included the different small detachments of
volunteers, who acted with the army.

Besides this infantry, was the National Guard of Warsaw, amounting to
10,000 men.

The cavalry were also formed into four divisions, as follows. The 1st
division, under the command of general Uminski, 16 squadrons. The 2d,
under general Lubinski, 16 squadrons. The 3d, under general Stryinski,
16 squadrons. The 4th, which formed the reserve of 19 squadrons, was
under general Pac. The whole force of cavalry amounted to about 14,000.

The construction and completion of the fortifications at Warsaw and
Praga were not less actively pressed than the administration of
the army; and, as the left bank of the Vistula, on which Warsaw is
situated, commands the right, with Praga and its environs, general
Skrzynecki placed on the left bank twelve pieces of cannon of 24 pound
calibre, on the heights of Dynasow and Zoliborz. This battery covered
with its fire the neighboring plain, to the extent of a circle of three
miles in diameter, and could overpower any battery which the enemy
might open against Praga. That town is divided into two parts, the
first of which borders on the Vistula, and formed the bridge-head of
the position; the other part, which is more distant, was not fortified.
This latter part was taken possession of by the Russians, after the
battle of Grochow, and was burnt by them. To the inhabitants this was
a disaster; but for our defence it was a most favorable circumstance,
as it left the enemy's approach unprotected, and opened a range for our
fire.

General Krukowiecki, who was appointed governor of Warsaw, continued
the works in the city and its suburbs with great activity. The rampart,
which surrounds the city beyond the walls, had been constructed for
a defence against musquetry only; but at several points, it was now
made defensible against artillery. The ditch was considerably widened
and deepened. Beyond the ramparts, the city was surrounded by a chain
of _lunettes_, placed in two lines, so as to alternate with each
other, and afford a mutual support. The city itself was divided into
six parts; each part being susceptible of an independent defence. The
barricades in the streets were constructed with openings for the fire
of the artillery, above which platforms were raised for the infantry.
Mines were also prepared in different parts of the city.[44]

The positions of the army, and of the different detached corps were as
follows:--The infantry, the artillery, and the 4th division of cavalry
of the grand army, were at Warsaw and its environs. Three divisions
of cavalry were posted above and below the city, on the left bank of
the Vistula, whose duty it was to patrol the river, and to guard the
communications between the fortress of Modlin and Kozienice. This chain
of patrols, by watching the movements of the enemy, kept the grand army
continually advised of his intentions, and in constant readiness to
act against him, at any point which he might choose for attempting the
passage of the Vistula.

The corps of general Dwernicki was at Pulawy. The plan of operations
which had been assigned to him, and which, indeed, he had already put
in execution, was to transfer the seat of hostilities to the right bank
of the Vistula, to hang over and harass the left wing of the enemy, to
relieve the palatinate of Lublin from his presence, and, in case of
danger, to fall back to the fortress of Zamosc, and from that point
to act on the neighboring region, according as circumstances might
indicate.

Colonel Valentin was in the environs of Pultusk, with his small corps
of partizans. In concert with the garrison of Modlin, he was to act
on the right wing of the enemy, and hold in check all his manoeuvres
upon Plock. This concave line of operations, of which the extremities
were at Zamosc and Modlin, and the centre at Warsaw and Praga, was
strengthened by the Vistula, which, although frozen, would not allow
of a passage by the enemy in large bodies, or of the construction of a
bridge, as the ice of the river was momentarily expected to break up.

The position of the Russian army was as follows. The right wing was at
Nowy-dwor, opposite to Modlin. At Jablonna, which is situated half way
from Praga to Nowy-dwor, was placed a strong detachment. At Praga were
two divisions, one of infantry, and the other of cavalry, with twelve
pieces of cannon, under the command of general Giesmar. The greater
body of the Russian forces was between Wawr and Milosna; and with them
was the head-quarters of Diebitsch and Constantine. Their left wing
occupied Karczew, and their patrols extended themselves along the right
bank of the river, as far as Macieowice.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 40: This regulation led to an occasion for the exhibition
of the firmness of general Skrzynecki's character. On the very day of
the issuing of the order, the general of division, Szembek, brought
in a report, in which he presented for decorations the names of
several officers. General Skrzynecki refused his application. General
Szembek, thinking himself injured by this refusal, addressed a letter
to the general in chief, renewing his application, and adding that
if it should not be granted, he would feel obliged to surrender
his commission. General Skrzynecki, far from being moved from the
resolution which he had adopted, again promptly refused the request.
Szembek surrendered his commission. The whole nation regretted the loss
of the valuable services of this officer, and under such circumstances.
But in regretting their loss they applauded the firmness of general
Skrzynecki. The latter indeed felt this regret strongly, but on the
other hand he was satisfied that he had done his duty. The opinion of
most of the patriots was decidedly expressed against general Szembek,
who, upon such a point of personal feeling, could forget his duties to
his country, and abandon the ranks of his fellow-soldiers, by whom he
was held in high estimation. Szembek indeed more than once reproached
himself for the sacrifice which he had thus made. The following
anecdote will show the degree to which general Skrzynecki was beloved
by the army, and the influence which his appointment to the chief
command had on the minds of the soldiers. A soldier named Golembiewski,
of the 7th regiment of infantry, who had been wounded in the battle of
Boimie, had, on the 1st day of March, left the hospital convalescent,
although his wounds were not entirely healed. Skrzynecki, while
inspecting the regiment, noticed him with his head still bandaged, and
said to him, 'My dear comrade, why have you left the hospital in such
a state? You had better return immediately.' The soldier answered,
'General, I have heard of your courage and your achievements, and how
much you are beloved by the nation, and I could not refuse myself the
satisfaction of being present at the first fire under your command, and
in which I hope that the Polish army will be victorious.' Skrzynecki,
embracing him, exclaimed, 'With such soldiers to command, I need have
no fear that I shall fail to support the honor of my country.']

[Footnote 41: The Polish women, wishing to share the dangers and
sufferings, and to witness the triumphs of their brethren, proposed
to follow the example of the daughters of Sparta, and to form three
companies under the command of several ladies of the most distinguished
families. They proposed to march upon the rear of the army, and when an
action occurred, they were to advance to the aid of their countrymen.
The first company, to be composed of the young and active, were to
receive and carry off the wounded from the field of battle, thus at
the same time animating the soldiers by their presence. The second
company was to be placed near the vehicles in which the wounded were
transported, there to receive and place them, and to dress their
wounds. The third was to take charge of the provisions, the preparation
of lint and bandages, and even of the washing of the clothing of the
soldiers. These patriotic propositions, however, neither the nation
nor the general in chief were willing to accept, considering that the
fatigues of a campaign would be too trying to the female constitution.
But to satisfy in some degree the noble impulses of these ladies, the
three companies were distributed among the hospitals, to take care of
the sick and wounded there.]

[Footnote 42: To satisfy the reader that marshal Diebitsch had began
to be conscious of his weakness, the following trifling circumstances
will suffice. On the first day of March, two of our soldiers who had
been made prisoners by the Russians, returned to Warsaw, and presented
themselves to the general in chief. One of them, who was a Galician
volunteer, on the question being asked in what way they escaped,
answered, that general Diebitsch himself dismissed them with a present
of four ducats each, enjoining them to make it known in the army, and
to say that each soldier who should go over to the Russians, would
receive a like sum, and in addition to it a portion of land sufficient
for his maintenance; and that moreover they should not be forced to
enter the service of the army. He also assured them that if they should
return with many of their comrades, to accept these terms, they should
be made officers. 'Dear general,' the Galician added, 'we have sought
your presence, in order to apprize you of these circumstances, and to
place you upon your guard. The money which we have received, we request
you to take as a contribution to the service of our country. We have
no need of it; your care will provide for our wants, and our desires
are limited to the satisfaction of fighting for the cause of our
beloved country.' These brave soldiers were hailed with enthusiastic
expressions of respect and affection by their comrades, and the
circumstance was published in an order of the day, to the whole army.
This adoption of such a system of intrigue and espionage indicated
sufficiently the sense of weakness which marshal Diebitsch began to
feel, in the situation in which he was then placed.

One of our generals published in the Gazette some remarks upon this
conduct of general Diebitsch, from which the following is a passage.
'Marshal! such conduct is reproachful to you; and by it, you have
strengthened the current suspicions of the world, that the passage of
the Balkan, which has given you such a name in history, was made upon
a bridge of gold. But if such measures might have been successful in
Turkey, they will not do in Poland. If you do not by this time know it,
I can assure you that every Pole is willing to sacrifice his all in
the cause of his country, and your offers can therefore avail little.
I repeat to you, that the words of our motto are, "to die or conquer."
Come then, Marshal, with the sabre, and not with ducats, to the
contest!']

[Footnote 43: _Extract from the proclamation of Yermolow._ 'Brave sons
of Russia! An old man of seventy, who, the contemporary of four reigns,
knows well his nation and its sovereigns, lifts his voice towards you,
with a heart devoted to the good of his country. He wishes, in the
decline of a life which has been agitated by the storms of despotism,
to infuse into your hearts the sentiments of liberty, and to die a
freeman. Our complaints have been uttered in vain: our blood has been
shed in vain. Are these complaints the only arms worthy of the Russian
people? No! It is with the sword in hand, in the capital itself, on the
field of battle, in the north and in the south, that you should claim
your national liberty. The idols of despotism will fall before you.
The books of the divine law will be opened. The Czars will become the
fathers of their people: we shall be no longer orphans and strangers
upon our native soil. As the French and English have done, and even as
the Greeks, our brethren in Jesus Christ, have done, we will swear to
conquer our liberty, and that achievement will immortalize us. Nations
less celebrated, and less populous than ours, surrounded by monarchs
who have combined to destroy them, have arisen. Their brave men have
joined together. They hasten, at the call of their country, to defend
their national liberty, by their arms and their acts of valor. The hour
is come. God, who holds in his hands the fate of kings and people,
will bless us. Russians! break the chains of despotism! You have sworn
fidelity to the Czar, but he also has sworn to be our father. He has
perjured himself, and we are therefore released from our oaths. Respect
nevertheless the person of the Czar, for he is the anointed of the
Lord, and our sovereign. Limit yourselves to a change of the form of
the government, and demand a constitution. Rise up, and the throne will
tremble. But if the despot should attempt to arrest your enterprize
by the aid of the accomplices upon whom he lavishes all his favors,
forgetting that he is our monarch, and not theirs, and that he is the
father of the great family of Russians; it is then that it will be seen
that the autocracy must cease to exist, that the Russians long for
liberty, that they can and will be free.

 Yermolow.

 _Samara, 29th of January, 1831.'_]

[Footnote 44: In the construction of these works in the city and the
environs, all the citizens engaged, without distinction of age or sex.
One of the outworks received the name of the '_lunette_ of the women,'
having been constructed wholly by the hands of the fair sex.]




CHAPTER XII.

 Operations of the corps of general Dwernicki against the Russian
 corps under the prince of Wirtemberg, in the Palatinate of
 Lublin.--Battle of Pulawy, and defeat of Wirtemberg.--Atrocities
 of that prince at Pulawy.--Pursuit of the enemy.--Battle of Kurow,
 and annihilation of Wirtemberg's corps.--Operations of colonel
 Valentin, between Modlin and Pultusk.--A detachment of the enemy
 is surprised at Nasielsk.--Transports of provisions for the enemy
 from Prussia taken.--Successful skirmishes.--Marshal Diebitsch
 demands the capitulation of the fortress of Modlin. Reply of colonel
 Leduchowski.--A detachment from the garrison of Modlin attacks and
 defeats a Russian force at Serock.--General Skrzynecki makes an
 offer of pacification on the basis of the concessions originally
 demanded by the Poles.--This proposition is rejected and hostilities
 are recommenced.--Reconnoissance upon the right bank of the Vistula
 under Jankowski and Gielgud.--A Russian corps under general Witt is
 sent against Dwernicki.--General Uminski is sent against the Russian
 guard.--First encounter.--The Russian guard is compelled to leave
 their position for Ostrolenka.--The guard evacuates Ostrolenka to join
 the grand army.


On the day after the battle of Grochow, colonel Lagowski fought with
success at Pulawy, at the head of a detachment from the corps of
general Dwernicki. The details of that combat are as follows:


COMBAT OF PULAWA. [_See Plan_ XIII.]

The prince of Wirtemberg, having been beaten, as the reader has seen,
by general Dwernicki at Swierza and Nowawies, was forced to retreat
rapidly in the direction of Pulawy, and to repass the Vistula, opposite
that place. The ice of the river was, fortunately for him, still strong
enough to admit of a passage upon its surface; but notwithstanding
this advantage, he had been pursued by Dwernicki so closely, through
the whole of his line of retreat, that he daily lost great numbers
of prisoners. It was on the night of the 23d of February, that this
passage was made by the Russians, and Pulawy occupied by them. As the
position of that place was strong and commanding, general Dwernicki
did not think it expedient to attack the enemy in front, who, although
beaten, were still superior in force. He conceived the plan of passing
the Vistula, at a point at some distance below Pulawy, and of making
an attack upon the Russian right wing. On the evening of the 26th,
the brave colonel Lagowski, with 500 infantry and two squadrons of
cavalry, passed the Vistula (_p_). On reaching the opposite side of
the river, he threw himself into the forests which surround Pulawy.
The position of Lagowski would have been critical, if the Russians had
obtained intelligence of this manoeuvre; but they had no suspicions of
it. Colonel Lagowski, expecting that general Dwernicki would soon make
a demonstration in front, left the forest, and approached the town,
keeping up a brisk fire of skirmishers (_a_). The Russians, surprised
by this attack, directed against it as strong a fire of artillery
(_f_) and infantry (_d_) as its suddenness would allow; but our light
troops succeeded in approaching the town, and getting possession of
several houses, keeping up a continued fire. The two squadrons of
cavalry (_b_) which had been sent to attack the enemy in his rear,
threw themselves upon him at the same time, with great impetuosity. The
consternation of the Russians became general, the greatest disorder
soon followed, and a retreat was commenced, which was attended with the
loss of several hundred men and horses, and four pieces of artillery.
The enemy, in evacuating the town, set it on fire, to complete the
barbarities which they had been practising. Pulawy, a spot one of the
most favored of nature, and perhaps presenting one of the finest scenes
in Europe, was soon a mass of ruins, the sight of which filled the
bosom of every Pole with regret and horror. Those ruins, such indeed
as the whole country is now filled with, evidences of the horrible
barbarity of the Russians, in recalling to the minds of the Poles the
lost beauty and magnificence of their country, will be a pledge of
their eternal hatred of the despotism which authorized those ravages.

[Illustration:

 XIV. _p.180_.]

[Illustration:

 _Pulawy_ XIII. _p.178_.]

[Illustration:

 _Kurow_ XV]

The Russians had gained already a considerable distance from Pulawy,
before the corps of general Dwernicki approached it, and, of course,
the whole glory of that defeat is due to colonel Lagowski.[45]

The corps of general Dwernicki, after a short repose at Pulawy, renewed
the pursuit of the enemy on that night. In every part of their route
the enemy's stragglers were continually falling into their hands. This
corps overtook the enemy so soon, that in order to save himself from
total destruction, he was forced to give battle.


BATTLE OF KUROW. (_See Plans_ XIV _and_ XV.)

General Dwernicki, in his pursuit of Wirtemberg, had the intention
of effecting the destruction of this corps before they could reach
Lublin. To accomplish this object, he took advantage of the two roads
(_g_, _g_) which lead from Pulawy to Lublin (1). Remaining himself with
the greater part of his forces (_a_) upon the causeway which leads to
Lublin by Konskawola (2), Kurow (3), and Markuszew (4), he sent a small
detachment (_b_) with two pieces of cannon by the other and smaller
road, which, traversing the forest between Belzyc and Pulawy, presents
a shorter and more direct route to Lublin. This road had not been
occupied by the enemy. Colonel Lagowski, who commanded this detachment,
had instructions to follow out this road, and to keep up a constant
communication with the superior force under general Dwernicki. He was
ordered to keep himself constantly abreast of the enemy (_d_). At the
moment that he should hear the fire of our cannon, he was directed to
hasten to the attack of the enemy on his left wing, or on his rear, as
circumstances might direct. This manoeuvre was executed with the utmost
punctuality. The enemy pressed in upon the causeway by the larger body
under Dwernicki, and thus forced to give battle, took a position upon
the heights of the town of Kurow, in doing which, his consternation or
his inconsiderateness was such, that he neglected the ordinary means of
security, and did not occupy the roads which centre at that place, not
even that which it was of the utmost importance for him to occupy,--the
one which leads from Belzyc to Pulawy; in fact, he had even neglected
to send out reconnoissances on any side, supposing that our entire
force was before him on the causeway. This battle commenced on the
afternoon of the 2d of March, and continued only a few hours.

General Dwernicki, after reconnoitering the enemy's position, which
was commanding, and strengthened in its front by sixteen pieces of
cannon [(_f_), _Pl._ XV,] thought it expedient to commence with a
fire of skirmishers only (_a_), under cover of which he manoeuvred
his cavalry (_b_) upon the Russian wings, with the sole purpose of
occupying the attention of the enemy until the detachment of colonel
Lagowski should make its appearance. The enemy, on the other hand,
commenced a warm fire from his artillery, and threw forward his light
troops (_d_) in every direction. Some hours passed in this manner,
the enemy attempting from time to time to force our position. But the
hour of his destruction was approaching. General Dwernicki perceiving,
from an elevation of ground, the detachment of Lagowski (A) advancing
upon the enemy's rear, instantaneously gave orders for the cavalry to
concentrate themselves. The signal for advance was then given, and the
cavalry having formed on each side of the main road, pressed forward
and fell upon the centre of the enemy. At the same moment, a charge was
made by the cavalry of Lagowski upon the enemy's rear. The disorder and
consternation of the Russian forces was indescribable. In a moment ten
pieces of cannon, a thousand prisoners, some hundreds of horses, with
many wagons of ammunition and baggage, fell into our hands. The route
was general. The enemy fled pell-mell, and his loss was much increased
by a fire of grape from the two pieces of artillery of colonel
Lagowski, which he placed by the side of the road from Kurow to Lublin,
over which the Russians retreated. This road was literally covered with
dead. Nothing but the coming on of night saved the enemy from entire
destruction. After this battle, the forces of the prince of Wirtemberg
ceased to act as a corps. What remained of them, took the direction
of Lublin, where the corps of general Dwernicki arrived the next day,
having taken prisoners during the whole route. The prince of Wirtemberg
barely escaped from our hands, for he was in quarters in that city
when our advanced detachments entered it, and was just able to save
himself by flight. Such was the end of this Russian corps, which,
when it began to act against Dwernicki with his small force of 3,000
men, and ten pieces of cannon, consisted of 15,000 infantry and 24
pieces of cannon. In the course of eleven days, general Dwernicki gave
battle to this corps four separate times, viz. at Swierza, Nowawies,
Pulawy, and Kurow; and besides the loss he caused them in killed and
wounded, he took 8,000 prisoners, 19 pieces of cannon, besides 1,000
horses, with a great quantity of ammunition, baggage, &c. In all these
actions the corps of general Dwernicki lost but 500 men, in killed and
wounded. The panic which had began to prevail in the Russian forces, in
consequence of these disasters, reached such a degree that, at times,
the mere sight of our troops was sufficient to put them to flight. The
Russian commander in chief deprived the prince of Wirtemberg of his
post, and his name was not heard of during the rest of the war.

General Dwernicki, by his victories over this corps, had completely
freed the department of Lublin from the presence of the enemy.
On arriving at Lublin, he restored the authority of the National
Government in that place, and the region about. He made the necessary
arrangements for reinforcing his corps, and left for Krasny-taw, in the
environs of Zamosc.

While these successful operations of general Dwernicki, in the southern
part of the kingdom, were in progress, and by this series of victories,
he was approaching the frontiers of Wolhynia and Podolia, our arms were
not less successful in the North.

The brave colonel Valentin, with a small detachment of partizans,
fought the enemy with success between Modlin and Pultusk. This
detachment was thrown into that region, (acting, however, more
particularly between the rivers Wkra and Orsyca,) in order to hold in
check the operations of the enemy upon Plock. This detachment was to
obtain succor, in case of necessity, from the garrisons of Modlin. It
was especially destined to intercept the transports which were to come
from Prussia upon the road to Mlara, for the relief of the Russian army.

Colonel Valentin was occupying with his detachment the forest near
the town of Nasielsk, when he was apprised that a small body of
Russian troops, under the order of colonel Schindler, consisting of
two regiments of cavalry, a battalion of infantry, and two pieces of
cannon, had arrived on the 3d of March, at that town. This detachment
had been sent to protect a transport which was to pass there. Colonel
Valentin immediately formed a plan to attack it. During the night of
the 3d and 4th of March, he approached the town, invested it, and
ordered an attack, in which the detachment surprised the enemy, and
forced him to quit the city, leaving his two pieces of artillery, and
a number of prisoners. Colonel Valentin, thinking that the Russians
might possibly return with a superior force, evacuated the city, and
took his prisoners to Modlin, in order, by disembarrasing himself of
them, to hasten his march and reach the environs of Pultusk, in time to
intercept the transport. On the 5th, he took this transport, consisting
of eighty vehicles loaded with various kinds of provision, together
with twelve loads of equipage, &c, for the Russian generals, which
he sent to Warsaw. The detachment of colonel Valentin continued to
manoeuvre for a long while in those environs without any support.

In the vicinity of Warsaw, along the banks of the Vistula, both above
and below the city, small skirmishes almost daily occurred. On the
fourth of March, the brave lieutenant Berowski, passing the Vistula
opposite Jablonna with his platoon, surprised a squadron of cossacks,
and took a hundred prisoners and as many horses. The battalion of
volunteer chasseurs of colonel Grotus, posted in the environs of the
villages Siekierki, and Wilanow, brought in, almost every day, parties
of Russian prisoners, by surprising the different detachments of the
enemy placed upon the island of Saxe, opposite to the above mentioned
places. This same battalion burnt two batteaux, in which were a party
of Russian troops, who were sent during the night with combustibles
to burn the bridge between Warsaw and Praga. These boats were sunk,
and the Russians who escaped drowning, were taken prisoners. In the
environs of the small town of Gora, about twenty miles from Warsaw,
a considerable body of workmen who were sent by the enemy to prepare
the materials for building a bridge, were surprised by a battalion
of the 2d regiment of light infantry. A hundred pioneers and sappers
were taken prisoners, and many hundred male and female peasants set at
liberty, who had been forced to work for the enemy.

At about the 8th of March, marshal Diebitsch demanded the capitulation
of the fortress of Modlin, for which object he despatched colonel Kil.
This officer was entrusted with a letter to the count Leduchowski,
written by the marshal's own hand. His proposition was rejected.[46]

Some days after this answer, a part of the garrison of this fortress,
sent as a reinforcement to colonel Valentin, surprised the Russians
in the town of Serock. They had passed the river Bug, and the Narew
opposite that town, to make requisitions of forage in the country
around. By a prompt arrangement, the batteaux of the enemy were taken
by our troops; and his forces, suddenly attacked and defeated, were
compelled to evacuate their position, leaving a thousand prisoners in
our hands, which were immediately carried to Modlin, and thence to
Warsaw.

In this state of things, and while circumstances were continually
occurring with uniform advantage to the Polish arms, general
Skrzynecki, with the most sincere wish to finish a bloody struggle,
and anxious to show that the Poles were always ready to hold out the
hand of reconciliation, wrote, with the permission of the provisional
government, a communication to marshal Diebitsch, with propositions of
that purport. But as these offers of conciliation were rejected by the
marshal, the contest was recommenced.[47]

On the 10th of March, the operations of the campaign were recommenced.
The 2d division, the command of which, after the death of general
Zimirski, was given to general Gielgud, and a division of cavalry,
under the command of general Jankowski, received orders to make a
strong reconnoissance upon the right bank of the Vistula. This division
was ordered to pass the bridge in the night, and at break of day to
commence the attack upon whatever force of the enemy they might find
on the plains of Grochow or Kawenczyn, and, by this manoeuvre, to
harass the right wing of the enemy. But general Jankowski arrived
late. It was near eight o'clock, A.M. before he approached with his
division, at which time the two divisions united left Praga to commence
their attack, but this operation being thus retarded, could not be
made effective. The enemy, seeing our movement, had time to prepare
themselves to counteract it. Our forces having advanced a mile or two
upon the main road, commenced a fire of tirailleurs, and the enemy
began to retire. As it was designed to act upon Kawenczyn, a battalion
was sent to attempt an attack on the forest of elders, well known
to the reader; but as the enemy was quite strong at that point, and
particularly in artillery, a fire from which was immediately opened
upon our force, the attack was not made, and our battalion was ordered
to withdraw. The Russians, at about mid-day, began to show a stronger
force upon the plains of Wawr. Their artillery, also, opened a fire
upon the main road. This fire had continued an hour, when our generals,
not perceiving that the artillery was protected by cavalry, decided
to make a charge upon them with the regiment of Mazurs, and the 3d
regiment of light cavalry. This brigade of cavalry, under the command
of the brave colonels Blendowski and Miller, threw themselves with
courage upon that artillery, when, at the moment of the charge, two
regiments of Attaman Cossacks, which were posted in a wood adjoining,
displayed their front, and advanced to charge our cavalry upon the
flank and rear. Our attack therefore failed, and it was owing to good
fortune alone that by a rapid bending of our flank, this body of
cavalry was saved from total ruin. This unfortunate affair cost us a
heavy loss of men, and of both of the brave colonels who commanded the
attack. At about 2, P.M. as the enemy began to debouch from the great
forest with increased forces, it was decided to return to Warsaw, and
thus ended this reconnoissance, which had it been executed by more
skilful generals, might have had the best success, for all the Russian
regiments which had advanced towards Praga, at a considerable distance
from their main forces, might have been taken. A reprimand was publicly
given to the two generals, Gielgud and Jankowski, for their remissness
in executing their instructions. The only advantage which was gained by
this reconnoissance, was the taking of a great quantity of fascines and
other materials prepared for a storm of Praga, and the collection from
off the field of a considerable quantity of arms, which had been left
there by the enemy, after the battle of the 25th.[48]

The Russian commander having, as the reader is aware, lost nearly the
whole of the corps of the prince Wirtemberg, the remnants of which was
dispersed and had wholly ceased active operations, sent against general
Dwernicki the corps of general Witt, composed of 8,000 infantry, 2,000
cavalry, and 16 pieces of cannon. This corps arrived on the 11th at
Lublin, in which town was a small detachment of Dwernicki's corps,
commanded by the colonel Russyian. This small detachment, having only
barricaded a few streets, defended with much firmness the passage of
the small river Bystrzyca, and left the city at nightfall to rejoin its
corps, which was in the environs of Zamosc.

Again the corps of the Russian guard, which had recently arrived, under
the command of prince Michael, consisting of 16,000 infantry, 4,000
cavalry, and 36 pieces of cannon, a division of cavalry, with eight
pieces of cannon, was sent into the environs of Pultusk, commanded by
general Uminski, who was to take under his command the detachment of
colonel Valentin, and acting in concert with the garrison of Modlin,
he was to occupy the attention of the enemy, in order that our main
body should not be disturbed in the offensive operations which general
Skrzynecki had decided to adopt.

General Uminski arriving with his corps, met an advanced detachment of
the Russian guard in the environs of Makow, composed of two regiments
of hussars and eight pieces of cannon, who were sent forward as a
party of observation in that vicinity. This was the first encounter
with this celebrated guard. Our cavalry waited impatiently for the
moment to try their strength with them. Two young regiments, one a
regiment of Krakus of Podlasia, and the other the 5th Hulans, entreated
their general to be permitted to make the charge. General Uminski
observing that there was no stronger force near, ordered an immediate
attack.

Our cavalry, on receiving the order, did not even give the enemy time
to display his front, or to make use of his artillery; but rushed
upon him with an impetuous charge, under which he was at once borne
down. Of one regiment of those hussars nearly a squadron were taken
prisoners. This Russian cavalry, which were in full rout, were pursued
as far as the environs of Magnuszewo. The enemy was not permitted
to take position, and the pursuit was pressed with such rapidity,
that they had not time to destroy the bridge which crosses the river
Orsyca, but were followed even to the environs of Rozany, where they
reached the position of their main body. General Uminski, in order
not to expose his force to the observation of the enemy, halted in
an advantageous position in the forests near Rozany, and from this
position he continued to hold the enemy in check. In fact, by harassing
and wearying the enemy with continual attacks, he at length forced the
prince Michael to quit Rozany, taking the direction of Ostrolenka.
General Uminski sent in pursuit of the enemy the brigade of cavalry
under the command of colonel Dembinski. This brigade, opposite
Ostrolenka upon the Narew, had on the 26th of March an advantageous
affair with the advanced guard of the enemy, in which forty prisoners
were taken. By closely observing the enemy in this manner, it was
ascertained that the Russian guard, after destroying the bridge, had
completely evacuated Ostrolenka. It was evident that the design of
prince Michael, in this sudden evacuation of Ostrolenka, was to join
himself to the grand army. General Uminski immediately sent an officer
to inform the commander in chief of this movement, continuing in the
mean time in the position which he had taken before Ostrolenka.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 45: General Dwernicki, on arriving at Pulawy, regarded it as
his first duty to repair to the palace of the princess Czartoriski, the
estimable lady of the president of the National Senate, to offer his
services to her, and to assure her of safety. On entering the court,
the venerable Dwernicki and the officers who accompanied him, could
not restrain their tears at the sight of the ruins of that edifice,
so uselessly destroyed, to gratify the brutality of the prince of
Wirtemberg, who pushed his fury to such a degree, as to have directed a
fire of artillery against the central division of the palace, occupied
at that moment by the princess and her attendants. General Dwernicki
and his officers, struck by the melancholy scene before them, feared to
advance another step, in the dread of meeting even more horrible traces
of barbarity,--to find perhaps the princess and her suite the victims
of Russian cruelty. But what was their astonishment, when, on entering
the porch of the edifice, they were accosted by the princess, who with
a cheerful air exclaimed: 'Brave general, and officers! how happy am I,
that God has allowed me to greet my brave countrymen once more, before
my death.' Then giving her hand to general Dwernicki, and presenting
to him and his officers the ladies who were her attendants during the
whole of these horrible scenes, she continued, 'General, do not be
astonished to see us accoutred in the best garments which the Russians
have left to us; we have arrayed ourselves in our funeral attire,'--and
pointing to the holes with which the enemy's artillery had pierced
the walls, she added, 'Those marks will explain my language.' General
Dwernicki, struck with the heroism of the princess and her companions,
addressed her in the following terms:--'Madam, permit me, in the name
of the whole nation, to make to you the homage of my high admiration.
Brave indeed ought Poles to be, with mothers and sisters such as
these!' He then urged upon the princess the expediency of leaving
Pulawa, which might still be the scene of distressing events, and upon
this suggestion she departed under an escort furnished by general
Dwernicki, for her estates in Galicia.]

[Footnote 46: The reader will perhaps be gratified with a short
topographical description of this fortress, and some details of this
affair. The fortress of Modlin, which is in a pentagonal form, is
situated sixteen miles from Warsaw, upon the right bank of the Vistula,
at the junction of the Narew with the former river. Not far from this
fortress, the small river Wkra also joins the Narew. The fortress is
thus situated between three rivers. In addition to this peculiarity
of its situation in regard to the rivers, its commanding elevation
makes it a point of great strength. Opposite to it is the small town
of Nowy-dwor, but this town is so low that it is commanded by the
fortress, and it is besides too distant for the erection of batteries
by which the latter could be bombarded with success. This post is
very important in regard to tactics, and it is a key of position,
to protect, or to act upon, all operations between the Narew and
the Vistula. Marshal Diebitsch considering these circumstances, and
seeing that an open attack was scarcely possible, was led to attempt
negotiation. The letter sent by the marshal, was full of flattering
language in regard to the heroism of the Polish army. He permitted
himself, however, to say that it was to be regretted that such a
degree of heroism was not exhibited in a better cause--that the brave
Polish army was made a sacrifice of, by some ambitious and opinionated
men, who had forgotten their duties to their monarch, and their oaths
of fidelity. From such men as those, he wished to distinguish the
count Leduchowski, for whom he had the highest esteem, and who, he
was convinced, had no desire to continue a useless expenditure of
blood, and would willingly surrender the fortress to the troops of his
legitimate monarch. To all this, marshal Diebitsch added the assurance
that the fortress should be garrisoned by equal bodies of Russian and
Polish troops. Colonel Leduchowski made a reply to this complimentary
communication in nearly the following terms:--'Marshal, to your letter,
in which you have chosen to flatter the valor of my countrymen, and in
which you have honored me, in particular, with your attentions, I have
the honor to answer, that I cannot better deserve your good opinion,
than in defending, with my compatriots, our beloved country to the last
drop of my blood. This is the course which the honor of each brave Pole
dictates to him.']

[Footnote 47: This letter, written at the moment when our army was
victorious, and when a revolution, ready to break out in all the Polish
provinces attached to Russia, made the position of the Russian army
extremely dangerous, was couched in most conciliatory terms, having
for its sole object the termination of a fraternal struggle. In this
letter, the generalissimo sought to convince marshal Diebitsch, that
this was not a war undertaken on our part at the instigation of a few
individuals, but that it was espoused by the whole nation, and that
the people were forced to take up arms by the enormity of those acts
of tyranny, which were not perhaps even known to the monarch. He urged
him to consider the amount of blood which had been already shed, and
the indefinite prolongation to which such a struggle might be extended.
He urged him also, to make known these representations to the monarch,
and to invite him to lay aside all enmity, to visit and hear in person
the complaints of the nation, who would receive him with sincerity, and
who demanded of him only the confirmation and observance of the rights
granted by the constitution, and the extension of the same rights to
our brethren in the Russo-Polish provinces. What an opportunity was
here presented to the Emperor Nicholas to act with magnanimity, and to
extend a conciliatory hand to the Polish nation! Those letters will be
an eternal testimony, that the Poles attempted every amicable means, to
establish upon an equal basis their own happiness and civilization, and
that of the whole north, and that all the responsibility of the bloody
struggle which was continued, rests on the side of despotism.]

[Footnote 48: The following particulars will demonstrate to the reader
how much even the enemy appreciated Polish courage and devotedness.
After this affair, our generalissimo, regretting much the loss of the
brave colonel Blendowski, who had fallen in his wounded state into the
enemy's hands, sent a flag to general Giesmar, the commander of the
Russian advanced guard, to propose an exchange, if colonel Blendowski
was still living, and if dead, to request that his body might be given
up. At the moment that the officer bearing the flag, with a party of
lancers, arrived at the Russian quarters, he saw a body of Russians
with general Giesmar, and his suite at their side, bearing a wounded
officer, and advancing towards them. Our officer, as they approached,
recognized colonel Blendowski in the wounded officer, and announced
to general Giesmar that it was to obtain him that he had been sent.
On receiving this communication, general Giesmar replied, 'You see,
sir, that I had anticipated your object. Make my intentions known to
your commander, and let him know how much I honor Polish heroism.'
This general took part, with his own hand, in all the arrangements for
transferring the wounded officer, and two of his suite were among those
who bore his body.]




CHAPTER XIII.

 Plan of general Skrzynecki to act upon the isolated corps of Rosen
 and Giesmar.--Battle of Wawr.--Various detachments of the enemy are
 taken after that battle, and a great number of prisoners.--Battle of
 Dembe-Wielke.--Destructive pursuit of the enemy by our cavalry.--View
 of the Russian losses in the preceding days.--Marshal Diebitsch
 abandons his plan of crossing the Vistula, and marches to the rescue
 of the remains of the corps of Rosen and Giesmar, and the Imperial
 Guard.--View of the position of the two armies, after the second
 repulse of the enemy from before Warsaw.--Operations of general
 Dwernicki.--Successes of a reconnoissance under colonel Russyian at
 Uscilog.--Effect of Dwernicki's victories on the inhabitants of the
 provinces.--Acknowledgment of general Dwernicki's services by the
 National Government.--The instructions for his future operations.


The news of this prompt and sudden evacuation of Ostrolenka by the
Russian guard, and the evident intention of the Grand Duke Michael to
discontinue his operations in the palatinate of Plock, and to make a
junction with the grand army, as well as other certain intelligence
that marshal Diebitsch had withdrawn the main body of his forces,
[_See_ (A) _Plan_ XVI,] and had left only a corps of observation,
composed of the two corps of Rosen and Giesmar (B), in the environs
of Wawr and Milosna, determined our generalissimo to hasten to the
execution of the plan, for a long time decided upon, which was to throw
himself with his whole force upon the nearest Russian corps, and to
crush them before marshal Diebitsch could come to their succor.

On the 29th and 30th, our general in chief made a review of the greater
part of the army. All the troops received him with expressions of the
greatest enthusiasm. He could not but be delighted at the sight of
that fine and energetic force, and be confident of the most brilliant
successes. All the troops defiled before the general, carrying with
them the trophies which they had taken from the enemy; and each
platoon, as they passed, hailed him with some patriotic exclamation,
and pledged themselves that they would never return without having
satisfied his orders to the utmost. On the night of that day, the
commanders of the several divisions received the order to hold
themselves in readiness to march at a moment's warning.


BATTLE OF WAWR. [_See Plan_ XVII.]

On the evening of the 30th, the two divisions of infantry under
Rybinski and Gielgud, and the brigade of cavalry under Kicki, received
orders to pass from Warsaw to Praga. That force quitted Warsaw at ten
o'clock, P.M.

[Illustration:

 _XVI. p. 264._]

[Illustration:

 _XVII. p. 266._]

Whilst the division of Gielgud and the cavalry of Kicki were to occupy
the great road (_g_) leading to Grochow, the 1st division under
Rybinski was to march upon the right wing of the enemy at Kawenczyn
(K). This last division was to drive the enemy from his position in
as short a time as possible. If the enemy's forces at Kawenczyn were
found to be greatly superior to his own, general Rybinski was directed
to continue his fire, and await a reinforcement, which should be
immediately sent to him. If he should be so fortunate as to take
Kawenczyn, general Rybinski was to send, by a small road (_l_) leading
from this place, through the forest, to Milosna, a few battalions (_m_)
to that village. Other battalions (_d_) were to be dispersed in the
forest, between that small road and the main road. Having made those
arrangements, the position of Kawenczyn was to be vigorously defended,
in order to baffle every effort of the enemy to retake it. The accurate
and prompt execution of this plan was expected to effect the cutting
off of all the enemy's forces, which were to be found upon the field
of Wawr. In regard to the division of Gielgud upon the main road, the
instructions given were that it should not commence its fire until
apprised of general Rybinski's having gained possession of Kawenczyn.
This division was till then to limit its attention to the object of
retaining the enemy in his position near Praga, long enough to give
time for the corps of general Rybinski to occupy the above mentioned
forest, and to operate in the enemy's rear. The moment for the advance
of the 2d division, was to be, when the fire of the light troops of
Rybinski should be heard in the forest.

All these dispositions were executed with the greatest exactitude under
the protection of a thick fog. The division of general Rybinski having
quitted Praga at midnight, arrived as far as the environs of Kawenczyn,
without being in the least disturbed by the enemy. This skilful
general had the precaution not to attack the enemy until an hour before
day-break; in the interval, while resting in the woody ground near
Kawenczyn, he sent forward a patrol, with directions to approach near
enough to ascertain, as far as practicable, the position, the strength,
and the nature of the force of the enemy, and sent another patrol in
the direction of the forest of elders to reconnoitre the enemy there.
Those patrols returned with the intelligence that the enemy's force
could not be great, as they could perceive no large detachments placed
as advanced posts. It was between five and six in the morning, when
the first fire of general Rybinski, at Kawenczyn, gave notice to the
2d division of Gielgud, at Praga, that it was the time to advance. The
brigade of cavalry under Kicki, (_b_), with the 2d and 7th regiments
of lancers, having with them three pieces of cannon, spread out their
flankers, and advanced slowly, directed continually by the fire of
general Rybinski, who in the mean time had pushed two battalions at the
charge, supported by a few pieces of artillery, and had carried the
enemy's position by storm, and taken possession of Kawenczyn. The enemy
were instantly routed by this impetuous attack, and lost three pieces
of cannon. The division passed through Kawenczyn, sent two battalions
(_m_) to Milosna, occupied the forest (A) in the rear of the enemy's
principal force, and commenced a fire. When this fire was heard by our
forces (B) upon the main road, they pushed forward, and a general and
rapid advance was commenced under cover of the thick fog. Two regiments
of cossack cavalry, (_h_), who were posted in columns near the Obelisk
of Iron, were borne down before them. A great number of prisoners were
taken on the spot. Our brave lancers, under Kicki, animated by this
success, did not halt in their attack. They fell upon an advanced post
of Russian artillery of three pieces (_f_) near Grochow, and took them
before they had time to fire. By seven or eight o'clock, the enemy was
entirely surrounded, and his retreat by Milosna was wholly cut off. It
was with the dissipation of the fog that we witnessed the confusion
into which had been thrown the whole advanced guard of Giesmar,
composed of four regiments or sixteen battalions of infantry (_a_),
eight squadrons of cavalry (_h_), and twenty-four pieces of cannon
(_f_). The disorder of this advanced guard was such, that the Russian
battalions had actually been firing against each other, and that fire
ceased only with the clearing up of the fog. The 95th and 96th Russian
regiments, amounting to 5,000 men, with all their officers and colors,
were taken in a body, and with them the brigadier general Lewandowski.
If the fog had continued half an hour longer, so that we could have
occupied the road to Karczew, the whole of this advanced guard would
have been taken; for what remained of them saved themselves only by
flying along that road.

This attack, which was the business of a few hours, forced the enemy
to quit his advantageous position in the commanding forest, between
Wawr and Milosna, which he had occupied for a month, and on which he
had constructed considerable fortifications. Driven from this important
position, he could only expect to be subjected to still greater losses.
At Milosna (3), three battalions of the enemy, with four pieces of
cannon, placed as an isolated detachment, were dispersed, and their
cannon taken. Another isolated detachment of cavalry of hussars and
cossacks of Czarno-morskie, posted at Janowek, met the same fate, and
prisoners were taken in every direction. Our two divisions pursued
the enemy with unremitted celerity, and, followed by our main forces,
reached Dembe-Wielke, at which place was the corps of general Rosen,
composed of about 30,000 men and 40 pieces of cannon.


BATTLE OF DEMBE-WIELKE. [_See Plate_ XVIII.]

As the enemy occupied the heights (D) of Dembe-Wielke, on the side of
the marsh opposite to our forces, which, to attack him, would have had
to traverse the dyke (_k_) constructed over this marsh,--the commanders
of the two divisions considered it expedient to await the arrival of
our whole force, which approached some hours after. General Skrzynecki,
satisfied that an attack made, over the dyke, upon the commanding
position of the enemy on the other side, in broad day, would cost too
great a sacrifice of men, determined to amuse him by a constant fire
of our skirmishers (_a_), who advanced as far as the marshy ground
which divided the two armies would permit. A little before night, the
general in chief ordered all the cavalry (_b_) to be brought together,
and formed in columns of attack, with the two squadrons of carbiniers,
under the brave colonel Sznayder, at their head. At the approach of
twilight, he ordered these columns to pass the dyke on a trot, and to
throw themselves upon the enemy on the right and left, attacking with
the sabre.

While the cavalry was passing the dyke, the artillery (_c_) was to open
a general fire, ceasing, however, when the passage of the dyke should
be effected.

The order was given, and this mass of cavalry, under the fire of the
artillery, raised the hurrah, and passed the dyke with the rapidity of
lightning, followed by our infantry, having at their head the brave
4th regiment. The enemy was in such consternation that he was not
in a state to make a defence, and his whole battery was overthrown.
Full three thousand prisoners were taken, together with the entire
battery, consisting of twelve pieces of cannon of large calibre,
some fifty voitures of different kinds, as caissons of ammunition,
baggage-wagons, &c, and a great number of horses.[49] In a word, the
corps of general Rosen was completely broken up; the coming on of
night, and the forests, alone saved them from total ruin. General Rosen
himself, with his suite, was pursued and was near being taken. All
his equipage, consisting of three voitures, fell into our hands. Thus
ended the glorious 30th of March. The generalissimo, who was always
in the advance, and who had personally arranged all the details of
that day's operations, particularly at Dembe, justified well the high
opinion which the general officers and the army had entertained of him.
The 30th of March placed his name high on the roll of distinguished
leaders. On that memorable day, two Russian corps, those of Giesmar and
Rosen, were completely broken up. It cost the enemy, in dead, wounded
and prisoners, full 10,000 men and 22 pieces of cannon. On our side
the loss was not more than 500 killed and wounded. For the successes
of that day general Skrzynecki received from the government the
order of the great Cross of Military Merit. The general in chief was
accompanied, during the actions, by prince Adam Czartoriski, and the
members of the National Government, Berzykowski, and Malachowski.

[Illustration:

 _XVIII. p. 200_]

[Illustration:

 _XIX. p. 202_]

To follow up the pursuit [_See Plan_ XIX] of the fragments of the two
Russian corps, general Skrzynecki designated the division of cavalry
(A) under general Lubinski, with a battery of light artillery. This
detachment set out during the night, sending reconnoissances to the
right and left, to see that the enemy did not prepare ambuscades.
The army followed this advanced guard, which soon overtook the enemy
(B), who was still in great disorder. Infantry, cavalry, artillery,
and vehicles, were mingled together, pressing their retreat. At each
step, our cavalry took up prisoners. Upon some positions the enemy
attempted to make a stand, but every such attempt was thwarted, and he
was carried along before our troops. This was the case in the position
of Minsk and of Jendrzeiow, where two regiments of Russian cavalry
were routed by the second regiment of chasseurs. It was the same case
in the forest of Kaluszyn, where our artillery approached the Russian
rear-guard, and poured upon them a fire of grape, which scattered death
among their ranks. The Russians, being no longer in a state to make any
stand whatever, fell into a panic, and commenced a general flight. They
were pursued by general Lubinski as far as Kaluszyn, where night closed
upon the scene of destruction.

This day cost the enemy nearly as much as the preceding. Besides their
loss in dead and wounded, 3,000 prisoners fell into our hands, with
three standards, four pieces of cannon, and a hundred vehicles of
baggage, ammunition, &c,--in fact, the whole baggage of the corps. But
the most agreeable success of our army, on that day, was the taking
possession of the hospitals of Minsk and Jendrzeiow, in which as many
as two hundred of our comrades were lying wounded. To witness the joy
of those brave sufferers was recompense enough for all our fatigues.
The impetuosity of our attack was such, that the enemy had not time
to burn the magazines of Milosna, Minsk, and Kaluszyn, which fell
into our hands. To make a recapitulation of the loss of the enemy on
those two days--it was as follows:--Two of their generals, Lewandowski
and Szuszerin, taken prisoners, with as many as sixty officers, of
different grades, 15,000 soldiers in killed, wounded and prisoners; 26
pieces of cannon, seven standards, 1,500 horses, a great quantity of
different kinds of arms and implements, and as many as 100 vehicles of
various kinds.

The disasters of these two Russian corps were the cause of the
abandonment of the plan which had been adopted by marshal Diebitsch, of
passing the Vistula between Pulawy and Maceiowice, opposite Kozienice,
with the greater part of his army; and to execute which he had left
his position on the latter days of March, and had reached the environs
of Ryk. [_See Plan_ XVI.] The fear of losing those two corps, together
with the guard, had led him to return in the direction of the town of
Kock, to afford them succor.

After these days, so fortunate for us, in which the Russian forces
were again driven from before the walls of Warsaw, the position of
their army was as follows. Their right wing, formed of the remains of
the corps of Giesmar and Rosen, was at Boimie; detachments being also
placed in the environs of Wengrow. The main body, under Diebitsch,
was at Kock. His advanced posts extended to Wodynie, Seroczyn, and
Zelechow. The Russian guard, which, as we have said, had formed the
plan of joining their main body, and had left Ostrolenka by the road
through Wengrow, was obliged, in consequence of the successes of our
army, to abandon that plan, and to retire again to the environs of
Ostrolenka, where they now were posted. In the palatinate of Lublin was
the Russian corps under general Witt.

The position of our army was as follows. Our left wing was opposite
Boimie. It sent out its reconnoissances along the river Kostrzyn, as
far as Grombkow, Zimna-woda, and even beyond. The head-quarters of the
general in chief were with the main body, at Latowicz. Our right wing
was at Siennica. Its reconnoissances were sent out as far as Zelechow,
at which place was a detached corps, under the command of general Pac.
In this manner, the marshy rivers, Kostrzyn and Swider, covered our
front. [_Refer to Plan_ VI.] General Uminski, with his detached corps,
was at Rozany, in the palatinate of Plock, opposed to the Russian
guard. In the environs of the fortress of Zamosc in the palatinate of
Lublin, opposed to the Russian corps of general Witt, was the corps
of general Dwernicki. Besides this, a small corps was placed in the
environs of the town of Granica, upon the left bank of the Vistula,
under the command of general Sierawski.

While the main forces were acting with such success, the two detached
corps, under generals Uminski and Dwernicki, had also fought
gloriously, and gained important advantages. The corps of general
Dwernicki spread terror in its vicinity, and the Russians were
compelled to send a new corps against him, under the command of general
Kreutz; so that the combined Russian forces opposed to him amounted
to 20,000 men. Greatly superior as this force was, they did not dare
to attack general Dwernicki, who, reinforced every day by volunteers
coming from Galicia and Volhynia, soon found himself at the head of
4500 men, and 20 pieces of cannon. This corps, in concert with the
garrison of Zamosc, was sufficient to hold in check all the operations
of the enemy in that quarter.

On the 25th of March, general Dwernicki sent a reconnoissance as far
as the environs of Uscilug, at which place a new Russian corps, coming
from Turkey, was expected to arrive. This reconnoissance was composed
of two battalions of infantry, one company of Galician volunteers,
three squadrons of cavalry, and four pieces of cannon. The commander
of this force was the brave colonel Russyian. The detachment arrived
at the above place, and received intelligence of the approach of
an advanced guard of the corps of general Rudiger, composed of two
regiments or six battalions of infantry, one regiment of cossacks, and
eight pieces of cannon. Colonel Russyian did not stay for the approach
of this guard. He took possession of the different batteaux which were
prepared for, and were waiting the arrival of the Russian force at the
distance of a league from the town. Passing the river Bug, with his
corps, in these boats, he suddenly attacked the Russian advanced guard
with such success, that he took two thousand prisoners, and six pieces
of cannon, and several hundred horses. With these trophies he returned
and joined the corps, to their astonishment, for they had received but
a single report from him, and had no expectation of such results. The
rumor of the continual successes of this corps of general Dwernicki,
spread along the borders of the Dnieper, reached the distant regions of
our brethren in the Ukraine, and awakened in them an ardent desire to
unite themselves to our cause.

For the continued and glorious advantages of this corps, which
commenced its operations with 3,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, and three
pieces of cannon, and had nearly destroyed two Russian corps, those of
Kreutz and Wirtemberg, taking 10,000 prisoners, and thirty pieces of
cannon, the national government promoted its brave commander to the
rank of full general of cavalry, and honored him with the surname of
the famous Czarnecki, the ancient polish chief.[50]

The general in chief communicated to general Dwernicki his promotion,
with the sincere thanks of the national government; and at the same
time sent him instructions and advice in regard to the operations
which he was then to follow. The corps of general Dwernicki was to
manoeuvre in such a manner as to menace continually the left wing
of the Russian grand army. Keeping this object in view, he was not,
unless with the expectation of some very extraordinary advantages,
to remove himself very far from the fortress of Zamosc. This place
was to serve as a _point d'appui_ in every case of sudden danger.
About this point he was to manoeuvre, and from thence he was to push
himself, as circumstances might allow, into the environs of Lublin and
Wlodawa, to trouble incessantly the above mentioned wing, and even
the rear of the Russian grand army. In this instruction of keeping
himself near the fortress of Zamosc, and in the palatinate of Lublin
generally, another advantage was contemplated: viz. that he might
receive daily accessions of volunteers from Volhynia and Podolia. Our
brethren, in those provinces, would hasten to join themselves to his
victorious eagles, (of which disposition, indeed, he received continual
evidence,) and, in this manner his corps would be gradually increased
by such aid from those provinces, without attracting the attention
of the enemy. As the provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, from their
geographical character, having no large forests, were not in a state
to carry on a partizan warfare, as was quite practicable in Lithuania
and Samogitia, and also as the Russians had several corps upon the
frontiers of Turkey, which, by being concentrated in that open country,
might be dangerous to our small forces, general Skrzynecki was of the
opinion that general Dwernicki, by keeping near the frontiers of the
above mentioned provinces, should rather act by a moral influence upon
their inhabitants, than hazard certain advantages by entering them.
The river Wieprz was to be the leaning point of his left wing, and
the river Bug of his right. Between those two rivers, in a woody and
marshy region, he would find many strong natural positions. Of such
he would take advantage, and endeavor to strengthen them by different
fortifications. General Dwernicki, in receiving these instructions,
was also invested with full powers, by the national government, to
institute a provisional administration over the above provinces, (in
case that circumstances should lead him to establish a footing there,)
similar to that of the kingdom in general, and to bring them into a
state to act with effect in concert with the rest of the kingdom.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 49: The horses taken on that day, and at the battle of Wawr,
were employed to mount the entire new regiment of the Lancers of
Augustow.]

[Footnote 50: General Dwernicki, who received, among other titles,
that also of the 'Provider of cannon,' used his cavalry so constantly
in the charge upon artillery, that if the artillery of the enemy began
its fire, and the charge was not ordered, our cavalry were always
disappointed. This was the case at the battle of Kurow, on the 2d
of March. As the enemy in that battle had placed his artillery in a
commanding position, and as general Dwernicki was awaiting the arrival
of detachments under colonel Lagowski, in the direction of Belzge, he
was not disposed then to give the order for a charge, but preferred
to amuse the enemy by various manoeuvres of his cavalry. Passing
down the front of his lancers, he observed that they wore a look of
dissatisfaction. On noticing this, he was astonished, and demanded an
explanation. 'What does this mean, my dear comrades?' said he; 'you are
sad at a moment when, after so many victories, you ought to be joyful.'
The lancers replied--'Dear general, it is an hour since the enemy's
artillery commenced their fire, and you do not allow us to charge upon
them.' The general, smiling, answered, 'Make yourselves content; you
shall soon have that satisfaction;'--and in a short time, as the reader
will remember, general Dwernicki, seeing the detachment of colonel
Lagowski approaching, gave the order for an attack upon the enemy's
artillery, and in a moment they were driven from their position,
sabred, and ten pieces of their cannon taken. The Russians, to whom the
name of Dwernicki was a terror, would speak of him in the following
manner: 'What can we make of such a general? He performs no manoeuvres,
and never permits our artillery to fire. His generalship appears to lie
only in taking possession at once of our cannon!']




CHAPTER XIV.

 The insurrection in Lithuania.--Dispositions of the Lithuanians at the
 breaking out of our revolution.--Their offers of co-operation were
 rejected by the dictator.--View of the condition of Lithuania under
 the Russian sway.--Scheme of the Russian government to destroy all
 Polish national feeling in that province.--The insurrection is brought
 about by the massacre of the patriots at Osmiany.--Capture of numerous
 towns by the insurgents, and dispersion of their garrisons.--Storm
 of Wilno, and delivery of prisoners.--Several partizan corps are
 formed.--Their destination and successes.


It had pleased Providence thus far to make the success of our arms, in
every point, a just chastisement of our enemy, and encouraged by this
success, the nation had begun to cherish the brightest hopes for the
future. Their confidence and exultation were complete, when the report
was received, that our brethren in Lithuania and Samogitia had risen
to break the yoke of despotism, and had openly commenced a revolution.
The certain confirmation of this happy intelligence was brought to the
kingdom by one of the students of the University of Wilno. This brave
young man belonged to the patriotic club which had been secretly formed
there, and that club had sent him to Warsaw to carry the authentic
intelligence of the insurrection.[51]

Then it was, at last, that the voice of liberty was heard upon the
shores of the Baltic, and at the sources of the Dwina and the Niemen;
and with this voice, was heard that of union with ancient Poland. The
brave inhabitants of this immense region, animated with an attachment
for us, the strength of which ages had proved, regarded themselves only
as a part of one great family with ourselves. Almost within hearing
of the bloody combats which had been fought, they could not restrain
themselves from joining in the struggle, and acting side by side with
us, for our common Poland.

Before I enter upon the details of this revolution in Lithuania,
the reader will permit me to refer him, in the Appendix, to a short
description of that country and a view of its connection with Poland,
which is, in general, so imperfectly understood.

The Lithuanians of Wilno knew, four days after the 29th of November,
that Warsaw had given the signal of a new Polish insurrection. A
deputation was immediately sent by them to the dictator Chlopicki,
announcing to him _that all Lithuania, and particularly the Lithuanian
corps d'armee, of 60,000 strong, was ready to pass to the side of the
Poles_. But that inexplicable and lamentable dictatorship _rejected
this offer_, so great and so generous. The Lithuanians, however, not
despairing, waited for a more propitious moment; and scarcely was the
dictatorship abolished, when the national government,--thanks to the
thoughtful care of Joachim Lelewell,--addressed itself officially to
the Lithuanian committee. Every disposition was made for a rising at an
appointed time, which at length arrived.

It would not be in my power to give the reader a just idea of the
tyranny and persecution to which the Polish provinces united to
Russia were subjected. If the kingdom was oppressed, it has always
had some glimmer of constitutional right, but in the provinces the
only constitution was absolute power. Those provinces, abounding in
resources, and which, had they been protected by free laws, would have
been, as they formerly were, the granary of Europe, presented every
where traces of misery, being exposed to the abuses of the Russian
administration and its agents, who wrung them to the last drop, to
enrich themselves. Justice was unknown. Sometimes the governors, or
sprawnaks, men of most depraved conduct, changed the laws at their
own will, and not to obey that will was to be subject to be sent
into Siberia. All those provinces were submerged by the Russian
military, who were quartered in every village; and those soldiers,
receiving only the small compensation of a groat a day, which was
altogether insufficient for their subsistence, levied upon the
inhabitants the means of their support. But the cause of the greatest
suffering in Lithuania, was, that, in order to prevent all sympathy
between the soldiers and peasantry, and all national feeling in the
Lithuanian soldiers, most of the levies from that province were sent
to serve on the barbarian frontiers of Asia, while Russian soldiers
were substituted for them, who were without any sympathy with the
inhabitants, and who would be regardless of their feelings in their
deportment towards them, and merciless in their exactions. It was not
so under Alexander,--the arrangement was made by Nicholas. No idea can
be given of the distress which it caused. Many a family was obliged
to deny themselves their necessary food, to supply the demands of the
military tyrant who was quartered upon them. The peasantry in those
provinces were treated like brutes. No civilization, not the least
glimmer of light, not a school was permitted. That poor race were kept
in a state so degraded, that the elements of civilization seemed to
be lost in them, and the possibility of their being recovered seemed
almost hopeless.

One of the greatest evils was the systematic endeavor to destroy all
national sympathy with Poland. The Russians carried their oppression,
indeed, so far, as to change the religion of the country, and to
introduce the Greek schism. But through all these persecutions,
Providence saved that people from losing their national sentiments
as Poles. On the contrary, they have proved that neither time nor
persecutions will ever destroy that attachment, but will, indeed,
rather strengthen it. The late insurrections in Lithuania and
Samogitia, which have been so long under the Russian government, and
the inhabitants of which hastened to take up their arms, at the signal
of our revolution, afford a sufficient evidence of this attachment.
What deserves especially to be noticed, is, that in Lithuania, it was
the peasants and the priests, joined by the youths of the academies,
who first began the revolt, and who were the most zealous defenders of
the common cause. That heroic people commenced the revolution without
any munitions, and without any arms but the implements of husbandry.
Armed in most cases with clubs alone, they abandoned all to unite in
our aid, and fought with courage and success for nearly two months,
against the different Russian corps, before the corps of Gielgud and
Chlapowski arrived, which, instead of succoring them, by the misconduct
of their generals, sacrificed the Lithuanians, as well as themselves,
and gave the first downward impulse to our cause.

The insurrection of Lithuania and Samogitia, was propagated with
rapidity through all the departments of those provinces. The
commencement was made in the departments of Osmiany and Troki,
accelerated by the following circumstance.

Many of the patriots, for the purpose of consulting upon the different
arrangements for the revolt, had secretly assembled on the last of
March at Osmiany, and held their secret conferences in the church of
the place. While occupied in this manner, a loud shouting was heard
in the town. A regiment of cossacks had entered the place, and a great
part of the regiment surrounded the church. The doors were broken down,
and the cossacks entered and sabred the unfortunate men within these
sacred walls. Wounded as they were, those who survived the attack were
thrown into wagons to be carried to Wilno. But in this the barbarians
did not succeed. A few escaped from their bloody hands, ran into the
suburbs of the town and collected the peasantry, and on that very
night, some hundreds of the inhabitants having been got together,
Osmiany was attacked with the greatest fury by the patriots. Several
hundreds of cossacks were massacred. The others took flight, and the
poor prisoners were delivered. From that moment the flame spread to the
departments of Wilno, Wilkomierz, Rosseyny, and Szawla. In a few weeks,
more than twelve towns were taken by storm, and the Russian garrisons
driven out and dispersed. The principal of these towns were Jarbourg,
Szawla, Keydany, Wilkomierz, Kowno, Troki, Swienciany, Rosienice,
and Beysagola. In a short time, more than a thousand Russians fell
under the blows of the Lithuanians, and another thousand were taken
prisoners. The Lithuanians accoutred themselves with their arms. Some
hundred horses, and several pieces of cannon were also taken. The most
bloody affair was the storm of Wilno, on the night of the 4th of April.
Two hundred Lithuanians attacked this town, and fought with 4,000
Russian infantry, (nearly two regiments,) six squadrons of cavalry, and
twelve pieces of cannon. For the whole night, the Lithuanians pressed
their attack with fury. They took the powder magazine and arsenal,
where they found many arms. But the most consolatory success was, the
rescuing of some hundred patriotic students, and proprietors, who had
been confined in prison there for years. The battle of Keydany and
Szerwinty was also severe, and the valor of the brave Lithuanians was
equally displayed there. At Keydany, twenty of the brave youths of the
academy defended the bridge over the Niewiaza, against two squadrons of
cavalry, while, on the other side, some hundreds of those brave youths
made a storm upon the city, and routed the garrison, which consisted
of three squadrons of hussars. In a word, not quite 2,000 Lithuanians,
armed in the most defective manner, commenced the struggle, and drove
out garrisons to the amount of eight or ten thousand Russian regular
troops, spreading consternation throughout the whole of the enormous
space between the Dwina and the Niemen. Their numbers were soon
augmented, and armed with weapons taken from the Russians. Their forces
were afterwards divided into several small detached partizan corps,
which received the following destination. 1st, the corps under the
command of B***, consisting of about 1,500 infantry and 100 horse, was
to observe the territory upon the Russian frontier, between Jarbourg,
upon the Niemen, as far as the frontier of Courland. This corps was
to interrupt the transport of provisions, from the Russian territory,
and also to keep a communication between the ports of the Baltic Sea,
Lipawa and Polonga, so as to secure a correspondence with foreign
vessels which might arrive with ammunition and other aid for Poland.
The 2d corps consisted of about 2,000 infantry, under the command of
P***, and Z***, and were to act between Uceamy and Dawgeliszki. There
this corps of partizans was to profit by the strong positions which the
nature of the country offers, among its lakes and forests. This corps
was to observe the great road which leads through that country from
St Petersburgh to Warsaw, and to surprise and attack all the Russian
detachments which might pass that road, on their way to Poland.

To act in communication with this corps, and against the garrison of
Wilno, was designated a 3d corps, under the command of M***, composed
of nearly 2,000 infantry and 100 cavalry. This corps made itself
severely felt. A fourth small detachment, under the command of B***,
of about 800 strong, acted in the department of Grodno, and occupied a
part of the forest of Bialowiez.

Besides these, was a detachment of 400 horse, under the command of
V***. This detachment was constantly in movement, and kept open the
communications between the other corps, and acted as occasion required.
It was especially to attempt to surprise the enemy's artillery, which
was often sent in an unprotected state. This detachment of cavalry,
with the first named corps under the command of B***, attacked so
sudden and vigorously the Russian corps under the command of general
Szyrman, that they were forced to take refuge upon the Prussian
territory at Memel. The Prussians received them, and afterwards
permitted them to leave with their arms and ammunition. This was not
the first nor the last example of such relief afforded to our enemy by
Prussia.

The insurrections of Lithuania and Samogitia, which had begun so
successfully and promised to extend even to the borders of the
Dnieper and the Black Sea, could not but threaten the utmost danger
to the Russian forces which had entered the kingdom, and it was from
this moment that the situation of the enemy became in a high degree
critical, as every military judge will perceive. The danger of their
position was still more to be augmented by our success in the battle of
Iganie, on the 9th of April.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 51: The young Lithuanian, whose name was Szymanski, had
passed, on foot, two hundred and eighty miles in eight days, in the
vilest habit of a beggar, and even without shoes, through forests,
marshes, and fords, to avoid interception, exposed in fact to every
kind of privation. He arrived on the 4th of April, at the camp of
the generalissimo, at Jendrzeiow, where he was received with great
enthusiasm. He was immediately sent to Warsaw, to announce the happy
intelligence to the people.]




CHAPTER XV.

 Plan of operation against the two corps of Rosen and Kreutz.--Battle
 of Iganie.--Reflections on the state of the Polish cause after the
 victory of Iganie.--Review of the course of the campaign.--Condition
 of the Russian army.--Discontents in Russia.--Representations of the
 Senate at St Petersburgh to the Emperor.--Comparative view of the
 forces of the two armies at the present stage of the conflict.


Marshal Diebitsch, as is known to the reader, was forced, by our
victories of the 31st of March and the 1st of April, to abandon his
plan of passing the Vistula opposite to Kozienice, and to think of
nothing farther at present, than of saving the two corps of Rosen and
Giesmar, and the guard. He was so far separated from them while between
Kock and Ryk, where he then was, that by a prompt diversion on our
part, by Lukow, he might have lost those corps, and it was in fear of
this, that he hastened to arrive as soon as possible to their succor at
Siedlce. Our general in chief thought to anticipate this movement, and
to throw himself upon the combined corps of Giesmar and Rosen, before
Diebitsch should reach them.[52]

[Illustration:

 _XX. p 220_]

[Illustration:

 _XXI. p. 224_]


BATTLE OF IGANIE. [_See Plans_ XX _and_ XXI.]

On the 9th of April, the Russian army was nearly in the same position
as we have last described them. The main body, under marshal Diebitsch,
were in the environs of Kock, and the combined corps of Rosen and
Giesmar [_Plan_ XX, (_a_)], were upon the small river Kostrzyn (_b_),
at Boimie. Our army also had not changed its position.

The following were the dispositions for the attack. The reader, on
examining the plan, will see that the two corps opposed to our forces,
which were at Latowicz (_c_), were too far advanced, which exposed
them to be turned on their left wing, and even taken in the rear, if
our forces there should succeed in driving back the forces (_e_) of
the enemy on the road (_d_) from Latowicz by Wodynie to Siedlce. To
execute this movement the order was given that when the first division
of infantry (_f_), supported by twenty-four pieces of cannon, should
commence the attack upon the great road opposite Boimie, the third
division (_g_), having with them the brigade of cavalry of Kicki,
should leave the position at Latowicz before day-break, and take the
direction of Wodynie, to attack the forces which it might find there;
but if those forces should be found greatly superior, the division
was to remain in a strong position at Jeruzalem (_h_). If it should
succeed in driving back the enemy's forces, it was to take the road on
the left, leading from Wodynie through Iganie (_i_) to Siedlce. Every
effort was to be directed to the point of arriving as soon as possible
upon the dyke (_k_) at Iganie, which leads over the marshes of the
river Sucha (_l_). By a prompt manoeuvre of this kind, the enemy could
not, as we have said, escape being turned. For the better execution
of this plan, the enemy was to be harassed on the main road, in order
that general Prondzynski, who was to command the expedition to Wodynie,
might have time to manoeuvre upon the enemy's flank.

A division of cavalry (_m_), under the command of general Stryinski,
was to leave Boimie, and take a direction on the left, towards the
village of Gruszki, to pass there the fords of the river Kostrzyn, and
in case of the retreat of the enemy, to fall upon his right wing.

Having issued these instructions, and confided the command of the
little corps which was to act upon the enemy's left wing at Wodynie,
to general Prondzynski, the general in chief left himself for Boimie,
to lead the attack in person upon the main road. As was the case
in the position at Boimie, [_Refer to Plan_ II,] we were separated
from the enemy by the marshes of the river Kostrzyn. The two ruined
bridges upon the dyke not permitting either ourselves or the enemy
to pass, general Skrzynecki contented himself with opening a fire of
artillery upon the Russian position, in order to occupy the attention
of the enemy, while preparations were making to repair the bridges
sufficiently to admit a passage.

The moment that the work of reconstructing the bridges was to be put
in execution, was to be decided by the time and the direction in
which the fire of general Prondzynski should be heard. If the latter
general should succeed on the enemy's flank, then, of course, the
bridges were to be reconstructed, if not, they were to remain in their
present state to obstruct the passage of the enemy. Several hours
were occupied by this fire of artillery, and slight manoeuvres of the
light troops, when at last, between eight and nine o'clock, the fire
of general Prondzynski was heard, who had evidently passed Wodynie,
and had begun acting on the enemy's flank. This was the signal to
commence repairing the bridges. General Skrzynecki, with his suite,
superintended the work, and several battalions were employed in
bringing together the materials. A degree of consternation was observed
in the enemy's forces, in consequence of the attack on his flank, and
his columns began a movement; but his artillery continued in their
position, and commenced a terrible fire upon our men who were engaged
in reconstructing the bridges. The presence of mind, however, of the
general in chief, who exposed himself at the most dangerous points,
encouraged the men to persevere in their labors under this destructive
fire of artillery.[53] When the fire on his flank was at its height,
the enemy began to withdraw his artillery, and commenced a retreat. By
between 10 and 11 o'clock no part of the enemy's forces were remaining
upon the plain of Boimie; but, although the work of repairing the
bridges was pressed to the utmost, it was near two o'clock before they
could be brought to such a state as to admit the passage of artillery;
and although several battalions of the infantry had passed over before
this, they were not able, without too much exposure, to overtake the
enemy, who was in rapid retreat, leaving his cavalry as a rear guard.
It was not until the last mentioned hour, that the whole division
passed the bridges, and pressed forward at a rapid pace in the pursuit,
the cavalry advancing upon the trot. While this was taking place upon
the great road to Boimie, general Prondzynski [_Plan_ XXI, (A),]
who, according to his instructions, advanced to Wodynie, found there
a division of sixteen squadrons of Russian cavalry, whom he drove
from their position: he pursued them in the direction of Siedlce, and
reached the environs of Iganie, where he saw the corps of Rosen and
Giesmar (B) in full retreat. At this moment the position of general
Prondzynski was also critical; for, as the reader is already aware,
our main army was not in a condition to follow the enemy, on account
of the obstruction from the broken bridges. If the enemy had thrown
himself upon Prondzynski, they could have crushed him, and with their
other forces could have safely passed the dyke (_a_) at Iganie, before
our main forces, retarded as they were, could have arrived. This danger
was perceived by Prondzynski, and he therefore contented himself with
driving the division of Russian cavalry (C) from a position they had
taken upon the heights of Iganie, (a task which was bravely executed by
the cavalry of Kicki, and in which the colonel Mycielski was wounded)
and occupying that position himself, placing there the brigade of
Romarino to defend it.

It was between four and five o'clock that Prondzynski first perceived
our lancers (D) advancing upon the main road. A great part of the
enemy, particularly of their cavalry, had not yet passed the dyke
(_a_), being obstructed by their artillery. Generals Prondzynski and
Romarino, dismounting from their horses, with carbines in their hands,
placed themselves at the head of their columns, and commenced a fire
of artillery, to apprize our advancing cavalry of their position. At
the sound of this fire, the cavalry of Lubinski raised the hurrah,
rushed forward, and as they approached near the brigade of Romarino,
threw themselves at the charge upon that portion of the enemy's rear
guard which had not yet passed the dyke. Our infantry and cavalry thus
fell simultaneously upon them, the enemy were terribly cut up, and
the battle was gained. Nearly five Russian battalions, amounting to
4,000 men, with their officers, amounting to near one hundred, their
standards, and eight pieces of cannon of large calibre, were taken.
Six regiments of cavalry were dispersed, many of them were lost in the
marshes of the river into which they were driven, and several hundred
men and horse were taken prisoners there. In this battle, which may be
counted one of the finest in the campaign, the circumstance that our
main force was retarded by the state of the bridges, alone saved the
enemy from total ruin. It is to be remarked that the 2d division of
cavalry of general Stryinski, did not improve its time, and effected
nothing upon the right flank of the enemy, as the instructions
contemplated. The negligence of that general was inexcusable, and
the commander in chief deprived him of his command. We lost in this
battle about five hundred men, in killed and wounded. The brave general
Prondzynski was slightly wounded. Before night the two armies were not
at the distance of a cannon-shot from each other, but all was tranquil.
The disorder and consternation of the enemy may be imagined, when it is
stated that our columns took position before their eyes, on the field
of Iganie, without being in the least disturbed by them.

The reader will permit me to fix his attention upon the epoch of
the battle of Iganie, which was indeed the brightest moment of our
war, the moment of the highest success of the Polish arms, the
moment of the most confident hopes, when every Pole in imagination
saw his country already restored to her ancient glory. Let us then,
from this point, cast a look backwards to the commencement of this
terrible contest. Two months before, an enormous Russian force had
invaded our country, defended as it was by a mere handful of her
sons; and any one who had seen that immense army enter upon our soil,
could not but have looked on Poland with commiseration, as about to
be instantaneously annihilated. In this expectation, in fact, all
Europe looked on, and at every moment the world expected to hear of
the terrible catastrophe,--to see Poland again in chains, and the
Russian arms reposing on the borders of the Rhine. Such, in fact,
were the expectations and even the promises of marshal Diebitsch.
Providence, however, willed otherwise. The first shock of the Polish
arms with the Russians taught the latter what was the moral strength of
patriotism,--what a nation can do for love of country and of liberty.
The fields of Siedlce, Dobre, and Stoczek, the first witnesses of
our triumphs, and the grave of so many of our enemies, taught them
to respect the nation which they expected to subdue, made them
repent the audacity of having passed our frontiers, and gave them a
terrible presage of how dearly they would have to pay for this unjust
invasion of our soil. Battle upon battle was given, in which the
enemy were uniformly subjected to the severest losses. The two great
roads leading from different directions to Warsaw, on which they had
followed the Poles, were covered with their dead. Thus subjected to
loss at every step, the enemy reached at last the field of Praga, and
there collecting all his forces in one body, under a tremendous fire
of artillery he thought to overpower our small forces. But he failed
to do it. The immortal day of the 25th of February was nearly the
destruction of his enormous force, and, after fifteen days of severe
fighting, that great army, which was designed to destroy Poland and to
make Europe tremble, was brought to a state of extremity. The autocrat
and his general blushed at the menaces which they had uttered. Poland
believed that the former would reflect upon those bloody struggles
and the immense losses which he had suffered, and would be unwilling
to continue such sacrifices. Nearly 50,000 Russians were already
sacrificed. How many more lives might he not still lose? The Poles,
although conquerors, held out the hand of reconciliation, as the
letters that Skrzynecki addressed to Diebitsch have proved. In those
letters, written with the utmost cordiality, frankness, and directness,
he invited the Russian commander to present the real state of things to
the monarch, and to assure him that the Poles longed to put an end to
this fraternal struggle. A word of justice, of good will, indicative of
a disposition to act for the happiness of the nation, and to observe
the privileges which the constitution granted,--a word of this nature,
from the lips of the monarch, would have disarmed the Poles, blood
would have ceased to flow, and those arms outstretched for the fight,
would have thrown away the sabre, and would have been extended towards
him as to a father,--to him, the author of a happy reconciliation. He
would have been immortalized in history, and would have taken a place
by the side of Titus.

Far, however, from that true and noble course, that proud autocrat,
as well as his servant, Diebitsch, thought little of the thousands of
human beings he was sacrificing:--far from such magnanimous conduct, he
sent for other thousands to be sacrificed, to gratify his arrogance and
ambition. He contrives new plans to pass the Vistula. It was not enough
to have covered four palatinates with ruin on one side of that river.
He determines to spread devastation and ruin upon the other also:--in
fine, to attack Warsaw, and bury in its own ruins that beautiful
capital, the residence of the successors of Piast and Jagellow, and
where he himself could have reigned in tranquillity, by only having
been just and good. In the execution of this plan of destruction, he
was arrested and justly punished upon the glorious days of the 31st
of March and the 1st of April, which, in conjunction with the recent
revolutions in Lithuania and Samogitia, and the recent battle of
Iganie, seemed to threaten the ruin of his army.

The Russian army was now in a state of the greatest disaffection,
being posted in a devastated country, and having their resources for
subsistence entirely cut off by the state of Lithuania and Samogitia.
In addition to their immense losses in action, fatigue, sickness, and
other inconveniences had reduced them to a state of extreme distress.
Besides the influence of physical evils, there was a moral influence
which impaired their strength, arising from a conviction which they
could not avoid feeling, of the justice of the Polish cause. The
Russian soldiers began also to reflect, that by thus serving the ends
of despotism, they were only securing the continuance of their own
servitude. These reflections were not made by the army alone, but,
as we were secretly advised by persons coming from the interior of
Russia, they were made there also, and were accompanied with the same
sentiments of discontent. At St Petersburgh, as well as at Moscow,
various discontents were manifested, and notices of such must have
met the eye of the reader in the journals of the day. The senate of
St Petersburgh presented to the consideration of the monarch the
continual severe losses of the preceding years, in the wars with
Persia and Turkey, and those of this campaign, (though much underrated
by them,) which they had reason to fear would be still increased, and
which might encourage revolutions in all the provinces. For these
reasons the senate took upon themselves to advise some propitiatory
measures, and some attempt by concessions to satisfy the demands
of the Poles. The party most zealous in favor of such a course was
composed of those who had relations and friends exiled to Siberia, on
account of the revolutionary movement of 1825. The Russian patriots in
general, not only thought it a favorable moment to attempt to effect an
amelioration of the fate of those individuals, but they hoped that the
restoration of their ancient constitutional privileges and nationality
to the Polish provinces attached to Russia, would authorize a claim for
equal privileges to the people of the whole Russian empire.

To these circumstances, is to be added that at this time the other
cabinets began to feel dissatisfied at the course of Russia, and
decidedly refused the requests of aid in men and money which she made
on the pretext of former treaties. Every thing, in fine, seemed to
promise a near end of the present difficulties. The Polish army, to
whom this state of things was well known, waited impatiently for the
moment of a decisive contest. One victory more, and the Russians would
not be in a state to push their attempts farther. Nothing could then
stop the progress of our arms, which would rest on the borders of the
Dnieper, the only frontier known to our ancestors. One struggle more,
and the darkness of ages, which had hung over the Polish provinces
of the North, would be dispersed. The light of civilization would
then spread its rays as far as the Ural mountains, and with that
civilization a new happiness would cheer those immense regions. Upon
the borders of the Dnieper fraternal nations would hold out their hands
towards us, and there would be made the great appeal: 'Russians! why
all this misery? The Poles wish to deprive you of nothing. Nay, they
have even sacrificed their children for your good. Russians! awake to
a sense of your condition! You, like us, are only the unhappy victims
of the relentless will of those who find their account in oppressing
you and us. Let us end this struggle, caused by despotism alone. Let it
be our common aim to rid ourselves of its cruel power. It is despotism
alone that we have any interest in fighting against. Let us mark these
frontiers, which so much fraternal blood has been shed to regain,
by monuments, that shall tell posterity, that here ended forever
the contest between brothers, which shall recall the disasters that
despotism has caused, and be a memorial of eternal friendship between
us, and of eternal warning to tyranny.'


A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE FORCE OF THE TWO ARMIES AFTER THE BATTLE OF
IGANIE.

The Russian forces, which commenced the contest on the 10th of
December, amounted, as has been before stated, to about 200,000 men and
300 pieces of cannon. That army received two reinforcements, viz. the
corps of general prince Szachowski, consisting of 20,000 men, and 36
pieces of cannon; and the corps of the imperial guard, consisting also
of 20,000 men and 36 pieces of cannon. The whole Russian force, then,
which had fought against us, amounted to 240,000 men, and 372 pieces of
cannon.

To act against this force, our army, counting the reinforcements of
6000 men which it received before the battle of Grochow, had in service
about 50,000 men, and about 100 pieces of cannon. Up to the battle
of Iganie, fifteen principal battles had been given, viz. those of
Stoczek, Dobre, Milosna, Swierza and Nowawies, Bialolenka (on the 20th
and 24th), Grochow (on the 20th and 25th), Nasielsk, Pulawy, Kurow,
Wawr (on the 18th and 31st), Dembe-Wielkie and Iganie. To these are
to be added a great number of small skirmishes, in not one of which
could it have been said that the Russians were successful. By their
own official reports,--after the battle of Grochow, more than fifty
thousand Russians were _hors du combat_. It will not, then, be an
exaggeration to say, that their whole loss, taking into the account
prisoners and those who fell under the ravages of the cholera, which
had begun to extend itself in their army, must have amounted to between
80,000 and 100,000 men.[54] From the enormous park of artillery which
the Russians had brought against us, they lost as many as sixty
pieces. It may then be presumed that the Russian army remained at
between 130,000 and 150,000 men, and about 240 pieces of cannon, not
estimating, however, which it would be impossible to do, the number
of cannon which might have been dismounted. Our army, which was
reorganized at Warsaw, after its losses, was brought to about the same
state as at the commencement of the war, that is, about 40,000 strong.
The artillery was now augmented to 140 pieces.

Although the enemy's force was still sufficiently imposing, the reader
will permit me to say, (and in fact we did reasonably calculate thus)
that as we had fought with such success against the enemy in his
unimpaired strength, we might with confidence promise ourselves a
certain issue of the conflict in our favor, when, with his forces thus
diminished in numbers, sick, discouraged, and discontented, we could
meet him with the same and even a stronger force than that with which
we had already been victorious, animated too, as we now were, by the
inspiriting influence of our past success, and aided by the terror with
which our arms had inspired the enemy.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 52: Every military reader, who shall follow, with strict
attention, the plans of our general in strategy and tactics, will be
astonished, perhaps, that after such victories as those of the 31st of
March and 1st of April, he should have abandoned the advantages which
he might have gained, in following up, immediately, his operations
upon the two corps of Rosen and Giesmar, and then throwing himself
rapidly upon the superior forces of Diebitsch, which, after those corps
were cut off, could, by a simultaneous diversion upon Zelechow and
Lukow, [_See Plan_], have been attacked on both sides, and thrown into
confusion. Although I cannot give a satisfactory explanation of this
apparent fault, it must be considered, that those subsequent events
which give a color to the imputation, could not, perhaps, have then
been reasonably anticipated by the general; and the talent so uniformly
displayed by Skrzynecki should force us to suppose that there were some
conclusive objections to such a course, occurring to his mind, which
are not now apparent to the observer.]

[Footnote 53: No terms can express the admirable conduct of our
commander and his suite, who directed the work of reconstructing these
bridges, in person. The general and his officers all labored with their
own hands at this important task. Some of them were wounded. Our brave
soldiers, witnessing the fine example of their chief, shouted their
patriotic songs, as they worked, under this destructive fire. While a
party were placing some trunks of trees, a shell fell among them. To
have left their labor in order to avoid the danger, would have delayed
the work, they therefore remained in their places, and with the noise
of the explosion was mingled the shout of 'Poland forever!' Providence
granted that in that exposed labor our loss was very inconsiderable.]

[Footnote 54: I cannot pretend to give the reader an accurate idea
of the number of prisoners which were taken during the first days of
April. From the battle of Wawr to that of Iganie, not a day passed in
which great numbers of them, with baggage and effects of all kinds,
were not brought in. They must have amounted in that interval to full
16,000. Those prisoners arrived generally without escort, and it was
often the case that old men and even women of the peasantry were seen
leading them, or rather showing them the way,--two or three peasants,
perhaps, with twenty prisoners. This continual influx of prisoners gave
a name in fact to that interval of time, which was referred to, as 'the
Period of the Prisoners.' The inhabitants of Warsaw found an amusement
in witnessing this continual arrival of the captured Russians. 'Let us
go to Praga, to see the prisoners brought in,' was a proposition often
made, as referring to an ordinary recreation which might be counted on
with perfect certainty. If, for a half day, no prisoners appeared, the
complaint would be sportively made, 'What is Mr John about, (referring
to Skrzynecki) that he sends us no prisoners to-day?'

The great number of the prisoners engaged the attention of the national
government. It was impossible to leave them all at Warsaw; and they
were at first divided into three parts, one of which remained in Warsaw
to work upon the fortifications, and every soldier was paid for his
labor. The second part being also employed upon wages, labored on the
great roads leading from Warsaw, in a direction opposite to the seat
of the war. The third part were dispersed among the farmers in the
proportion of one Russian for three farmers; and these were also paid
for their labor. At stated times, an assemblage of the prisoners was
held, in which they were addressed in such a manner as to produce a
moral effect upon them. They were instructed in the true nature of
their political rights, the real causes of the contest were exhibited
to them, and they were made to be convinced that it was for their
advantage as well as our own that we were fighting.

The greatest harmony reigned between the Poles and their prisoners;
and I am sure that those Russians will remember the days they passed
as prisoners, as the happiest in their lives. With us their prison was
a state of freedom and tranquillity, in which they received a liberal
reward for their labor, while in their own country they were the slaves
of despots, great and little, to whom obedience was enforced by the
knout.]




CHAPTER XVI.

 Position of the two armies after the battle of Iganie.--Plan
 of a simultaneous attack upon the Russian forces upon opposite
 sides.--Instructions to the different corps.--Operations on the
 enemy's front.--Unfortunate operations of general Sierawski, and
 the _first defeat_.--Details of those operations.--Operations of
 general Dwernicki.--He defeats Rudiger; but by a false operation
 exposes himself to be attacked disadvantageously by two Russian
 corps.--In the course of the action the Austrian frontier is passed
 by the combatants.--An Austrian force interposes, and general
 Dwernicki consents to go into camp.--His arms and prisoners are
 taken from him, while the enemy is permitted to leave the territory
 freely.--Reflections on the conduct of Austria.--Consequences of the
 loss of Dwernicki's corps.--The cholera makes its appearance in the
 two armies.


The positions of the two armies, [_See Plan_ XXII,] were now as
follows:--The Russian army was divided into four principal bodies,
having no communication with each other. First, their main body (_a_),
consisting of about 60,000 men and 130 pieces of cannon, were between
Lukow (1) and Cock (2). Secondly, the remains of the corps of Rosen
and Giesmar (_b_) were at Siedlce (3). They could be counted at about
20,000 men and perhaps 50 pieces of cannon. Thirdly, at Ostrolenka (4)
was the Imperial guard (_c_), consisting of 18,000 men and 36 cannon.
Fourthly, in the palatinate of Lublin, were the combined corps of Witt
and Kreutz (_d_), consisting of 30,000 men and 60 pieces of cannon.
Their different scattered detachments might be counted at 10,000 men.
This separation of their different corps invited a sudden attack on
either, before it could receive succor from the others.

[Illustration:

 _XXII. p. 234_]

[Illustration:

 _XXIII. p. 243._]

Our main body (_e_), composed of four divisions of infantry,
and three of cavalry, making in all about 30,000 men and 80 pieces
of cannon, was placed between Iganie (5) and Siennica (6). Our
reconnoissances were pushed along the left bank of the river Liwiec
(L), as far as its junction with the river Bug (B). On the right, those
reconnoissances reached Zelechow (7). This was nearly the same as our
first position, and it was strong. Besides this main force, was the
division of cavalry of general Uminski (_f_) upon the right bank of
the Narew, at Nasielsk (8), amounting to 3,200 horse and 24 pieces of
artillery, placed there to observe the Russian guard. In the environs
of Pulawy (9) was a small partizan corps, under the command of general
Sierawski (_g_), with 3,000 men and four pieces of cannon. The corps
of general Dwernicki (_h_) was in the environs of Zamosc, (10) and
consisted of 4500 men, and 30 pieces of cannon. This corps, though at
a distance from the rest of our forces, could not be cut off, having
the fortress of Zamosc as a _point d'appui_. If the reader will examine
a map of the country, or even the small plan in the preceding pages
[_No._ VI, _or_ XXII,] he will be satisfied that by our forces, small
as they were, the Russian army was already surrounded, and that on the
least advantage which Dwernicki, in conjunction with Sierawski, might
gain over Witt and Kreutz, that army could have been taken in the rear,
by means of a diversion upon Kock (2) and Radzyn (11). In a word, the
moment approached at which our commander had determined to give the
enemy a last decisive blow, by attacking him at the same time on every
side; and for this object, the following instructions and orders were
given.

First. The generalissimo renewed the order for strengthening the
fortifications of Warsaw and Praga, as well as those on the whole
plain of Grochow. From the first day of April, as many as 5000 Russian
prisoners were continually employed upon those fortifications.
Warsaw, which was already, as the reader is informed, defended by
a girdle of lunettes and redoubts, communicating with each other,
received the additional defence in some places of block-houses. To
strengthen the fortifications of Praga, besides the bridge-head, there
were constructed, within the distance of an English mile, a line of
circumvallation, which could hold more than twelve thousand men. Still
farther, at a distance of two miles beyond, or nearly upon the field of
Grochow, was constructed a third line of lunettes and redoubts, which
occupied the whole distance from Kawenczyn to the marshes of Goclaw,
or the entire field of battle of Grochow, as seen in the plan of that
battle. In fine, the approach to Praga was so defended, that the
enemy, before reaching it, would have to pass three different lines of
fortification. The general in chief gave instructions to the governor
of Warsaw in regard to the defence of the city, in which he placed his
chief trust upon the national guard. The guard counted it an honor to
be entrusted with this duty, and were unwilling that a single soldier
of the regular army should be detailed for the service. How admirably
they executed their noble resolutions, when the occasion came, is
probably well known to every reader.

After his plans for the defence of Warsaw were communicated to the
authorities of the city, he gave particular attention to those points
on which he intended to support all his operations, and, relying on
which, he could at any time hazard the boldest attempts. Having thus
made Warsaw an axis, upon which all his operations could revolve, he
proceeded to arrange his attack. In the first place he sent orders
to general Dwernicki (_h_) to attack immediately the combined corps
of generals Witt and Kreutz (_d_). In this attack the small corps of
general Sierawski (_g_) was to aid, and the two corps were to preserve
a constant communication with each other. For that object general
Sierawski was to pass the Vistula at Kazimierz (12), and, avoiding an
engagement with the enemy, to endeavor to join, as soon as possible,
the corps of general Dwernicki, who received orders to leave Zamosc and
approach Lublin (13). These two corps were to take such a position,
that they could at any time retire upon Zamosc or Kazimierz. General
Dwernicki was also informed that a third small corps would be sent in
the direction of Zelechow (7) and Kock (2), to act in concert with him
on the enemy's rear. If they should succeed in the attack, general
Dwernicki was to endeavor to force the enemy to take the direction of
Pulawy (9), to drive him into the angle formed by the Vistula (V) and
the Wieprz (P); in fine, so to act as to cut off those two corps from
all communication whatever with their main body. Leaving the corps
of general Sierawski to continue to observe them, and to push his
advantages over them, Dwernicki himself was to pass the Wieprz at Kock,
and from thence by forced marches to leave in the direction of Radzyn
(11) for Lukow (1) or Seroczyn (14), as circumstances might direct,
and according as he should ascertain the position of the enemy to be.
Arrived at Lukow or Seroczyn, as the case might be, he was to await
there the orders of the general in chief, to join in the attack upon
the main force of the enemy under Diebitsch (_e_), in which attack he
was to act on the enemy's left wing. The main body of the enemy, thus
taken in front and in flank, simultaneously, could not but have been
broken up. For all these operations the general in chief had destined
fourteen days only.

On the night of the battle of Iganie, the general in chief having
decided upon the above plan, sent officers in every direction with
orders and instructions. The officers sent to the corps of general
Dwernicki were enjoined to communicate their orders to him with the
utmost haste.

The generalissimo, while making his preparations for this last blow,
continued an unremitting observation upon all the movements of the
enemy, even to the minutest details, and in order that the enemy
might be constantly occupied, and diverted from suspecting our plans,
he directed small attacks to be continually made upon his front. For
this object the second division, posted at Siennica, received orders
to advance to the small town of Jeruzalem. The division, in executing
that order, fought the enemy for three successive days, the 12th,
13th and 14th of April, at Jedlina, Wodynie, and Plomieniece, and
always with advantage. In one of those attacks, at Jedlina, a small
detachment of sixteen Krakus attacked a squadron of Russian hussars,
coming from Wodynie, dispersed them, and took some twenty prisoners.
This division received also the order to communicate constantly with
the corps of general Pac at Zelechow. This last general was to send
continual reconnoissances towards Kock, to keep a constant observation
upon the Russian corps of Kreutz and Witt. Of the movements of those
two corps, the generalissimo was each day to receive the most accurate
information, in order to be ready prepared to prevent, at any moment,
a junction which might be attempted between those corps and their main
body.

General Skrzynecki, seeing that the enemy had fallen into his plan, (of
which, indeed, he could not have had the least suspicion,) and full
of the brightest hopes, waited impatiently in his strong position,
for intelligence from general Dwernicki, and the approach of the
moment for his attack upon Diebitsch. Almost sure of the successful
execution of his admirable arrangements, what can express his
disappointment on hearing of the unfortunate operations of the corps
of general Sierawski, and of the defeat of that corps at Kazimierz in
the palatinate of Lublin, _the first defeat in the whole war_. That
general, in neglecting the instructions of the commander in chief, not
to engage with the enemy, on account of the inferiority of his own
forces, (with which forces in fact he could not expect to act but in
partizan warfare,) approached Lublin, where the two corps of Kreutz and
Witt were supposed to be posted, while his orders were, by avoiding
those corps, and taking the most circuitous roads, to endeavor to
join as secretly and as soon as possible, the corps of Dwernicki. He
was probably deceived by false information as to the direction of the
enemy's corps, and led to believe that those two corps had quitted
Lublin, to attack general Dwernicki at Zamosc. He therefore probably
took the direction of Lublin, with the idea of acting upon the rear of
the enemy at the moment of his attack upon Dwernicki. In this manner
general Sierawski, quitting Kazimierz, arrived on the 16th of April at
Belzyca. To his great astonishment he found there a strong advanced
guard of the above mentioned corps. To avoid compromitting himself, he
engaged with this advanced guard, when, observing the very superior
force and the advantageous position of the enemy, he ordered a retreat,
which retreat was well executed and without much loss. This general
should have continued his march the whole night, with as little delay
as possible, in order to repass quietly the Vistula, and thus be
protected from all molestation by the enemy. But, for what cause it
is almost impossible to conjecture, he awaited the enemy in order of
battle the next day, at Serauow. Perhaps, finding himself in rather a
strong position, he thought that the corps of general Dwernicki might
arrive to his aid. The enemy approached the next day with his whole
force against Sierawski, and as warm an action commenced as the nature
of the ground would admit, it being covered by woods with patches of
open ground intervening. Some squadrons of young Kaliszian cavalry,
led by the general himself, advanced to the attack of the enemy's
artillery, which being disadvantageously posted, was exposed to be
captured. That cavalry, however, by a false direction of their charge,
fell among the concealed masses of the enemy's infantry, and their
attack failed.

This unsuccessful attack had unfortunate results. The corps of general
Sierawski was obliged to evacuate its position, and along its whole
retrograde march continual attacks of the enemy were pressed upon
it. The peculiar nature of the ground, and the extreme brevity of
general Sierawski, a veteran of between sixty and seventy, who, at
the head of the detachments of his rear guard always led the charges
against the enemy, and held him in check, was all that saved the corps
from destruction. At length the corps reached Kazimierz, the point
which it had left; and here again, instead of passing the Vistula,
Sierawski awaited another attack from the overwhelming force of the
enemy, and that too with only the half of his corps, for the other
half was sent to pass the Vistula. This course was inexplicable, and
excited much remark in the army. On the 18th, the Russians reached
Kazimierz. The town was vigorously attacked by them, and their assaults
were repeatedly repulsed by the new Kazimierz infantry, under colonel
Malachowski, who, with a scythe in his hand, marched at their head. But
the death of that brave patriot spread among the ranks of those new
soldiers a degree of disorder, and the city was taken by the enemy.
We must again thank general Sierawski for having saved the rest of
the corps from ruin; having executed the evacuation of the town with
such order that he passed the Vistula at the point of Borowa, not far
from Kazimierz, without being molested in the attempt. He then took a
position on the left bank.

Although the unfortunate affairs of those two days were not attended
by severe losses, yet they were deeply afflictive to the general in
chief. They threatened the entire disarrangement of his plans, and were
followed by the more important disasters of general Dwernicki. The
latter general, who, as is known to the reader, commenced his career
so gloriously; whose very name, indeed, was a terror to the Russians,
and who, by his successive victories over the three corps of Kreutz,
Wirtemberg, and Rudiger, had established the strongest claims upon the
gratitude of his country,--this general, I must repeat it with pain,
finished his great career in the most unfortunate manner. His case
should serve as a strong example, that it is not bravery alone which is
required in a great general, for in that it would be difficult to find
his equal, but that this bravery loses its value when not united with
circumspection.

The following are the details of the operations of general Dwernicki.
[_See Plan No._ XXIII.] We cannot well imagine the cause which
induced that general to quit Zamosc (1), and the important operations
in the palatinate of Lublin, and, neglecting all his instructions
and orders, to have crossed the Bug (B) and entered the province of
Volhynia, unless it were the reception of some certain news of a fresh
insurrection in that province, and of the collection of insurgent
forces there, who might be waiting for his approach, and who needed
his protection. He might, perhaps, have thought to be able so to
accelerate his movement as to avail himself of such new strength before
a superior Russian force should arrive in that province to crush such
insurrection, and disperse the insurgents. At the moment when Dwernicki
might have conceived such a plan, there was, in fact, only a corps of
about 12,000 men and some 20 pieces of cannon, under Rudiger, in the
province. This corps, Dwernicki perhaps intended to attack, in his
way, and crush them, and then attaching the insurgents to his corps, to
return to the palatinate, or if circumstances might make it expedient,
to follow up his blow into the heart of Volhynia. In fine, on the 15th
of April, this general quitted the environs of Zamosc, taking the
direction of Uscilog (2), where, on the evening of the 16th, he passed
the river Bug. On the 17th he continued his march in the direction of
Dubno (3), where the insurgents were perhaps supposed to be awaiting
him. On the road to that town he received information that the corps of
Rudiger had marched from Radziwilow (4) and was now in the direction of
Milatyn (5). General Dwernicki turned immediately from the direction in
which he was marching, to throw himself upon this corps, which he found
on its march, at the village of Boromel (6), where, without giving the
enemy time to take position, he attacked and overthrew him. The enemy
was routed, and lost several hundred in killed and prisoners, with
eight pieces of cannon. That in this fine, and the last fine battle
of Dwernicki, the Russian corps was not wholly destroyed, was owing
to the circumstance that a branch of the river Styr (S), over which
the bridge had been destroyed, stopped our pursuit. The Russians,
during the night of the 18th, evacuated their position, and took the
road to Beresteczko (7), where they took a new position. In regard to
tactics, the corps of general Rudiger could not have chosen a worse
direction than that of the angle formed by the river Styr, and the
frontier of Austria (F). General Dwernicki, by a passage to the right
bank of the Styr, could have cut off all the enemy's communications
with his other corps, and could have again fought him at the greatest
advantage. It was here then that our brave Dwernicki committed his
great fault, and in place of acting upon the right bank of the river,
where he would have had an open field for the most enlarged operations,
he chose to follow up the attack; and as he saw that the enemy could
not be safely assailed in front, on account of his strong position
between two small lakes, but found that this position was open towards
the frontier of Austria,--there it was that the unhappy idea occurred
to him, of marching to the environs of Kolodno (8), on the frontier
of Austria, and attacking the enemy on that side, feeling sure of
victory. But general Rudiger did not wait for this attack. Perceiving
his exposed position between the river and the frontier, he was
satisfied with being permitted to escape, and declined battle. Upon
observing that general Dwernicki was manoeuvring upon the frontiers of
Austria, general Rudiger repassed the Styr, avoided the attack by this
manoeuvre, and was in a situation to join himself with all the Russian
detachments which might come into the province from the heart of
Russia, by the different directions of Krzemieniece, Ostrog, &c, and to
act with them in surrounding Dwernicki, who was confined in this above
described angle. This is what in fact took place.

Dwernicki remained, for what reason we cannot conceive, at Kolodno
until the 23d of April, whence, following along the frontiers of
Austria, he took the direction of Wereszczaki (9). There dispersing
a Russian detachment, he arrived on the 26th at Knielce and Wielkie
(10). Knowing that the Russians were observing him, he determined to
remain there and take advantage of a strong natural position. He wished
in this position to await the enemy and give him battle, hoping by
a victory to free himself from the contracted space in which he was
confined. In fact, on the next day, the corps of general Rudiger (_b_)
made its appearance, having come in the direction of Krzemienic (11).
The battle commenced, and in the midst of the action another Russian
corps (_c_) was seen approaching in the direction of Proskirow (12)
and Stary-Konstantynow (13) under the command of general Rott, acting
thus upon the right wing and even the rear of general Dwernicki's
corps. To avoid being turned, general Dwernicki retired in such a
manner as to lean his right wing upon the Austrian frontier. The
Russians, not regarding this, passed that frontier, and proceeded to
push their attack upon his flank. This obliged general Dwernicki to
withdraw his left wing, and indeed his whole front, upon the Austrian
territory, where, in fact, the line was not distinctly marked, all
the while being engaged with the enemy. The action having continued
thus for some hours, a detachment of Austrian cavalry, under colonel
Fac, approached and threw themselves between the combatants, calling
on them to respect the neutrality of the territory. In this manner
the combat ceased. General Dwernicki gave his parole to discontinue
hostilities, and consented to advance farther into the interior, and,
placing himself in camp, waited the result of the decision of the
Austrian government upon what had occurred. The Russian corps, which
had just passed the frontier, and which had in fact entered it with
its whole force, was permitted to leave freely. The first duty which
general Dwernicki thought imposed upon him in his present situation,
was to make a full and true report of what had occurred to the National
Government and the general in chief, which he was permitted to do. He
also sent a letter to the commander in chief of the Austrian forces
in Gallicia, explaining how it was that, in a necessary manoeuvre he
had passed over a point of land on the Austrian territory without
the intention of occupying it. Having done this, he supposed that he
would be permitted to remain in camp, retaining his own arms, those
taken from the enemy, and his prisoners, until conferences between the
governments should decide respecting the course to be taken. But the
Austrian government, far from giving such a reasonable permission,
collected a strong corps in the environs of Tarnopol, and the Austrian
commander in chief demanded of general Dwernicki to surrender both his
own arms and those taken from the enemy. General Dwernicki, although
this Austrian corps was not formidable to him, yet being anxious to
avoid the serious political consequences which might possibly follow
resistance, submitted to this unjust demand, which will be an eternal
reproach to the Austrian government. The Austrians returned their arms
to the Russian prisoners, whom they liberated, and retained the arms of
the Polish troops. The whole corps was conducted into the interior, and
thus ended the career of that important body of our forces.[55]

The conduct of Austria, in regard to the corps of Dwernicki, I am sure
will excite the indignation of the reader. If general Dwernicki had
entered upon the Austrian territory, he was forced to do it by the
Russian corps, which had already passed the frontier; and that cannot
be regarded as an intentional invasion of the frontiers which was done
without design, and was a mere transition over an indistinct line,
made necessary by the position which the enemy had taken. Such a case
certainly should have formed an exception to a general rule. To the
Russian corps all the prisoners were returned, without any consent
obtained from our government, to whom they, in fact, belonged, and
should have been considered as belonging, until the end of the war.

It was in this manner that those intriguing cabinets repaid the debt
of gratitude which they owed to Poland. They had forgotten the times
of John Sobieski, who, in 1683, delivered their capital, and their
whole territory, from destruction at the hands of the Turks. They had
forgotten that they thus owe their very existence to Poland.

At present, regardless of all obligations of justice, they concert
with our enemy for our ruin. But if by this unjust treatment of their
benefactors, the Austrians may have gained some temporary advantages,
the reader will acknowledge that in reference to their ultimate good,
they have acted with a most short-sighted and mistaken policy. The
aggrandizement of Russia can never be an advantage to Austria.

There were few more melancholy events in our war than this. The
disaster of this corps grievously paralyzed all the fine plans of the
general in chief. It reinforced the Russian superior force by 40,000
men;--for the different corps of Kreutz, Witt, Rudiger and Rott, could
now rejoin their main army without obstruction.

To these disasters of the two corps of Dwernicki and Sierawski, which
were deeply felt by the nation, was now to be added the appearance of
that horrible malady, the cholera, which after the battle of Iganie
commenced its devastations in our ranks. On the night of that battle
several hundreds of our troops fell sick. This terrible disease caused
us, on the first few days, the loss of nearly 1,000 men; but if it
was terrible with us, nothing can express the suffering it produced
in the Russian camp, aided by the want of comfort in the arrangements
of that camp, and the acid food upon which the Russian soldiers were
habitually fed. Thousands of those wretched sufferers were left exposed
to the open air, and died upon the field. The Poles took even more
care of them than of their own sick. They were brought together, and
transported to Menie, where there was a large convent, which was turned
into an hospital for their use. The total number of those sufferers
may be imagined, when it is stated, that, in that hospital and village
alone, two thousand Russian sick were reported.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 55: This unfortunate and painful event should serve as an
impressive example, which cannot be too often brought to mind, of
what disastrous consequences may follow from the neglect of observing
a constant communication between corps acting together, and, above
all, the departing from orders which are given upon a general plan,
the absolute control of which should belong to the general in chief.
Had general Dwernicki, conforming to his instructions, acted only
against the corps of Kreutz and Witt, and in concert with the corps
of Sierawski, he would have been apprised of that general's quitting
Kazimierz, and both of those two corps could have joined in the attack,
in which they would have been aided by another corps which was to be
sent, as the reader is aware, to act against the enemy's rear. If those
corps of Kreutz and Witt had been defeated, immense advantages would
have followed; indeed the war would have been over, for the Russian
main army would have been taken in flank and rear, and, in fact,
completely cut off.]




CHAPTER XVII.

 The Russian commander resumes offensive operations.--Object of the
 attack of the 25th of April.--Combat of Kuflew.--General Dembinski
 evacuates the position of Kuflew and awaits the enemy at Bady.--Battle
 of Minsk.--The enemy suddenly evacuates his position.--Reflections on
 this stage of the conflict.--Positions of the two armies.


The Russian main army, which, since the last of March had been on the
defensive, from weakness or from indecision, on the 23d of April began
to change its position, and to take the offensive. Having received
intelligence, as we may suppose, of the disasters of Sierawski, and
also of the passage of general Dwernicki into Volhynia, general
Diebitsch gave orders to the corps of Witt and Kreutz to pass the
Wieprz at Kock, and to attack our detachment at Zelechow, which was
forced to retire. On the same day, (23d) the brigade of colonel
Dembinski was attacked at Jeruzalem, without any decisive result. Those
small attacks by the enemy served, however, as an indication of the
intention of general Diebitsch to take the offensive on a larger scale.
To meet this intention, all our detachments received orders to hold
themselves in readiness. Firstly, these detachments were to concentrate
themselves upon a line of operations, between Kaluszyn, Siennica, and
Zelechow. [_The reader can refer to Plan_ VI.] The whole line, in case
of attack, on whatever quarter it might be, was to make a retrograde
movement, upon the same plan as heretofore, as far as the field of
Wawr. General Pac, in particular, who was the farthest removed from
Zelechow, was to use the utmost vigilance, and to make this retrograde
movement in the promptest manner, when occasion required.

On the 25th of April, in fact, marshal Diebitsch commenced his attack
at two principal points, Boimie and Kuflew. Upon the last of these
two points, he threw his greatest force, intending to pierce our line
there, and by a diversion at Minsk to divide our forces. Besides the
prevention of this design, the defence of Kuflew was of the greatest
importance to us from the circumstance that along the whole course of
the river Swider, at Latowicz, Starygrod, &c, were posted various small
detachments, which would have been cut off, if we should be forced to
make a sudden evacuation of that point.


COMBAT OF KUFLEW. [_See Plan_ XXIV.]

This combat deserved to be forever held up as an example in tactics,
to show how much can be done with a small force, managed with prudence
and skill. Colonel Dembinski, who, in this battle, commanded the
inconsiderable forces that met the attack of the masses of Diebitsch,
well merited the rank of general, to which he was then advanced. Our
position was covered by the river Swider (S) and its marshes, which
secured it from being taken in flank. The enemy had one debouchment
(_a_), consisting of a kind of dyke, which led from Kolacze (1). He
could pass this dyke easily, for the bridge was entire. On our side,
not far from this dyke, were small forests, or rather brush-wood,
occupied by two battalions (_b_) of our infantry. Upon the plain
between Kuflew and the river Swider, ten squadrons of our cavalry
(_c_) manoeuvred. Near the village (II) upon a little hill, on which
was a wind-mill, our artillery (_d_), consisting of only four pieces,
were posted, and directed their fire upon the passage over which the
enemy were to debouch. The position of the enemy was commanding, for
his artillery could sweep the whole plain on each side of the Swider.
The details of this battle were as follow:--At sunrise, on the 25th,
several regiments of cossacks (_e_) appeared upon the heights of
Jeruzalem. They even several times attempted to pass the dyke, but were
repulsed by the fire of our tirailleurs from the brush-wood. It was
mid-day when strong columns of infantry (_f_) began to show themselves
in the direction of Lukowiec and Plomieniec. In a short time all the
heights of Jeruzalem were covered with columns of infantry, and they
began their descent to Kolacze. The Russian light troops (_g_) began
their debouchment, and a warm fire commenced between the Russian
infantry upon the dyke, and our own tirailleurs in the brush-wood. The
Russian artillery (_h_) which remained upon the heights on the other
side, consisting of twenty and more pieces of large calibre, poured
for several hours a heavy fire upon Kuflew, where they supposed a
large force to be placed, but where, in fact, besides the four pieces
of artillery, we had but one company of infantry. Under this terrible
fire, that village was burnt to the ground. Those attacks of the
Russian artillery and infantry continued for three successive hours,
when colonel Dembinski, being informed that the small detachments at
Latowicz, &c, above referred to, had evacuated their position and were
safe from being cut off, commenced his retreat, as his instructions
directed. By accelerating his retreat he had another object in view,
namely, to lead the enemy in the direction of the 2d division, which
was posted at Ceglow, and was prepared to receive him. Our infantry and
artillery had left their position and were on the road, when colonel
Dembinski, placing himself at the head of his cavalry, threw himself
with great boldness upon the columns of the enemy which had debouched
over the dyke, and by repeated attacks kept them off from our rear.
After having passed the first forest without molestation, between
Ceglow and Kuflew, colonel Dembinski took a position, between forests,
in the environs of Bady, where a part of the 2d division was placed
in expectation of the enemy, in a kind of ambuscade. Here our forces
waited in vain until night for the enemy, who had contented himself
with having taken Kuflew. Two squadrons of cossacks, whom he ventured
to send towards our position, to reconnoitre, were, as soon as they
were seen, fallen upon by our cavalry, and either cut down or made
prisoners, to the amount of more than a hundred men and horses, with
two officers. As the enemy attempted nothing more, our forces, during
the night, evacuated their position, agreeably to instructions, and
reached Minsk at 3, A.M. of the next day. At Kuflew, full 40,000 men,
with some twenty pieces of artillery, and commanded by Diebitsch in
person, were opposed to general Dembinski, who had not quite 4,000 men
and four pieces of artillery, with which force he stood against the
enemy for that whole day. The loss of the Russians was about a thousand
men, and on our own side it was not fifty.

[Illustration:

 _XXIV._]

[Illustration:

 _XXV._]

The actions which took place on the same day at Boimie, were without
any decisive result, consisting only of a continued fire of artillery.
During the night of that day, our forces in every point made a
retrograde movement. The general in chief arranged his preparations
to receive the enemy on the 26th, dividing his forces into two parts.
The second division under Gielgud, and the division of cavalry, under
Skarzynski, was to await the enemy at Minsk; while the general in
chief, with the main body, awaited him in person at Dembe-Wielke.


BATTLE OF MINSK. [_See Plan_ XXV.]

The position of Minsk may be considered as one of the strongest upon
the great road from Siedlce to Warsaw. That town is situated in a
plain, surrounded by an impenetrable forest, and traversed by a small
river, which falls into the Swider. Upon the side of Warsaw, where
our forces were placed, are heights which overlook the whole town,
and they were particularly commanding upon the right of the roads
leading to Warsaw. The fire from those heights could sweep almost every
street of the city, and they were occupied by twenty-four pieces of
artillery (_a_). Upon the side of Siedlce and Ceglow, whence the enemy
was approaching, the whole plain was exposed to the commanding fire of
this artillery. The town of Minsk was occupied by two battalions of our
light infantry, dispersed as sharp shooters (_b_).

It was mid-day when the Russians (_c_) (_d_) debouched from the forest,
commenced their advance, and deployed upon the plain under the fire
of our artillery, which was opened immediately. Some fifty pieces of
the enemy's artillery, (_e_) approached the city, took position, and
commenced their fire. As the town was occupied by so small a force,
and so distributed as not to be affected by the enemy's fire, he was
permitted to continue this fire, and our artillery reserved theirs for
the moment when he should make a general advance to storm the town.
This soon took place. An enormous mass of infantry (_f_) advanced to
the assault. Our light troops evacuated the part of the town beyond
the river, to enable our artillery to open upon it. That part was
immediately occupied by the enemy, who, crowded together in the
streets, were subjected to a fire which spread death among their ranks.
The enemy hesitated whether to advance or retire, and remained in the
utmost disorder, falling under the fire of our artillery and the torn
and burning fragments of the wooden buildings which were rent in pieces
by that fire. While the enemy remained in this horrible suspense, the
brave colonel Oborski led his regiment to the charge, and bore down
all before him. A most terrible massacre, at the point of the bayonet,
then took place in the Square of the Church (_g_), where great masses
of the enemy were crowded together. The Russians were driven out of
the town after a most severe loss. They were left at liberty to take
possession of the same part again, but they did not repeat their
attacks upon the town, satisfying themselves with concentrating a heavy
fire of artillery principally upon the heights occupied by our own.
This state of things continued till three o'clock, when general Gielgud
gave orders to evacuate the position, agreeably to the directions of
the general in chief. Sixteen squadrons of cavalry were left to cover
the movement, and in this way our division, reaching the village of
Stoiadly, two English miles distant, took a second position there.
This new position was advantageous, on account of the elevation of
the ground. Our right wing, in particular, was well supported upon a
thick marshy forest, and was pushed forward far enough to give a cross
fire to the enemy, in case he should try to force the passage of the
great road. As the enemy was so imprudent, after our evacuation, as to
commence his debouchment through the town, with his cavalry in advance,
he exposed himself to a severe loss; for our artillery, consisting
of six pieces, poured a destructive fire upon the main street of the
city, which led to the only passage over the river; and again, after
deploying under this fire upon the plain, he was subjected to vigorous
charges from our cavalry under Skarzynski, which cost him a severe
loss, and delayed his advance for more than half an hour. As the space
between Stoiadly and Minsk was a plain gently descending from our side,
moist in the lower parts, and in every way favorable for attacks by
our cavalry, their charges were continually repeated, and the combat
on this plain deserved the name of the combat of cavalry. To give the
reader an idea of these effective charges against a cavalry of much
superior force, I will merely state that each squadron of the sixteen,
was engaged some three or four successive times with the enemy. Their
horses were continually in foam. The regiment of Zamoyski, the Krakus,
and the 5th Hulans greatly distinguished themselves. The loss of the
enemy's cavalry, of which the greater part consisted of regiments of
heavy dragoons, was very great. Their horses hoofs sunk into the humid
ground, and our Krakus, on their light animals, assaulted them in the
very midst of their ranks. Many staff and other officers of the enemy
were left dead upon the field. Our advanced guard having, in this way,
fought with such advantages, against the whole Russian army, at Minsk
and Stoiadly, from mid-day until 5, P.M.; the general in chief ordered
them to evacuate their position as promptly as possible, and retire to
Dembe-Wielke, where he awaited the enemy in order of battle, and where
he was desirous of meeting his attack before night. This movement was
executed without molestation from the Russians. Our advanced guard
passed the forests between Dembe-Wielke and Stoiadly, and arrived at
the position of Dembe-Wielke, where fifty pieces of our artillery
were posted to receive the enemy, and our whole force took the order
of battle. The enemy, however, did not debouch from the forests, but
remained on the other side. This finishes the details of that day and
of the battle of Minsk, in which the early cessation of the attacks of
the enemy proved how much he had suffered. He had two generals mortally
wounded, general Pahlen and the prince Galiczyn, and lost nearly 4,000
men. On our side the loss was four or five hundred only.

For their conduct in this battle, the National Government and the
general in chief presented their thanks to the 2d division under
Gielgud and the division of cavalry under Skarzynski. General Gielgud
was advanced to the rank of general of division, and it was perhaps
owing to his skilful dispositions and brave conduct on that day, that
it was not feared to entrust him with the command of the all important
expedition to Lithuania.

On the 27th and 28th, no events took place. During the night of the
28th, the enemy, to our astonishment, evacuated his position and
retired as far as Kaluszyn, twenty-four English miles distant. We
cannot give the true cause of this sudden and unexpected retreat.
Perhaps it was on account of a failure of provisions. Another cause
might have been the rumors, which had begun to take an aspect of
importance, of the revolutions in Lithuania and Samogitia.

The reader will allow me to dwell for a moment upon this extraordinary
movement of the enemy, which must be considered an indication, either
of the extreme of physical and moral weakness to which the Russian
army was reduced, or of a great want of generalship on the part of
marshal Diebitsch. Such a course, voluntarily taken, in the eyes of the
military critic, is enough to destroy all claim to military talent on
the part of that commander. Such great objects attempted, followed up
with so little perseverance, and abandoned without an adequate cause,
would seem to indicate either the absence of any fixed plan, or a
degree of indecision inconsistent with any sound military pretensions.

Our commander in chief felt sure that when general Diebitsch attacked,
on the 25th, and 26th, it was with the view, having no longer any fear
of the corps of generals Dwernicki and Sierawski, and being reinforced
by the corps which had been opposed to the former, to follow up his
attack and compel us to a general battle. Whatever might have been the
result of that battle, it was the only course which a true general
could have followed, especially when his army was in such superiority
of strength. To one who considers these circumstances, two questions
will arise. First, what was the object of commencing the attack?
Secondly, what was, in regard to tactics, the cause of its cessation,
and of that sudden retreat? It will be very difficult to find a
satisfactory answer to either of those questions.[56]

Our army, after this retreat of the enemy, commenced anew its advance,
and, on the 30th, it occupied again its former position at Boimie, on
the river Kostrzyn. At this time, our left wing under Uminski, which,
as the reader is aware, was on the right bank of the Narew, at the
environs of Pultusk, received orders to join the main army, leaving
a detachment at Zagroby, where the generalissimo ordered a strong
bridge-head to be erected.

The position of the two armies on the 30th was as follows. [_Plans_
VI _and_ XXIX.] Our army was again concentrated between Wengrow and
Ceglow, and indeed Wengrow was occupied by a small detachment. The
centre or the greater force was on the main road at Kaluszyn. Its
advanced posts were along the banks of the river Kostrzyn at Grombkowo,
Strzebucza, and Boimie. Our right wing was again posted upon the river
Swider, between Karczew and Ceglow. The Russian army was concentrated
in the environs of Mordy and Sucha, where marshal Diebitsch entrenched
himself in a fortified camp, and took again a defensive attitude.
The corps of Kreutz and Witt were in the environs of Pulawy, and the
Russian imperial guard advanced to the environs of Pultusk.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 56: In the whole of this war, the videttes of the two armies
were at no time so near as they were after this last battle. On the
27th and 28th, those of the Russian cavalry, cossacks and hussars,
occupying the main road, were within fifty paces of the videttes of
our lancers, so near in fact that they could have conversed together.
On having this circumstance reported to him, the general in chief did
not take advantage of any attack, but ordered the utmost forbearance
to be observed, and the most friendly demonstrations to be made by our
outposts. On changing of the guard, our sentinels, as they quitted
their post, bade a friendly adieu to the opposite sentinel of the
enemy; and under the cover of night, the enemy's sentinels, and even
some of their officers, approached our videttes, gave their hands,
and entered into friendly conversation. It was touching to see those
brave soldiers deeply affected at such meetings. With tears in their
eyes, the Russians could only repeat that they had been forced to
this contest, and confessed that, even if we should be conquerors,
they would be the gainers in other respects. They also uttered their
complaints of the tyranny and the privations to which they were
subjected, and our lancers gave them all the relief which their own
means could furnish.]




CHAPTER XVIII.

 General Skrzynecki resumes the offensive.--He decides to adopt an
 enlarged plan of operations, and to make the revolutionized provinces
 supply the place of a corps d'armee.--The corps of Chrzanowski is sent
 to occupy the Russian corps of Witt and Kreutz.--Admirable execution
 of this enterprise.--Attack on Kock.--Attack of Rudiger's camp.--Plan
 of operations by the main army against the Russian guard.--Forced
 march from Kaluszyn by Praga to Serock.--Advanced post of the guard
 attacked and defeated.--The corps of Saken is cut off.--The 2d
 division under Gielgud sent into Lithuania.--The imperial guard are
 driven with great loss beyond the frontier.--Retrograde movement.


As several days passed away, without any thing having been attempted
on the part of the enemy, our general in chief decided to re-commence
hostilities by small attacks, which were designed to mask the great
plan he intended to put into execution. The general view which
occupied our commander, was to continue the offensive, to follow up
the enemy constantly, and not to leave him unless some very important
occasion should call for a different course. Let us reflect upon the
difficulties of such a plan, and let us then examine how it was in fact
executed by the general in chief.

General Skrzynecki, regarding all the existing circumstances, the
actual position of the enemy, and his strength, found a great
difference between the present state of things and that which existed
after the battle of Iganie. The misfortunes of the corps of Dwernicki
and Sierawski, had made a vast change in the relative strength of the
two parties. The fate of those two corps gave a great advantage to the
enemy, leaving him free to concentrate all his forces and to act in
one mass. This advantage of the enemy was to be met, and means were to
be taken to keep his forces in detached bodies, by giving occupation
to each. To provide such means, it was next an object to give an
important character to the revolution in Lithuania, and in fact to
make that revolution supply the place of a _corps d'armee_, to send a
body of troops to aid it, and to direct and lead the partizan forces
which might be there enrolled. If then by such operation, Lithuania
and Samogitia could be kept in constant communication with the main
army, the line of operations would be enlarged, and would be based
upon Wilno and Warsaw. This line of operations would embrace also the
towns of Grodno and Lomza. To occupy the corps of Witt and Kreutz,
which were still in the palatinate of Lublin, the general in chief
detached a small corps under the command of general Chrzanowski, which
were furnished with the same instructions as its predecessor, that of
general Dwernicki, which were, in general, to act in the environs of
Zamosc.

To facilitate the execution of these plans, the general in chief
determined to give daily occupation to the enemy. On the 2d of May, the
fire was renewed along our whole line. Each following day presented
sanguinary scenes at different points. In the midst of one of these
actions, on the 7th, the small corps above mentioned, consisting of
4,000 men and eight pieces of cannon, under general Chrzanowski,
left the main body [_See Plan_ XXVI], took the direction of Stoczek
(1), Zelechow (2), and Kock (3), to reach the environs of Zamosc (4).
The reader, on examining the plan, and looking at the space which this
corps (_a_) was to pass over, in the midst of the enemy's detached
corps (_b_), and in which it was exposed every moment to be surrounded
and cut off, will acknowledge that this expedition, which was most
successfully executed, is to be ranked among the finest operations
in the campaign. It demanded a general of talent, and a soldier of
determination.

[Illustration:

 _XXVI. p 265_]

[Illustration:

 _XXVII. p 267_]

[Illustration:

 _XXVIII. p. 266_]

When I allow myself thus to detain the attention of the reader upon
the extraordinary efforts of this war, it is only with the view to
convince him that nothing is difficult of execution which is prompted
by a resolute determination based upon high principles, and that what
would be deemed almost impossible in an ordinary war, in which despots,
to gratify their ambition or their caprices, force their subjects to
battle--an involuntary sacrifice, is far from being so, in a war like
ours. In such a war, moral impulse becomes an element, the importance
of which cannot be over-estimated.

General Chrzanowski, quitting, as we have mentioned, the main body,
took the direction of Ceglow, and threw himself into the great forest
of Plomieniec. Leaving that forest, he met, near Wodynie, a strong
detachment of the enemy, composed of infantry, cavalry, and several
pieces of artillery, belonging to their main body, and probably
detached to make a reconnoissance. By a sudden attack that detachment
was at once overthrown. The cavalry ordered for their pursuit were
instructed to return in another direction, in order to deceive the
enemy. In this manner general Chrzanowski, frequently meeting with
small detachments of the enemy and deceiving them continually,
traversed the woody plain between Stoczek and Zelechow, and arrived, on
the night of the 9th, at the environs of Kock, where he had to pass the
river Wieprz.


ATTACK OF KOCK. [_See Plan_ XXVII.]

At the moment of the arrival of the corps of general Chrzanowski, this
town was occupied by a part of the corps of general Witt, composed
of 6,000 men and 20 pieces of artillery. Besides this considerable
garrison, the place had been strengthened by several fortifications (1)
on each side of the river, to defend the passage of the bridge (2), and
without taking those fortifications it would be impossible for us to
pass the bridge. In such circumstances there was no alternative, and it
was necessary to attempt to take the town by storm. General Chrzanowski
announced his intention to the corps, and addressed a few animating
words to them. Having divided his corps into small parties (_a, a_),
he surrounded the town. He placed especial importance upon the forcing
of the avenue (3) leading to the palace, and getting possession of
the garden (4) which surrounded the palace, and bordered on the river.
If all this could be rapidly executed, the enemy would be taken in the
rear.

The signal for the attack being given, a warm fire from our skirmishers
was commenced in all points round the city, and, while the cavalry
(_b_), divided into detachments, threw themselves continually upon
the Russian infantry (_c_), our infantry, at the charge, forced the
entrance to the palace and garden, which was immediately occupied by
our tirailleurs, who opened their fire upon the fortifications (1) and
on the Russian columns in the square (_d_). In this manner the enemy
was surrounded, and forced to evacuate the city with great loss, and
to take the direction of Radzyn. General Chrzanowski passed the river
and took the direction of Lubartow. Leaving the town of Lublin on the
right, and following the banks of the river Wieprz, he reached on the
11th the environs of Piaski. In the latter place he was apprized that a
Russian corps under Rudiger was at Krasny-staw. Chrzanowski decided to
attack them.


ATTACK OF RUDIGER'S CAMP. [_See Plan_ XXVIII.]

The corps of general Rudiger, after the unfortunate disaster of general
Dwernicki, having traversed Volhynia, entered the frontiers of the
kingdom, and took the direction of Lublin, being destined probably to
reinforce the main army under Diebitsch. This corps, which was composed
of about 12,000 men, and some twenty pieces of cannon, was in camp (E)
near the town of Krasny-staw, having that town and the river Wieprz in
its rear.

General Chrzanowski, who halted with his corps in the forest between
Piaski and Krasny-staw, having sent out patrols, was perfectly informed
of the position of the enemy, and ascertained that he had not his wing
supported on the river;--indeed, he was in such a state, as satisfied
our general that he had no expectation of meeting a Polish force, and
that he might be surprised in his camp. To effect this object, general
Chrzanowski divided his corps into two parties, and giving the command
of one to the brave general Romarino, he ordered him to traverse the
forest longitudinally, as far as the road which leads from Tarnogora
to Krasny-staw, and by this road, which is wholly through forests,
to approach, as near as possible, to the left of the enemy's camp;
and also, if circumstances might permit it, to push himself even
against the enemy's rear. On arriving there, he was to commence his
fire immediately. These instructions to general Romarino being given,
general Chrzanowski (B) advanced with the other part of the corps,
through the forest, keeping the left bank of the Wieprz. He approached
so near the enemy, without being perceived, as even to be on a line
with him. Not long before evening, Romarino having reached the enemy
on the other side (C), began his attack, and his fire was a signal for
Chrzanowski to quit the forest. Thus suddenly assaulted upon his two
wings and his rear, the disorder of the enemy was unimaginable, and he
was not in a state to offer resistance. The whole camp was taken, with
all its baggage, ammunition, &c, and as many as two thousand prisoners
and six pieces of artillery fell into our hands. The remains of his
force fled along the great road (D), which was purposely left open to
him. General Chrzanowski contented himself with occupying the town, in
which he furnished himself with ammunition from the magazines, and,
remaining there but a short time, left for the environs of Zamosc, in
which fortress he deposited his prisoners.

Conformably to his instructions, he remained in camp, near this
fortress, at Labunia.[57]

The general in chief having thus accomplished his object of supplying
the place of general Dwernicki's corps, and holding in check the
corps of Witt and Kreutz, in the palatinate of Lublin, it remained to
him to complete his great plan by sending a corps into Lithuania. He
decided to remove the only obstacle to this attempt by attacking the
Russian imperial guard, which was somewhat detached from the Russian
grand army. To carry this bold purpose into effect, the following
instructions were given to the different commanders.

[Illustration:

 _XXIX._]


[Illustration:

 _XXX._]


OPERATIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIAN GUARD. [_Plan_ XXIX.]

On the 12th of May, general Uminski with his division of cavalry (_a_)
was ordered to quit the left wing and the position of Zimna-Woda, and
to move to the position of Kaluszyn. This traverse of the line he was
to make in full view of the enemy, and he was to give to the manoeuvre
the aspect of a reconnoissance. The object of this change of position
was, that in the new position he might mask the movements of the main
body. This important disposition general Uminski was directed to carry
into effect with the utmost prudence. The enemy was to be each day
harassed, but never to be engaged with in any decisive manner. Small
detachments were to be sent against the enemy, along his whole line,
and especially on the first days of the movement. The general in chief
instructed general Uminski to watch every movement of the enemy, and
give information of such at head-quarters. If the main body of the
Russian force should make an attack, he was to execute his retreat upon
the main road, as far as the fortifications of Praga, and there he
was to act in junction with the other detachments left there for the
defence of those fortifications. If, on the contrary, the Russian army
should make a retrograde movement, general Uminski was to endeavor,
by following them, to keep them constantly in view. If circumstances
permitted, the rear guard of the Russians might be harassed during
the night. Above all, general Uminski was to endeavor to keep up his
communications with the neighboring corps, that of general Lubinski,
and the detachments left at Siennica and Karczew. In this moderate
pursuit of the enemy, the general was to ascertain whether their
retrograde movement was a retreat or a manoeuvre, in order to avoid
every hazard.

General Lubinski (_b_), with his division of cavalry, was to pass the
right bank of the Bug (B), and leaving small detachments at Wyszkow (1)
and Brok (2), he was to advance as far as the environs of Nar (3), not
quitting the right bank of the river. All his care was to be devoted
to the observing of the enemy, and to the preventing of any sudden
passage of the river by him. In regard to his communications, the same
instructions were given to him as to general Uminski.

Having given these orders to the above mentioned corps, general
Skrzynecki, with the main force (_d_), left suddenly the position at
Kaluszyn (4), making a retrograde movement upon the great road, by
Minsk (5), traversed Praga (6), and through Jablonna (7), and Zegrz
(8), arrived on the 15th, at Serock (9). On the 16th, he passed the
Narew (N), at this place, leaving a brigade of infantry and cavalry
(_e_), under general Dembinski, upon the right bank, with orders to
advance to Ostrolenka (10), through the towns of Pultusk, Magnuszewo
and Rozany (11). This detachment was not to commence the attack on
meeting the enemy, but was only to harass him and keep him in check,
and detain him as near as possible to Serock. If the enemy should
commence the retreat, this corps was to pursue him with the greatest
activity, in order that at Ostrolenka, where the general in chief had
determined to attack him, he might be exposed between two fires.

On the 17th, this corps met the first advanced post (_f_) of the
Russian imperial guard at Modzele, which, after a slight engagement,
evacuated its position, and retired. Being pursued by the brigade of
cavalry under general Dembinski, they, on the 18th, commenced the
passage of the Narew, at Ostrolenka. In attempting this passage, the
rear-guard of the enemy was overthrown, and four regiments of the
light infantry of Finland were taken prisoners. This pursuit by the
brave Dembinski was executed with such rapidity, that the corps of
general Saken, which made a part of the grand corps of the guard, but
was a little detached, was completely cut off from the main body and
forced to take refuge in the palatinate of Augustow. It is much to be
regretted that our main force (_d_) could not reach Ostrolenka; having
to pass narrow roads, through forests, in which the artillery met with
much obstruction. Otherwise, the whole of that imperial guard would
have been surrounded.

With the arrival of our main body, on the night of the 18th, the
Russians passed the Narew, but many voitures and stragglers fell into
the hands of our cavalry in the forest of Troszyn (12). The general in
chief, having given the corps a short rest, and having despatched a
detachment, under the command of colonel Sierawski, for the pursuit of
the corps of Saken, on the same night continued his march in pursuit of
the guard, in the direction of Troszyn (12). On the morning of the next
day, arriving at Dlugie-Siodlo (13), this village was found occupied
by two regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, the latter covering
the village. Our 1st regiment of lancers, which were the leading force,
leaving the forest and finding the Russian cavalry in line before that
village, threw themselves upon them with the rapidity of lightning.
The enemy's cavalry was borne down before them, and pursued by our
lancers into the village; but his infantry, under cover of the village,
opened a terrible fire upon our cavalry, which compelled them to retire
and await the arrival of the artillery. At length, eight pieces of
light artillery, commanded by colonel Boehm, arrived, and commenced a
vigorous fire of grape upon the village, which compelled the enemy's
infantry to evacuate it, and they were pursued with such spirit, that
one battalion was taken, and the rest were dispersed in the forest. On
the same day, the enemy was again pressed upon in his retreat, in the
environs of Xienzopol (14), especially on the passage of the river and
marshes of Kamionka.

The 1st lancers, and the battery of light artillery, who did not
quit the enemy a moment, arrived simultaneously with him at the point
of the passage. The enemy was obliged to debouch under the fire of
our artillery and the charges of our cavalry, and lost again several
hundred in dead, wounded and prisoners.

I cannot give the reader a satisfactory explanation, why general
Skrzynecki did not pursue the enemy on the 20th. Perhaps he considered
the great fatigue of the army, particularly the infantry, which the
reader will, of course, presume to have been incurred by the forced
march which the distance passed over supposes. Another reason, perhaps,
was, that he had sent from this place the first detachment (_i_) for
Lithuania, wishing to be sure of its safe passage to the frontiers. The
detachment, in fact, left on that day, in the direction of Mniszew,
and passed the frontier of the kingdom at the village of Mien, between
Ciechanowiec and Suraz, opposite Brainsk.

Our army, having halted one day at Xienzopol, on the evening of the
20th, quitted this position to continue the pursuit of the guard, and
overtook them in the forest of Menzynin (15). This forest, occupied by
the Russian rear-guard, was so near the heights of the village, which
command the whole vicinity, that it was exposed to a fire of artillery
from these heights. Our generalissimo placed his artillery on the
heights, and directed a fire upon the forest; the infantry was ordered
to take the enemy in front, in case he should quit the forest, and the
cavalry was to advance in strong columns along the road, to cut off his
escape from the forest into the road. In this they were successful, and
took many prisoners. Thus continually pursued, and subject to severe
losses along the whole route, the guard (_l_) was again pressed at the
passage of the Narew at Tykocin (16). The consternation and disorder of
the enemy was such, that he did not take time to destroy the bridge.
Our lancers, commanded by the brave colonel Langerman, commenced an
attack upon the Russian cuirassiers, on the bridge itself. The regiment
of cuirassiers was almost annihilated, many being thrown from the
bridge, and a great number taken prisoners.

Having thus driven the Russian guard from the kingdom, (of which the
Narew was the boundary,) general Skrzynecki commenced a retrograde
movement, to meet the demonstration which general Diebitsch might make
upon his rear. On the night of the 22d, our army (_m_) began this
movement, having destroyed the several bridges of the Narew.

These then are the details of the operations upon the Russian guard,
which will be admitted to be among the finest in the history of modern
warfare. The operations of Napoleon, in the campaign of Italy--the
brilliant commencement of his career, in 1796,--will be always cited
as the highest examples of stratago-tactics, but I do not think that a
finer and bolder plan of operations can be found even there. In both
cases, success was owing, not more to the great military genius of the
leaders, than to those high moral impulses which must animate armies in
every contest for national existence.

Our army, evacuating on the 12th, the position at Kaluszyn, from that
date to the 26th, when the battle of Ostrolenka took place, had passed
over a distance of from 200 to 250 miles, which, deducting the six
days occupied in action, was executed in eight days, making an average
of twenty-eight English miles per day, an extraordinary and perhaps
unexampled effort. The rapidity, in fact, with which this movement
was performed, was such, that our forces were on their return before
marshal Diebitsch commenced his march to intercept them. This object
the marshal thought himself in season to effect, but the reader will
see in the sequel how completely he failed of it.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 57: The reader may be pleased with a short biographical
sketch of general Chrzanowski, who distinguished himself here so much.
This skilful officer commenced his military career in 1815, on leaving
the military school at Warsaw, as officer of the corps of engineers,
in which department he was distinguished for his skill and industry.
In the year 1828, during the war of Turkey, the Emperor Nicholas was
desirous of obtaining the aid of Polish officers of engineers, and
Chrzanowski was among the number chosen. In this campaign his talents
made themselves remarked, and marshal Diebitsch gave him great marks
of confidence, and placed him near his person. He returned from the
campaign as captain, and received several Russian decorations. In the
revolution, like a worthy son of Poland, he offered his services to
the common cause; but the dictator Chlopicki, who, among his other
faults, had that of either being unable to appreciate, or willing
to disregard the merits of the officers from among whom he was to
make his appointments, did not give any important trust to general
Chrzanowski;--perhaps it was because Chrzanowski was among the number
of those who were desirous of taking the field without delay. With
the glorious commencement of the era of the command of our estimable
Skrzynecki, this brave officer was advanced to the rank of lieutenant
colonel, and was placed in the post of chef d'etat major. While in this
post he was advanced to the rank of general. The generalissimo, who in
all his plans observed the greatest secrecy, and his example ought to
be followed by every good general, initiated, however, Chrzanowski,
and Prondzynski, who succeeded the former as chef d'etat, into all his
plans: and indeed those two brave generals were valuable counsellors
to Skrzynecki. Among other qualities necessary to a great general,
Chrzanowski was endowed with great coolness and presence of mind,
and with a spirit of system, which he carried into every thing which
he undertook. He was seen in the midst of the hottest fire, with his
plan of the battle before him, referring the movements to the plan,
and giving his orders with the greatest sangfroid imaginable. The
generalissimo could not enough regret that he had not given him the
command of the expedition to Lithuania, in place of Gielgud. If the
skill and coolness of Chrzanowski could have been united, in that
expedition, with the bold and adventurous enterprise of Dwernicki,
every thing would have been effected there in a few weeks.]




CHAPTER XIX.

 The Lithuanians compel two Russian corps to evacuate
 Samogitia.--Operations of general Chlapowski in the department of
 Bialystok.--Capture of Bielsk.--Defeat of a Russian force at Narewka
 and expulsion of the enemy from the department.--Recapitulation of
 the forces which had been sent into Lithuania.--Operations of the
 main army.--Attempt of marshal Diebitsch to intercept Skrzynecki on
 his retrograde march, by a diversion to Ostrolenka.--General Lubinski
 surprises the Russian advanced guard at Czyzew.--Marshal Diebitsch
 attacks the Polish rear-guard at Kleczkowo.--The rear-guard quits its
 position at night, and joins the main army at Ostrolenka.--Battle of
 Ostrolenka.


Quitting the main army, which had thus successfully executed the
important operation of driving the Russian imperial guard from the
kingdom, and sending a corps into Lithuania,--we will now turn to take
a view of the state of affairs in that province.

The brave Lithuanians in a series of bloody encounters had made
themselves severely felt by the enemy. In the departments of Roszyienie
and Szawla, at about the middle of the month of May, a short time
before the battle of Ostrolenka, the two Russian corps, under
Malinowski and Szyrman, were almost annihilated by the Lithuanian
insurgents, who, night and day, falling upon them from forest
ambuscades, subjected them to immense losses. Those corps literally
wandered about, for some time, and being unable to hold themselves in
any position, were forced at last to evacuate Samogitia.

In the department of Bialystok, the little corps recently sent under
the command of general Chlapowski, began its operations with great
success. In the environs of Bielsk, that small detachment, composed
of four squadrons of the 1st regiment of lancers, consisting of four
hundred and eighty horsemen, a hundred and ninety light infantry
volunteers mounted,[58] and two pieces of cannon, routed two regiments
of cossacks and two battalions of infantry, the latter being taken in
a body and the former dispersed; and, what was of much importance to
us, in Bielsk, as well as in Brainsk, several magazines of powder were
found. In the environs of Bielsk, colonel Mikotin, aid-de-camp of the
grand duke Michael, and on his way with despatches from him to the
Grand Duke Constantine, was taken prisoner.[59]

The corps of general Chlapowski left Bielsk in the direction of the
town of Orla, and entered the forest of Bialowiek, where he received
reinforcements of Lithuanian insurgents.

On the same day that our main army fought at Ostrolenka, the 26th
of May, this little corps had an engagement with the enemy in the
environs of Narewka. A considerable Russian detachment, under the
command of general Rengardt, composed of 6,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry,
and five pieces of cannon--in all, nearly 9,000 men--was posted near
Nasielsk. This considerable force was attacked by our small corps,
to which were added some hundreds of insurgents, making in all, a
force of not more than a thousand men. The Russians were completely
beaten in this action. Full a thousand prisoners were taken, and
all their artillery. An important advantage of this affair, was the
taking of a great transport of some hundred vehicles with provisions,
destined for the Russian grand army. By the dispersion and ruin of
this corps, the department of Bialystok was entirely cleared of the
Russians, and nothing interrupted the formation and organization of
the insurgent forces. The taking of Bielsk, and the affair of Narewka,
will be admitted by the reader to have been above the rank of ordinary
achievements, and should immortalize the handful of brave men which
formed this detachment. They may be pointed at, as examples, with many
others, in this war, of how much can be effected by that prompt and
energetic action which no ordinary motives will sustain.

While the affairs of Lithuania and Samogitia, and those in the
department of Bialystok, wore this favorable aspect, a new corps was
approaching to aid this propitious state of things, to protect the
insurrections, and, as might be confidently hoped, to bring them to a
sure and happy result. The new force destined for this object consisted
of the 2d division, reinforced by a squadron of cavalry, which force
quitted Lomza on the 27th for Lithuania.

Before returning to the operations of the grand army, we will give a
short recapitulation of the forces which had been sent into Lithuania
and Samogitia, at successive periods, to support the insurrections in
those provinces.

The first corps under general Chlapowski, left, on the 20th of May,
the village of Xienzopol, with this destination;--to enter the
department of Bialystok, to occupy the forest of Bialowiez, in which
were collected the forces of the revolted Lithuanians, with the view
to organize these forces; from that position to act on the Russian
communications, and, if circumstances might allow it, to make an
approach upon Wilno. This little corps, as we have seen, was composed
of 190 infantry volunteers mounted, the 1st regiment of lancers,
consisting of 480 horsemen, and two pieces of light artillery.

The second corps, under the command of colonel Sierakowski, left, a few
days before that of general Chlapowski, with the view, as we have also
seen, to follow and observe the division of general Saken, who had been
cut off by general Skrzynecki from the Russian guard, and compelled
to remain on the right bank of the Narew. This corps consisted of two
battalions of infantry of the 18th regiment, recently formed, amounting
to 1,500 men, two squadrons of horse, of Plock, also recently formed,
250 in all, and two pieces of cannon. This corps, in the execution
of its instructions, obtained several advantages over general Saken,
near Stavisk. Colonel Sierakowski then advanced to the environs of the
little town of Graiewo, where he took a strong position, and awaited
the arrival of the corps of general Gielgud.

The third corps, under the command of general Gielgud, being the second
division, left the town of Lomza on the 27th of May. It was composed
of 9 battalions of infantry, consisting of 4,500 men, 5 squadrons of
cavalry of 600 men, 160 sappers, and 24 pieces of cannon. The total
force of these three corps was then as follows:

_Artillery_, 28 pieces. _Infantry_, 6,350 men. _Cavalry_, 1,300.

Besides these forces, which were detached from the grand army, there
were formed in Lithuania, several regiments of infantry and cavalry,
which we shall designate in the sequel, but which did not commence
active service until the battle of Wilno.

To return to the main army. Such was the rapidity with which the
operations of general Skrzynecki upon the Russian guard were executed,
that, as we have said, he was on his retrograde march, after having
driven that guard beyond the frontiers, before marshal Diebitsch
received intelligence of his operations. It was then that the Russian
commander, having no hope of saving the guard, conceived the plan of
attempting, by a prompt diversion towards Ostrolenka, to cut off the
communication of our army with Warsaw. [_See Plan_ XXIX.]

With this view he evacuated his position at Sucha and Mordy (_o_),
passed by Sokolow, crossed the river Bug at Granne (16), entered into
the Russian province of Bialystok, passed through a corner of this
department on the 24th of May, and crossing the little river Nurzec
(R), at Ciechanowiec (17), entered again into the Polish territory, and
occupied the road of Czyzew (18) and Zambrowo (19). Without any delay
he pushed his advanced guard as far as Czyzew.

General Lubinski was then at Nur. This little town was at the same
distance from Ostrolenka as Czyzew, but the communications with
Ostrolenka were more difficult, Czyzew being on a principal road.
The enemy, observing this circumstance, and taking it for granted
that Lubinski was cut off from the main army, sent an aid-de-camp
with a flag of truce to summon him to surrender.[60] This summons was
rejected.

After the departure of the aid-de-camp, general Lubinski commenced his
march, and, though it was practicable for him to reach Ostrolenka by
a direct route, yet thinking it possible that Czyzew was not occupied
by a very strong force, and that he might profit by the approach of
night, he determined to march at once upon the latter place, and to
attack the Russian advanced guard there. This bold thought was executed
with perfect success. On reaching Czyzew he found two regiments of
cavalry encamped, and wholly unprepared for an attack. They had not
even an outer-guard upon the road to Nur. He made a charge which threw
them into complete disorder, and compelled them to retreat with the
loss of a great number in killed and wounded, and four to five hundred
prisoners. It was to be regretted that the necessity under which
general Lubinski was placed of reaching Ostrolenka as soon as possible,
did not permit him to profit farther by these advantages.

On the next day, (the 25th) the rear-guard of our main army, consisting
of the brigade of general Wengierski, was attacked at mid-day by the
Russians, on the side of Zambrowo, near Kleczkowo (20), a village
situated at the distance of three leagues from Ostrolenka, on the left
bank of the Narew. General Diebitsch, being under the conviction that
he had encountered the whole Polish force at Kleczkowo, consolidated
his strength there, and determined to come to action, and, by so doing,
give time for another corps to advance in the direction of Czyzew, and
occupy Ostrolenka, by which movement he trusted that our army would
be cut off from Warsaw, and forced to retire to Lomza. The Russian
commander, presuming on the celerity of his movements, was so confident
of meeting our whole army at this point, that nothing could exceed his
surprise on learning that our army had already passed the town, and
that it was only the rear-guard which was before him.[61] In order to
lose no time, he commenced an immediate attack on the rear-guard thus
posted at Kleczkowo. Our general in chief who was then at Troszyn, on
hearing the fire of the Russians at Kleczkowo, immediately repaired
thither, and profiting by the fine position of that place, which
commanded the marshy plain on the side of the enemy, passable only
by a dyke, the bridge over which had been demolished by our troops,
ordered general Wengierski to sustain himself in that position until
night. In vain the Russian cavalry and infantry attempted to pass this
dyke. At each approach they were uniformly driven back by a destructive
fire of grape from our artillery. In vain were sixteen pieces of
their artillery employed to silence this fire; our position was too
commanding to be affected by them.

The brigade of general Wengierski having held out in this position,
with the greatest determination against a vastly superior force,
for nine hours, left the place at night in the greatest order, and
followed the main army. On the next day, the 26th of May, our army
(_h_) evacuated Ostrolenka, passed the river Narew, and took, upon the
right bank of that river, opposite to Ostrolenka, a new position,[62]
leaving the bridge partly destroyed, but in such a state that the
Russian infantry might pass it slowly. Not long after we had occupied
our position, the enemy commenced debouching over this bridge.


BATTLE OF OSTROLENKA. [_See Plan_ XXX.]

The battle of Ostrolenka, which cost us the lives of two brave
generals, Kicki, and Henry Kaminski, was, in point of tactics, simply
the passage of the river. We may presume that the intention of general
Diebitsch was, by passing the Narew at this point, to send at the same
time a corps to Serock, in order to cut off our army, and place it
between two fires. At 11 o'clock, the Russian infantry (_a_) under the
protection of a most terrible fire from fifty-four pieces of artillery,
(_b_) placed in a very strong position on the left bank of the
Narew, commenced, as we have said, the passage of the river. General
Skrzynecki, not wishing absolutely to prevent this passage, placed
but sixteen cannon in advantageous positions, on slight elevations of
ground, (_d_) designed to prevent the repairing of the bridge, and the
consequent rapid passage of the enemy's infantry. The powerful Russian
artillery attempted, without success, to silence these few pieces.
Their fire was equally harmless to the main army (A); for the latter
was withdrawn to an advantageous position. Our artillery, on the other
hand, was used with great effect, being brought to bear directly upon
the bridge. During these operations, the advanced guard, with all the
baggage and ammunition of the army, received the order to take up the
march towards Warsaw.

At 3 o'clock, our artillery received orders to evacuate their position,
and the skirmishers (_e_) were ordered to advance. On the cessation of
the fire of the artillery, the light troops commenced a warm fire upon
the columns of Russian infantry, which had already passed the bridge.
The enemy, profiting by the withdrawal of our artillery, commenced
repairing the bridge, to afford a passage for large masses of infantry,
and artillery. A strong Russian column (_f_), after passing the bridge,
took a direction to the left, to throw itself into the forest which
borders on the Narew, at the distance of a quarter of a league from
the bridge; and by occupying that forest and the communications which
traverse it, they thought to commence an attack upon our right wing.
To have permitted this would have much deranged our dispositions. The
Polish commander, observing that a great body of the Russian infantry
had already passed the bridge, and that this strong column had been
sent to occupy the forest, ordered general Lubinski to send forward a
brigade of cavalry (_g_), to charge upon this column, on its march, and
at the same time ordered general Kaminski, with a division of infantry,
to make a charge upon the Russian infantry near the bridge. These
two attacks were executed with great promptness and spirit, and were
successful. The column which the cavalry attacked on its march to the
forest, was dispersed with the loss of more than a hundred men left on
the field. The attack of the division of general Kaminski was equally
fortunate. The Russian columns, on receiving his charge, fell back upon
the bridge, or concealed themselves under the banks of the river. These
two attacks cost us the lives of the two generals, Kaminski and Kicki,
who threw themselves upon the enemy, at the head of their respective
columns. Their loss was deeply regretted by the army and the nation.

Although the result of these attacks was favorable to us, yet, the
general in chief, considering the terribly destructive fire of the
Russian artillery, which commanded the whole plain near the bridge,
decided that the repetition of them would cost us too severe a loss,
and commanded both the cavalry and infantry to withdraw to their former
position, and to cease firing.

At 6 o'clock, the firing on both sides had entirely ceased. Profiting
by this interval, the Polish army pursued its route, and the Russian
infantry again commenced debouching upon the bridge. At dusk, nearly
the whole Polish army was on the march to Warsaw, and one division
only [_Plan_ XXXI, (_d_)] remained on our position. On the part of the
Russian army, we may suppose that nearly two divisions had passed the
bridge, when our general in chief, wishing to profit by the obscurity
of the night, in order to subject the enemy to still greater losses,
conceived the bold idea of advancing our artillery (_a_) so near the
Russian columns (_b_), as to pour upon them a fire of grape-shot.
General Skrzynecki himself approached colonel Boehm, and taking the
command of the twelve pieces of light artillery under him, led them
in person to the distance of within three hundred paces of the enemy,
and brought forward at the same time two regiments of cavalry for the
support of this artillery. Placing this little detachment in a very
advantageous position behind small elevations of ground, he commanded
colonel Boehm to commence firing. The Russian columns were thrown
into confusion by this unexpected and terrible fire; and it may be
imagined that their loss was immense, enclosed as they were within a
narrow space, on the bank and on the bridge. Every discharge of the
artillery was with effect, and by the testimony of the prisoners taken,
their loss must have amounted to an entire brigade, without estimating
those who left the field wounded, and those who fell into the river.
On our side, this attack cost us only the loss of two officers of the
artillery, although this detachment was exposed to the fire of the
whole Russian artillery.[63] Our battery fired but three rounds, when
the general gave the order to withdraw, and follow the main army (A) to
Warsaw.[64]

These are the details of the battle of Ostrolenka, in which the loss on
the enemy's side was from 10,000 to 15,000 men, and on our side, the
two general officers above mentioned, with about 4,000 men.

On the afternoon of the day of the battle of Ostrolenka, the division
of general Gielgud received orders to depart from the town of Lomza.
General Dembinski, on the night of the same day was ordered to join him
with two squadrons of lancers of Poznan. The latter general left the
field of battle with these squadrons, and on the next day joined the
division of general Gielgud.[65]

[Illustration:

 _XXXI._]

[Illustration:

 _XXXII._]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 58: We found, on experiment, that this species of force
acting in conjunction with cavalry could be used with great advantage,
especially against a hostile cavalry. The mounted infantry were placed
in the rear of the cavalry. When the latter advanced to the charge the
former dismounted, and leaving their horses in the care of a party
detailed for the purpose, dispersed themselves as sharp-shooters, and
commenced a fire upon the enemy, who, thrown into confusion by this
unexpected attack, were open to a destructive charge from the cavalry.]

[Footnote 59: The capture of the town of Bielsk and its garrison was
marked with such singular circumstances, that I think that some of the
details will interest the reader. The small corps of general Chlapowski
arriving suddenly before this town, on the 22d of May, was informed
that it had a garrison of two battalions of infantry, and that near
the town was a body of a thousand cossacks, in camp. The advanced
guard of our small corps, with which was the general and several
of his officers, approached the barriers of the town. The Russian
sentinel observing our party, and seeing a general officer among them,
did not recognize them as enemies, but called the guard to give them
the honors of the place. General Chlapowski, on the approach of the
guard, commanded them to lay down their arms, which they did. The same
ceremony was gone through with the grand-guard in the square of the
town, and the Russians mechanically obeyed these orders, in a state of
amazement. General Chlapowski fearing that he might be surrounded by
the cossacks, left his infantry volunteers to disperse any detachments
of the enemy in the town that might rally to oppose him, and led
all the artillery and cavalry against the camp of the cossacks. The
Russian infantry who attempted to make a resistance in the town, were
dispersed at the point of the bayonet, and, with the assistance of the
inhabitants, they were all made prisoners; while by the attack of the
artillery and cavalry, the encamped cossacks were entirely dispersed,
and several of them taken prisoners. General Chlapowski left his
prisoners in the care of the inhabitants, taking with him only those
who were Poles, and who volunteered their services.]

[Footnote 60: The officer announced to general Lubinski that the
whole Russian army had occupied Ciechanowiec, that the advanced guard
was already at Czyzew, and that those circumstances ought to satisfy
him that his communications with his friends were entirely cut off,
and that therefore he would do well to lay down his arms and throw
himself upon the magnanimity of the Emperor. To this proposition
general Lubinski replied, that although such might be his situation,
he could not think of surrendering himself without a struggle; and
to satisfy the aid-de-camp that this was not his individual feeling
alone, but that it was partaken by the whole body of his soldiers,
he would present him to them, and enable him to satisfy himself
personally on this point. The aid-de-camp was then conducted to the
front of the line, and he addressed himself to the troops, exhibiting
the circumstances under which they were placed, assuring them that the
bravest resistance would be hopeless, and inviting them to surrender.
This address was interrupted by a universal shout of indignation from
the soldiery, and they commanded him to leave their presence. This
division was composed of two regiments of old light infantry, and two
recently formed regiments of Mazurs.]

[Footnote 61: Marshal Diebitsch must by this time have become satisfied
that the operations, both in strategy and tactics, of the Polish
commander, were the result of extensive and just combinations. General
Skrzynecki, in contriving this plan (with the valuable assistance of
general Prondzynski,) of surprising and defeating the Russian guard,
had satisfied himself of the practicability of returning to Ostrolenka
without being intercepted.]

[Footnote 62: The question might be asked by some, whether this battle
was necessary, and why general Skrzynecki did not pursue his route
to Warsaw, as he could have done without molestation. In the course
which he took, he had two objects in view; the one was, to cause this
destructive passage of the Narew, and thus diminish the forces of his
enemy; the other was, by thus occupying general Diebitsch to give time
to general Gielgud to leave Lomza in safety for Lithuania. (_See Plan_
XXIX.)]

[Footnote 63: This fire of the Russian artillery might almost be
compared to the terrible fire of the 25th of February, at Grochow, in
the attack on the forest of elders.]

[Footnote 64: This manoeuvre, of bringing the artillery so near the
columns of the enemy, and under the terrible fire of the Russian
artillery, was one of those bold and hazardous steps which were
necessary for the object of reducing the immense superiority of the
enemy's force. The personal agency of general Skrzynecki was demanded
for a blow like this; and in executing it he displayed equally the
qualities of the soldier and the general. The admiration of his
soldiers was excited by seeing him dismount and place himself with the
utmost coolness at the head of this battery of artillery, exposed to
the incessant fire of that of the enemy. Neither the fear of the enemy,
nor the entreaties of his officers, who begged him, on their knees,
to withdraw and to reserve his valuable life for his country, could
induce him to move from his place, until he had seen the successful
termination of this effort.]

[Footnote 65: For those who have asserted that general Gielgud was cut
off from the main body of the Polish forces and compelled to escape
into Lithuania, the sending of these two squadrons of lancers to join
him, will be a sufficient answer. The division of general Gielgud
could have even remained at Lomza for as many as three days after this
battle.]




CHAPTER XX.

 Operations of the Lithuanian corps.--Battle of Raygrod and defeat
 of the Russian corps of Saken.--Importance of this first success in
 Lithuania.--General Gielgud neglects to follow up his advantages.--He
 loses time by passing the Niemen at Gielgudyszki, and enables the
 enemy to concentrate his forces in Wilno.--Entrance into Lithuania
 and reception by the inhabitants.--Position of the two main
 armies.--The Russian forces remain inactive and receive supplies from
 Prussia.--Death of marshal Diebitsch.


On the 27th of May, the corps of general Gielgud, attached to which
were generals Rohland, Szymanowski, Dembinski, and colonel Pientka,
left Lomza, and commenced their march into Lithuania. On the evening
of that day, they arrived at Stawisk, passing through Szczuczyn and
Graiewo. In the last town they were joined by the little corps of
general, then colonel, Sierakowski, which, as we have already remarked,
had been employed in observing general Saken, and was here occupying an
advantageous position. The force of this corps has been already stated.


BATTLE OF RAYGROD. [_Plan_ XXXII.]

I have divided this battle into two different periods, marked by the
two different positions which the enemy successively took.

On examining the plan of the first position of the Russians, it will be
at once seen that they had no knowledge of the arrival of our corps.
They supposed that they were acting against the corps of colonel
Sierakowski alone, and they had conceived the design of out-flanking
him. On the morning of the 29th, our whole corps, quitting the little
town of Graiewo, met, at the distance of about a quarter of a league,
the Russian flankers, against whom our own were immediately sent out.
The Russian cavalry began to retire. Our columns continued their
march slowly, having the forces of colonel Sierakowski in front, as
an advanced guard,[66] and we thus arrived at the lake of Raygrod,
the advanced guard meeting only small detachments of the Russian
cavalry, which retired as we approached. On reaching the lake, our
advanced guard were fired upon by the Russian skirmishers, concealed
in the woods on the opposite side of the lake, which bordered upon the
causeway. Colonel Sierakowski received orders to engage with them. He
sent forward his own light troops, and placed two cannons upon the
causeway, with which he commenced a fire upon the woods. The Russian
infantry instantly evacuated the woods, and allowed our skirmishers
to occupy them. By this manoeuvre, the Russians intended to lead on
our forces with the view to attack them on their flank, and even to
surround them, by sending detachments (_a_, _b_) to the right and left,
as will be seen on the plan. In a short time our larger force, under
general Gielgud, commenced debouching between the two lakes. A strong
column (_c_) of our infantry took a direction towards the forest, to
the left, and another column (_d_) to that on the right, to dislodge
the enemy, if he should be found to have occupied either. At the same
time our artillery (_e_), to the number of fourteen pieces, taking a
position at the side of the causeway, opposite to that of the enemy
(_f_), commenced firing. The whole of our cavalry, and the greater part
of our infantry remained in the centre, and constituted a formidable
front.

In a few moments after these dispositions were made, a brisk fire of
tirailleurs was commenced on our left wing (A). The Russian centre (B),
suffering from the fire of our artillery, and taken by surprise at the
unexpected strength of our forces, began to waver. This was a signal
for our advance. Colonel Pientka, who commanded the artillery, gave
the order. A strong column of three battalions of infantry commenced
the hurrah, and charged with the bayonet, upon the wavering columns
of the enemy. At the same time, general Dembinski gave the order to
our cavalry (_g_) to charge upon that of the enemy on the right and
left. The first squadron of the lancers of Poznan received the order
to throw themselves forward, and fall upon the breaking columns of
the enemy. The greatest consternation and disorder began to exist in
the Russian ranks. It was no longer a retreat; it was a flight. This
squadron of lancers, commanded by the brave major Mycielski, performed
prodigies of valor. They entered the town simultaneously with the
Russian columns, cutting down immense numbers of the enemy, and taking
many prisoners. This squadron courageously remained in the streets of
the city, exposed to the fire of the enemy's infantry, who had occupied
the houses, until the arrival of our own infantry. In this exposed
situation they lost their commander.[67]

These several attacks, which did not occupy two hours, caused an
immense loss to the enemy. Three entire battalions, which formed their
right wing (C), consisting of 2,000 men, were taken prisoners, with
three superior officers, and fourteen of a lower grade. By the entry
of our forces, the enemy were driven from the town, and took another
position (D) upon elevated ground, on the opposite side of a small
stream, near the town. This position was strong, and commanded the town
and the whole of the other side of the stream. General Saken would
certainly have remained long in this position, if our right wing under
colonel Koss had not, as we shall see, succeeded in passing the stream
at a higher point (_i_), and acted on his flank. The Russian general,
as soon as he had established himself in his new position, commenced
a fire upon the town, which was returned by our artillery. It was
during this fire that colonel Koss succeeded in passing the stream, at
a quarter of a league above the city, on the right. This was effected
by demolishing the buildings in the vicinity, and making a passage for
the artillery from their materials. General Saken, seeing his left wing
thus menaced, evacuated his position, in which, as we have said, but
for this attack on his flank, he could have well supported himself for
some time.

At 3 o'clock the Russians commenced their retreat upon the road to
Kowno, and thus terminated a battle of the most advantageous character
for us, and with which begins an important era in our affairs.

By this battle the Polish forces had made the acquisition of great
advantages, both in respect to strategy and tactics, and the highest
hopes might reasonably be cherished in regard to the future.

It was, as it were, a return of the state of things brought about by
the victory of Iganie, and which menaced the enemy with total ruin. Our
main army was then near to Warsaw, composed of a force of considerable
strength, and which, under the command of Skrzynecki, had been
victorious in every battle. New troops had been formed there. Neither
provisions nor forage had failed, for they were constantly sent from
Warsaw to the army, in whatever quarter it might be.

The Russian army was, in the mean while, suffering under all the
disadvantages which we have before described. Wearied and discouraged
by the disasters of the campaign, posted in regions which they had
devastated, and therefore suffering from scarcity; without hospitals
for their sick and their wounded,--for the towns which contained them
had been destroyed,--and with the cholera ravaging their ranks, that
army was in the most precarious situation. The communications between
the Russian provinces and the army were entirely cut off by the Polish
Lithuanian corps. They received their provisions exclusively from
Prussia; and, but for this assistance of Prussia, no one can doubt
that Diebitsch would have been, before this, under the necessity of
withdrawing from the country. The reader will also remember that at
this time, the brave and skilful general Chrzanowski, had obtained
repeated advantages over Rudiger, in the environs of Zamosc, and that
the little corps of general Chlapowski which had entered, on the 20th
of May, the Russian department of Bialystok, was acting with great
advantages. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, the provinces of Podolia,
Volhynia, Ukraine, as well as Lithuania and Samogitia, containing
a population of twelve millions of inhabitants, were in a state of
excitement, and would soon have risen in the holy cause. They were
waiting only the arrival of our victorious troops. It cannot but be
assumed, therefore, that if general Gielgud, at the head of the Polish
corps in Lithuania, had acted with promptness and energy, the most
happy results would have been achieved. It is, therefore, with the
deepest chagrin, that I have to record that from the moment of the
termination of the fortunate battle of Raygrod, all the operations
of general Gielgud were not only deficient in energy, but altogether
wrongly planned. The first fault which he committed, was not continuing
to press the attack upon general Saken, after he had retired from
Raygrod. Under the pretext that the soldiers were fatigued, the corps
was encamped. This pretext was groundless, for the soldiers themselves
demanded to be led in pursuit of the enemy. In this camp we passed
the whole night, and left it [_Plan_ XXXIII.] at the hour of nine the
following morning; having given fifteen hours to the retreating enemy.
We continued our march to Kowno, through the duchy of Augustow. On
the 30th of May, we arrived at Suwalki (1) its capital, and remained
there a day and a night, without any conceivable reason. The enemy,
profiting by the slowness of our movements, escaped the certain
destruction with which he had been threatened. On the 1st of June, we
arrived at Kalwaryia (2), and at that town our corps was very uselessly
divided into two parts, the larger (_a_), under general Gielgud, took
the road to Gielgudyszki (3), on the Niemen,[68] to pass the river at
that point. General Dembinski, with the remainder of the corps (_b_),
continued on the main road, and on the 3d of June arrived at Alexota
(4).

This separation of our forces into two bodies, to pass the Niemen at
Gielgudyszki, was not recommended by any conceivable advantage, and,
indeed, operated much to our injury. This plan of operations was also
in opposition to the instructions, not only of the general in chief,
but of the National Government, and obstructed the rapid execution of
the great designs of the campaign.

In any plan for the occupation of a foreign country, the first
object should be to get possession of the principal towns, for at
those points are chiefly concentrated both the moral and physical
resources of the country. Of Lithuania, the town of Wilno (5) is the
capital. Against it all our plans should have been directed; and, in
fact, the instructions of the government to general Gielgud were
all to this effect. By a prompt occupation of that city, we should
have unquestionably reaped the greatest advantages. As Wilno was the
residence of the principal officers of the government of the province,
it would have been there that all the arrangements could best be
made for a provisional administration, and for the convocation of a
conventional Diet of the people. In regard also to the formation of new
forces, Wilno was the place that presented the greatest facilities.

Taking all these circumstances into view, it must be conceded that
after the battle of Raygrod, the first object of general Gielgud
ought to have been to march upon and to occupy Wilno with the utmost
promptness. With this view, his course should have been, after masking
his movement at Kowno, to have passed the Niemen (N) at Rumszyski (6),
a village which was about sixteen English miles above Kowno (7) and
in the direction of Wilno, while Gielgudyszki, on the other hand, was
thirty-two miles below Kowno, and forty-eight from Rumszyski, and out
of the direction of Wilno. With the exception of that of general Saken,
no other Russian force was interposed between us and Wilno. Indeed the
corps of general Chlapowski (_c_), with which he had traversed the
department of Bialystok, was at that moment between Kowno and Wilno,
and had we passed at Rumszyski, we should have been within but one
day's march of him. It is evident, then, that Wilno would have fallen
into our hands without a blow. All these advantages were sacrificed
by making the passage at Gielgudyszki. General Saken, meeting with
no interruption, thus escaped a second time, and marched from Kowno
to Wilno. At the same time several other Russian corps began to
concentrate themselves at Wilno.

The corps of general Dembinski, having maintained a moderate fire upon
Kowno for two days, in order to mask our movements from the enemy,
marched for Gielgudyszki, to follow the other corps in the passage of
the river, at that point, on the 7th of June. Our troops thus entered
the province of Lithuania, an interesting day for us, thus engaged in
the effort to re-unite this dissevered portion of our country to its
ancient parent. The manner in which the inhabitants of every village
received us, expressive of the warmest satisfaction, showed that they
regarded us as brothers. This reception deeply affected both soldiers
and officers. They hailed us as their deliverers, and it is now a
mournful reflection that, owing to the misconduct of our commanders,
that enthusiasm, instead of leading to happy results, proved, in the
end, only an aggravation of their misfortunes.

       *       *       *       *       *

Leaving the corps of general Gielgud upon the Niemen, we will return
again to the operations of the grand army, and of the different
detached corps. Our main body, which, after the battle of Ostrolenka,
retired towards Warsaw, was now at Praga, where the head-quarters
of the commander in chief were fixed. General Skrzynecki, during the
repose of the army, occupied himself with its re-organization.

In the environs of Zamosc, the corps of general Chrzanowski, in which
the brave general Romarino commanded a brigade, was sufficient to keep
the different Russian corps in check.

On the 3d of June, the Russian army, which, up to the present time,
continued in the environs of Ostrolenka, on the left bank of the
Narew, commenced its operations upon the right bank of that river.
A considerable corps, amounting to 20,000 men, passed that river in
the neighborhood of Prasnysz. The principal object of this corps was
not to re-ommence hostilities, but to protect the large transports
of provisions which were sent daily from Prussia. In the environs of
Brzesc was the corps of general Kreutz. The Russian army thus fed by
Prussia, remained inactive in their position at Ostrolenka, during
which interval, and while he was perhaps contriving new plans for our
subjugation, occurred the sudden death of marshal Diebitsch. He died at
Kleczkowo, not far from Ostrolenka, on the 9th of June.[69]

The provisional command of the Russian army was taken by general Toll.

If the reader should examine closely the operations of the two armies
after the battle of Ostrolenka, he will, perhaps, be astonished at
their inactivity. He will, however, acknowledge that the blame of that
inactivity cannot rest upon the Polish side. The retreat which we
made was necessary; first, for the sake of the re-organizing of the
army; secondly, for the object of leading the enemy to the environs
of Praga, which were in a state of devastation, and generally into
the region between the Bug and the Liwiec, where he would not be able
to support himself; and in this manner to force him either to attack
the fortifications of Praga, to attempt a passage of the Vistula,
or to evacuate the country. That either of the two first would be
attempted, while the insurrections in Lithuania and Samogitia, &c, were
in progress, and after our success at Raygrod, was hardly to have been
expected; for the one would cost too great a sacrifice of men, and the
other would be attended with too much hazard. If, then, the Russian
forces undertook nothing, it was a consequence of their critical
situation. We can, in fact, safely assume that it was their intention
to evacuate the country; for to have obtained sufficient supplies by
their own means was almost impracticable. When, therefore, this army
remained there, it was only because it was fed by Prussia, who did not
scruple openly to succor the enemy in his perilous position, by sending
enormous transports by the roads of Neydenburg and Mlawa. It was those
transports which saved the Russian army from the utmost extremity.
I leave to the reader to judge, then, whether it was with one enemy
alone that the Poles had to contend. The Prussian government, which
arrested all the volunteers who were passing through its territory to
augment our ranks, and which stopped all the aids of money and arms
sent to us by the generous friends of liberty in other countries, took
every occasion to aid and protect our enemy. If that government has
satisfied its own inhuman will, by this interference to injure a cause
so sacred as that of the Poles, they have unintentionally aided that
cause by raising its merit in the eyes of the present and future ages,
who will know with what difficulties we had to struggle. In return for
these good offices of the Prussian government, the Poles will only
say,--Przyidzie kryska na malyska,'--'Every one has his turn.'

If the two main armies were at rest, it was not so with the corps in
the palatinate of Lublin, where general Chrzanowski beat, on the 10th
of June, general Rudiger, between Zamosc and Uchania, and took from
him numerous prisoners. General Rudiger was forced, by this action,
to retire to Lublin, and to cease offensive operations. General
Chrzanowski then prepared to surprise this corps, with the aid of the
garrison of Zamosc.

It was on the 12th of June, that after being apprized of the continual
victories of general Chrzanowski, the general in chief concluded to
re-commence hostilities. His plan was, to act in concert with this
corps, and to crush the enemy in all the southern parts of the kingdom.
He would afterwards have to do only with the Russian main army, which
had commenced passing the Narew and entering into the palatinate of
Plock, to keep its communications open with Prussia, and where it would
have been in a manner cooped up between the Narew and the Vistula,
with insurrectionized Lithuania in its rear, and our army in its front
or flank, according as that army should operate, at Stanislawow, at
Wyskow, or at Ostrolenka.

It was here again that our commander in chief felt his hopes renewed,
confiding always in the fortunate result of the operations in
Lithuania, which had so happily commenced; but he was to be again
mournfully disappointed, by the pusillanimity of the generals to whom
the all-important expedition to Lithuania had been entrusted.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 66: This disposition was made, expressly with the view of
confirming the Russian general in the idea, that he was opposed by
colonel Sierakowski alone.]

[Footnote 67: The reader will allow me to give some details of this
charge of cavalry, which was, indeed, of an extraordinary character.
At the moment that the Russian centre began to waver;--with the view
to continue and augment the disorder of the enemy, and to break their
front, order was given to the cavalry to push their attacks, without
intermission, on the sides of the great road. With this force was the
1st squadron of the lancers of Poznan, of between 80 and 100 men. This
squadron threw themselves upon the Russian columns, and, simultaneously
with them, entered the town, which was full of the enemy's infantry.
Far from being discouraged by this overwhelming force, the brave
Poznanians penetrated the different streets, and continued their
attack on the enemy on every side. But the Russian infantry protected
themselves within the houses, and behind the walls, and commenced
a fire of musquetry, which fell like hail upon this brave handful
of lancers, so that it would have been thought that not a man would
have escaped. It was impossible for our lancers either to advance or
retire, for the streets before them were commanded by artillery, and
the enemy's columns of infantry had closed in behind them; there was
only one outlet for them, which was by a small street, issuing out of
the town to the left, and that was also occupied by the enemy. There
was no alternative but to force their way through it. Our Hulans then,
forming a phalanx of lances, opened a passage through the enemy, and
quitted the town. It was here that the brave Mycielski fell. The
brave Poznanians, leaving the town, by the side of the lake, whither
the Russian right wing had retreated and were about entering the
city, presented to the Russians the impression that the city was in
possession of our troops, and supposing themselves between two fires,
they no longer hesitated to lay down their arms to the pursuing force.]

[Footnote 68: Gielgudyszki was the paternal estate of the Polish
general.]

[Footnote 69: The reader may be curious to know some details of the
career of marshal Diebitsch. He was born in Silesia, not far from
Wroclaw, the capital of that province. His father was a major in the
Prussian service, and young Diebitsch was sent by him at an early
age to the military school at Berlin. It was, perhaps, in about the
year 1805, that he first entered the Russian military service, as
a cadet in one of the regiments of the guard, from which he was,
in 1807, transferred to the corps of engineers. In this service he
advanced rapidly, not so much by real talent, as by a certain art
which he had of exhibiting himself to the best advantage. In the place
of aid-de-camp of the late emperor Alexander, to which he was soon
advanced, he was known to have intrigued in opposition to the interest
of Poland. These intrigues, as well as those which he afterwards
practised, to supersede Wittgenstein, in the command of the army
against Turkey, degraded him in the esteem of all upright men. He was
never regarded by us as a general of talent, and the truth of our
estimate will be by this time conceded.

One cannot but be impressed with the fate which has awaited the two
greatest enemies of Poland, Diebitsch and Constantine. Arrested by
Providence, amid the persecutions which they had inflicted, and were
designing to inflict upon our country, they perished in disgrace. They
died acting the part of the enemies of humanity, and their names thus
rest, sealed with the eternal reproach of history. Here is a fate which
ought to alarm despots. The thought that in the moment that they are
most deeply engaged in contriving the oppression of their fellow-men,
a sudden death may come upon them, and thus stigmatize their names
forever, should teach them an impressive lesson.]




CHAPTER XXI.

 General Gielgud advances into Lithuania.--Allows a Russian corps
 to pass within a league of him unperceived.--Operations on
 Wilno.--Enumeration of our present force.--Plan of a simultaneous
 attack upon Wilno on opposite sides by the corps in two
 divisions.--General Dembinski engages the enemy with the smaller
 part of the corps.--Being unsupported by Gielgud, is forced to
 retreat.--General Gielgud attacks Wilno.--Battle of Wilno.--A retreat
 is commenced.--Prodigious efforts of the Polish cavalry in protecting
 this retreat.--Consequences of the repulse from Wilno.--The removal
 of general Gielgud is called for.--General Chlapowski consents to
 take the virtual command of the corps, in the post of chef d'etat
 major.--Consideration on the state of things consequent to the battle
 of Wilno.--Details of the admirable plan of operations proposed by
 colonel Valentin.


The forces of general Gielgud having thus crossed the Niemen, passed
a night at Rewdany, and the next day [_Plan_ XXXIV.] marched on to
Czaykiszki (1), in the direction of Keydany. We cannot understand why
general Gielgud did not attack Malinowski (_b_), who passed at the
distance of half a league from us, at the head of 6,000 men, on his
march to Wilno. It is, we believe, a thing unheard of in the history
of military affairs, that an inferior force should be suffered to
pass, unmolested, so near a hostile army. It discovered the very last
degree of carelessness, to enter a country in the occupation of the
enemy, without sending out even the ordinary reconnoissances. General
Malinowski,[70] with his corps, which ought to have fallen into our
hands, escaped, and made the second Russian force which had owed its
safety to our negligence, and contributed a new accession to the forces
which we should have to contend with.

[Illustration:

_XXXIV._ ]

On the 10th of June, the corps arrived at Keydany (2), in which place
it was joined by general Chlapowski with his corps, which had so
successfully traversed the departments of Bialystok and Grodno.

This force, which, on quitting Xienzopol, amounted to scarce 1,000 men,
received reinforcements of cavalry and infantry, from the insurgents
of the provinces, through which it had passed.[71] From the new
forces, ten squadrons of cavalry, counting nearly 1,200 horse, and two
battalions of infantry, amounting to nearly 1,800 men, were formed.

On the 11th of June, the united corps quitted Keydany, to march to
Zeymy (3), where we arrived at night. In this little town we remained
several days, we know not for what object. From this place general
Chlapowski was sent with a detachment, consisting of the 1st regiment
of lancers and five pieces of light artillery, to make reconnoissances
in the direction of Wilno. The new forces of which we have just spoken,
were attached to the main body, under general Gielgud. A few hundred of
insurgent cavalry of Lithuania also arrived at Zeymy, which were joined
to the lancers of Poznan and the 3d regiment of lancers.

On the day of our departure, general Szymanowski received orders to
leave for Polonga with a small corps of insurgents (_c_) from the
department of Szawla. This corps consisted of 1,500 infantry, 400 light
cavalry, and two pieces of cannon.

As it was from Zeymy that we commenced our operations upon Wilno,
after having organized the new forces; and as from this point begins
an era in the history of the expedition, it may be well to give a new
enumeration of our forces. Our infantry consisted of 13 battalions of
infantry, amounting in all to nearly 8,700 men, including a body of
sappers; our cavalry of 24 squadrons, amounting to about 2,750; and
our artillery of 29 pieces of cannon. To these forces we might add a
detachment of 500 men and 100 horse, acting independently as a corps
of partizans, under colonel Zaliwski. This corps of colonel Zaliwski
was formed in the duchy of Augustow, with the destination to operate
there upon all the demonstrations of the enemy, on his communications,
his magazines, his baggage, his transportations of provisions, &c; and
when it is considered that this officer remained for four months thus
successfully employed, and exposed to the enemy's forces on all sides,
a particular acknowledgment is due to him for his meritorious services.
In the above enumeration we have, of course, excluded the force of
general Szymanowski, which, as we have stated, received another
destination.

With the forces which we have enumerated, general Gielgud left Zeymy on
the 14th of June. The operations on Wilno were planned for an attack
on two sides, and with that view general Dembinski was detached with
a small corps (_d_) of 1,200 infantry, 900 cavalry, and 4 pieces of
cannon. This general was to attack Wilno on the road from Wilkomierz to
that city, at the same time that the larger force (_e_) made the attack
on the road from Kowno, on the left bank of the river Wiliia. This plan
demanded the most exact communication between the two attacking corps.
That communication was not observed, and, in fact, as it will be seen,
the plan itself was not executed.

The corps of general Dembinski reached Wieprz (4), on the river
Swieta, on the 14th of June. On the next day it passed that river,
and arrived at Szerwinty (5). From thence, after resting for a few
hours, the corps marched to Myszogola (6), where it passed the night.
On the 16th, leaving this village, after a march of two leagues, the
corps began to meet with small detachments of the enemy's Circassian
cavalry.[72] General Dembinski gave the order to throw forward the
flankers. The Circassians commenced a retreating fire, and, thus
engaged with them, we approached within a league of Wilno, taking a
position at Karczma-biskupia (7), or The Tavern of the Bishop, a large
public house, surrounded by small dwellings, and which was in rather a
commanding situation.

On the 17th, general Dembinski sent parties of cavalry to the right as
far as the river Wiliia (W), and to the left as far as Kalwaria (8),
to make reconnoissances, and advanced with the body of the corps in
the centre, for the same object. In these reconnoissances a constant
fire of flankers was kept up, with which the whole day was occupied.
It was a great fault in general Dembinski, to have commenced this
fire, without having any intelligence of the situation of the corps of
general Gielgud, with which he was to act in concert. On the morning of
the same day, in fact, on which general Dembinski was thus employed,
the corps of general Gielgud was at the distance of thirty-six English
miles from him. By these imprudent reconnoissances, general Dembinski
laid open all his forces to the knowledge of the enemy. Of this fault
the enemy took advantage on the next day.

On the 18th, at sunrise, clouds of Circassian cavalry made their
appearance, and commenced attacks upon our flanks, endeavoring to
turn them. Several columns of Russian infantry then approached,
and manoeuvred upon our centre, on which also 12 pieces of Russian
artillery of large calibre commenced firing. Other columns of cavalry
manoeuvred upon our wings. As far as we could judge, the enemy's forces
amounted to about 8,000 men. General Dembinski, seeing the strength of
the enemy, and appreciating his own danger, gave orders for a retreat,
which was commenced under a terrible fire from the enemy's artillery,
and from his flankers, who harassed us on every side. The retreat was
executed in the greatest order, as far as Myszogola, a distance of 12
miles from our position, with the loss only of some fifty cavalry. On
arriving at Myszogola, general Dembinski, concerned at receiving no
intelligence from general Gielgud, sent an officer with a report of
what had occurred. That officer found general Gielgud with his corps,
at Oyrany, occupied in making the passage of the Wiliia, at that
place. The report of general Dembinski, as we can assert from personal
knowledge, gave a faithful description of the occurrences of the
preceding days, and contained a request, that, in case he (Dembinski)
was expected to maintain the position in which he then was, general
Gielgud must send him reinforcements of infantry and artillery. The
report finished with the suggestion, that it would be, under all
circumstances, the course most expedient, to re-unite his forces with
those of general Gielgud. Upon the receipt of this report, to which
general Gielgud gave little attention, orders were sent to general
Dembinski to depart for Podbrzeze (9), eight miles to the left of the
road which leads from Wilkomierz to Wilno. The pretext of this order
was to attack Wilno on the side of Kalwaryi, and to pass the river
Wiliia at that point. Thus, instead of being allowed to unite his corps
with that of general Gielgud, as he had proposed, general Dembinski was
ordered to remove to a still greater distance, a disposition for which
we can conceive no possible motive. On the 19th of June, the day on
which general Gielgud commenced his attack on Wilno, general Dembinski
was thus employed on his march, without an object, to Podbrzeze.


BATTLE OF WILNO. [_Plan_ XXXV.]

The battle of Wilno was, in point of tactics, simply a strong attack
upon the Russian centre (A), with the view, by forcing it, to pass on
to the occupation of the city. The adoption of such a plan supposes
an ignorance of the nature of the position of the enemy, and of the
strength of his forces.[73] Indeed any plan of attacking this city
on its strongest side, that toward Kowno, was almost impossible of
execution.

[Illustration:

 _XXXV. p. 312_]

[Illustration:

 _XXXIII. p. 296_]

The battle commenced on the morning of the 19th of June. The enemy
was dislodged from his first position, which was about one mile from
the city. Their retreat was caused by a spirited charge, by the 1st
regiment of lancers, upon the Russian artillery, and the columns of
infantry in the centre. The enemy, on quitting this position, took
another of great strength on the heights called Gory-Konarskie (B).
This strong position was already covered with fortifications. The
right wing of the enemy (C), composed of strong columns of infantry
(_a_), rested on the river Wiliia; the centre, (A), embracing all their
artillery, which consisted of 50 pieces of cannon (_b_), occupied the
heights above mentioned; the declivity of those heights was covered
with sharp-shooters (_d_), concealed behind small heaps of earth,
thrown up for this purpose. The left wing of the enemy (D) was entirely
composed of cavalry (_e_).

After driving the Russians from their first position, our artillery
(_f_) was brought forward and placed opposite the enemy's centre.
This is to be regarded as a great fault. At the same time that our
artillery was thus disposed, our left wing received orders to attack
the right wing of the enemy. The columns of our infantry (_g_),
composed in part from the new Lithuanian levies,[74] threw themselves
with such fury upon the enemy, that they did not give them even time
to fire, but fought them hand to hand: an immense slaughter ensued,
and the Russians began to give way before this desperate assault; but
at this very moment, our artillery, who could not sustain themselves
under the overpowering fire of the enemy from his commanding position,
began to fall back; and gave time to the Russians to send fresh bodies
of infantry to support their right wing. Our left wing, being unable
to sustain a conflict with the reinforced strength of the enemy, and
apprehensive of being cut off, to which hazard they were exposed by
the retreat of our artillery, began to give way also, and upon that a
retreat commenced along our whole line, under the protection of the
cavalry (_h_). The cavalry, both old and new, performed prodigies of
valor, in executing this duty. Single squadrons were obliged to make
charges against whole regiments of the enemy, who constantly pressed
upon us, with the object of throwing our forces into disorder. All the
efforts of the enemy were thwarted, by this determined bravery. The
Russians themselves have borne testimony to the unparalleled efforts of
our cavalry on that occasion. Our lancers seemed to feel the imminent
danger of permitting the Russian cavalry to fall upon our ranks, and
they fought with the energy of desperation. They repelled the attacks
of a cavalry three times superior in force, and which was in part
composed of regiments of the imperial guard.

The enemy having been thus foiled in his attacks, our forces repassed
in safety the bridge of Oyrany, leaving it destroyed.

The battle of Wilno, so disastrous to us, was our greatest fault in the
expedition to Lithuania; and it was the first of a series of disasters.
The evil consequences of this battle did not rest with ourselves; they
fell heavily upon the inhabitants of Wilno, whose hopes of acting in
concert with us were disappointed. At the sound of our cannon, a revolt
of the inhabitants was commenced, and after the repulse of our forces,
arrests and imprisonments of course followed. This unfortunate battle,
in fine, disorganized all the plans of the main army, and had a most
discouraging effect upon the spirits both of the army and the nation.
An attack upon Wilno, at a time when all the enemy's forces were
concentrated there, should only have been made upon the basis of the
most extensive and carefully adjusted combinations. A successful attack
on Wilno would have been a difficult achievement, even by a force
equal to that of the enemy, when the strong positions of the place are
considered. What then shall we say of an attack, with a force amounting
to but one third of that of the enemy, and made also, in broad day,
upon the most defensible point of the enemy's position?

But, as if these disadvantages were not enough, general Dembinski,
after having been compromitted at Myszggola, instead of being enabled
to aid in this attack, was, by the orders of general Gielgud, at the
very moment of the attack, marching in the direction of Podbrzeze,
[(9) _Plan_ XXXIV,] and was also by this separation exposed even to
be cut off by the enemy, who could easily have done it, by sending a
detachment for this object on the road from Wilno to Wilkomierz.

This succession of inconceivable faults arrested the attention of the
corps, and created a universal dissatisfaction. The removal of general
Gielgud, and the substitution of general Chlapowski in the chief
command, who had distinguished himself so much in the departments of
Bialystok and Grodno, was loudly called for. General Chlapowski was
unwilling to take the chief command, but, to satisfy the wishes of the
corps, he consented to take the office of chef d'etat major, a post in
which he was virtually chief, having the exclusive responsibility of
every operation. To this arrangement general Gielgud readily consented.
It took effect on the evening of the 20th. From that day general
Chlapowski was the director of all our operations.

After all these disasters, which had both morally and physically
weakened us, and with a clear knowledge of the amount of the enemy's
strength, our leaders should have been satisfied that it must be out
of the question with us to act any longer on the offensive, and that
our whole plan of operations on Samogitia ought to be abandoned. We
will give the reader an exposition of the views of a great majority
of the officers of the corps, upon this point, formed even during the
battle of Wilno.

It was near mid-day on the 19th, and when our line was commencing
their retreat, that colonel Valentin, with several other officers,
addressed themselves to general Gielgud, represented to him the
disastrous situation in which we were placed, and proposed to him a
plan of operations adapted to our new circumstances. There was, in
their opinion, but one course to pursue. This was, to abandon our whole
plan of operations between the rivers Niemen, Dwina, and Wiliia. The
space enclosed between these rivers, the Baltic Sea and the Prussian
territory, was a dangerous position for us, as it contracted our
movements, and at the same time exposed us to being surrounded by
the superior forces of the enemy. Colonel Valentin designated, as
the most eligible line of operations, the space between Kowno and
Lida. From this oblique line we could at any moment menace Wilno. He
proposed to occupy Kowno, and to fortify that town as well as Alexota
and Lida in the very strongest manner. On this line we should have
been in a situation to profit by any advantageous opportunities which
the negligence of the enemy might leave to us, of acting upon Wilno;
and if we might not be fortunate enough to surprise that city, we
should, at least, compel the Russians to keep a strong force within
its walls, as a garrison. The town of Lida touches upon the great
forest of Bialowiez. It is situated at the meeting of three great
roads, viz. those from Poland, from Volhynia, and from the province of
Black Russia, a circumstance in its position which made it a place of
great importance. The communications of the town with the neighboring
forest were extremely easy, and this forest colonel Valentin designed
a place of concentration for all the insurgent forces of Lithuania
and the other provinces. He proposed to fortify, in the strongest
manner, all the roads which concentrated here, and thus to make the
position difficult and dangerous of access to the enemy. This forest,
which is more than one hundred and twenty English miles in length, and
from thirty to sixty in breadth, reaches the great road which passes
by Bielsk, from Warsaw to St Petersburgh and Moscow, and extends
northwards to the environs of Wilno.

By means of prompt operations, according as circumstances might direct,
our forces could act upon each of these roads, and could obstruct
all the communications of the enemy with St Petersburgh and Moscow.
Colonel Valentin, in proposing this plan, also gave much weight to
the consideration that our main army under general Skrzynecki, was
victorious in the vicinity of Warsaw, and that general Chrzanowski was
with a corps in the environs of Zamosc, having been victorious over
Rudiger, and on the point of entering into Volhynia; with this latter
corps, a junction could easily be effected, and the two corps could
act in concert, for the support of the insurrections which might occur
in all the provinces between the Dnieper and the Black Sea; and even
if all these great advantages, which we should have been justified
in counting upon, had not been attained, we should, at least, have
compelled the enemy to retain a great body of forces in Lithuania, and
thus have hindered him from reinforcing his main army.[75]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 70: This general Malinowski, as was generally understood,
was a native of Mohilew, or Little Russia, a province of ancient
Poland, and had been long in the Russian service. The Lithuanians
and Samogitians had much reason to complain of his conduct in those
provinces.]

[Footnote 71: Among the Lithuanians who hastened to join our ranks, and
aid in the restoration of their beloved country, were several of the
fair sex,--generally from the principal families of the province. There
were personally known to me the following, whose names I deem it an
honor to record;--Plater, Rasinowicz, Karwoska, Matusiewicz, Zawadzka,
and Lipinska. The countess Plater, perhaps, should receive a more
especial notice. This young heroine joined our corps with a regiment
of from five to six hundred Lithuanians, raised and equipped at her
own expense, and she was uniformly at their head in the midst of the
severest engagements. How strongly do such examples prove the sacred
nature of our cause! What claims must not their country have presented
to the minds of these females of the most exalted character, to have
induced them thus to go out of their natural position in society, and
to sacrifice domestic happiness, wealth, life itself, in the effort to
rescue that country from her degradation!]

[Footnote 72: This was a formidable force from the province of
Circassia, consisting of two regiments, amounting to about 3,000 men,
which had recently arrived at Wilno. It was a species of light cavalry,
of the most efficient character. The fleetness of their horses was
such, that they would often throw themselves in the very midst of our
flankers, and having discharged their arms, retreat in safety. They
were armed with two pistols, a long fusil, a sabre, a long knife, and a
lance.]

[Footnote 73: As we have been informed, Wilno was defended by five
corps, consisting in all, of about 30,000 men, under generals Kuruta,
Tolstoy, Saken, Malinowski, and Szyrman.]

[Footnote 74: This Lithuanian force consisted of the regiment of the
countess Plater, who accompanied them in the charge.]

[Footnote 75: This valuable officer, colonel Valentin, unfortunately
lost his life on the day after the battle of Wilno, while bathing in
the Wiliia. The regrets of his brother officers were aggravated by
their sense of the value of those wise counsels, the suggestion of
which was the last act of his life. He had every quality of heart and
intellect for the highest military station.]




CHAPTER XXII.

 Operations of the main army.--Expedition under Jankowski.--General
 Chrzanowski having driven Rudiger from his position, crosses the
 Vistula, but returns to act in concert with general Jankowski against
 the enemy near Kock.--Details of general Jankowski's movement.--He
 remains inactive within sight of the fire of the corps with which he
 was to co-operate.--Other evidences of treason.--Generals Jankowski
 and Bukowski are arrested and ordered for trial.--View of the
 advantages that were sacrificed by this misconduct.--Discovery of
 a plot to liberate and arm the Russian prisoners at Warsaw, and to
 deliver the city to the enemy.--State of the public mind induced by
 these events.


From these melancholy occurrences in Lithuania, let us turn to follow
the operations of the grand army.

On the 13th and 14th of June, a division of infantry, under the command
of general Muhlberg, left Praga, and took the direction of the environs
of Stanislawow and Jadow. In the latter place this division surprised a
strong detachment of the enemy in camp, and took many prisoners. Thence
they were instructed to follow the left bank of the Liwiec as far as
the environs of Kaluszyn, and even to Zelechow, clearing each bank of
the presence of the enemy. This division was then to join itself with
the division of cavalry of general Jankowski, which on that day left
for Kock. Those two divisions combined, were to endeavor to act upon
the different corps of the enemy which were pressed by the corps of
general Chrzanowski.

The latter general had commenced the offensive on the 16th, and had
driven the corps of general Rudiger from its position at Krasny-taw,
and compelled it to retreat to Lublin, continually pursued by him. On
the 23d, he took that town by storm. The enemy was obliged to evacuate
it in disorder, leaving a great number killed, wounded, and prisoners,
and to take the direction of Kock. The corps of Rudiger would have been
inevitably destroyed, if another Russian corps of 15,000 strong had not
marched to its aid.

General Chrzanowski, apprized of the arrival of this reinforcement,
quitted the pursuit, for a more favorable moment; and, to avoid an
engagement with this combined force of the enemy, as well as to escort
the prisoners, which he had taken at Lublin, to a place of safety, he
repassed the Vistula, at Pulawy. He had scarce reached the opposite
side of the river, when he received the intelligence that the division
of general Jankowski, reinforced by a brigade of infantry, was
approaching Kock, where was already the corps of general Rudiger, and
whither the corps of general Keisarow, above mentioned, was hastening
to join him. In order, therefore, to take between the two fires all
the forces which might be collected at Kock, general Chrzanowski
promptly repassed the river, reached the environs of Kock, and waited
impatiently for the attack of general Jankowski, in the opposite
direction; but Jankowski delayed his movement, and allowed the corps of
Kiesarow to join Rudiger.

The following are the details of this expedition, as they were
related by an officer of the division of Muhlberg, and which exhibit
satisfactory evidence of treason on the part of general Jankowski.

'The issue of this expedition, which could have had the most brilliant
results, has filled us with grief and indignation. We were marching in
the utmost haste upon Kock, with the hope of beating Rudiger. On our
route, at Stoczek, for our misfortune, we were joined by the division
of cavalry under general Jankowski, who then took the command. We
ought to have passed the Wieprz, to meet Rudiger, and cut him off.
Suddenly news was brought to us that the enemy had passed the Wieprz,
at Lysobyki, with 6,000 infantry, sixteen squadrons of cavalry, and
ten pieces of cannon. General Jankowski then called a council of war,
at which the following plans were adopted. General Turno was to attack
the enemy, in the direction of Sorokomla, and general Jankowski was to
come to his support at the first sound of his cannon. The brigade of
general Romarino (detached from the corps of general Chrzanowski, and
destined to act as an independent corps) was to act upon the left wing,
and general Bukowski, with a brigade of cavalry, upon the right wing of
the enemy by Bialobrzegi. This plan, which in the conviction of all our
officers would have exterminated the corps of general Rudiger, and the
execution of which was reserved to general Jankowski, came to nothing.

'General Turno, trusting in the faithful execution of the plan,
attacked the enemy with courage and vigor. He was sure of receiving
support on three sides. He made head against the enemy for six
hours, while generals Jankowski and Bukowski, at the distance of
about three miles from him, hearing and even seeing the fire of the
action, remained in a state of complete inaction. Nay more, a Russian
detachment took possession, almost before their eyes, of the ammunition
and baggage of a whole regiment, and they did not stir to prevent it.
General Turno fought with bravery and sangfroid, notwithstanding that
none came to his support, and did not retire till he received orders
to do so. The whole corps was indignant at the conduct of Jankowski,
and his brother-in-law, Bukowski, who had evidently acted the part of
traitors.'

General Skrzynecki was deeply afflicted with the sad result of an
expedition, which, based upon infallible calculations, had promised the
very surest success. The event was of the most disastrous consequence
to us. If the corps of general Rudiger had been crushed, as it
certainly could have been, the combined corps of Chrzanowski, Muhlberg,
and Jankowski, could have acted upon all the corps of the enemy, which
might be found between the Wieprz, the Swider, and the Liwiec. As those
corps were quite distant from their main army, which was now upon the
right of the Narew, and as they were even without a free communication
with each other, they could have each been beaten in detail, by a
prompt action on our part. I leave to the reader to decide, whether,
after we should have obtained such successes over these detached corps,
we could not have acted with certain success against the Russian main
army.

The corps of general Rudiger, which thus escaped its fate, left for the
environs of Lukow, whither it was followed by general Chrzanowski. The
corps of general Jankowski returned in the direction of Macieiowiec
and Laskarzew, and the division of general Muhlberg returned to Minsk.
The general in chief deprived generals Jankowski and Bukowski of their
command, and ordered them to be tried by a court-martial.

But other and even more affecting disasters were awaiting us. Poland,
which had been so often made a sacrifice of, through her own generosity
and confidence, now nourished upon her bosom the monsters who were
plotting her destruction.

On the 28th of June, general Skrzynecki received information of a
conspiracy which had for its object the delivering up of Warsaw
into the hands of the enemy, by liberating and arming the Russian
prisoners. Several generals, of whom distrust had been felt, and who
had been deprived of their commands when the revolution broke out,
having been known as the vile instruments of the former government,
were at the bottom of this plot. Of this painful intelligence, general
Skrzynecki immediately apprized the National Government, who, relying
on his report, caused to be arrested general Hurtig, former commander
of the fortress of Zamosc, and a base instrument of Constantine,
general Salacki, colonel Slupecki, the Russian chamberlain Fenshawe,
a Mr Lessel, and a Russian lady, named Bazanow. Generals Jankowski
and Bukowski were also implicated in the conspiracy. This band of
traitors intended to get possession of the arsenal, to arm the Russian
prisoners, and to destroy the bridges; (in order to cut off all
communication with the army, which was then on the right bank of the
Vistula;) and the Russian army, advertised of this movement, was then
to pass to the left bank of the Vistula, at Plock or Dobzyn, and take
possession of Warsaw. Those traitors succeeded in setting at large a
great number of Russian prisoners at Czenstochowa.

What a terror must poor Poland have been to the Russian cabinet, which
did not find it enough to have deluged her with their immense forces,
and to have engaged all the neighboring cabinets to aid them against
her, but must go farther, and, by the employment of such vile means,
attempt to kindle hostilities in her interior, and to subject her at
the same time to a civil and an external war! They had good cause for
these desperate attempts. From the earliest stage of the conflict, they
had seen that the Poles, nerved by the consciousness of the justice of
their cause, were capable of crushing the force which they had sent to
execute the will of the despot. Unable to meet us in the open field,
they must invent some new method, no matter how base, to accomplish
their end. It was through the instrumentality of their intrigues that
the dictatorship was prolonged. It was by such intrigues, that the
apple of discord was thrown into our national congress, and even into
the ranks of that handful of brave men who had sworn to sacrifice
themselves in the cause of their country. They employed their vile
accomplices to betray us, and they succeeded.

The discovery of this extensive treason struck the people with
consternation and dismay. It drove them to a state bordering on
desperation. When Poland had sent and was sending her sons, and even
her daughters, to the field of death;--when she was sacrificing every
thing to achieve her deliverance, and was awaiting the fruits of such
sacrifices, sure, if not to conquer, at least to fall with honor,--she
sees that all is in vain--that her holy purposes are mocked at, and
that all her noble efforts are thwarted! Can we be surprised, then, at
the state of the popular mind which ensued?

The state of feeling which these events caused was aggravated by
the reflection, that the surveillance of certain individuals, of
whom distrust had been already entertained, had been more than
once demanded; and that from an early period it was urged upon
the government, that the Russian prisoners, particularly those of
distinction, should be carefully watched, and prevented from holding
free communication together, or with others. So far, however,
from such care having been taken, the very Jews were permitted to
communicate with them constantly, and to bring them intelligence of
the events of the war. Can it be wondered then, that the neglect of
these repeated warnings, and the tremendous consequences which had
well nigh followed this neglect, should have weighed upon the minds of
the people, and have even brought the National Government itself into
suspicion? It was, in fact, from this moment, that the nation began
first to look with dissatisfaction and distrust upon that government,
upon prince Czartoriski its head, and even upon the general in chief
himself. The melancholy news of the treason of Jankowski filled the
minds of the patriots with bitter anticipations; they naturally
foreboded, that if such treasons could be perpetrated in the grand
army, under the very eyes of the general in chief, the danger might be
still greater in the more distant corps. Their forebodings were but
too well justified by the events which took place in Lithuania, the
intelligence of which was soon received at Warsaw.




CHAPTER XXIII.

 General Chlapowski arrives at Keydany, having ordered general
 Dembinski to Wilkomierz.--The position of the two forces and their
 line of operations.--Examination of these arrangements.--Neglect of
 the important position of Kowno.--General Chlapowski, at Keydany,
 proposes to form a provisional government, and obtain a levy of
 troops.--Dispositions of the Lithuanians, as effected by the
 mismanagement of our leaders.--Advantages offered to the enemy by the
 delay at Keydany.--Brave defence of Kowno, by the small force left
 there.--Skirmish at Wilkomierz.--The opportunity of concentrating all
 the forces at Keydany, and repassing the Niemen, is neglected.--The
 enemy presses his pursuit.--Battle of Rosseyny.--Attack on
 Szawla.--Loss of the ammunition and baggage of the corps.--The corps
 retreats in order to Kurzany, protected by a rear guard of cavalry
 and light artillery.--At Kurzany the corps is subdivided into three
 parts.--Destination and strength of each.--Examination of this plan.


General Chlapowski, whom we shall hereafter name as having the chief
command of the Lithuanian force, arrived on the night of the 22d of
June at Keydany, having sent orders to general Dembinski to withdraw
with his corps, and to march to Wilkomierz. (10) [_Plan_ XXXIV.] The
corps of general Dembinski arrived, on the 21st, at Szerwinty, and on
the 22d, at Wilkomierz. On quitting Podbrzeze, general Dembinski left a
small detachment in the environs of Myszogola, to act as partizans.

The position of our corps was then as follows;--The larger force
was at Keydany (2). The corps of Dembinski was at Wilkomierz, and a
small corps (_c_) under the command of general Szymanowski was in the
environs of Szawla. Our line of operations was on the river Swienta (S)
and along the Wiliia (W), for a short distance below the junction of
the former river with it. To defend the passage of those rivers against
the enemy, the following detachments were designated. Kowno (11) was
occupied by two battalions of Lithuanian infantry, recently levied,
under the command of colonel Kikiernicki, and a squadron of the 11th
regiment of lancers, also Lithuanian, and recently formed.

At Janow (12) was a battalion of infantry and a squadron of the 11th
lancers, under the command of colonel Piwecki. At Wieprz were three
squadrons of the 10th lancers.

This separation of our forces in Lithuania, and, above all, this
designation of the most recently organized troops for the defence of
the passage of the two rivers, with a full knowledge of the great
strength of the enemy, was a gross error. To leave the defence of
Kowno, a place of so much importance, to three battalions of infantry
and a squadron of cavalry, all of them newly formed troops, and that,
too, without ammunition, (for they had barely three rounds each,) was
a course perfectly inexplicable. Besides all this, the river Swienta
was so shallow as to be fordable by both infantry and cavalry, and in
some places even by artillery. Why then was that river defended? It was
owing, in fact, to good fortune that all these detachments were not cut
off.

On the arrival of the two corps at Keydany and Wilkomierz, the
organization of a provisional government for the province, was
commenced. Diets were convoked at these two places, to organize
an administration, and to procure levies of forces. Although these
arrangements were all proper in themselves, yet it was a late hour to
undertake them, and no place could have been so well adapted for them
as Wilno. Had the corps of Saken been pursued and broken up, Wilno
would have been ours; and all such arrangements could have been made
there under the most favorable circumstances. In that event, the brave
Lithuanians would have come in from all sides and crowded our ranks,
without waiting for any appeal to be made to them. But at present,
a new crisis had arrived. We had fought the battle of Wilno with a
disastrous result. The enemy had become acquainted with the inferiority
of our forces, and had begun to understand the errors of our commander,
and was prepared to take advantage of them. In fine, the Lithuanians
themselves, witnessing all this gross mismanagement, became disgusted,
and after having once so cheerfully tendered their co-operation, began,
at length, to discover that they were sacrificing themselves in vain,
and that the fate of the inhabitants of Wilno would await them. This
people, as we have already stated, had commenced their insurrection two
months before they had hopes of any assistance from our forces, and
badly armed as they were, they had maintained a partizan warfare during
this period with uniform success. We can, therefore, have no reason
to reproach them, if after the misconduct which was exhibited before
their eyes, they began to be reluctant to join their forces to our
own, and chose to reserve the sacrifice of their exertions and their
lives for some other occasion, when there might be some hope of useful
results.

The six or seven days which we passed thus at Keydany and Wilkomierz,
seemed as if designed to invite the enemy to pursue his advantages,
and to lead him to the idea of surrounding our forces. The enemy,
fortunately for us, did not improve the opportunity which we presented
him, but remained inactive. This inactivity, whether it arose from the
imbecility of his commanders, or whatever other cause, afforded us an
opportunity of changing our plans, and of extricating ourselves from
the dangerous position in which we were placed. But instead of this,
we awaited his attack. On the 29th, the enemy commenced an attack upon
every point, at Wilkomierz, Wieprz, Janow, and Kowno, with his whole
force.

A corps of 4,000 Russians, with 16 cannon, commenced the attack on
Kowno, defended, as we have said, by 2,000 new troops. From morning
until night, the defence was sustained with great courage. The contest
was for the first half of the day in the town itself, and the rest
of the day was spent in disputing the passage of the bridge over the
Wiliia. The Russians occupying all the houses upon the banks of the
river, and the neighboring heights, commenced a terrible fire of
artillery and musquetry upon the bridge, which was defended by a
body of infantry, almost without ammunition. At nightfall, colonel
Kikiernicki, seeing that the Russian cavalry had found means of fording
the river, ordered a retreat, but remained himself at the head of a
single company, defending the bridge, until he learnt that the rest of
the corps had passed the town of Sloboda, and had gained the heights
which are behind the town. Upon that bridge, fell the captain of this
company, Zabiello, a Lithuanian. He was shot in the act of cutting
away the bridge with his own hands. This company, after having thus
sustained their post at the bridge with the greatest bravery, commenced
their retreat. The Russian cavalry, having succeeded in fording the
river, had already commenced acting in their rear. At the same time,
the Russian columns of infantry were debouching upon the bridge.
Colonel Kikiernicki, perceiving his situation, animated his little
corps to make the desperate effort of breaking through the Russian
cavalry, and of gaining Sloboda. His spirit was seconded by his brave
followers, and this company of one hundred men, raising the hurrah,
forced a passage through the enemy's cavalry, gained Sloboda, and,
under cover of night, succeeded in joining their comrades.[76] In this
effort, colonel Kikiernicki fell wounded, and was made prisoner by the
enemy.

The detachment, having lost one half of their numbers in the sanguinary
attack to which the mismanagement of our general had exposed them,
took the road to Janow. In this manner ended the attack on Kowno, and
the Russians took possession of that important post, which might be
regarded as the key to all our communications with Poland.

There can be no excuse for not having fortified Kowno. It is a
town, containing ten or twelve thousand inhabitants, of which one
half, perhaps, were Jews, but they could have been employed in the
construction of the works. It was also most favorably situated for
defence, being surrounded by heights on every side.

On the same day, sanguinary skirmishes took place at Janow, Wieprz,
and Wilkomierz. The two first towns were abandoned. In the attack on
Wilkomierz, which was successfully repelled, an action took place, in
which the lancers of Poznan and Plock threw themselves upon the flank
of Russian cavalry, and, after causing severe loss, took about eighty
prisoners, consisting of Circassians. General Dembinski, on the night
of the 29th, learning that our positions of Janow and Wieprz were
abandoned, quitted Wilkomierz on the next day, and took the road to
Szawla. [_Plan_ XXXIV, (13)]. Although the occupation, by the enemy, of
the town of Kowno, and the interruption of our whole line of operations
on the Swienta and Wiliia, made our situation very perilous; yet it was
still possible to avoid the disasters which followed, and to effect
a return to Poland. By concentrating all our forces at Keydany, we
could have effected a passage of the Niemen, in the same manner as we
had already done in the direction of Gielgudyszki, which would have
left the enemy in our rear; while on the other side of the Niemen, the
enemy were not in force enough to prevent our passage. But, instead of
doing this, as if to insure our ruin, a small detachment, consisting
of four squadrons of cavalry, and the sappers, under the command of
colonel Koss, were sent to make a bridge over the Niemen! This measure
is perfectly inexplicable. Scarcely had this detachment arrived at
the river, and commenced the erection of the bridge, when they were
attacked on two sides, by the cuirassiers and the artillery of the
enemy. They were saved only by the judicious conduct of colonel Koss,
who threw himself into the protection of the neighboring forest, and
succeeded in rejoining the corps. The loss which we incurred by this
expedition, of all our implements for the construction of bridges, was
irreparable.

From this time, the enemy did not for a moment lose sight of us;
and throwing his superior forces upon the great road which leads
from Keydany, through Rosseyny (14), to Szawla, forced us to take
that direction which was the most dangerous for us, as the field
of operation for our forces was continually becoming more and more
contracted.


COMBAT OF ROSSEYNY.

The cause of this action, which it would have been most desirable to
have avoided, was a strong attack by the enemy upon the rear-guard of
general Chlapowski which was marching on the road to Szawla. To avoid
exposing the rear-guard to a great loss, or even to the chance of it,
the command was given, to take position, and the corps was placed
in order of battle. The battle of Rosseyny, which lasted scarcely
four hours, was very sanguinary, and highly honorable to the Polish
arms. The object of the enemy on this occasion was to surround our
left wing. As soon as he perceived that our corps had taken position
and was arranged in order of battle, the enemy brought forward his
artillery, consisting of 24 pieces of cannon, and commenced a heavy
fire upon our centre. This fire did not cause a great loss, for, our
position being elevated, the shot struck too low to be effective. A few
moments after this fire of artillery was commenced, a strong column
of Russian cavalry showed itself on our right wing. This column had
with it a body of light artillery, which commenced fire also. On our
left wing, which was supported upon a marsh, and, for that reason, in
little expectation of an attack, but a small force was collected. This
wing was composed of a battalion of infantry and the 1st regiment of
lancers. These troops had been placed on this wing to repose from the
combats and fatigues of the day and night preceding, in which they had
acted as rear-guard. The brave lancers, however, at the first sight of
the enemy, demanded of the general to be permitted to make a charge.
This permission being given, at the first discharge of the Russian
artillery, our soldiers threw themselves with impetuosity upon both the
cavalry and the artillery of the enemy. The capture of sixty prisoners
and the spiking of three cannon were the fruits of this brilliant
attack. It was the last charge of that brave regiment.

Our centre was not less fortunate than our left wing. Our artillery
being better placed than that of the enemy, several of his pieces were
dismounted, and his fire began to slacken. For some hours a light fire
of tirailleurs was continued on both sides, when our generals, seeing
that the enemy did not renew the attack, gave orders to evacuate the
position, and to resume the march for Szawla.

On the same night, the corps arrived at Cytowiany. There our forces
were joined by the corps of general Rohland, which had had a bloody
skirmish at Beysagola, [_Plan_ XXXIV, (15)] on the same day on which
general Dembinski was also attacked at Poniewieze. The corps of general
Chlapowski left the next day for the attack of Szawla, which was
occupied by a Russian garrison. The corps of general Dembinski, which
as we have already stated, was marching by another route upon Szawla,
arrived there at mid-day on the 7th. That general, considering the
smallness of the Russian garrison in this town, consisting only of
four battalions of infantry, and six pieces of cannon, after waiting
a short time for the arrival of the corps of general Chlapowski,
concluded to send a summons, by colonel Miroszewski, to the Russian
commandant, proposing to him to surrender, and save a useless effusion
of blood. The Russian colonel Kurow would not accept of these friendly
propositions, and compelled general Dembinski to order an attack; a
very moderate one, however, as he was in hopes that the arrival of
our superior forces would soon convince the Russian commander that a
defence would be useless. In fact, the corps of general Chlapowski
arrived at about 5, P.M. at a village about four miles from Szawla,
where he was met by an officer, sent by general Dembinski, with a
report of the circumstances which had taken place. Indeed, the sound
of the cannon and musquetry, ought already to have satisfied general
Chlapowski that general Dembinski was engaged in the attack; but
instead of hastening to his assistance he went into camp, and thus
remained until two hours past midnight. At two o'clock then, of the
morning of the 8th, the corps took up the march, and arrived by
day-break before Szawla.


ATTACK ON SZAWLA.

On examining the plan of this battle, and considering the smallness
of the Russian garrison in Szawla, we cannot but be satisfied that
the town ought to have been taken at the first assault, and it will
seem almost incredible that after having occupied four hours in an
unsuccessful attack, we should have at last quitted our position.

On arriving on the plain before Szawla, the two corps were placed in
order of battle. The force of general Dembinski changed its position,
and formed our left wing. We commenced a fire of artillery from the
right wing and the centre, at the same time throwing forward our
skirmishers. The enemy had made an entrenchment round the whole town,
behind which his infantry was concealed; and upon the right of the town
he had constructed a redoubt. On the sides of the town against which
the right wing and centre were posted, a general fire of musquetry and
artillery was commenced, under the cover of which our light troops
endeavored to take possession of the ramparts.

General Szymanowski and colonel Pientka, who were the only general
officers who were actively engaged in this battle, seeing that this
attack of the light troops upon the Russian infantry, thus safely
entrenched, was very destructive to us, and would prolong the attack,
ordered two battalions of infantry, under colonel Jeroma and Piwecki,
to make an assault, protected by two pieces of cannon and a squadron of
the 3d regiment of lancers. This order was executed with the greatest
determination. Our artillery having fired two rounds of grape, the two
battalions of infantry entered the city at the charge, and regardless
of the terrible fire from the windows of the houses, they reached the
market-place of the town.[77] The enemy was in consternation, and the
taking of a hundred prisoners by us, showed the disorder into which
he had already fallen. If but two other battalions had been sent to
support those which had entered the town, the attack would have ended
here. But this was neglected, and the latter were remaining in their
dangerous situation, while the rest of our forces were uselessly
engaged, and received no orders. The bold idea of the brave colonel
Pientka, of forcing the attack, was no where seconded. The corps of
general Dembinski remained wholly inactive, although officers were
occasionally sent by him to general Chlapowski for orders. By this
fault the battalions who had entered the city were exposed to the
superior forces of the enemy, who, falling upon them from all sides,
forced them to quit the city, leaving among their dead the brave
colonels Jeroma and Piwecki, and nearly one half of their whole
number.[78] With the retreat of these brave battalions, all our forces
commenced evacuating their position,--we cannot tell for what reason.
The enemy did not attack us; on the contrary, he was well satisfied
with the cessation of hostilities on our part. At 9 o'clock our corps
recommenced its march.

These are the details of the battle, or rather the attack, of Szawla,
which town we quitted, after investing it for nearly five hours, and
after having sustained a severe loss in men and officers, a sacrifice
which was owing to our most defective and ill-judged arrangements.

On this same day, we were again unfortunate, in the loss of all our
baggage and several wagons of ammunition, which were sent forward by
a road on our right, and fell into the hands of the light Circassian
cavalry of the enemy.

This battle discovered an extreme of negligence in our commander in
chief. With the knowledge that the enemy was pursuing us in the rear,
and on each side, we remained uselessly encamped during the night
of the 7th, which we ought to have employed in the attack. The true
course should have been to have set fire to the place, which would
have required only the agency of a few bold men. This town, indeed,
deserved no better fate; for it was inhabited almost exclusively by
hostile Jews. When the general welfare is at risk, there should be no
hesitation in sacrificing the convenience of individuals. If we compare
the consequences of having burnt this town, and of having attacked it,
we shall see that, by the former course, we should have compelled the
Jews to fly with their effects, and the Russian garrison to surrender,
without any effusion of blood, while, by attacking it, we lost nearly
one thousand men, without any advantage whatever.

In regard to the attack, the surrounding of the town was a great fault;
for neither the fire of the artillery nor of the light troops could
be effective, as the Russian artillery was in a dominant position,
and was concealed within the city, as their infantry was behind their
entrenchments. The skirmishers, in approaching the city, fell, without
having harmed the enemy. The plan of colonel Pientka, of masking the
attack on one side, and forcing the attack upon the other, at a single
point, was well conceived, but failed, as we have seen, by the want of
support.

At about ten o'clock the flanking parties of the Russian cavalry began
to show themselves on each side of us, upon the road to Wilkomierz, and
on that of Cytowiany. Our corps was already on the march for Kurszany.
The 1st regiment of lancers and the light artillery were designated
as a rear-guard. This rear-guard, taking advantage of a small defile,
which presented a favorable position, took post there, and sustained
themselves for some hours against an attack from the Russian advanced
guard; thus protecting the march of our main body, which was executed
with the greatest order. The lancers and light artillery then evacuated
their position, by a retreat at full speed, which, by taking advantage
of the windings of the road, and the vicinity of the forests, they were
able to effect with inconsiderable loss. On the evening of the same
day, we arrived at Kurszany. On the next day we remained some hours
in that place, to hold a council of war. General Chlapowski proposed
to divide our forces into three corps, each to act independently.
This arrangement was carried into effect, and our forces were thus
distributed.

The 1st corps, under general Chlapowski, with which general Gielgud
remained, consisted of five battalions of infantry, amounting to 1,500
men; four squadrons of the 1st regiment of lancers, and two squadrons
of Kaliszian cavalry; in all, 450 horse, and an artillery consisting of
13 pieces of cannon.

This corps received the destination, to march for Rosseyny, leaving the
enemy on the right, and from thence directly for Kowno, and, by this
unsuspected march, to surprise the last important position. By that
means, the communication between us and Poland would be re-opened; and
to protect this communication was to be the principal employment of
that corps.

The 2d corps, under the command of generals Rohland and Szymanowski,
was composed of eight battalions of infantry, amounting to about 3,000
men; all the cavalry which was recently formed in Lithuania, consisting
of nearly 1,000 horse; and an artillery, commanded by the brave colonel
Pientka, consisting of 12 pieces of cannon.

This corps was directed to march upon Polonga, a port on the Baltic.
It had been rumored that two French vessels with arms, funds, and
ammunition, together with a small body of volunteers, were cruising
near that port. After they should have received these expected
supplies, the corps was directed to march towards the Dwina, and, by
following along the banks of that river, to observe and interrupt the
communications between the forces of the enemy in Lithuania, and the
province of Courland.

The 3d corps, under general Dembinski, was composed of three battalions
of infantry of the 18th regiment, recently formed, consisting of about
1,000 men; two squadrons of the lancers of Poznan, two squadrons of
the lancers of Plock, and one squadron of the 3d regiment of Hulans,
in all, about 500 cavalry; and seven pieces of artillery. This corps
received orders to march for the environs of Szawla, traversing the
forests, and leaving the enemy on the right; from thence to take a
direction to Wilkomierz, and thence to the environs of Wilno, and to
attack that city, if circumstances might allow of it; and then to
manoeuvre in the department of Minsk, and in the forests of Bialystok,
acting there in support of the insurrection, and collecting the forces
of the insurgents. An important object of this corps was to support
a communication with the corps of general Chlapowski. This plan, the
reader will observe, was, in many of its points, the same with that
suggested by colonel Valentin.

A proper reflection upon all these arrangements would convince any one
that much more loss than advantage was to be anticipated from them.
This subdivision of the force was, in fact, a visionary scheme. Many
officers openly declared their opinions to this effect, and urged that
in our critical situation, almost surrounded as we were by a hostile
force, so superior to our own, we ought not to form any new projects,
but, profiting by the concentration of our forces, to redouble the
rapidity of our march, and, taking advantage of the forests and covered
roads, to reach Poland as soon as possible. This would, indeed, be
attended with difficulties; but it would still be much easier of
execution, and much more proper to be attempted, than the plan which
we have detailed. Such views, however, were not regarded. The project
was highly colored, and the most brilliant successes were promised to
follow it. The separation of the corps was accordingly ordered, and our
fate was sealed.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 76: With this company was the countess Plater, and her
aid-de-camp M'lle Rasynowiecz.]

[Footnote 77: The Jewish inhabitants of the city even fired upon our
soldiers. Many of them were taken with pistols in their hands, and
afterwards executed.]

[Footnote 78: In this affair we ought to make particular mention of the
estimable Laga, a priest, who was at the head of the squadron in this
attack, having the cross in one hand and the sabre in the other.]




CHAPTER XXIV.

 The three subdivisions of the Lithuanian corps take their
 respective destinations.--Details of the operations of that of
 general Rohland.--He meets alone the attack of the whole Russian
 force.--Battle of Powenduny and Worna.--General Rohland, on his
 way to Polonga, learns that general Chlapowski had marched towards
 the Prussian frontier.--He presses his march to overtake and form
 a junction with him.--The greater part of the corps of Gielgud
 and Chlapowski were found to have passed the frontier, when that
 of Rohland came in sight.--Indignation of the soldiery.--Death of
 general Gielgud.--General Rohland, joined by a portion of the corps
 of Gielgud which had not yet passed the frontier, continues his march
 to Nowe-Miasto.--He declines a proposition from general Kreutz, to
 surrender.--Successful skirmish with the enemy's cavalry.--General
 Rohland takes a position at Nowe-Miasto, and awaits the enemy.--The
 Russian forces, however, do not continue their pursuit, but go into
 camp.--Propositions to pass the frontier are sent to general Rohland
 by the Prussian authorities.--They are submitted to the corps, and
 accepted.


On the 9th of July, at about 10, A.M., each of the three subdivisions
of the corps took the road designated for it. From this moment,
commences a new epoch in our operations in Lithuania, and we shall give
a separate detail of the proceedings of each of these corps, commencing
with that of general Rohland, which was in the line of the enemy's
pursuit, and was followed by his whole force. This corps, quitting
Kurszany, took the road for Telze. On the night of the 10th, it arrived
at Powenduny and the lake of Worna. Upon the road, it was joined by
colonel Koss, who had been sent, as we have said, with his detachment,
from Keydany, to construct a bridge over the Niemen, and who had
extricated himself from the exposed situation in which this attempt
had placed him. As the position was advantageous, and as our soldiers
had need of repose after their fatiguing march, we remained there the
whole night. On the next day, at sunrise, our camp was alarmed by the
approach of the Circassian cavalry of the enemy. Our generals decided
to wait the enemy's attack in their eligible position, and that day
was one of most brilliant success. We will present to the reader full
details of the events of that day, for they were of an extremely
interesting character. The manoeuvres of all our forces were admirable;
but those of the cavalry were indeed extraordinary. The reader will
be astonished to find how much was done by a cavalry, fatigued, their
accoutrements in disorder, and almost without ammunition, against a
cavalry like that of the enemy, well mounted, with fresh horses, and in
every respect in perfect order.


COMBAT OF POWENDUNY AND WORNA.

The battle commenced at sunrise, as we have already mentioned, with an
attack from two squadrons of Circassian cavalry. Those squadrons turned
our outer guard, and came in contact with our tirailleurs, who received
them with a warm and unexpected fire. These tirailleurs were concealed
in the forest and brush-wood. The Circassians halted, and commenced
a fire of carbines in return. Our fire could not but be attended
with great loss to the enemy, and they were forced to retire. In
this retreat, our own cavalry, which was at Powenduny, and which had
debouched by a covered road, and taken position, entirely surrounded
these two squadrons, and, attacking them on all sides, causing a severe
loss and taking forty prisoners. An hour after, the Russians renewed
the attack. Strong columns of infantry and cavalry passed through a
little village which is on the road from Kurszany to Powenduny. The
Russian artillery took positions upon the declivity of the heights
adjoining that village, and commenced a fire upon our cavalry. At the
same time, several columns of the Russian infantry threw themselves
into the brush-wood on the right of our position, while a strong
detachment, composed of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was pushed
forward upon our right wing, with the design to turn our flank, and,
by surrounding us, to cut off our communications with Worna. This
detachment, after losing several hours in attempting to act upon us,
under the obstacles which were presented by the marshy nature of the
ground, returned without having effected any thing. Our generals,
seeing the superior force of the enemy, ordered our cavalry to retire,
and to place themselves in the rear of our artillery, which occupied
heights commanding the whole vicinity, and arrested by an incessant
fire, for more than four hours, the advance of the enemy. After our
cavalry had retired, the tirailleurs began to evacuate the wood, and
concentrating themselves upon the road to Powenduny, retired also,
after having destroyed the bridge which crosses a small marshy stream,
intersecting the road, and burnt a faubourg which adjoins Powenduny,
and was near this bridge. Such was the state of things when, at about
ten o'clock, a flag was announced from the Russian commander. It was
brought by an aid-de-camp of general Delinghausen. The proposition
borne by this flag was, that we should surrender, on the ground that we
were engaged with the whole of the Russian force, amounting to nearly
20,000 men, and that that force had already occupied the road to Worna,
the only communication which remained to us. This proposition was
followed by the usual considerations,--the wish to prevent the needless
effusion of blood, &c. It was declined, and the aid-de-camp returned
to the Russian head-quarters, but in a short time appeared again with
a renewal of the proposition. General Szymanowski, who received the
aid-de-camp, persisted in his refusal, adding, that 'he knew the duties
of a soldier--duties which were doubly obligatory upon one who is
fighting in the cause of liberty, and in the defence of the country of
his ancestors.' After the departure of the aid-de-camp, the order was
given to the artillery and infantry to re-commence their fire. At the
same time, arrangements were made for the continuation of our march to
Worna. At about mid-day, our columns of infantry, and a part of the
cavalry and artillery, quitted their position, and took up the march
for Worna. After a short time, there remained but one battalion of
infantry, and three squadrons of cavalry. The cavalry was employed to
mask the withdrawing of the remaining artillery. After our corps had,
by a march, arranged in the manner we have described, reached a point
sufficiently distant from our first position, the battalion of light
infantry which remained in that position was ordered to withdraw as far
as certain mills, keeping up a retreating fire. After passing those
mills, the tirailleurs received orders to run at full speed to rejoin
the corps, and to occupy the adjoining forests, while the cavalry
were ordered to take post at the mills, to cover this movement, and
afterwards to retire slowly, pass a small village which was on the
road, and on the opposite side of that village to await the approach of
the enemy. This manoeuvre was well executed by both the infantry and
cavalry, the latter placing themselves on rather an open space behind
the village, to await the enemy. After some time, six squadrons of the
light Russian cavalry, consisting of hussars and Circassians, passed
through the village, and seeing the small number of our cavalry, gave
the hurrah, and threw themselves upon them. Our cavalry, expecting this
attack, received orders to quit their position with promptness, in
order to lead the Russian cavalry upon the fire of our infantry, who
were concealed in the woods. The Russian cavalry, presuming that this
was a disorderly retreat, followed with impetuosity, while our cavalry
threw themselves on one side, to pass a ford which had been designated
for that object, and thus left the enemy exposed in a mass, to the fire
of our tirailleurs. The manoeuvre cost the Russians two hundred men, by
the acknowledgment of officers who were made prisoners. After having
caused this severe loss to the enemy, our infantry and cavalry retired
slowly, to occupy their third position, and the enemy did not follow.

A short time after we quitted our second position, the Russian cavalry
showed themselves again. General Szymanowski remained, with two
companies of the 7th regiment of the line, to defend the passage of
the third village against the enemy, and to give time to our cavalry
to take a third position. This general, for nearly an hour, resisted
the attack of a strong force of cavalry, but commenced evacuating
the position on the approach of considerable bodies of the Russian
infantry, withdrawing through the forests. The Russian cavalry, seeing
that the village was abandoned by our infantry, began to debouch
through it. It was an act of the greatest imprudence in the Russian
cavalry, unsupported by either infantry or artillery, to advance thus
upon a plain surrounded by forests, in which they might have supposed
infantry, and even cavalry, to be concealed. Two squadrons of our
cavalry commenced a fire in order to harass them, and draw them on
to the middle of the plain. Afterwards, those two squadrons wheeling
about, laid open the Russian cavalry to the fire of our artillery,
which was posted on a little elevation and concealed by brush-wood.
This fire of our artillery was effective. The enemy's cavalry began
to waver. General Szymanowski observing this, ordered an immediate
attack by our whole cavalry, consisting of twelve squadrons. This
attack was made with great impetuosity. Sixteen hussars, with two
officers, were taken prisoners, and forty or fifty were left, killed
or wounded, on the field. After this, the corps recommenced its march
to Worna, leaving two battalions of the 7th regiment of infantry, as a
rear-guard, in the forests which border on that road.

The successes which we had thus obtained in our three first positions
were over the advanced guard of the enemy; but in the fourth position,
arranged by the brave and skilful colonel Koss, and in which our
successes were even greater, we had to encounter the whole body of
the Russian forces in Lithuania, which, according to some of our
prisoners, were to be estimated at 18,000, and by others at 25,000 men,
with 36 pieces of artillery, under the command of the several Russian
generals, Kreutz, Tolstoy, Szyrman, Delinghausen, and Saken. The town
of Worna is surrounded by two large lakes, in such a manner that the
only communication with that town to the west, is by a neck of land,
separating the extremities of those two lakes. The town is situated
upon an elevated ground, which overlooks the whole vicinity. On our
left wing was a forest, that reached one of the lakes. This forest was
occupied by two battalions of infantry. Our right wing leaned upon the
other lake. All our artillery remained in the centre, and occupied the
heights near Worna.

When our arrangements were completed, we heard the fire of the
two battalions composing our rear-guard, who were engaged, while
withdrawing, with the Russian infantry. Strong columns of the enemy's
infantry, which were following these battalions began to debouch from
the forest, and to deploy upon the plains before Worna. Those columns
were followed by the enemy's artillery, 12 pieces of which took post on
the side of the road, and immediately opened a fire upon our centre.
At the same time, a warm fire of skirmishers was commenced on each
side. Our artillery, which was very advantageously placed, without
replying to that of the enemy, opened a fire upon the columns of the
enemy's infantry. Before night, the whole Russian forces had deployed
upon the plain, and a powerful attack on their side was expected; but
instead of this we were astonished to find that their fire began to
slacken, perhaps owing to a heavy rain, which had just began to fall.
Our commander with the view to profit by this rain and the approach
of darkness, after an interval of not more than ten minutes, ordered
the two battalions which remained in the forests on our left, to make
a sudden charge with the bayonet upon the right wing of the enemy.
These battalions, under the command of the brave colonel Michalowski,
performed prodigies of valor in this charge, and bore down all before
them. Colonel Koss at the same time taking the command of the cavalry,
and addressing a few exciting words to them, led them upon the centre
of the enemy at the charge. The consternation of the Russians was
extreme. A great part of their cavalry was found dismounted, for they
had not the least expectation of an attack; their artillery fled,
and abandoned their cannon; the utmost disorder followed, and a vast
number of the enemy fell upon the field. According to the testimony of
prisoners, the consternation was at such a height that we might have
put their whole corps to rout. Our forces, however, could not follow up
these advantages; for the obscurity of the night and our own weakness
made it impossible. We were content with having reduced the strength of
the enemy by the great losses we had occasioned; and we continued our
route towards the seaport of Polonga, agreeably to our orders, where we
were looking for reinforcements, and where our generals believed that
the corps of general Chlapowski would join, and act with us upon some
new plan. On the morning of the 12th we arrived at Retow.

The battle of Powenduny and Worna, in which we had beaten the Russians
in four positions, and which cost the enemy more than a thousand men,
including prisoners and wounded, renewed our hopes. We were expecting,
as we have said, new accessions of strength at Polonga; and we were not
without hope that our other corps under Dembinski and Chlapowski, who
could not have been far distant, finding that we had been thus engaged
and so successfully, with the whole force of the enemy, would change
their plan of operations, and attack him in his rear or his flank.
To this end, in fact, on the very morning of that battle, after our
first successes, we sent two officers in the direction of Dembinski
and Chlapowski, to apprize them of the circumstances in which we were
placed, and especially to inform them of the important fact that the
whole force of the enemy were before us. With these hopes awakened in
our minds, our disappointment may be imagined on learning, at Retow,
that the corps of general Chlapowski had passed through that place on
the day before, in a rapid march towards the Prussian frontier. During
the battle of Powenduny, therefore, the corps of general Chlapowski
was at the distance of only _four miles_ from us. He heard our fire
during the whole day, but instead of marching to our support, which,
as we afterwards learnt, his officers and even his soldiers loudly
called upon him to do, he declined doing it, answering their appeals in
the following terms:--"What do you ask of me, gentlemen? I can assure
you that the corps of general Rohland, on whom the whole force of the
enemy has fallen, is destroyed. The baggage of his officers have passed
through Retow.[79] All is lost, and, surrounded as we are on all sides
by the enemy, it only remains for us to seek at once the frontiers of
Prussia, and to throw ourselves upon the protection of that power."

Generals Rohland and Szymanowski, on receiving the unwelcome
intelligence of the course which general Chlapowski had adopted,
concluded to change their plan of operations, and instead of going to
Polonga, to follow the march of general Chlapowski, to endeavor to
join him as soon as possible, and by exhibiting to him the unimpaired
strength of our corps, which he had believed to be annihilated, to
induce him to abandon the project of crossing the Prussian frontier,
and to make some farther attempts in junction with us.

With this view, after resting a few hours at Retow, we left, by a
forced march, for Gorzdy, a small town near the Prussian frontier, at
which we hoped to overtake the corps of general Chlapowski, and at
which we arrived on the next day (13th,) at noon. But it was already
too late. The greater part of the corps of Chlapowski and Gielgud had
passed the frontier at the village of Czarna, about a half league from
the former place, and an inconsiderable part only of the corps, which
had not yet passed over, could unite with us. The other part were
already advanced a considerable distance within the Prussian territory,
and having been disarmed, were placed under a guard of Prussian
sentinels.

Such was the end of the corps of generals Chlapowski and Gielgud,
composed of our best troops, and which had performed such feats of
valor in so many battles. Those brave soldiers were led, against their
will, into the territory of a foreign nation, to seek a protection of
which they themselves had not even dreamed.

This step, which every historian of our revolution will record with
horror, when it was seen how totally without justification it was,
awakened the disgust and indignation of all. The part of the corps of
general Chlapowski which was already in the Prussian territory, when
they saw the corps of general Rohland, which they had been made to
believe was destroyed, continuing its march in an entire state, and
even with nearly 200 Russian prisoners in its train, and hearing too
the animating shouts which naturally burst from their comrades, as they
came in view of them, and who called on them to rejoin them, fell into
a state of the utmost exasperation. A great number rushed forward, and,
breaking through the Prussian guard, unarmed as they were, reached our
side of the frontier. The brave commander of the light artillery, who
was already on the Prussian territory with his battery, profiting by
the circumstance that his horses were not yet unharnessed, returned,
and joined our corps, with five pieces of cannon. Both officers
and soldiers surrounded general Gielgud, and loudly demanded some
explanation of this state of things. That general betrayed the utmost
confusion, and seemed wholly at a loss to satisfy these demands; his
manner, indeed, was such as to encourage the suspicions of treason,
which his previous conduct had but too well justified. At this moment,
one of his officers, in a frenzy of patriotic indignation, advanced
towards him, drew a pistol from his side, and exclaiming, 'This is the
reward of a traitor,' shot him through the heart. After this sad event,
general Chlapowski was sought after, and the same fate would have
probably awaited him, had he not succeeded in concealing himself. A
scene of great confusion then took place throughout the corps. General
Rohland and the other officers exerted themselves to tranquillize the
soldiers, reminding them that our situation was critical, and that
the Russians were pressing upon us. These appeals had the effect of
restoring quiet; and at about 4 o'clock the corps of general Rohland,
joined by a part of that of Chlapowski, took up the march in the
direction of Yurburg, in order to pass the Niemen there, and attempt to
reach Poland. At night, we arrived at Wierzbna. After having marched
four miles from the spot where the Prussian frontier was passed by
general Chlapowski, we were met by an aid-de-camp of general Kreutz,
sent with a flag of truce, and bearing a letter to general Rohland,
which was read aloud, containing propositions to surrender, and setting
forth the circumstances under which we were placed. In declining
the proposition, general Rohland, among other expressions, used the
following: 'The strength of your forces is well known to us; we have
seen them at Powenduny and Worna. If Providence protected us there, it
will still protect us;' and turning towards the officers of his suite,
he added, 'Gentlemen, look on my grey hairs! they have become blanched
in a service of thirty years under the Polish eagles, and during that
whole period I have endeavored to keep the path of honor and duty.
Permit me in my old age to continue in that path.' The answer having
been communicated to the corps, the cry of 'Long life to Rohland,'
burst forth on every side. The aid-de-camp departed, and we continued
our route.

Having passed the night at Wierzbna, we arrived on the noon of the
next day (the 14th,) at Nowe-Miasto, at which place we put to flight a
squadron of Russian cavalry posted there. Before reaching that town,
and at the distance of about a half league from it, our cavalry had
a small skirmish with four squadrons of the Russian light cavalry.
This cavalry fell upon a small detachment of our sappers, which had
been detailed for the object of destroying a bridge upon a branch of
the main road, at the distance of about a mile from it. The sappers,
in withdrawing, kept up a fire, and thus drew the enemy on, till our
cavalry falling upon them, dispersed them, causing a considerable loss,
and taking several prisoners.[80]

On arriving at Nowe-Miasto, our commander sent a reconnoitering party
in the direction of Yurburg, in order to ascertain if any of the
enemy's forces were there, and considering the strong position of
Nowe-Miasto, he decided to remain there, and to await the result of
this reconnoissance. Our forces were placed in order of battle, to
await the enemy, in case he should choose to make an attack. Remaining
for two hours in this position, we were astonished that the enemy did
not show himself; and a platoon of cavalry, sent in the direction of
the enemy to observe him, returned with the intelligence that he was
_encamped_ at the distance of two miles from us.

Four hours had thus passed, when the arrival of a Prussian officer
upon the frontier was announced, who requested an interview with our
general. General Rohland, accompanied with a party of officers, went to
receive him. The Prussian officer was an aid-de-camp of the commandant
general of the forces on this part of the frontier, (general Kraft, we
believe). The officer, after some complimentary language, presented a
letter from his commander, which was filled with expressions of respect
and good will, and in which it was proposed that, in consideration of
our position, surrounded as we were by a force so much superior to our
own, and in a state of destitution in respect to arms and ammunition,
we should accept the offer which the Prussian government had authorised
him to make, in order to save the useless effusion of the blood of
so many brave men, and throw ourselves upon the protection of its
territory, where we would be convinced of the cordial disposition of
that government towards us,--adding, that our sojourn there would be
short, and that we should soon be allowed to return to our firesides,
as was the case with the Russian soldiers who had sought the same
protection. We have already mentioned that several detachments of
Russian soldiers, who had before sought the protection of Prussia, had
been allowed to return with their arms and ammunition. Our generals,
on being thus apprised of the liberal intentions of the Prussian
government, which were confirmed by the personal representations of the
officer who brought the letter,--reflecting on the deplorable state
of our soldiers, fatigued and weakened by so many forced marches; the
greater part of the infantry being without covering to their feet,
which were lacerated with wounds; the greater part of the cavalry,
almost without horses, (for their animals were so broken down, and
chafed by unremitted use, as to be unfit for service;) both artillery
and infantry nearly destitute of ammunition, a great quantity of which
had been thrown into the river by the orders of generals Gielgud and
Chlapowski, on passing the frontier;--considering also the assurance
which had been made that we could return to our country, and hoping
therefore to be able to renew their services to that country at some
more favorable period,--presented these circumstances to the whole
corps, and solicited the opinion of the soldiers upon the question of
acceding to the propositions of the Prussian government. The soldiers,
manifesting their entire confidence in the judgment and the honor
of their officers, signified their assent to the acceptance of the
propositions, influenced strongly by the assurance of being allowed
to return to their country. In consequence of this assent, a protocol
was prepared that night, and signed by our generals, and by several
Prussian officers on the other part, who came over for that object.
On the morning of the next day, we passed the frontier and marched
into the Prussian territory, and by that act the operations of the
Lithuanian corps were ended.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 79: It might have been the case, that a few wagons with some
of the baggage of the corps, were sent in advance in the direction of
Polonga, merely as a precautionary arrangement.]

[Footnote 80: In this affair major the prince Giedroyc distinguished
himself at the head of his regiment, the 6th chasseurs, and killed with
his own hand the commander of the enemy's cavalry, an officer of the
rank of general.]




CHAPTER XXV.

 Effect of the news of the Lithuanian disasters on the minds of the
 people.--Distrust of the National Government.--The Russian army
 resumes the offensive under general Paszkewicz.--He decides to
 pass the Vistula.--Examination of the merits of this plan.--Plan
 of general Skrzynecki to act on the different detached corps of
 the enemy.--Advantages of general Chrzanowski over the corps
 of Rudiger.--The Russian forces execute the passage of the
 Vistula.--General Skrzynecki crosses the Vistula at Warsaw to operate
 against the enemy on the left bank.--An inquiry into the conduct
 of general Skrzynecki, and the appointment of a Council of War is
 demanded by the nation.--Arrival of the corps of general Dembinski at
 Warsaw.


While the nation was afflicted by the treasons at Warsaw, their hopes
had been still kept alive by looking towards Lithuania. What, then, can
express the disheartening effect produced by the intelligence that the
Lithuanian corps existed no longer;--that that pillar, so essential to
the support of the fabric we had been rearing, had fallen; and that
this disaster had been brought on by the gross negligence, if not
the treason, of those to whom that all-important expedition had been
entrusted. They felt that this was an almost mortal blow. They saw a
horrible future opening upon them, prepared by parricidal hands. After
such renewed outrages, the people fell into the greatest exasperation.
That people, whose confidence had been so basely abused, whose holiest
purposes had been so shamelessly sported with, seemed at last to
have changed their nature. So often betrayed, they lost confidence
in all, and seemed to see in every one a traitor. If, in the frenzy
of indignation, which such an experience had justified, they allowed
themselves to be carried away by their feelings, and to be guilty of
acts of severity, it can scarcely be wondered at.

Immediately after the arrival of the sad news from Lithuania, the
nation demanded explanations of the generalissimo. They demanded to
know how he could have given the command of so important an expedition
to a man like Gielgud, one who had never been esteemed by the nation or
the army, and who had not even the reputation of a general of talent.
How could an expedition which demanded the very highest talents,
and the most undoubted patriotism, have been confided to a man like
him? With him had been associated general Chlapowski, who was the
brother-in-law of the Grand Duke Constantine. That circumstance alone,
they justly considered, should have been enough to suggest suspicion,
and to have at least indicated the expediency of keeping him near the
eye of the commander in chief, and subject to his constant observation.
Such were the complaints of the people, and they went to the heart of
the commander in chief, and the president of the National Government;
for they were conscious, but too late, of their justice.[81]

The Russian army, the command of which, on the death of general
Diebitsch, was taken by general count Paszkewicz, and the main body of
which remained in a state of inaction at Ostrolenka, having no longer
any apprehensions from Lithuania, could now act with freedom, and the
offensive was recommenced under the command of its new chief, who
decided to pass the Vistula, and to act upon the left bank.

I may be allowed to detain the attention of the reader a moment upon
this passage of the Vistula by Paszkewicz, a manoeuvre of which so
much boast has been made, and to consider whether it is really to be
regarded as a great and bold step, or one of necessity. What was the
state of the Russian army after the battle of Ostrolenka?--A month
had passed, and that army had not made a single movement, but was
kept there merely to be fed by Prussia. Was not this inactivity an
infallible evidence of weakness? Does it not show that, alarmed by the
prospects in Lithuania, it was in a state of hesitation, not daring to
advance into the kingdom, and holding itself in readiness to evacuate
it on an occasion of necessity, which indeed seemed near at hand? In
this period of hesitation, the new general arrives from the regions of
the Caucasus. He must do something. The question presents itself to
him,--what course is best to be taken? His army, now reinforced by the
corps which had been in Lithuania, amounted to perhaps near one hundred
and fifty thousand men. Although this force was considerable, yet to
attack the fortifications of Praga, which, as is known to the reader,
had been augmented, and which the Russian army in their primitive and
unimpaired strength had never had the temerity to attack, was out of
the question. What other course could he take, unless he could submit
to continue in this state of inactivity, but to pass the Vistula, and
under the assistance of Prussia, to make his attempts against Warsaw
on the other side, a step, however, which he never would have dared to
have taken without that assistance. This is the natural explanation of
that boasted plan, in which we can see nothing but an almost necessary
movement, encouraged by a reliance on Prussia.

In the first days of the month of June the Russian army began to
approach the Vistula, in order to execute the passage. Their march
was in three principal columns, and was arranged in the following
manner:--general Witt, commanding the columns of the left wing, took
the direction of Sochoczyn. The centre, under marshal Paszkewicz, left
for Sonk and Luberacz, passing the river Wkra at Maluszyn. The column
of the right, consisting of the imperial guard, under the command of
the grand duke Michael, marched from Makow, by Ciechanow and Racionz.
General Pablen commanded the advanced guard. A considerable train of
ammunition, with provisions for twenty days, and a park of artillery
of reserve, formed the fourth column, and followed the imperial guard.
Detached posts towards Modlin and Serock, covered this march on the
left. One regiment of dragoons remained at Pultusk. This combined force
consisted of 80,000 men and three hundred pieces of cannon. Besides
these forces, there were in the kingdom, the corps of general Rudiger
at Kaluszyn, and that of general Rott at Zamosc. Those two corps might
now number about 20,000 men, and some thirty pieces of cannon. Opposed
to these forces, we had an army of 40,000 men, a hundred and twenty
pieces of cannon, not counting the national guard of Warsaw, and the
garrisons of the two fortresses of Modlin and Zamosc.

The plan of our generalissimo was to throw himself upon the detached
corps of the enemy, under Rott and Rudiger, and afterwards to act upon
his main body. For this end an attack was ordered upon the corps of
Rudiger, which was beaten in the environs of Minsk by the corps of
general Chrzanowski, in successive actions, on the 14th, 15th, and
16th of July. A third part of his corps being destroyed, a thousand
prisoners, four pieces of cannon and all his baggage taken, he was
forced to retire behind Kaluszyn. After these new advantages, the
general in chief prepared to act upon the rear of the Russian main
army, and to attack them while engaged in the passage of the Vistula,
which he supposed they would attempt either at Plock, or between Plock
and Modlin. But as he was afterwards apprized that the Russians were
to attempt the passage at a much more distant point from Warsaw, and
beyond his reach while on the right bank, he thought it most expedient
to pass the Vistula at Warsaw, and to operate against the enemy on the
other side. The Russian army thus passed the Vistula without being
intercepted, between the 12th and the 20th of July. Having reached the
left bank, the enemy took the direction of Lowicz, where, on the 27th,
the head-quarters of general Paszkewicz were established, and whither
our army marched to meet him.

At this important moment, when the operations of the enemy had taken a
new face, and seemed, in the eyes of the people, by his near approach
to Warsaw, to menace the utmost danger--made more threatening in their
imaginations by the recent discovery of the conspiracy of Jankowski and
the news of the misfortunes in Lithuania;--at this anxious moment, the
nation demanded a council of war, and called on the National Government
to make an inquisition into the conduct of the general in chief, to
demand of him full explanations of his purposes, and a submission of
all his plans of operation to the examination of such a council. Such
a council of war was instituted by the government and directed to be
attached to the person of the general, and to be initiated into all
his designs, in order to be enabled to tranquillize and re-assure the
minds of the nation, which had so naturally become distrustful and
suspicious, after the events which had taken place.

The council having been organized, and having taken an oath of secrecy,
general Skrzynecki laid before them all the plans of operation that he
had hitherto followed, as well as those which he had in contemplation,
and gave a full exposition of the reasons for each. This council then
published to the nation an address, announcing their entire confidence
in the patriotic intentions of the general in chief, and assuring them
that the crisis was by no means as dangerous as they apprehended. By
these proceedings the minds of the people were much tranquillized, and
this tranquillity was increased by the arrival of the corps of general
Dembinski from Lithuania after its glorious retreat; which arrival not
only cheered them by the addition which it brought to our forces, but
by the more encouraging accounts than had before been received, which
it gave of the state of Lithuania, authorizing some hope of a renewal
of the insurrection in that province at a more propitious hour.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 81: A few details of the history of the two generals who
were the cause of these fatal disasters, may gratify the curiosity of
the reader. General Gielgud was born in Lithuania, at Gielgudyszki,
(the place at which he crossed the Niemen in 1831). Passing over
his early life, which presents nothing noticeable, he commenced his
military career in 1812, when Napoleon entered Lithuania. In a moment
of patriotic fervor, he formed a small detachment at his own expense,
and joined the ranks of the supposed deliverer of Poland; and this
perhaps was the most praise-worthy act of his life. During the campaign
of 1812, 13, and 14, he was in no way distinguished either for good or
bad conduct. At the end of the Russian campaign, in 1815, he was made
colonel. As during that year, Poland came under the Russian government,
our army was subjected to a change of organization, and as many
officers of high rank, who were in independent circumstances, gave up
their commands, Gielgud then obtained the rank of general, at about the
age of thirty. This rapid advancement, as was natural to a man of weak
character, inspired him with an extreme of arrogance and pretension;
qualities which were encouraged in his intercourse with the Russian
generals, with whom he was much associated. It was this arrogance which
uniformly lost him the esteem of those under his command.

When the revolution broke out, general Gielgud was at the town of
Radom, and his life was in great danger from the suspicions of which he
was naturally the object, but he was protected by some of the patriots,
on the assurances which he gave of his patriotic dispositions. Still,
however, the military demanded his removal from his post, and, in fact,
for some weeks he was without command. The dictator, Chlopicki, whose
modes of action were, as the reader knows, too often inexplicable,
restored him to his command, persuading himself that he was one of the
best of patriots, and that if his exterior was offensive, he was right
at heart. In the war,--having first commanded a brigade, and afterwards
a division,--while he was attached to the grand army, his conduct was
not marked by any very great faults; indeed, in the battle of Minsk he
performed his part well. It was such occasional exhibitions of good
conduct which kept him in some consideration.

After having taken command of the corps of Lithuania, and when he was
removed from the observation of the army, he exhibited himself in his
true character. He was giddy with the distinction, and feeling himself
the absolute master of his own conduct, he gave himself up to all the
suggestions of his vanity.

His first act of folly was to surround himself with a numerous suite,
(it was in number four times that of the commander in chief,) in which
suite those individuals were held in greatest esteem, who were most
fertile in resources for amusement. It was to this love of personal
gratification that we can attribute those delays which were sacrificing
the cause of the country. At Gielgudyszki the general gave a _fête_
to his officers; and it is not impossible that it was a motive of
mere personal ostentation which induced him to make the passage of
the Niemen, at that place, by which two days' march were given to the
retreating enemy, time was allowed him to concentrate his forces in
Wilno, and that capital was lost to us!

This general was never seen to share the privations, fatigues, and
exposure of his subalterns. In his personal deportment he neglected the
true means of gaining the confidence and attachment of his troops. On
the eve of a battle, in moments of danger and anxiety, it is cheering
to the soldier to see the face of his commander, and to hear from him a
few words of encouragement. These are apparent trifles, but they are in
reality of most serious consequence. They are the secret keys by which
every thing can be obtained from the soldier. The personal attachment
of the soldier to his commander, is worth more than the finest
combinations in strategy and tactics. The commander, who succeeds in
gaining the affection of the soldier, inspires him with a new impulse
for exertion. To his other motives is added the dread of forfeiting
the confidence and esteem of a friend; and perhaps, with the mass of
an army, such a motive would yield to no other in efficiency. To the
modes of conduct which would have secured this result, general Gielgud
was an entire stranger. Instead of freely approaching the soldier
and endeavoring to gain his attachment, he treated him with uniform
coldness and reserve. It is on the whole a matter of just surprise,
that a man with such glaring faults of character should have been
appointed to so responsible a trust.

General Chlapowski commenced his military career also in 1812. In the
Russian war he advanced to the rank of officer, and was made aid-de
camp of prince Poniatowski. While in this situation he advanced to
the rank of a staff officer, in which rank he left the army in 1815,
and retired to his estates in the grand duchy of Pozen, where he
married the sister of the princess of Lowicz, the wife of the Grand
Duke Constantine. The entrance of this general into the revolutionary
ranks excited considerable surprise. But as he joined himself to
the squadrons of Pozen, which were formed of the bravest and most
patriotic materials, there was no distrust felt of him. His successes
in traversing the department of Bialystok, entitled him to the highest
praise. It was this fine expedition which gained him the confidence
of the Lithuanian corps, and after the battle of Wilno, they were
unanimous in inviting him to take the chief command. The nominal
command, as we have related, he declined, but took a post which gave
him the superintendence of all the operations. While he was thus in
the direction of affairs, the greatest faults, as we have seen, were
committed, for which no adequate explanation can be given. We will
recapitulate some of them.--They were, 1. The sending of the sappers to
build the bridge over the Niemen. 2. The ill-arranged attack on Szawla.
3. His not succoring general Rohland in the combat of Powenduny. 4. The
inexplicable secrecy which he kept upon his intention of passing the
Prussian frontier; having left Kurszany for that object, whilst all
his officers were given to understand that the separation of the corps
at that place was with the view of marching to act in the environs of
Kowno. These are points upon which this officer has yet to answer at
the bar of his country. Chlapowski was a more dangerous person even
than Gielgud, for Gielgud was a man of such undisguised arrogance,
that he repelled the confidence of others; but Chlapowski, with all
the faults of Gielgud, had an exterior of dissimulation which won
insensibly upon those who had not thoroughly studied his character. But
none who had observed and known him well, could ever yield him their
esteem.]




CHAPTER XXVI.

 Operations of general Dembinski's corps.--He traverses the
 country between Szawla and the Niemen without being observed
 by the enemy.--Attacks and disperses a brigade of Russian
 infantry.--Passes the Niemen and throws himself into the forest of
 Bialystok.--After leaving that forest, is joined by the corps of
 general Rozycki.--Reaches Warsaw.--His reception at Warsaw.--View
 of the exposed situation of Paszkewicz after his passage of the
 Vistula.--Examination of the plan of operations of the Polish
 commander.--Morbid state of the public mind at Warsaw.--Skrzynecki and
 Czartoriski deprived of their trust.--Capture of the city.--Documents
 showing the influence exercised by the cabinets in discouraging active
 operations.--Conclusion.


The corps of general Dembinski had been more fortunate than those of
Chlapowski and Rohland. That general, quitting Kurszany on the 9th of
July, returned, in obedience to the orders which we have detailed, by
means of the forests, to the environs of Szawla, leaving the enemy
upon the right, and without being observed by him;--he having advanced
with his whole force in the direction of Worna, under the belief that
our undivided forces were in that position. This corps traversed the
country between Szawla and Rosseyny, and arrived during the night of
the 15th at Janow, where they dispersed a squadron of the enemy's
cavalry and took fifty prisoners, and passed there the river Wiliia
without interruption. From thence they left for the environs of Kowno,
where, not far from Rumszyski, on the 16th, they met a brigade of
Russian infantry which was on the march from Wilno to the frontier of
Poland.

General Dembinski attacked this brigade with such impetuosity, that
they were thrown into the greatest consternation. Two cannons and
several prisoners were taken. The great forests, by which the Russians
were able to effect their escape, alone saved this brigade from entire
destruction. Having thus opened their road, they took the direction
of the town of Lida, passing the Niemen not far from that place.
Afterwards they threw themselves into the forests of Bialystok, and
in these forests the corps was reinforced by a considerable number
of Lithuanian insurgent cavalry, which had been acting with great
advantages over the enemy, by cutting off his transports of ammunition
and other modes of harassing him, during the whole of our campaign.
This force was under the command of colonel B***. General Dembinski
quitted the forests in the environs of Orla, and leaving the town of
Bielsk on his right, passed through the town of Bocki, near which
he surprised and dispersed a regiment of cossacks, and took several
prisoners, and among them a number of officers. In the environs of
Siemiatycze, where the corps arrived on the 20th of June, they were
arrested by the sudden appearance of a large body of troops. General
Dembinski halted and placed his forces in order of battle, sending his
flankers in advance. On the other side the same movement was made. The
flanking parties of the opposite forces approached each other, but
what was the astonishment of the two corps at seeing the tirailleurs,
in place of firing upon each other, rushing into each other's arms,
and rending the air with patriotic exclamations. The corps which
was thus met by that of general Dembinski, was the corps of general
Rozycki, which had been sent from our grand army to reinforce the
corps of general Gielgud. The reader will now call to mind the plan
of operations proposed by colonel Valentin after the battle of Wilno;
and the arrival of this reinforcement at the very spot which was to
have been the point of concentration aggravates the regret that his
plans were not adopted. Nothing could exceed the satisfaction of the
two corps at thus meeting. General Rozycki, learning the disastrous
circumstances which had occurred, changed his plan of operation, and
decided to unite himself with the corps of general Dembinski, and to
return with it to the grand army. The junction of these two corps had
scarcely taken place, when a cloud of dust, in the direction of Bielsk,
announced the march of another body of troops. A small reconnoissance,
sent in that direction, returned with the intelligence that it was
the Russian corps under Golowkin. Our generals, considering all
circumstances, determined not to engage with them, and continued their
march towards Poland, passing at night the river Bug. They then took
the direction of Wengrow and Kaluszyn, and by that route arrived at
Warsaw, toward the end of the month of July.

The corps of general Dembinski, which had traversed more than four
hundred miles in about twenty days from its departure from Kurszany,
in the midst of detachments of the enemy, was received by the nation
with the greatest enthusiasm. The president of the senate, prince Adam
Czartoriski, the generalissimo Skrzynecki, with all the officers of
government, followed by an immense body of citizens, met him at the
distance of a half league from the city; and he was greeted with an
address expressive of the thanks of the nation for his courageous and
persevering exertions. It ended in the following terms:--'Dear general,
and brethren in arms, you will be a living reproach to those who,
forgetting their sacred duties, have, by their misconduct, forced their
countrymen to lay down their arms, and seek the protection of another
nation.'

To commemorate the brave exertions of this corps, and to transmit these
events to posterity, the address above referred to was ordered to be
enregistered in the volumes of the public laws. A printed copy was
also given to each soldier of the corps. At the same time a commission
was appointed to inquire into the conduct of generals Gielgud and
Chlapowski.

When we consider the manner in which the Russian army, after their
passage of the Vistula, passed the interval between the 27th of July,
(the day of their arrival at Lowicz) and the 15th of August, we shall
be at a loss to account for their inaction.

If general Paszkewicz was in a condition to take Warsaw, he could gain
nothing by this repose. Nay, every moment of delay might increase the
difficulties he would have to overcome. Why then all this delay? What
could have prevented us from reinforcing our ranks, strengthening the
fortifications of Warsaw, and even sending another corps, however
small, into Lithuania, to support a new insurrection? Such a corps
could have easily made its way even in the midst of the Russian
detached corps remaining on the other side of the Vistula, and indeed
those corps, so imprudently left there, could have been beaten in
detail by our forces. If these circumstances are well considered,
the reader will be satisfied that this manoeuvre of passing the
Vistula, though in appearance so threatening to us, was in reality a
most imprudent step on the enemy's part, and exposed him to the most
imminent danger. Many detailed considerations might be given upon this
point, but as they would occupy much space, and would withdraw us too
far from the purpose of this narrative, we must leave them to abler
pens. The general view, however, which we have taken of the position of
the enemy, will be enough to awaken the astonishment of the reader that
the event of the contest should have arrived so suddenly and so fatally
to us. We are, therefore, led to present some reflections upon what
seems to us to have been the true causes of the disastrous issue of the
struggle.

We may, in the first place, be permitted to remark that the removal
of our army from Warsaw to Lowicz to meet the enemy there, does not
appear to have been a fortunate disposition. By it, some twenty
days were spent in indecisive manoeuvres against a superior force.
If, during that interval, in place of marching to meet the enemy,
the army had been concentrated in the environs of Warsaw, and
employed in constructing fortifications upon the great roads leading
to Warsaw, from Blonie, Nadarzyn, Piaseczno, and Kalwaryia, as a
first line of defence, and in strengthening the great fortifications
of Warsaw:--then, leaving half of our force to defend these
fortifications, we might have crossed the Vistula with the other half,
and acted upon all the detached corps of the enemy on the right bank,
and have, besides, intercepted all the reinforcements for the main
army of Paszkewicz. Our communications, also, with the provinces,
being thus opened, and their territory freed from the presence of the
enemy, we should have again been enabled to avail ourselves of their
co-operation. I cannot but think that if such a plan of operation had
been adopted, for which, in fact, there was ample time in the interval
above named, an altogether different turn would have been given to our
affairs.

If the objection should be made that the delay which actually occurred
could not have been reasonably anticipated, and that Paszkewicz might
have immediately advanced to the attack of Warsaw, still, without
entering for the present into more detailed considerations in support
of my opinion, it will be enough to answer, that if twenty-four
hours merely were to be had, those twenty-four hours should have
been employed in fortification rather than manoeuvring, for it was
not at Lowicz, but under the walls of Warsaw, that the enemy were to
be fought. As it was at Warsaw, then, that the decisive encounter
must inevitably have taken place, would it not have been the most
judicious course, to have confined our operations on the left bank of
the Vistula, to the strengthening of the defences of Warsaw; to have
in fact adopted in regard to the enemy, who had now transferred his
strength to the left bank of the Vistula, the same course of operations
which we had hitherto pursued against him while he was in occupation of
the right; in short, to have made of Warsaw another Praga. Our course
of operations should in fact have been just reversed, to correspond
with the change which the enemy's passage of the Vistula had made in
our relative positions. While he was on the right bank, the region on
the left of the river was open to us, and there were our resources;
but now that he was acting with his main army on the left bank, it
should have been our aim, by annihilating his detached corps, to have
opened to our operations the whole region of the right, which was far
more extensive than the other, and which, besides, had the advantage
to us of being contiguous to the insurrectionary provinces. In case of
an attack on Warsaw, which of course could not be an affair of a few
days only, that part of our forces operating on the right bank could be
withdrawn in ample season to present our whole strength to the enemy in
its defence.

Since I have allowed myself to make the above remarks in regard to the
plans of the general in chief, I must also be permitted to add that, at
that period of inquietude and distrust, the presence of the commander
in chief and of the president of the National Government, at Warsaw,
was of the utmost importance. That presence was continually needed to
act on the minds of the people, to preserve union and tranquillity,
and to discover and bring to exemplary punishment the traitors who
had been plotting the ruin of their country; in short, to encourage
the patriotic and to alarm the treacherous. If those two individuals
so deservedly beloved and honored by the nation had been present, we
doubt whether those melancholy scenes at Warsaw, on the 14th, 15th,
and 16th of August, when some forty persons who were under conviction
of treason, perished by the hands of the people, would ever have taken
place. Revolting as those scenes were, we must yet consider whether
the circumstances of the moment will not afford some palliation for
them. Deserted by those who had been the objects of their profoundest
attachment and confidence, haunted by the recollections of the terrible
disasters which had been incurred, and which they could attribute to
nothing short of treason,--seeing twenty days again sacrificed, during
which the Russian corps from Lithuania were permitted to pass the
Vistula, (that of Kreutz at Plock, and that of Rudiger at Pulawy,)
and join their main army; in fine, seeing this immense Russian force
approaching the capital, from which perhaps they were expecting a
repetition of all the atrocities of Suwarow,--remembering the thousands
of victims which these traitors had already sacrificed, and reflecting
on the thousands whom they had plotted to sacrifice; can it be wondered
that, in those moments of despair, that people should have yielded to
their impulses of indignation and have chosen rather to sacrifice at
once those convicted traitors, than permit them to live, and perhaps be
the instruments of the vengeance of the conqueror. Abandoned thus by
those who should have been near to tranquillize them, the people took
that justice into their own hands which the government had neglected to
execute, and with their suspicions operated upon by this accumulation
of disasters, they went to the degree of demanding the removal from
their posts of prince Czartoriski and the general in chief.

Such are, I think, the true explanations of those acts, so serious
in their consequences, and which have created so much surprise. The
removal of Skrzynecki from the chief command was certainly one of the
most deplorable results of this disordered state of the minds of the
people;--for who could so well meet the exigencies of the time as
he, familiar with every detail, engaged in the midst of events, and
possessing the entire confidence of the army? It was in this period
of distrust and suspicion that the Russian army, which seemed to have
been waiting only for such a moment, received the intelligence from
some traitors, yet undiscovered, within the walls of Warsaw, that the
time had arrived for their attack. It was undoubtedly directed by such
intelligence, that they made their attack on Warsaw, at the moment
when the greater part of our army had been sent by its new commander,
Prondzynski, to act on the right bank of the Vistula against the corps
of Golowkin, which was menacing Praga. The city thus defended by the
national guard and a small part of the army alone, and distracted by
the divisions which Russian intrigues had fomented, fell, after a
bloody defence,[82] and the fate of Poland was decided.

We have stated our belief that the fatal events which hastened the
catastrophe might have been prevented by the mere presence, at the
capital, of the heads of the army and the National Government, at
those trying moments which brought on that disordered state of the
public mind. Of this error we cannot readily acquit them, upright and
patriotic as we know their intentions to have been. But upon the other
point--that mysterious inaction of our forces, for so considerable a
period, there is an important light thrown, in the following extracts
from the correspondence of the prince Czartoriski with the French
minister of the Exterior, read in the chamber of deputies, on the 19th
of September, by the venerable general Lafayette, and in the extracts
from his remarks, and those of general Lamarque, made on that occasion,
and which have probably before met the eye of the reader.


EXTRACT FROM THE LETTER OF PRINCE CZARTORISKI.

'But we relied upon the magnanimity and the wisdom of the cabinets;
trusting to them, we have not availed ourselves of all the resources
which were at our command, both exterior and interior. To secure the
approbation of the cabinets, to deserve their confidence, and to obtain
their support, we have never departed from the strictest moderation;
by which moderation, indeed, we have paralyzed many of the efforts
which might have saved us in those latter days. But for the promises
of the cabinets, _we should have been able to strike a blow, which
perhaps would have been decisive_. We thought that it was necessary to
temporize, to leave nothing to chance--and we have at last seen the
certainty, at the present moment, that there is nothing but chance that
can save us.'

_General Lafayette_: 'If it be said that the promises here referred to
might have been only an affair of the gazettes,--I answer, that I have
demanded explanations of the Polish legation, and here is the reply
which I have obtained.

'"In answer to the letter which we have received from you, general, we
hasten to assure you--

'"1. That it was the Minister of Foreign Affairs who engaged us on the
7th of July, to send a messenger to Warsaw, whose travelling expenses
were advanced by the Minister: that the object of this messenger
was, as his Excellency the Count Sebastiani told us, to induce our
government to wait two months longer, for that was the time necessary
for the negociations.

'"2. That the circular of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated the
15th of August, signed by the Minister ad interim, Audne Horodyski, and
also another circular of the 24th of the same month, signed by the new
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodore Morawski, came to our hands by
the post of the 14th current; that they are the same circulars which
we at first officially communicated to the Count Sebastiani, on the
15th of September, and which we immediately after addressed to the
journals, where they appeared on the 17th and 18th, and that those two
circulars in fact explain the effect which the mission of the above
envoy produced at Warsaw.

 '"Le Gen. Kniazewiecz--L: Plater."'

 _Paris, the 20th November, 1831_.

_Gen. Lamarque_: 'Poland! Can it be true that this heroic nation,
who offered her bosom to the lance of the Tartars only to serve as
a buckler for us, is to fall because she has followed the counsels
which France and England have given her! Thus then is to be explained
the inaction of her army at the moment when it ought to have taken
a decisive step. Thus is to be explained the irresolution of the
generalissimo, who from the first moment had showed so much audacity
and skill. We may now know why he did not profit by the passage
of the Vistula, which divided the army of the enemy, to give him
battle either on one bank or the other. The minister rejects with
indignation this imputation of complicity. He declares formally that
he had made no promise, that he had given no hope, that he had fixed
no date.--Honorable Poles, whom I have seen this morning, affirm the
contrary. Our colleague, M. Lafayette, will give you details, almost
official, on this subject.'


SESSION OF THE 13th SEPTEMBER.

_Gen. Lafayette_: 'I will ask this, without the least expectation of
receiving a reply, but only to render a just homage to the conduct of
the Poles, and of their government,--I will ask, if it is true that the
Poles were urged by the French government, by the English ministers,
and by the French ambassador at London, to use moderation, and not to
risk a battle, because the measures which those powers were to take in
behalf of Poland would not be delayed but for two months, and that in
two months Poland would enter into the great family of nations.--Those
two months have expired; and I state this here to render justice to the
conduct of the Polish government, the Polish army, and its chief, who
may have thought that on his giving a general battle, to prevent the
passage of the Vistula, they could thwart the good intentions of the
French and English government in this respect. I think that this will
be considered a fair procedure towards Messieurs the Ministers, to whom
the questions shall be addressed on Monday, to apprize them that this
is one of those which will be then submitted to them.'

       *       *       *       *       *

These documents will be for the present age and for posterity an
explanation of the true causes of the ruin of Poland. She fell not by
the enormous forces of her enemy, but by his perfidious intrigues. We
cannot accuse France or England, and indeed no Pole does accuse them;
for, although we may have some enemies in those countries, yet we
cannot conceive of the existence of any causes of hostility towards
us, by which those nations can be actuated.[83] They were blinded by
the promises of Russia,--by the solemn assurances[84] which she gave,
that she would soon arrange every thing in the most favorable manner
for Poland. In this web of intrigue were those cabinets entangled, who
would else have followed the common dictates of humanity in succoring
Poland. While she was thus deceiving the cabinets, Russia was doing
her utmost to sow distrust and disunion among our people. It was
her intrigues, through the instrumentality of the traitors whom she
had gained for her accomplices, that caused the estrangement of the
nation from Skrzynecki, who, having a true Polish heart, had repelled
all her vile attempts to shake his integrity, and who, by his talent
and energy, had so often defeated and might still defeat the enormous
masses which she had sent against us. Those intrigues succeeded,
and Russia gained her end in overwhelming Poland with misery; not
reflecting that by so doing she was bringing misfortunes upon her
own head. Russia, by a liberal concession to Poland of her national
rights, could have been truly great. Not to speak of the influence
of the Polish institutions upon the happiness of her own people; her
true stability and strength could in no way be so well secured as by
the independent existence of Poland. They who have labored for our
destruction were not then true Russians; they were the enemies of their
country and of humanity;--heartless calculators, acting with a single
view to their own personal aggrandizement;--men, in fact, who have no
country but self. Equally the enemies of the monarch and of the people,
they make the one a tyrant, and sport with the misery of the other.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 82: As the author was attached to the Lithuanian corps, and
as he was actually in a Prussian prison at the time of the capture of
Warsaw, he cannot undertake to give any details upon so important an
event with the limited information at present at his command.]

[Footnote 83: Appendix No. III, IV.]

[Footnote 84: Appendix No. IV.]




APPENDIX.

No. I.


HISTORICAL VIEW OF LITHUANIA.

If, notwithstanding the many good works recently published upon Poland,
the history of that country is still but imperfectly known to the
rest of the world; it may be said that the history of Lithuania is
almost absolutely unknown to the people of the West. It is generally
thought that it has always composed an integral part of the Russian
empire, and that it was only occasionally that it has held relations
with ancient Poland;--a false impression, and one which the public
journals have but too frequently assisted in propagating. The truth
is, that for five hundred years, Lithuania has voluntarily associated
herself with the destinies of ancient Poland, and it is only with
shame and reluctance that she has borne the Russian yoke. But that
which is of great importance at present to consider, is, the ancient
sympathy which has constantly united the two people. There is a common
spirit of nationality, which, notwithstanding the studiously contrived
disintegration of their territory, has always animated the Lithuanians
and the Poles;--a most important fact, for it is on this fraternity of
feeling and community of opinion between the ancient Polish provinces,
that the salvation of modern Poland essentially depends. We will
endeavor, by presenting to the reader the following extracts from the
work of Leonard Chodzko, to throw some light upon the political history
of this interesting portion of the Slavian race.

'For a long time a distinct power, and governed by its Grand Dukes,
united for the first time with Poland in the year 1386, and making,
in 1569, an integral part of the republic of Poland, Lithuania, from
that epoch, to that of 1795, formed, in the political state, the
third province of Poland; being composed of the palatinates of Wilno,
of Troki, the duchies of Starostia, and Samogitia, of Nowogrodek,
of Brzsclitewski, of Minsk, of Polock, of Witepsk, Mscislaw and of
Smolensk. The Grand Duchy was bounded on the north by Courland,
Semigallia, Polish Livonia, and the province of Great Nowogorod;
on the east by Moscovy; on the south by the Ukraine, Volhynia, and
the country of Chelme; on the west, by the Baltic Sea, the duchy of
Prussia, and the palatinates of Podlasia and Lublin. Its arms were
a cavalier at full speed, with a sabre raised over his head. This
cavalier of Lithuania, joined with the white eagle of Poland, figured
inseparably upon the arms of the republic, upon the national standards,
the public edifices and the coins, up to the moment when foreign force
and domestic treason struck a liberticide blow at that union which
ages has consecrated. In 1812, for a moment, those fraternal arms
were united; but separated again, they once more floated upon every
banner after the memorable date of the 29th of November. According to
ancient traditions, towards the year 900, there landed on the coast
of Samogitia, between Memel, Polonga, and Libau, a colony of Italians
who introduced into that country a certain degree of civilization,
and from thence came that multitude of Latin words which are to be
remarked in the Lithuanian language. From these Italian families, arose
several sovereign dynasties, which governed Lithuania and Samogitia. Of
this origin were, without doubt, the Gerules or Herules, who formerly
governed Lithuania. This people is the same which in the fifth century
invaded Italy, with Odacre, and returning on their steps, spread
themselves upon the shores of the Baltic, which embrace, at the present
day, Oriental Prussia, Lithuania, Samogitia, and Courland.

'The Lithuanians, though subjugated first by the Russians, did not
fail to make their strength soon felt by their invaders. In the 13th
century, when the Tartars ravaged on one side the Russian States, the
Lithuanians on the other side took possession of Grodno, Brzesc, and
Drohyczyn, and did not stop till they reached the banks of the Prypec
and the town of Mozyr. In the north their victorious arms were pushed
as far as the Dwina, and the city of Polock. In the year 1220, the
Russians, under Mscislaw-Romanowicz, declared war upon Lithuania, but
they were beaten near the river Tasiolda, and the Lithuanians augmented
their possessions by the occupation of Pinsk and Turow. Ringold was
the first who took the title of Grand Duke of Lithuania, in 1235.
Mindowe or Mendog, having promised the Pope to embrace the Christian
religion, was crowned king of Lithuania in 1252, at Nowogrodek; but
this did not continue long, for Mindowe, finding himself deceived,
returned to Paganism, and died in 1263. From 1280 to 1315, the dukes
Latuwer and Witènes reigned over this country; but the greatest power
of Lithuania dates from the fourteenth century, when Gédymin seized the
reins of government. Impatient to crush the Russian power, which had
distressed Lithuania, this prince defeated the enemy in 1320, upon the
river Pirna, made himself master of Volhynia, of Küovie, of Sewerie,
of Czerniechovia, and extended his boundaries as far as Putiwel upon
the Diésna. In 1340, when Gédymin perished upon the field of battle by
the hands of the Teutonic knights, the Tartaro-Russian power commenced
ravaging Polodia, but Olgerd, successor of Gédymin, came to the succor
of his nephews, Koryatowicz, who were in possession of that province,
defeated the Czars of the Tartars in a pitched battle, and extended the
territory of Lithuania as far as the banks of the Don and the Black
Sea. To form an idea of the extent of the Lithuanian provinces, it is
sufficient to point out here the partition between the sons of Gédymin:
Monwid possessed Kiernow and Slonim; Narymond--Pinsk, Mozyr, and a part
of Volhynia: Olgerd--Krewo, the ancient capital of the duchy, and all
the country as far as the Berezina; Kieystat--Samogitia, Troki, and
Podlachia: Koryat--Nowogrodek and Wolkowysk: Lubar--Wlodgimierz, with
the rest of Volhynia: Jawnat--Wilno, Osmiana, Wilkomierz, Braslaw. The
last succeeded first to his father, but after his death it was Olgerd
who took the reins of government.

'Olgerd was the most powerful of the sovereigns of Lithuania.
The republic of Pskow, in 1346, and that of Nowogorod, in 1349,
acknowledged him for their master. In 1363, the Tartars of Pérékop
(Krimea,) became his vassals. On the east, embracing the cause of the
duke of Twer, he came three times, in 1368, 1370, 1373, to break his
lance against the ramparts of the city of Moscow; of that city where
at a later day the great generals of Poland and of Lithuania, and at
last, in 1812, the Gallo-Polono-Lithuanian lances were crossed in
front of the superb Kremlin! Kiegstut powerfully seconded his brother
in his conquests. It was under such auspices that Olgerd, descending
to the tomb, left his brilliant inheritance to Jagellon, one of his
thirteen sons. Jagellon, who ascended the grand-ducal throne in 1381,
ceded it to his cousin Witold, in 1386, when he went to place upon his
head the crown of the Piasts, to unite his hand to that of Hedwige,
and to cement forever the glorious junction of Lithuania and Poland.
In 1389, he gave the government of the duchy of Sévérie-Nowogorodien
and the republic of Nowogorod-the-Great to his two brothers; while on
the other side, his cousin Witold, being attacked in his new conquests
by the Tartars, beat them, chased a part of them beyond the Don, and
transported those who fell into his hands into the different countries
of Lithuania, where, instead of reducing them to slavery, he gave them
possessions, with the liberty of freely exercising their religious
rights. It was the descendants of those Tartars who showed themselves
such worthy children of their adopted country, at the epoch of the war
of independence, in 1794, and in the campaign of 1812. In this manner
Witold acquired the possession, not only of the Russian territories,
delivered from the yoke of the Tartars by his grandfather and his
uncle, but those which were held by the other small Trans-Borysthenian
Czars. Turning then his victorious army to the north, he forced the
northern republics, whose fidelity he suspected, to humble themselves
before him, and recognize his unqualified supremacy. In fine, Poland
and Lithuania arrived, at that epoch, to such a degree of power, that
the dukes of Mazovia and Russia, the Czars of Moscow, Basile, that of
Twer Borys, that of Riezan, Olegh, the little Czars of Pérékop and
Volga, the Teutonic masters, the Prussians and Livonians, in fine,
the emperor of Germany, Sigismond himself, accompanied by his wife,
and several princes, Erik, king of Denmark and Sweden, as well as
the ambassadors of the emperor of the East, Paleogogus, presented
themselves to Wladislas-Jagellon at Luck, in Volhynia, and held there
a general congress in 1428, in which they deliberated upon the war
against the Ottomans; and at which the emperor of Germany attempted
in vain, by means of intrigues, to throw some seeds of dissension
between Jagellon and Witold. Witold died in 1430. Kasimir le Jagellon,
successor of Wladislay, was reigning still with eclat; when the
moment approached, at which from one side the Ottomans began to take
possession of the Tauride, while a new Muscovite power, subjugating the
Russians from the north and east, were soon to contract the frontiers
of Lithuania.

'All this, however, could have no effect upon the union of the two
nations, which daily acquired new strength; for, subsequently to the
first union of 1386, a Diet, in 1413, held in the bourg of Horoldo,
having declared the Lithuanians to be on an equal footing with the
Poles in regard to taxes and laws, many Lithuanian families allied
themselves with Polish families; in fine, the arms of the two nations
were united. It was then determined that the Lithuanians should receive
their grand duke from the hands of the king of Poland, and that,
when the latter should die without children or descendants worthy to
succeed him, the Poles should elect their new king conjointly with the
Lithuanians. The alliance concluded in 1413, was renewed in 1499; and
it was added, explicitly, that the Lithuanians should not elect their
grand duke without the concurrence of the Poles, nor the Poles their
king, without that of the Lithuanians. In 1561, the knights militant
submitted themselves, and the part of Livonia which remained with them,
to the domination of the king of Poland, as grand duke of Lithuania;
the new duke of Courland became also his feudatory. In fine, in 1569,
under Sigismond-Augustus, the Poles and Lithuanians held a Diet at
Lublin, in which the grand duchy was limited to the kingdom of Poland,
so that they thereafter formed but one body, subject to one prince, who
was conjointly elected by the two nations, under the double title of
king of Poland and grand duke of Lithuania. It was agreed, also, that
the Diet should be always held at Warsaw, that the two people should
have the same senate, the same chamber of deputies; that their coins
should be of the same designation; that, in fine, their alliances,
their auxiliary troops, and every thing, should be in common. The
campaigns of Moskow under Sigismond III, Wladislaz IV, and Etienne
Batory, amply proved that the Lithuanians were worthy of calling the
Poles brethren; for they were found ready for every sacrifice, when
the general good of the country was in question. In the laws of 1673,
1677, and 1685, it was ruled that each third Diet should be held in
Lithuania at Grodno; the Diets of convocation, and of election and
coronation were excepted, however, from this rule. In 1697, the Polish
and Lithuanian laws received an equal force and authority.

'At the epoch of the regeneration of Poland, the Lithuanians gave the
most convincing proofs of their devotedness to the Polish cause, in
the last years of the existence of Poland. In effect, when they became
satisfied that, for the common interest, and to give more consistency
to the new form of government which it was proposed to establish,
at the Diet of 1788, it was necessary to strengthen still more the
relations between Lithuania and the crown; that is to say, between
Little and Great Poland, so as to form out of the three provinces a
single powerful state, and to obliterate totally all the distinctions
which had before existed between the Poles and the Lithuanians, they
made a voluntary sacrifice of the privileges which they had held with
great pertinacity, and renounced, without hesitation, that of having
a separate army and treasury, consenting to unite themselves under a
single administration with the two other provinces.

'The whole world was witness to the heroism which the Lithuanians
displayed in the glorious confederation of Bar, from 1768 to 1772;
in the campaigns of 1792 and 1794, against foreign rapacity, when
Kosciuszko, a Lithuanian by birth, covered with imperishable laurels
the chains of Poland. The Lithuanians fell, but they fell with the
whole of Poland, and were buried in the common ruin. How nobly have
not the Lithuanians been seen to figure among the brave Polish
patriots, who sought in France, in Italy, and in Turkey, some chances
of restoration for a country which had been the victim of foreign
ambition! And how many of them have not been found under the banners
of Dombrowski, in Italy, and under those of Kniaziewiez, upon the
Danube? Have we not seen, in the years 1806 and 1809, twelve thousand
Lithuanians, united with their brethren, the Volhynians, the Podolians,
and the Ukranians, hastening to range themselves under the banners of
the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw? In 1812, their joy was extreme,
when they thought that their political existence was, at last, about to
be renewed. Then was seen the cavalier of Lithuania, united with the
white eagle, decorating the flags planted on the walls of Wilno. But
the disastrous retreat of the French army struck a mortal blow to the
destinies of those countries. The kingdom of Poland was proclaimed in
1815; the Diets of Warsaw, of 1818, 1820, and 1825, preserved silence
respecting the lot of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. A look full of
hope from all Lithuania was turned once more towards Warsaw, upon the
24th of May, 1829, the day of coronation of Nicholas the 1st, but the
reunion of Lithuania was not even made a question of.'

 [_Tableau de la Pologne, ancienne et moderne, par Malte Brun, edition
 refondue et augmentee par Leonard Chodzko. Paris, 1831._ pp. 288-295.
 Tom. I.]


No. II.

ADDRESS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND TO THE INHABITANTS OF
LITHUANIA, VOLHYNIA, PODOLIA, AND UKRAINE.[85]


_Brethren, and Fellow Citizens!_

The National Government of regenerated Poland, happy on being able at
last to address you in the name of the bond of brotherhood and liberty,
is anxious to lay before you the present state of our country, and to
show you our wants, our dangers, and our hopes.

The wall which separated us is broken down--your wishes and ours
realized. The Polish eagle flies over our territory. United as we are,
hand and heart, we will henceforth proceed in concert to accomplish the
difficult, perilous, but just and sacred work--the restoration of our
country.

The Manifesto of the Diet, in explaining the cause of our rising, gave
an account of our sentiments as well as yours. Scarcely had we risen in
arms, provided with but few means, and uncertain what course to pursue,
before we showed to the world and to the Emperor Nicholas that the same
spirit animated us, and that we were desirous to become, as we had
formerly been, but one and the same nation. The Emperor Nicholas did
not wish to consecrate the tomb of his brother by a monument, which,
during the life time of Alexander, would have sealed the glory of his
reign.

He did not wish to regard us as Poles, bowed down with injuries--as
citizens of a free and independent country;--and would treat with us
only as slaves who had rebelled against Russia. We have arrested--we
have driven back the threatening phalanxes of his different corps. Of
the forces of which our army was composed, some fought here against the
main body of the enemy; others penetrated into your provinces to call
forth our brethren to range themselves under the national banner. You
did not wait for this appeal.

At the very commencement of the insurrection, many of your citizens
explained their sentiments and their wishes in the National Assembly,
and some raised regiments, dignified by the names of your provinces; in
fine, whole districts of Lithuania and Volhynia rose _en masse_.

The partition of Poland has been denominated a crime by the unanimous
voice of Europe, and who at this day will revoke such a decision? Who
will venture to come forward as the champion against it? Undoubtedly
none! And we have the well-grounded hope that Europe will hasten to
recognize our independence, as soon as we have proved by our courage,
our perseverance, our union, our moderate and noble conduct, that we
deserve to be a free nation. This revolution is only a consequence of
our oppression and our misfortunes. It was the wish of our hearts, and
arises from the nature of our history, which displays our determination
from the very beginning, and proves that our rising was not of foreign
prompting. It is not civil war--it is not tainted with the blood of our
brethren--we have not overturned social institutions in order to raise
up new ones at hazard;--it is a war of independence, the most just of
wars. This is the character of our revolution, which is at once mild,
but firm--which with one arm conquers the enemy, and with the other
raises and ennobles the needy peasant.

We admire England and France--we wish to be, like them, a civilized
nation, but without ceasing to be Poles! Nations cannot and ought
not to change the elements of their existence. Each has its climate,
industry, religion, manners, character, education, and history. From
these different elements spring the feelings or passions which display
themselves in revolutions, and the circumstances proper to be adopted
in their future conduct.

Individuality strongly expressed, forms the power of a people. We have
preserved ours in the midst of slavery. Love of country, prepared to
make every sacrifice--courage--piety--noble-mindedness, and gentleness,
formed the character of our forefathers. These qualities also are ours.

The patriots of Warsaw triumphed without chiefs and without law; yet
with what crime can they be charged? An army of 30,000 men, and, in
short, the whole kingdom, rose as if by enchantment; and how did they
conduct themselves towards the Grand Duke Constantine? That prince, who
for fifteen years had shown himself destitute of regard or pity for
our feelings and liberties, was in our power; but he knew the nation,
and, just to it for once only, he intrusted his person and his army
to our honor! At the moment of alarm, we did not listen to the voice
of public vengeance, but respected the prince and his troops, without
taking advantage of our superiority. Our battalions who had awaited
with a firm determination all the forces of Russia, allowed to pass
through their ranks the fallen enemy, whose safety was guaranteed by
the national honor.

The generosity of the nation has been proved by many isolated facts,
and Europe admires our moderation as much as our valor. Brethren,
fellow-citizens, equal admiration still awaits us. Without delay,
then, come forward with the whole of your force simultaneously, and
act as one man in peace and in war; it is the people who are the
source of all power. To the people, then, direct your views and your
affections. Children, worthy of your fathers, you will act like them;
you will break the odious bonds, and you will cement a holy alliance
by reciprocal benefits and by gratitude. In other countries it is by
force, and force alone, that the people recover their liberties--here
those liberties are received as the gift of their brethren. A generous,
just, and necessary deed will become the act only of your own choice,
and you will proclaim to the people their independence, and the return
of the Polish eagles to their native soil. Our fields will lose nothing
in cultivation and value when they are tilled by the industry of brave
men. You will be ennobled in the eyes of civilized Europe, and your
country will gain millions of fellow-citizens, who, like our brave
peasants, will fly to the defence of their liberty, and drive back a
power whose character is that only of slavery. Do not forget, brethren
and fellow citizens, that the Greek religion is professed by a great
part of the people. Toleration is one of the qualities of civilization.
The clergy, the churches, and religion, shall be placed under the
protection of the government, and will lend you their assistance in
carrying this measure of justice into effect.

[The address goes on to enlarge upon the respect paid by Polish
noblemen to religious rites and feelings, and calls on the people on
this occasion to follow their example; also to send deputies from
the different provinces to the National Congress. It then goes on
to describe the vast power of Russia, and the difficulties to be
encountered, much in the same manner as the proclamation of Skrzynecki,
and concludes thus:--]

God hath already wrought prodigies for us. God, and not the Emperor of
Russia, will be our judge! He will decide.

He will decide who hath committed perjury, who has been the victim
of oppression, and who ought to obtain the victory. We have already
fought with success, in the name of the God of our fathers; and we will
fight till at length we have accomplished the ends of justice. All
the nations of Europe possessed of the feelings of humanity tremble
for our fate, and exult with joy at our successes.--They only wait
your general rising to hail you as members of the free and independent
nations of Europe.

Brethren and fellow-citizens! when we shall have finished this terrible
and unequal contest, we will invite the Powers of Europe to form
themselves into a tribunal of justice; we will appear before them
covered with our blood, lay open the book of our annals, unroll the
chart of Europe, and say--'Behold our cause and yours! The injustice
done to Poland is known to you: you behold her despair; for her courage
and generosity appears to her enemies!'

Brethren! let us hope in God. He will inspire the breast of our judges,
who, obeying the dictates of eternal justice, will say--'Long live
Poland! free and independent!'

 The President of the National Government,

 (Signed)      The Prince Czartoriski.

 Warsaw, May 13, 1831.


No. III.

There is a rich consolation for the sufferings of a just cause, in the
demonstrations of sympathy which my countrymen have uniformly met with
on the part of the people among whom they have been thrown in their
exile. I cannot refuse myself the satisfaction of inserting here one
among the many notices which have appeared in the journals of the day,
exhibiting the warm interest with which they have been regarded by the
people of France.


[From the N.Y. Courier des Etats Unis, 7th April.]

'The _Journal of Saoine and Loire_ publishes full details of the
arrival of the Poles at Maçon. The reception given to the third
detachment, which has passed through that city, was even still more
marked, affectionate, and touching than that of the preceding. All the
inhabitants of the country quitted their labors, to go out to meet
the exiles. The national guard and the troops of the line paid them
the honors of the place. Salvos of artillery announced their arrival
and their departure. It was a triumphal march. The director of the
packet boats gratuitously transported the Poles from Chalons to Lyons.
At Maçon, just as the packet boat pushed off, a Polish captain threw
his sword upon the bank, exclaiming--'Brave Maçonnois, I give you the
dearest possession I have in the world; preserve it as a token of our
gratitude.' The sword was carried in triumph to the _Hotel de Ville_,
of Maçon, where it was deposited, and a subscription was opened to make
a present to the brave stranger of a sword of honor.

'The arrival of this column at Lyons was celebrated with great
solemnity. An idea of it may be formed from the recital which is given
in the _Precurseur de Lyon_.

'"Since the triumphal passage of the veteran of Liberty, Lyons has
seen nothing so magnificent as the great movement of which the arrival
of the Poles was the signal. From eighty to a hundred thousand souls
marched before the column, upon the road of Bresse, and from far beyond
the faubourgs. Having reached the entrance of the city, escorted by the
elite of its inhabitants, the Poles found themselves in the midst of an
immense crowd, who made the air ring with their cries of enthusiasm and
sympathy. From thence to the Place de Terreaux, the column experienced
extreme difficulty in advancing through the throngs of the delirious
multitude. Words would fail to give the brilliant colors of this truly
sublime picture.

'"Maledictions against the infamous policy of the Cabinets, mingled
with the cries of 'Vive la Pologne!' The accents of generous
indignation were united with those of a deep and heartfelt pity for
those remnants of an exiled people.

'"A banquet was prepared at the Brotteaux. One of the committee
ascended a carriage to conduct hither that young heroine [the
countess Plater, we presume,] who follows to a land of exile her
noble companions in arms, as she had followed them upon the field of
battle. The people had scarcely recognized her, when they precipitated
themselves towards her, unharnessed the horses, and dragged the
carriage in triumph to the place of the assemblage.

'"The banquet was attended by more than five hundred persons, and the
committee had been forced to refuse a great number of subscribers on
account of the smallness of the accommodations.

'"The first toast, given by the president, M. Galibert, was, 'To
immortal Poland!' This toast, enlarged upon with an eloquence full of
warmth and pathos, excited a universal enthusiasm. The French embraced
their noble guests, and it was a touching spectacle--this assembly,
electrified by the most pure emotions of the soul, and in which tears
flowed from every eye.

'"It was affecting to see the physiognomies of the brave Poles during
this solemnity. Many of them understood the French language, and
tears flowed down their cheeks at each of the allusions which the
orators made to their absent country, their crushed revolution. The
young heroine, seated by the side of the president, and who excited a
profound and general interest, could hardly suppress the sobs which
oppressed her.

'"The most perfect order reigned through the whole fete. Not a
gendarme was present, and no excess of the slightest kind occurred.
This countless multitude was calm, notwithstanding the violence of its
emotions. The people proved how little their masters understand them."'


No. IV.

The following extract from the London Courier of April 9th, 1832, in
reference to the recent Imperial Manifesto which converts Poland into
a province of Russia, may serve to confirm the remarks which we have
made in the text, on the system of deception practised by the Emperor
Nicholas towards the Cabinets both of England and France, on the
subject of Poland.

       *       *       *       *       *

'We perceive that the Manifesto of the Emperor of Russia, relative to
Poland, which we gave on Saturday, has excited general indignation in
France, as well as in this country. Perhaps, as the Poles are not of a
character to be awed into submission by the power of their oppressors,
whilst the slightest chance of emancipation is open to them, it is
better for the cause of humanity that they should be tied hand and foot
in the bonds of slavery, than that any opportunity should be afforded
them of again saturating the soil of Poland with the blood of its
best and bravest patriots. If life with disgrace be better than death
without dishonor, the destruction of the nationality of Poland may
not be so great an evil as the world at large imagine. If the utter
impossibility of successful revolt be clearly shown, the Poles may at
length wear their fetters without resorting to vain attempts to shake
them off; and the monarch who has enslaved them, may gradually witness
the extinction of mind, in proportion as he coerces and binds the body.
But what a sad disgrace it is upon the government and people of this
country to have neglected, in proper season, the means of securing to
the brave and unfortunate people of Poland a nationality which would
have given to them the form and substance of liberty, without involving
the necessity of a rupture with the Power which has conquered them. Is
it not true, that, at a time when the warm-hearted and generous portion
of the people of this country were calling upon the Government to
exercise the influence and power of the British Crown on behalf of the
Poles, the reply was, 'We cannot go to war with the Emperor of Russia
for foreign interests--we cannot insist upon his evacuating Poland,
and leaving the country in a state of complete independence; but we
will use our good offices towards obtaining favorable terms for the
insurgents; and we have already the satisfaction of knowing that the
Emperor Nicholas has declared that the nationality of Poland shall in
no case be forfeited, and that in all other respects the world shall be
astonished at the extent of his generosity towards the vanquished.'

'Is there a member of the Government, or any other person, who will
tell us that such language as this was not made publicly and privately,
in Parliament and out of Parliament, in the newspapers and out of the
newspapers, and that the sole excuse for non-intervention was not
the real or pretended belief that the nationality of Poland would
be respected, and the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas be full of
generosity and magnanimity? Gracious God! and are we come to such a
pass that the sovereign of a semi-barbarous country can laugh at the
honor and dignity of the British name! Is all the respect that he can
show to the good offices of the British Government, in behalf of a
great-minded people, to be found in empty professions and unmeaning
declarations; and are we to put up tamely with one of the greatest
insults that ever was inflicted upon the Government of the country?
Was it for this that we conciliated the Autocrat of the North on the
Belgian question? And is all the return of our concessions a bold and
naked defiance of our power, and a determination to convince the world
that the days of British influence are passed forever? Perhaps we shall
be told, even now, of the magnanimous intentions of the Emperor of
Russia; but the cheat is too stale. Every body knows not only that we
have truckled to Russia in vain, but that to deception she has added
insult, and that at this moment there is a Russian Ambassador in town,
with instructions to cajole the Government on the Belgian question,
and to withhold the ratification of the treaty until after the passing
or rejecting of the Reform Bill, when the Emperor may be enabled by a
change of government to dispense with it altogether.--But we are tired
of the subject; the more we look at it, the more we feel disgraced. We
blame not this or that minister; for the intentions of the government
towards Poland, we firmly believe, were kind in the extreme; but we
blush for the country at large in having purchased the chance of peace
at the sacrifice of honor.'


No. V.

The following is the Imperial Manifesto referred to in the preceding
article, as it appears in the Berlin State Gazette, under the head of
Warsaw, March 25th, 1832.

       *       *       *       *       *

'By the grace of God, Nicholas I, Emperor of Russia, King of Poland,
etc. When, by our Manifesto of Jan. 2, last year, we announced to our
faithful subjects the march of our troops into the kingdom of Poland,
which was momentarily snatched from the lawful authority, we at the
same time informed them of our intention to fix the future fate of
this country on a durable basis, suited to its wants, and calculated
to promote the welfare of our whole empire. Now that an end has been
put by force of arms to the rebellion in Poland, and that the nation,
led away by agitators, has returned to its duty, and is restored
to tranquillity, we deem it right to carry into execution our plan
with regard to the introduction of the new order of things, whereby
the tranquillity and union of the two nations, which Providence has
entrusted to our care, may be forever guarded against new attempts.
Poland, conquered in the year 1815 by the victorious arms of Russia,
obtained by the magnanimity of our illustrious predecessor, the
Emperor Alexander, not only its national existence, but also special
laws sanctioned by a Constitutional Charter. These favors, however,
would not satisfy the eternal enemies of order and lawful power.
Obstinately persevering in their culpable projects, they ceased not
one moment to dream of a separation between the two nations subject to
our sceptre, and in their presumption they dared to abuse the favors
of the restorer of their country, by employing for the destruction of
his noble work the very laws and liberties which his mighty arm had
generously granted them. Bloodshed was the consequence of this crime.
The tranquillity and happiness which the kingdom of Poland had enjoyed
to a degree till then unknown, vanished in the midst of civil war and
a general devastation. All these evils are now passed. The kingdom
of Poland, again subject to our sceptre, will regain tranquillity,
and again flourish in the bosom of peace, restored to it under the
auspices of a vigilant government. Hence we consider it one of our
most sacred duties to watch with paternal care over the welfare of our
faithful subjects, and to use every means in our power to prevent the
recurrence of similar catastrophes, by taking from the ill-disposed
the power of disturbing public tranquillity. As it is, moreover, our
wish to secure to the inhabitants of Poland the continuance of all
the essential requisites for the happiness of individuals, and of the
country in general, namely, security of persons and property, liberty
of conscience, and all the laws and privileges of towns and communes,
so that the kingdom of Poland, with a separate administration adapted
to its wants, may not cease to form an integral part of our empire,
and that the inhabitants of this country may henceforward constitute a
nation united with the Russians by sympathy and fraternal sentiments,
we have, according to these principles, ordained and resolved this day,
by a new organic statute, to introduce a new form and order in the
administration of our kingdom of Poland.

 'St Petersburgh, February 26, 1832.

 'NICHOLAS.

 'The Secretary of State, Count Stephen Grabowski.'

After this Manifesto, the organic statutes of Poland are given, the
principal of which are as follows:

       *       *       *       *       *

'By the grace of God, we, Nicholas I, Emperor and Autocrat of all the
Russias, King of Poland, &c, &c.

'In our constant solicitude for the happiness of the nations which
Providence has confided to our government, we are occupied in fixing
the basis for the future organization of the kingdom of Poland, having
regard to the true interests and positions of the country, and to the
local wants and manners of the inhabitants.


'GENERAL DISPOSITIONS.

'Art. 1. The kingdom of Poland is forever to be re-united to the
Russian empire, and form an inseparable part of that empire. It shall
have a particular administration conformably to its local necessities,
as well as a civil and military code. The statutes and the laws of
cities and towns remain in full vigor.

'Art. 2. The Crown of the kingdom of Poland is hereditary in our person
and in our heirs and successors, agreeably to the order of succession
to the throne prescribed by all the Russias.

'Art. 3. The Coronation of the Emperors of all the Russias and Kings
of Poland shall be one and the same ceremonial, which shall take place
at Moscow, in the presence of a deputation from the kingdom of Poland,
which shall assist at that solemnity with the deputies from the other
parts of the empire.

'Art. 4. In the possible event of a regency in Russia, the power of
the regent or regentess of the empire will extend over the kingdom of
Poland.

'Art. 5. The freedom of worship is guarantied; every one is at liberty
to exercise his religion openly, under the protection of Government;
and the difference of Christian faiths shall never prove a pretext for
the violation of the rights and privileges which are allowed to all the
inhabitants. The Roman Catholic religion, being that of the majority of
our Polish subjects, shall be the object of especial protection of the
Government.

'Art. 6. The funds which the Roman Catholic clergy possess, and those
of the Greek church united, shall be considered as the common and
inviolable property of the hierarchy of each of those creeds.

'Art. 7. The protection of the laws is assured to all the inhabitants
without distinction of rank or class. Each shall be empowered to assume
dignities or to exercise public functions, according to his personal
merits or talents.

'Art. 8. Individual liberty is guarantied and protected by the existing
laws. No one shall be deprived of his liberty, or called to justice, if
he be not a transgressor of the law in all the forms prescribed. Every
one detained shall be apprised of the motive of arrest.

'Art. 9. Each person arrested must submit to a delay of three days to
be heard and judged of, according to the forms of law, before competent
tribunals: if he be found innocent, he will instantly obtain his
liberty. He will be equally restored to liberty who shall furnish a
sufficient surety.

'Art. 10. The form of judicial inquests directed against the superior
functionaries of the kingdom, and against persons accused of high
treason, shall be determined by a particular law, the foundation of
which shall be accordant with the other laws of our empire.

'Art. 11. The right of property of individuals, and of corporations,
is declared sacred and inviolable, inasmuch as it will be conformable
to the existing laws. All the subjects of the kingdom of Poland are
perfectly free to quit the country, and to carry away their goods,
provided they conform to the regulations published to that effect.

'Art. 12. The penalty of confiscation shall not be enforced but against
state crimes of the first class, as may be hereafter determined by
particular laws.

'Art. 13. Publication of sentiments, by means of the press, shall
be subjected to restrictions which will protect religion, the
inviolability of superior authority, the interests of morals, and
personal considerations. Particular regulations, to this effect, will
be published according to the principles which serve as a basis to this
object in the other parts of our empire.

'Art. 14. The kingdom of Poland shall proportionably contribute to the
general expenditure and to the wants of the empire. The proportion of
taxes will be stated hereafter.

'Art. 15. All contributions and all taxes which existed in November,
1830, shall be levied after the manner formerly settled till the new
fixing of taxes.

'Art. 16. The treasury of the kingdom of Poland, and all the
other branches of the administration, shall be separated from the
administration of the other parts of the kingdom.

'Art. 17. The public debt of Poland, acknowledged by us, shall be
guarantied as formerly, by the government, and indemnified by the
receipts of the kingdom.

'Art. 18. The bank of the kingdom of Poland, and the laws respecting
credit, shall continue under the protection of Government.

'Art. 19. The mode of commercial transactions between the Russian
empire and the kingdom of Poland shall be regulated according to the
respective interests of the two countries.

'Art. 20. Our army in the empire and in the kingdom shall compose one
in common, without distinction of Russian or Polish troops. We shall
reserve to ourselves a future decision of this, by an especial law,
by what arrangement, and upon what basis, the kingdom of Poland shall
participate with our army. The number of troops which shall serve as
the military defence of the kingdom will be also ultimately determined
upon by a law.

'Art. 21. Those of our subjects of the empire of Russia, who are
established in the kingdom of Poland, who possess or shall possess,
real property in that country, shall enjoy all the rights of natives.
It shall be the same with those of our subjects of the kingdom of
Poland, who shall establish themselves, and shall possess property, in
the other provinces of the empire. We reserve to ourselves to grant
hereafter letters of naturalization to other persons, as well to
strangers as to Russians, who are not yet established there. Those of
our subjects of the Russian empire who may reside for a certain time
in Poland, and those of our subjects of the kingdom of Poland who may
sojourn in the other parts of the empire, are subject to the laws of
the country where they reside.

'Art. 22. The superior administration of the kingdom of Poland is
confided to a council of administration, which shall govern the kingdom
in our name, under the presidency of the governor of the kingdom.

'Art. 23. The council of administration is composed of the governor of
the kingdom, of superior directors, who superintend the commissions,
and among whom are divided the interests of the administration, of
comptroller, presiding over the supreme Chamber of Finance, and of
other members, whom we shall appoint by special orders.'

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 85: Not having a copy of this address in the original, we
make use of a rather unsatisfactory translation, which we find in the
journals of the day.]




LIST OF POLISH NAMES,

_With their Pronunciation in English_.


POLISH ALPHABET.

  a  b   c    d  e  f   g    h  i  j   k  l  m  n  o  p  q

 ah bey tsey dey ey ef ghey hah ye ee kah el em en o pey koo

  r  s   t  u   w  x  y   z.

 err es tey oo voo ix ee zed.

_Note._ In every Polish name, or word, the letters are all sounded and
pronounced, as their names indicate.

Names as spelled in Their pronunciation. Polish.

   A

   Adamski           Ahdamsky
   Augustow          Owgoostov
   Alexota           Ahlexotah

   B

   Bestuzew          Bestoozhev
   Boleslaw-Chrobry  Boleslav-Khrobry
   Biala-Cerkiew     Beahlah-Tseyrkyev
   Bilinski          Belinsky
   Biernacki         Byernatsky
   Bialystok         Beahlistok
   Brzesc            Brzhests
   Boimie            Boimea
   Boguslawski       Bogooslavsky
   Bialolenka        Beahlolenkah
   Bug               Boog
   Bielak            Bieylak
   Berowski          Beyrovsky
   Blendowsky        Blendovsky
   Bystrzyca         Bistrzhitsa
   Berzykowski       Berzhyhkovsky
   Beysogola         Beysogolah
   Bialowiez         Beahlovyezh
   Belzyca           Belzheetsah
   Borowa            Borovah
   Beresteczko       Beyrestechko
   Bady              Bahdy
   Brainsk           Brainsk
   Bielsk            Byelsk
   Bukowski          Bookovsky
   Bialobrzegi       Byahlobrzheygy
   Bocki             Botsky
   Blonie            Blony

   C

   Chlopicki         Khlopitsky
   Chodkiewicz       Khodkyavitch
   Czarnecki         Tcharnetsky
   Czartoryski       Tchartorisky
   Ciechanowiec      Tsyakhanovyets
   Czyzewski         Tcheejevski
   Czaykowski        Tshahovski
   Czarno-morskie    Tcharna-morskyey
   Chlapowski        Khlaposvky
   Ceglow            Tseyglov
   Chrzanowski       Khrzhahnovsky
   Czyzew            Tcheejev
   Czaykiszki        Tchaikishki
   Czenstochowa      Tchenstokhovah
   Cytowiany         Tsetoviahny
   Czarna            Tcharnah
   Ciechanow         Tsyeykhhanov
   Chodzko           Khodzko

   D

   Dembek            Dembek
   Downarowicz       Dovnarovich
   Dombrowski        Dombrovsky
   Diebitsch         Deebich
   Dwernicki         Dvernitsky
   Dobre             Dobrey
   Dembe-Wielkie     Dembey-Vielkye
   Dnieper           Dneeper
   Dembinski         Dembinsky
   Dawgeliszki       Davgalishky
   Dubno             Doobno
   Dlugie-Siodlo     Dloogya-Syodlo
   Dobzyn            Dobzhin.

   G

   Grabowski         Grahbovsky
   Grodno            Grodno
   Grochow           Grokhov
   Granica           Grahnitsah
   Goclaw            Gotslav
   Gotembiewski      Gotembyevsky
   Gielgud           Gyelgood
   Grombkow          Grombkov
   Gruszki           Grooshky
   Galiczyn          Gahlichyn
   Graiewo           Grahyeyvo
   Gielgudyszki      Gyelgoodishky
   Gury-Konarskie    Goory-Konarskya
   Gorzdy            Gorsdy
   Giedroyc          Gyedroits

   H

   Hauke             Houka
   Hildebrand        Hildeybrand
   Hurtig            Hoortig

   J

   Jablonowski       Yablonovsky
   Jgelstrom         Eegelstrom
   Jurgaszko         Yoorgashko
   Jezierski         Yazhyersky
   Jadow             Yahdov
   Jablonna          Yablonnah
   Jakubow           Yahkoobov
   Januwek           Yahnoovek
   Jankowski         Yankovsky
   Jendrzeiow        Yendrzhagov
   Jarburg           Yarboorg
   Jagiellow         Yahgyellov
   Jedlina           Yedlenah
   Janow             Yahnov
   Jeroma            Yaroma

   K

   Kosciuszko        Kostchioushko
   Krzyzanowski      Krzhezhanovsky
   Kichelbeker       Keekhelbaker
   Kachowski         Kakhovsky
   Krasinski         Krahsinsky
   Kornatowski       Kornahtovsky
   Kozienice         Kozhyanetsey
   Krukowiecki       Krookovyetsky
   Kock              Kotsk
   Kaluszyn          Kahlooshyn
   Kostrzyn          Kostrzhyn
   Konik             Konyik
   Kawenczyn         Kahvenchyn
   Kicki             Keetsky
   Krasny-taw        Krasneestav
   Kozieradzki       Kozhyaradzky
   Karczew           Karchev
   Kurow             Koorov
   Konskawola        Konskahvolah
   Keydany           Kaydahny
   Kowno             Kovno
   Kazimierz         Kahzheemyerzh
   Kolodno           Kolodno
   Krzemieniece      Krzheymyeynyets
   Knielce           Knyeltsa
   Kuflew            Kooflev
   Kolacze           Kolachey
   Kamionka          Kahmyonkah
   Kleczkowo         Klechkovo
   Kaminski          Kaminsky
   Koss              Koss
   Kalwaryia         Kalvahreya
   Karwowska         Kavovskah
   Kurzany           Koorzhahny
   Kikiernicki       Kekyornitsky
   Kniaziewicz       Knyahzyavich

   L

   Lubowidzki        Looboveedzky
   Lazienki          Lahzhyenky
   Lelewel           Leyleyvel
   Lubecki           Loobetsky
   Lubinski          Loobinsky
   Lowicz            Lovich
   Lubomirska        Loobomeerskah
   Lenczna           Lenchnah
   Lukow             Lookov
   Lublin            Looblin
   Liwiec            Levyets
   Leduchowski       Leydookhovsky
   Lagowski          Lahgovsky
   Lewandowski       Leyvandovsky
   Latowicz          Lahtovich
   Lipawa            Lepahvah
   Lukowiec          Lookovyets
   Lomza             Lomzah
   Lubartow          Loobartov
   Lubania           Loobahnyah
   Lipinska          Lepinskah
   Lida              Ledah
   Lysobyki          Lysobyky
   Laskarzew         Laskarzhev
   Laga              Lahgah
   Luberacz          Loobeyrach

   M

   Murawiew          Mooravyev
   Mieciszewski      Myatsishevsky
   Mokotow           Mokotov
   Miendzyrzyc       Myenjeerzhyts
   Makowiec          Mahkovyets
   Minsk             Minsk
   Macieiowice       Matsyaovcetsa
   Mingosy           Mingosy
   Milosna           Melosna
   Makow             Mahkov
   Malachowski       Mahlahkhovsky
   Maslowski         Maslovsky
   Markuszew         Markushev
   Magnuszewo        Magnooshavo
   Memel             Mamel
   Mycielski         Meetsyelsky
   Modlin            Modlin
   Milatyn           Meelahtyn
   Mordy             Mordy
   Modzele           Modzala
   Mniszew           Mneshev
   Menzynin          Menzhenin
   Malinowski        Mahlenovsky
   Mlawa             Mlahvah
   Matusiewicz       Mahtoosyavich
   Myszogola         Meshogolah
   Michalowski       Mekhahlovsky
   Maluszyn          Mahlooshyn
   Morawski          Moravsky

   N

   Niemcewicz        Nyemtseyvich
   Nasielsk          Nahsyelsk
   Narew             Nahrev
   Nowawies          Novah-vies
   Nowy-dwor         Novy-dvor
   Niewiaza          Nyavyahzhah
   Narewska          Nahrevkah
   Nurzec            Noorzhets
   Neydenburg        Nidenboorg
   Nowe-miasto       Nova-myasto
   Nadarzyn          Nahdarzhyn

   O

   Ostrowski         Ostrovsky
   Ostrolenka        Ostrolenkah
   Orsyca            Orseetsah
   Okuniew           Okoonyev
   Osmiany           Osmyahny
   Ostrog            Ostrog
   Orla              Orlah
   Oyrany            Oyrahny

   P

   Plichta           Plikhtah
   Pestel            Pestel
   Potocki           Pototsky
   Poniatowski       Ponyahtovsky
   Powonzki          Povonsky
   Pac               Pats
   Pultusk           Pooltoosk
   Parczewo          Parchavo
   Praga             Prahgah
   Pientka           Pyentkah
   Paszkiewicz       Pashkyavich
   Pulawy            Poolahoy
   Polonga           Polongah
   Prondzynski       Proodzynsky
   Piast             Pyast
   Plomieniec        Plomyanyets
   Proskirow         Proskerov
   Piaski            Pyasky
   Poznan            Pornan
   Prasynsz          Prasnysh
   Plater            Plahter
   Podbrzeze         Podbrzhazha
   Piwecki           Pevetsky
   Pawenduny         Pahvendoony
   Piaseczno         Pyasechno

   R

   Rozniecki         Rozhnyetsky
   Releiew           Reyleyiev
   Rukiewicz         Rookyavich
   Ruda              Roodah
   Ryczywol          Reecheevol
   Radom             Rahdom
   Radomierza        Rahdomyerzhah
   Radzimin          Rahjeemin
   Rybinski          Reebinsky
   Rozany            Rozhahny
   Rosseyny          Rosseyny
   Radziwil          Rahjecvel
   Radziwilow        Rahjeevelov
   Raygrod           Raigrod
   Rumszyski         Roomshysky
   Rewdany           Revdahny
   Rasinowicz        Rahsenovich
   Retow             Retov
   Racioncz          Rahtsyonzh
   Ruzycki           Roozhytsky

   S

   Sokolnicki        Sokolnitsky
   Soltyk            Soltyk
   Szlegel           Shleygel
   Suwarow           Soovahrov
   Sobieski          Sobyesky
   Sapieha           Sahpyahah
   Szulec            Shoolets
   Siemiontkowski    Syamyontkovsky
   Skrzynecki        Skrzhynetsky
   Szembek           Shembek
   Sierawski         Syeyravsky
   Siedlce           Syedltsa
   Serock            Seyrotsk
   Stryinski         Stryinsky
   Seroczyn          Serochyn
   Sokolow           Sokolov
   Stoczek           Stochek
   Swider            Sveder
   Stanislawow       Stahneslahvov
   Swierza           Svyerzhah
   Szachowski        Shakhovsky
   Skarzynski        Skarkhynsky
   Siekierki         Syakerky
   Sznayder          Shnider
   Szuszerin         Shoosherin
   Siennica          Syenneetsah
   Szymanski         Shymansky
   Szawla            Shavlah
   Swienciany        Svyentsyahny
   Szerwinty         Shervinty
   Sucha             Sookhah
   Styr              Styr
   Stary-Konstantynow  Stahry-Konstantenov
   Starygrod         Stahregrod
   Stoiadly          Stoyadly
   Strzebucza        Strzhaboocha
   Suraz             Sooraz
   Sierakowski       Syeyrahkovsky
   Szymanowski       Shemahnovsky
   Szczuczyn         Shchoochyn
   Suwalki           Soovalky
   Swieta            Svieytah
   Salacki           Sahlatsky
   Slupecki          Sloopeytsky
   Sloboda           Slobodah
   Sonk              Sonk
   Siemiatycze       Syamyahtecha

   T

   Tarnowski         Tarnovsky
   Trembicki         Trembitski
   Turno             Toorno
   Targowek          Targovek
   Troki             Troky
   Tarnopol          Tarnopol
   Tarnogura         Tarnogoorah
   Troszyn           Troshyn
   Tykocin           Tykotsin

   U

   Uminski           Oominski
   Uscilug           Oostseloog
   Uchania           Ookhanyah

   W

   Wigielin          Vegyalen
   Wielkaniee        Vyelkahneetsa
   Wiliaminow        Velyahmeenov
   Wyzechowski       Vezhakhovsky
   Wysocki           Vesotsky
   Wengrzecki        Vengrzhetsky
   Wonsowicz         Vonsovich
   Wolicki           Volitsky
   Wlodawa           Vlodahvah
   Wielezynski       Vealazhynsky
   Wengrow           Vengrov
   Wawr              Vavr
   Wkra              Vkrah
   Wilanow           Velahnov
   Wodynie           Vodenya
   Wieprz            Vyeyprzh
   Wilno             Vilno
   Wilkomierz        Vilkomyerzh
   Wereszczaki       Vareshchahky
   Wielkie           Vyelkya
   Wyszkow           Vyshkov
   Wroclaw           Vrotslav
   Wiliia            Veleyah
   Worna             Vornah
   Wierzbna          Vyerzhbnah

   Z

   Zamoyski          Zahmoisky
   Zymirski          Zymeersky
   Zegrz             Zeygrzh
   Zlotoria          Zlotoryah
   Zelechow          Zheyleykhov
   Ziemiecki         Zyeymyeytsky
   Zombky            Zombky
   Zagroby           Zahgroby
   Zaluski           Zahloosky
   Zoliborz          Zoleborzh
   Zimna-woda        Zimna-vodah
   Zamosc            Zahmosts
   Zambrowo          Zambrovo
   Zeymy             Zaymy
   Zawadzka          Zahvadzkah
   Zaliwski          Zahlivsky
   Zabiello          Zabyello


[Transcribers Note: Original spelling of names and place-names
has been retained]












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