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Title: The Etymology and Syntax of the English Language Explained and Illustrated

Author: Alexander Crombie

Release date: February 14, 2021 [eBook #64554]

Language: English

Credits: Turgut Dincer, John Campbell and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ETYMOLOGY AND SYNTAX OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED ***




  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

  Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been
  placed at the end of the book.

  Contractions such as ’tis are displayed as in the original text,
  so they sometimes have a space (’t is).

  Several letters from Old English (Anglo-Saxon) and the Insular script
  are used. These will display on this device as:

      ð eth
      þ thorn
      ħ h with stroke
      ꝼ insular f
      ꞃ insular r
      ꞅ insular s
      ꞇ insular t

  There are several words and phrases in Greek and Hebrew. These may
  display imperfectly on some devices.

  The many tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font.

  Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.




                                 THE

                         ETYMOLOGY AND SYNTAX

                                OF THE

                           ENGLISH LANGUAGE

                       EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED.


                       BY THE REV. ALEX. CROMBIE,
                    LL.D. F.R.S. M.R.S.L. AND F.Z.S.


                            SEVENTH EDITION.


                                LONDON:
                       SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, AND CO.,
                         STATIONERS’ HALL COURT.

                                 1853.




  LONDON:
  GEORGE WOODFALL AND SON,
  ANGEL COURT, SKINNER STREET.




PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.


The success with which the principles of any art or science are
investigated, is generally proportioned to the number of those, whose
labours are directed to its cultivation and improvement. Inquiry is
necessarily the parent of knowledge; error itself, proceeding from
discussion, leads ultimately to the establishment of truth.

Were we to estimate our progress in the knowledge of English grammar
from the number of works already published on the subject, we should
perhaps be prompted to infer, that in afield so circumscribed,
and at the same time so often and so ably explored, no object
worthy of notice could have escaped attention. And yet in this, as
in every other art or science, strict examination will convince
us, that, though much may have been accomplished, still much
remains, to stimulate the industry, and exercise the ingenuity, of
future inquirers. The author indeed is fully persuaded, that it
is impossible to examine the English language with any degree of
critical accuracy, and not perceive, that its syntactical principles
especially are yet but imperfectly illustrated, and that there are
many of its idioms, which have entirely eluded the attention of our
grammarians. That these defects are all supplied by the present work,
the author is far from having the vanity to believe. That he has
examined a few peculiarities, and elucidated some principles, which
have escaped the observation of other grammarians, he trusts the
intelligent reader will remark.

The Treatise, the second edition of which now solicits the notice
of the public, is intended chiefly for the improvement of those,
who have made some advancement in classic literature. That an
acquaintance with Greek and Latin facilitates the acquisition
of every other language, and that by a knowledge of these the
classical scholar is therefore materially assisted in attaining
a critical acquaintance with his native tongue, it would argue
extreme perversity to deny. But that an extensive knowledge of Greek
and Latin is often associated with an imperfect and superficial
acquaintance with the principles of the English language, is a
fact, which experience demonstrates, and it would not be difficult
to explain. To make any tolerable progress in a classical course,
without acquiring a general knowledge of English grammar, is
indeed impossible; yet to finish that course, without any correct
acquaintance with the mechanism of the English language, or any
critical knowledge of its principles, is an occurrence neither
singular nor surprising. No language whatever can be critically
learned, but by careful study of its general structure, and peculiar
principles. To assist the classical scholar in attaining a correct
acquaintance with English grammar, is the chief, though not the sole,
end for which the present Treatise was composed. That it is, in some
degree, calculated to answer this purpose, the author, from its
reception, is willing to believe.

His obligations to his predecessors in the same department of
literature, he feels it his duty to acknowledge. He trusts, at the
same time, that the intelligent reader will perceive, that he has
neither copied with servility nor implicitly adopted the opinions
of others; but has, in every question, exercised his own judgment,
in observance of that respect, which all men owe to truth, and
consistently, he hopes, with that deference, which is confessedly due
to transcendent talents.

The Treatise, he believes, contains some original observations. That
all of these deserve to be honoured with a favourable verdict in the
court of Criticism, he has neither the presumption to insinuate,
nor the vanity to suppose. If they be found subservient to the
elucidation of any controverted point, be the ultimate decision what
it may, the author will attain his aim.

The work having been composed amidst the solicitudes and distractions
of a laborious profession, the author has reason to apprehend, that
some verbal inaccuracies may have escaped his attention. But, in
whatever other respects the diction may be faulty, he trusts at
least, that it is not chargeable with obscurity; and that he may be
able to say, in the humble language of the poet,

          ... “Ergo, fungar vice cotis, acutum
      Reddere quæ ferrum valet, exsors ipsa secandi.”
                                       _Hor. Art. Poet._

  Greenwich.




PREFACE

TO THE THIRD EDITION.


The following work, which has been for some time out of print, having
been favoured with the gratifying approbation of the Rev. Professor
Dale, and selected by that learned and worthy preceptor, as one of
the text books for the class of English literature in the University
of London, a new edition has become necessary. The author’s time
and attention having been recently devoted to another publication,
which was not completed until it became indispensable that this
volume should be sent to press, the only additions here introduced
are such as occurred to the author while the work was proceeding
through the hands of the printer. They will be found, however, to
be in number not inconsiderable; and it is hoped, that in quality
they will be thought not unworthy of the student’s attention. They
consist chiefly of examples of solecism and impropriety, accompanied
with such critical remarks as these errors have suggested, and such
illustrations as they seemed to require. This mode of enlargement
the author has preferred, persuaded of the truth of Dr. Lowth’s
observation, that one of the most successful methods of conveying
instruction is, “to teach what is right, by showing what is wrong.”

  York Terrace, Regent’s Park.




                            CONTENTS.


      INTRODUCTION.
                                                   PAGE

  Of Language in general, and the English Alphabet    1


          PART I.

  OF ETYMOLOGY                                       12


      CHAPTER I.

  Of the Noun                                        16


      CHAPTER II.

  Of the Article                                     38


      CHAPTER III.

  Of the Pronoun                                     50


      CHAPTER IV.

  Of the Adjective                                   64


      CHAPTER V.

  Of the Verb                                        77


      CHAPTER VI.

  Of the Participle                                 102


      CHAPTER VII.

  Of Adverbs                                        142


      CHAPTER VIII.

  Of Prepositions                                   145


      CHAPTER IX.

  Of Conjunctions                                   153


      CHAPTER X.

  Of Interjections                                  160


          PART II.

  OF SYNTAX                                         161


          PART III.

      CHAPTER I.

  CANONS OF CRITICISM                               224


      CHAPTER II.

  Critical Remarks and Illustrations.

    SECT. I.--The Noun                              236

    SECT. II.--The Adjective                        244

    SECT. III.--The Pronoun                         254

    SECT. IV.--The Verb                             264

    SECT. V.--The Adverb                            284

    SECT. VI.--The Preposition                      290

    SECT. VII.--The Conjunction                     293




                        ETYMOLOGY AND SYNTAX

                                 OF

                        THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.




INTRODUCTION.


Language consists of intelligible signs, and is the medium by which
the mind communicates its thoughts. It is either articulate or
inarticulate; artificial or natural. The former is peculiar to man;
the latter is common to all animals. By inarticulate language, we
mean those instinctive sounds, or cries, by which the several tribes
of inferior creatures are enabled to express their sensations and
desires. By articulate language is understood a system of expression,
composed of simple sounds, differently modified by the organs of
speech, and variously combined.

Man, like every other animal, has a natural language intelligible
to all of his own species. This language, however, is extremely
defective, being confined entirely to the general expression of
joy, grief, fear, and the other passions or emotions of the mind;
it is, therefore, wholly inadequate to the purposes of rational
intercourse, and the infinitely-diversified ideas of an intelligent
being. Hence arises the necessity of an artificial or articulate
language; a necessity coeval with the existence of man in his rudest
state, increasing also with the enlargement of his ideas, and the
improvement of his mind. Man, therefore, was formed capable of
speech. Nature has furnished him with the necessary organs, and with
ingenuity to render them subservient to his purposes. And though
at first his vocabulary was doubtless scanty, as his wants were
simple, and his exigencies few, his language and his intellect would
naturally keep pace. As the latter improved, the former would be
enlarged.

Oral language, we have reason to suppose, continued long to be
the only medium by which knowledge could be imparted, or social
intercourse maintained. But, in the progress of science, various
methods were devised for attaining a more permanent and more
extensive vehicle of thought. Of these, the earliest were, as
some think, picture-writing and hieroglyphics. Visible objects
and external events were delineated by pictures, while immaterial
things were emblematically expressed by figures representative of
such physical objects as bore some conceived analogy or resemblance
to the thing to be expressed. These figures or devices were termed
hieroglyphics[1]. It is obvious, however, that this medium of
communication must not only have embarrassed by its obscurity, but
must have also been extremely deficient in variety of expression.

At length oral language, by an effort of ingenuity which must ever
command admiration, was resolved into its simple or elementary
sounds, and these were characterized by appropriate symbols[2].
Words, the signs of thought, came thus to be represented by letters,
or characters arbitrarily formed, to signify the different sounds
of which the words were severally composed. The simplest elementary
part of written language is, therefore, a letter: and the elements or
letters into which the words of any language may be analyzed, form
the necessary alphabet of that language.

In the English alphabet are twenty-six letters.

  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z.
  a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z.

Of these there are six vowels, or letters which by themselves
make every one a perfect sound. The remaining twenty are called
consonants, or letters which cannot be sounded without a vowel.

This alphabet is both redundant and defective. It is redundant; for
of the vowels, the letters _i_ and _y_ are in sound the same: one of
them therefore is unnecessary. Of the consonants, the articulator
_c_ having sometimes the sound of _k_, and sometimes of _s_, one
of these must be unnecessary. _Q_, having in all cases the sound
of _k_, may likewise be deemed superfluous. _W_ appears to me in
every respect the same with the vowel _u_ (_oo_), and is therefore
supernumerary[3]. The double consonant _x_ might be denoted by the
combination of its component letters, _gs_ or _ks_.

It is to be observed also, that _g_, when it has the soft sound, is
a double consonant, and performs the same office as the letter _j_;
each having a sound compounded of the sounds of _d_ and the French
_j_. Thus, _g_ in _general_ has the same sound as _j_ in _join_. _J_,
however, is not, as some have supposed, resolvable into two letters,
for we have no character to express the simple sound of the French
_j_, of which, with the consonant _d_, the sound of the English
_j_ is compounded. To resolve it into _dg_, as some have done, is
therefore an error; as the soft _g_, without the aid of the other
consonant, is precisely identical, in respect to sound, with the
consonant _j_. The letter _h_ is no consonant; it is merely the note
of aspiration.

Our alphabet is likewise defective. There are nine simple vowel
sounds, for which we have only six characters, two of which, as it
has been already observed, perform the same office. The simple vowel
sounds are heard in these words,

  Hall, hat, hate, met, mete, fin, hop, hope, but, full.

Some of these characters occasionally perform the office of
diphthongs. Thus, in the word _fine_, the vowel _i_ has the
diphthongal sound of the letters _â è_, as these are pronounced in
French; and the vowel _u_ frequently represents the diphthong _eu_
(e-oo), as fume (fe-oom).

There are, besides, four different consonants for which we have no
proper letters; namely, the initial consonant in the word _thin_, the
initial consonant in _then_, the sibilating sound of _sh_, and the
final consonant (marked _ng_), as in the word _sing_.

Consonants are generally divided into mutes and semi-vowels. The
mutes are those which entirely, and at once, obstruct the sound of
the vowel, and prevent its continuation. These are called perfect
mutes. Those which do not suddenly obstruct it are called imperfect
mutes.

Semi-vowels are those consonants which do not entirely obstruct the
voice: but whose sounds may be continued at pleasure, thus partaking
of the nature of vowels.

The nature of these consonants I proceed briefly to explain.

A vowel sound may be continued at pleasure, or it may be terminated,
either by discontinuing the vocal effort, in which case it is not
articulated by any consonant, as in pronouncing the vowel _o_; or by
changing the conformation of the mouth, or relative position of the
organs of speech, so that the vowel sound is lost by articulation,
as in pronouncing the syllable _or_. It is to be observed, also,
that a vowel may be articulated, not only by being terminated by a
consonant, as in the example now given, but likewise by introducing
the sound with that position of the organs, by which it had, in the
former case, been terminated, as in pronouncing the syllable _ro_.

In pronouncing the consonants, there are five distinguishable
positions of the organs[4]. The first is the application of the
lips to each other, so as to close the mouth. Thus are formed the
consonants _p_, _b_, and _m_.

In the second position, the under lip is applied to the fore teeth of
the upper jaw; and in this manner we pronounce the consonants _f_ and
_v_.

The third position is, when the tongue is applied to the fore teeth;
and thus we pronounce _th_.

In the fourth position we apply the fore part of the tongue to the
fore part of the palate, and by this application we pronounce the
letters _t_, _d_, _s_, _z_, _r_, _l_, _n_.

The fifth position is, when the middle part of the tongue is applied
to the palate, and thus we pronounce _k_, the hard sound of _g_ (as
in _ga_), _sh_, _j_, and _ng_.

In the first position we have three letters, of which the most
simple, and indeed the only articulator, being absolutely mute, is
_p_. In the formation of this letter, nothing is required but the
sudden closing of the mouth, and stopping the vowel sound; or the
sound may be articulated by the sudden opening of the lips, in order
to emit the compressed sound of the vowel.

Now, if instead of simply expressing the vowel sound by opening the
lips, in saying for example _pa_, we shall begin to form a guttural
sound, the position being still preserved; then, on opening the lips,
we shall pronounce the syllable _ba_. The guttural sound is produced
by a compression of the larynx, or windpipe; and is that kind of
murmur, as Bishop Wilkins expresses it, which is heard in the throat,
before the breath is emitted with the vocal sound. _B_, therefore,
though justly considered as a mute, is not a perfect mute.

The mouth being kept in the same position, and the breath being
emitted through the nostrils, the letter _m_ is produced.

In the first position, therefore, we have a perfect mute _p_, having
no audible sound; a labial and liquid consonant _m_, capable of a
continued sound; and between these two extremes we have the letter
_b_, somewhat audible, though different from any vocal sound.

Here, then, are three things to be distinguished. 1st, The perfect
mute, having no sound of any kind: 2dly, The perfect consonant,
having not only a proper, but continued sound: and 3dly, Between
these extremes we find the letter _b_, having a proper sound, but so
limited, that, in respect to the perfect consonant, it may be termed
a mute, and in relation to the perfect mute may be properly termed
imperfect.

In the second position, we have the letters _f_ and _v_, neither
of which are perfect mutes. The letter _f_ is formed by having the
aspiration not altogether interrupted, but emitted forcibly between
the fore teeth and under lip. This is the simple articulation in this
position. If to this we join the guttural sound, we shall have the
letter _v_, a letter standing in nearly the same relation to _f_, as
_b_ and _m_, in the first position, stand to _p_. The only difference
between _f_ and _v_ is, that, in the former, the compression of the
teeth and under lip is not so strong as in the latter; and that the
former is produced by the breath only, and the latter by the voice
and breath combined.

The consonant _f_, therefore, though not a mute like _p_, in having
the breath absolutely confined, may notwithstanding be considered as
such, consistently with that principle, by which a mute is understood
to be an aspiration without guttural sound.

Agreeably to the distinction already made, _v_ may be termed a
perfect consonant, and _f_ an imperfect one, having no proper sound,
though audible. Thus we have four distinctions in our consonantal
alphabet; namely, of perfect and imperfect consonants; perfect and
imperfect mutes: thus,

_p_ is a perfect mute, having no sound.

_b_ an imperfect mute, having proper sound, but limited.

_m_ a perfect consonant, having sound, and continued.

_f_ an imperfect consonant, having no sound, but audible.

In the third position we have _th_ as heard in the words _then_ and
_thin_, formed by placing the tip of the tongue between the teeth,
and pressing it against the upper teeth. The only difference between
these articulations is, that like _f_ and _v_, the one is formed by
the breath only, and the other by the breath and voice together[5].

Here also may be distinguished the perfect and the imperfect
consonant; for the _th_ in _thin_ has no sound, but is audible,
whereas the _th_ in _this_, _there_, has a sound, and that
continued[6].

In the fourth position there are several consonants formed.

1st, If the breath be stopped, by applying the fore part of the
tongue forcibly to that part of the palate, which is contiguous to
the fore teeth, we produce the perfect mute _t_, having neither
aspiration nor guttural sound. By accompanying this operation of the
tongue and palate with the guttural sound, we shall pronounce the
letter _d_, which, like _b_, of the first position, may be considered
as a mute, though not perfect. For in pronouncing _ed_, the tongue at
first gently touches the gum, and is gradually pressed closer, till
the sound is obstructed; whereas in pronouncing _et_, the tongue is
at once pressed so close, that the sound is instantly intercepted.

2dly, If the tip of the tongue be turned up towards the upper gum,
so as not to touch it, and thus the breath be cut by the sharp point
of the tongue passing through the narrow chink left between that and
the gum, we pronounce the sibilating sound of _s_. If we accompany
this operation with a guttural sound, as in _b_, _v_, and _th_ in
_then_, we shall pronounce the letter _z_; the same difference
subsisting between _s_ and _z_ as between _f_ and _v_, _p_ and _b_,
_tħ_ and _th_.

3dly, If we make the tip of the tongue vibrate rapidly between the
upper and lower jaw, so as not to touch the latter, and the former
but gently, we shall pronounce the letter _r_. The more closely and
forcibly the tongue vibrates against the upper jaw, the stronger will
the sound be rendered. It is formed about the same distance from the
teeth as the letter _d_, or rather somewhat behind it.

4thly, If the end of the tongue be gently applied to the fore part of
the palate, a little behind the seat of the letter _d_, and somewhat
before the place of _r_, and the voice be suffered to glide gently
over the sides of the tongue, we shall pronounce the letter _l_. Here
the breadth of the tongue is contracted, and a space left for the
breath to pass from the upper to the under part of the tongue, in
forming this the most vocal of all the consonants.

5thly, If the aspirating passage, in the formation of the preceding
consonant, be stopped, by extending the tongue to its natural
breadth, so as to intercept the voice, and prevent its exit by the
mouth, the breath emitted through the nose will give the letter _n_.

In the fifth position, namely, when we apply the middle or back part
of the tongue to the palate, we have the consonants _k_, _g_, _sh_,
_j_, and _ng_.

If the middle of the tongue be raised, so as to press closely against
the roof of the mouth, and intercept the voice at once, we pronounce
the letter _k_ (_ek_). If the tongue be not so closely applied at
first, and the sound be allowed to continue a little, we have the
letter _g_ (_eg_). Thus _ek_ and _eg_ bear the same analogy to each
other, as _et_ and _ed_ of the fourth position. If the tongue be
protruded towards the teeth, so as not to touch them, and be kept in
a position somewhat flatter than in pronouncing the letter _s_, the
voice and breath passing over it through a wider chink, we shall have
the sound of _esh_.

If we apply the tongue to the palate as in pronouncing _sh_, but a
little more forcibly, and accompanying it with the guttural sound, we
shall have the sound of the French _j_. Thus _j_ is in this position
analogous to the letters _b_, _v_, _th_, in the first, second, and
third positions, and is a simple consonant: _j_ in English is a
double consonant, compounded of _d_ and the French _j_, as in _join_.

If we raise the middle of the tongue to the palate gently, so as
to permit part of the voice to issue through the mouth, forcing
the remainder back through the nose, keeping at the same time the
tongue in the same position as in pronouncing _eg_, we shall have the
articulating sound of _ing_, for which we have no simple character.

The only remaining letter _h_ is the note of aspiration, formed in
various positions, according to the vowel with which it is combined.

The characters of the several letters may be seen in the following
table:

  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |Perfect|Sounded, or| Imperfect |        |
  | Mutes.| Imperfect.|Consonants.|Perfect.|
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |   P   |     B     |           |        |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |       |           |           |   M    |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |       |           |     F     |   V    |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |       |           |    tħ     | th the |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |   T   |     D     |           |        |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |       |           |     S     |   Z    |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |       |           |           |   R    |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |       |           |           |   L    |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |       |           |           |   N    |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |   K   |     G     |           |        |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |       |           |    Sh     |J French|
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+
  |       |           |           |  ng    |
  +-------+-----------+-----------+--------+

What effect the compression of the larynx has in articulation may be
seen by comparing these pairs of consonants:

  With compression.   Without compression.
          B                     P
          G                     K
          D                     T
          Z                     S
          Th                    Tħ
          V                     F
          J                     Sh

These, as Mr. Tooke observes, differ, each from its partner, by a
certain unnoticed and almost imperceptible motion or compression of
or near the larynx. This compression, he remarks, the Welsh never
use. For instead of

  I vow by God, that Jenkin is a wizard;

they say,

  I fow by Cot, that Shenkin iss a wisart.

The consonants have been distributed into different classes,
according to the organs chiefly employed in their formation.

  The Labial are  eb, ep, ef, ev.
      Dental      ed, et, etħ, eth.
      Palatal     eg, ek, el, er, ess, esh, ez, ej.
      Nasal       em, en, ing.

The association of two vowels, whether the sound of each be heard or
not, is called a diphthong, and the concurrence of three is called a
triphthong.

Of diphthongs there are twenty, viz. _ai_, _au_, _ea_, _ee_,
_ei_, _eo_, _eu_, _ie_, _oa_, _oo_, _ui_, _ay_, _ey_, _uy_, _oi_,
_oy_, _ou_, _aw_, _ew_, _ow_. Of the diphthongs seventeen have a
sound purely monophthongal; hence they have been called improper
diphthongs. It would be idle to dispute the propriety of a term
almost universally adopted; but to call that a diphthong whose sound
is monophthongal is an abuse of language, and creates confusion. The
only proper diphthongs in our language are _eu_, _oi_, _ou_, in which
each vowel is distinctly heard, forming together one syllable. The
triphthongs are three, _eau_, _ieu_, _iew_. Of these, the first _eau_
is sometimes pronounced _eu_, as in _beauty_; sometimes _o_, as in
_beau_: the other two have the diphthongal sound of _eu_.




PART I.

ETYMOLOGY.

OF WORDS IN GENERAL, AND THE PARTS OF SPEECH.


A word, in oral language, is either a significant simple sound, or
a significant combination of sounds. In written language, it may
be defined to be a simple character, or combination of characters,
expressive of significant sounds, simple or compound.

A word of one syllable is called a monosyllable; of two syllables, a
dissyllable; a word of three syllables, a trisyllable; and a word of
more than three syllables is called a polysyllable. The last term,
however, is frequently applied to words exceeding two syllables.

Words are either derivative or primitive.

A primitive is that which is formed from no other word, being itself
a root, whence others spring, as _angel_, _spirit_, _school_.

A derivative is that which is derived from some other word, as
_angelic_, _spiritual_, _scholar_.

A compound is a word made up of two or more words, as _archangel_,
_spiritless_, _schoolman_.

In examining the character of words as significant of ideas, we find
them reducible into classes, or denominations, according to the
offices which they severally perform. These classes are generally
called parts of speech; and how many of these belong to language has
long been a question among philosophers and grammarians. Some have
reckoned two, some three, and others four; while the generality have
affirmed, that there are not fewer than eight, nine, or ten[7]. This
strange diversity of opinion has partly arisen from a propensity to
judge of the character of words more from their form, which is a
most fallacious criterion, than from their import or signification.
One thing appears certain, how much soever the subject may have been
obscured by scholastic refinements, that to assign names to objects
of thought, and to express their properties and qualities, are the
only indispensable requisites in language. If this be admitted, it
follows, that the noun and the verb are the only parts of speech
which are essentially necessary; the former being the name of the
thing of which we speak, and the latter, verb, (or _the word_, by way
of eminence,) expressing what we think of it[8]. All other sorts of
words must be regarded as subsidiaries, convenient perhaps for the
more easy communication of thought, but by no means indispensably
requisite.

Had we a distinct name for every individual object of sensation
or thought, language would then be composed purely of proper
names, and thus become too great a load for any memory to retain.
Language, therefore, must be composed of general signs, that it may
be remembered; and as all our sensations and perceptions are of
single objects, it must also be capable of denoting individuals.
Now, whatever mode be adopted to render general terms significant
of individual objects, or whatever auxiliaries be employed for
this purpose, the general term, with its individuating word, must
be regarded as a substitute for the proper name. Thus _man_ is a
general term to denote the whole of a species; if I say, _the man_,
_this man_, _that man_, it is obvious that the words _the_, _this_,
and _that_, termed definitives, serve, with the general term, as a
substitute for the proper name of the individual.

Hence it is evident, that those words which are termed definitives,
how useful soever, cannot be regarded as indispensable.

The pronoun is clearly a substitute for the noun: it cannot therefore
be deemed essential. The adjective expressing merely the property
or quality _in concreto_, without affirmation, may be dispensed
with; the connexion of a substance with a quality or property
being expressible by the noun and the verb. Thus, “a good man” is
equivalent to “a man _of_, _with_, or _having_, goodness.” Adverbs,
which have been termed attributes of the second order, are nothing
but abbreviations, as, _here_, for _in this place_, _bravely_, for
_brave like_. These, therefore, cannot be considered as essentials
in language. In the same manner it might be shown, that all parts
of speech, noun and verb excepted, are either substitutes or
abbreviations, convenient indeed, but not indispensably requisite.
But, as there will be occasion to illustrate this theory, when the
generally received parts of speech are severally examined, it is
unnecessary to enlarge on the subject at present.

Though the essential parts of speech in every language are only two,
the noun and the verb; yet, as there is in all languages a number of
words not strictly reducible to either of these primary divisions,
it has been usual with grammarians to arrange words into a variety
of different classes. This distribution is partly arbitrary, there
being no definite or universally-received principle, by which to
determine what discriminative circumstances are sufficient to entitle
any species of words to the distinction of a separate order. Hence
grammarians are not agreed concerning the number of these subordinate
classes. But, into whatever number of denominations they may be
distributed, it should be always remembered, that the only necessary
parts of speech are noun and verb; every other species of words being
admitted solely for despatch or ornament. The parts of speech in
English may be reckoned ten: Noun, Article, Pronoun, Adjective, Verb,
Participle, Adverb, Preposition, Conjunction, Interjection.




CHAPTER I.

OF THE NOUN.


SECTION I.

Noun (Nomen) is that part of speech which expresses the subject of
discourse, or which is the name of the thing spoken of, as, _table_,
_house_, _river_.

Of nouns there are two kinds, proper and appellative.

A proper noun, or name, is the name of an individual, as _Alexander_,
_London_, _Vesuvius_.

An appellative, or common noun, expresses a genus, or class of
things, and is common or applicable to every individual of that class.

Nouns or Substantives (for these terms are equivalent) have also been
divided into natural, artificial, and abstract. Of the first class,
_man_, _horse_, _tree_, are examples. The names of things of our own
formation are termed artificial substantives, as, _watch_, _house_,
_ship_. The names of qualities or properties, conceived as existing
by themselves, or separated from the substances to which they belong,
are called abstract nouns; while Adjectives, expressing these
qualities as conjoined with their subjects, are called concretes.
_Hard_, for example, is termed the concrete, _hardness_ the abstract.

Nouns have also been considered as denoting genera, species, and
individuals. Thus _man_ is a generic term, _an Englishman_ a special
term, and _George_ an individual. Appellative nouns being employed
to denote genera or species, and these orders comprising each many
individuals, hence arises that accident of a common noun, called
Number, by which we signify, whether one or more individuals of any
genus or species be intended.

In English there are two numbers, the singular and the plural. The
singular, expressing only one of a class or genus, is the noun in
its simple form, as, _river_; the plural, denoting more than one,
is generally formed by adding the letter s to the singular, as,
_rivers_[9]. To this rule, however, there are many exceptions.

Nouns ending in _ch_, _sh_, _ss_, or _x_, form their plural by adding
the syllable _es_ to the singular number, as, _church, churches_.
Dr. Whately, (Archbishop of Dublin,) in violation of this universal
rule, writes _premiss_ in the singular number, and _premises_ in the
plural. (See his Logic, pp. 25, 26.) _Premise_, like _promise_, is
the proper term, and makes _premises_ in the plural. _Premiss_ and
_premises_ are repugnant to all analogy.--_Ch_ hard takes _s_ for
the plural termination, and not _es_, as _patriarch, patriarchs_;
_distich, distichs_.

Nouns ending in _f_ or _fe_, make their plural by changing _f_ or
_fe_ into _ves_, as, _calf, calves_; _knife, knives_. Except _hoof_,
_roof_, _grief_, _dwarf_, _mischief_, _handkerchief_, _relief_,
_muff_, _ruff_, _cuff_, _snuff_, _stuff_, _puff_, _cliff_, _skiff_,
with a few others, which in the formation of their plurals follow the
general rule.

Nouns in _o_ impure form their plural by adding _es_, as, _hero,
heroes_; _echo, echoes_: those which end in _o_ pure, by adding _s_,
as, _folio, folios_.

Some nouns have their plural in _en_, thus following the Teutonic
termination, as, _ox, oxen_; _man, men_.

Some are entirely anomalous, as, _die, dice_; _penny, pence_; _goose,
geese_; _sow, swine_; and _brother_ makes _brethren_[10], when
denoting persons of the same society or profession. _Die_, a stamp
for coining, makes _dies_ in the plural.

_Index_ makes in the plural _indexes_, when it expresses a table of
contents, and _indices_, when it denotes the exponent of an algebraic
quantity.

Some are used alike in both numbers, as, _hose_[11], _deer_, _sheep_,
these being either singular or plural.

Nouns expressive of whatever nature or art has made double or plural
have no singular, as, _bowels_, _lungs_, _scissors_, _ashes_,
_bellows_.

Nouns ending in _y_ impure form their plural by changing _y_ into
_ies_, as _quality, qualities_.

Nouns purely Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, &c., retain their original
plurals.

           _Sing._     _Pl._
  _Lat._  Arcanum     Arcana
  _Fr._   Beau        Beaux
  _Lat._  Erratum     Errata
  _Fr._   Monsieur    Messieurs, Messrs.
  _Heb._  Cherub      Cherubim
  _Heb._  Seraph      Seraphim
  _Lat._  Magus       Magi
  _Gr._   Phenomenon  Phenomena
  _Lat._  Stratum     Strata
  _Gr._   Automaton   Automata
  _Lat._  Vortex      Vortices
  _Lat._  Radius      Radii
  _Lat._  Genus       Genera
  _Gr._   Crisis      Crises
  _Gr._   Emphasis    Emphases
  _Gr._   Hypothesis  Hypotheses
  _Lat._  Genius      Genii,

when denoting aërial spirits; but when signifying _men of genius_,
or employed to express the plural of that combination of mental
qualities which constitutes genius, it follows the general rule.

A proper name has a plural number when it becomes the name of more
individuals than one, as, _the two Scipios_; _the twelve Cæsars_.
It is to be observed, however, that it ceases then to be, strictly
speaking, a proper name.

Some nouns have no plural. 1st. Those which denote things measured
or weighed, unless when they express varieties, as, _sugar, sugars_;
_wheat, wheats_; _oil, oils_; _wine, wines_. Here, not numbers of
individuals, but different species or classes, are signified. In this
sense the nouns are used plurally.

2d. Names of abstract, and also of moral qualities, as, _hardness_,
_softness_, _prudence_, _envy_, _benevolence_, have no plural. It
is to be observed, however, that several nouns of this class ending
in _y_, when they do not express the quality or property in the
abstract, but either its varieties or its manifestations, are used
plurally. Thus we say, _levities_, _affinities_, _gravities_, &c.
There may be different degrees and different exhibitions of the
quality, but not a plurality.

Where displays of the mental quality are to be expressed, it is
better in all cases to employ a periphrasis. Thus, instead of using
with Hume (vol. vii. p. 411) the plural _insolences_, the expression
_acts of insolence_, would be preferable.

Some of those words which have no singular termination are names of
sciences, as, _mathematics_, _metaphysics_, _politics_, _ethics_,
_pneumatics_, &c.

Of these, the term _ethics_ is, I believe, considered as either
singular or plural.

_Mathematics_ is generally construed as plural; sometimes, however,
we find it as singular. “It is a great pity,” says Locke, (vol. iii.
p. 427, 8vo. 1794,) “Aristotle had not understood mathematics, as
well as Mr. Newton, and made use of _it_ in natural philosophy.”

“But when mathematics,” says Mr. Harris, “instead of being applied
to this excellent purpose, _are_ used not to exemplify logic, but to
supply its place, no wonder if logic pass into contempt.”

Bacon improperly uses the word as singular and plural in the same
sentence. “If a child,” says he, “be bird-witted, that is, hath
not the faculty of attention, the mathematics _giveth_ a remedy
thereunto; for in _them_, if the wit be caught away but a moment,
one is new to begin.” He likewise frequently gives to some names of
sciences a singular termination; and Beattie, with a few others,
have, in some instances, followed his example.

“Thus far we have argued for the sake of argument, and opposed
_metaphysic_ to metaphysic.”--_Essay on Truth._

      “See physic beg the Stagyrite’s defence,
      See metaphysic call for aid on sense.”--_Pope._

This usage, however, is not general.

_Metaphysics_ is used both as a singular and plural noun.

“Metaphysics _has_ been defined, by a writer deeply read in the
ancient philosophy, ‘The science of the principles and causes of all
things existing.’”--_Encyc. Brit._ Here the word is used as singular;
as likewise in the following example:

“Metaphysics _has_ been represented by painters and sculptors as a
woman crowned and blindfolded, holding a sceptre in her hand, and
having at her feet an hour-glass and a globe.”

“Metaphysics _is_ that science, in which are understood the
principles of other sciences.”--_Hutton._

In the following examples it is construed as a plural noun.

“Metaphysics _tend_ only to benight the understanding in a cloud of
its own making.”--_Knox._

“Here, indeed, lies the justest and most plausible objection against
a considerable part of metaphysics, that _they_ are not properly a
science.”--_Hume._

The latter of these usages is the more common, and more agreeable to
analogy. The same observation is applicable to the terms _politics_,
_optics_, _pneumatics_, and other similar names of sciences.

“But in order to prove more fully that politics _admit_ of general
truths.”--_Hume._

Here the term is used as plural.

_Folk_ and _folks_ are used indiscriminately; but the plural
termination is here superfluous, the word _folk_ implying plurality.

_Means_ is used both as a singular and plural noun. Lowth recommends
the latter usage only, and admits mean as the singular of means. But
notwithstanding the authority of Hooker, Sidney, and Shakspeare, for
the expressions _this mean_, _that mean_, &c., and the recommendation
they receive from analogy, custom has so long decided in favour of
_means_, repudiating the singular termination, that it may seem,
perhaps, idle, as well as fastidious, to propose its dismission.

It is likewise observable, that the singular form of this noun is not
to be found in our version of the Bible; a circumstance which clearly
shows, that the translators preferred the plural termination.

That the noun _means_ has been used as a substantive singular by
some of our best writers, it would be easy to prove by numberless
examples. Let a few suffice.

“By _this_ means it became every man’s interest, as well as his duty,
to prevent all crimes.”--_Temple_, vol. iii. p. 133.

“And by _this_ means I should not doubt.”--_Wilkins’s real Character._

“He by _that_ means preserves his superiority.”--_Addison._

“By _this_ means alone the greatest obstacles will vanish.”--_Pope._

“By _this_ means there was nothing left to the parliament of
Ireland.”--_Blackstone_, vol. i. p. 102.

“Faith is not only _a_ means of obeying, but a principal act of
obedience.”--_Young._

“_Every_ means was lawful for the public safety.”--_Gibbon._

That this word is also used as plural, the most inattentive English
reader must have frequently observed.

“He was careful to observe what means _were_ employed by his
adversaries to counteract his schemes.”

While we offer these examples to show that the term is used either
as a singular or as a plural noun, we would at the same time remark,
that though the expression “a mean” is at present generally confined
to denote “a middle, or medium, between two extremes,” we are
inclined to concur with the learned Dr. Lowth, and to recommend a
more extended use of the noun singular. This usage was common in the
days of Shakspeare.

“I’ll devise a _mean_ to draw the Moor out of the way.”--_Othello._

“Pamela’s noble heart would needs gratefully make known the valiant
_mean_ of her safety.”--_Sidney._

“Their virtuous conversation was a _mean_ to work the Heathen’s
conversion unto Christ.”--_Hooker._

Melmoth, Beattie, and several other writers, distinguished by their
elegance and accuracy of diction, have adopted this usage. _A means_,
indeed, is a form of expression which, though not wholly unsupported
by analogy, is yet so repugnant to the general idiom of our language,
and seems so ill adapted to denote the operation of a single cause,
that we should be pleased to see it dismissed from use. If we
say, “This was _one of the means_ which he employed to effect his
purpose,” analogy and metaphysical propriety concur in recommending
_a mean_, or _one mean_, as preferable to _a means_. _News_, _alms_,
_riches_, _pains_, have been used as either singular or plural; but
we never say, “one of the news,” “one of the alms,” “one of the
riches,” “one of the pains,” as we say “one of the means;” we may,
therefore, be justified, notwithstanding the authority of general
usage, in pronouncing “a means” a palpable anomaly.

_News_ is likewise construed sometimes as a singular, and sometimes
as a plural noun. The former usage, however, is far the more general.

“A general joy at _this_ glad news appeared.”--_Cowley._

“No news so bad as _this_ at home.”--_Shakspeare_, _Richard III._

“The amazing news of Charles at once _was_ spread.”--_Dryden._

“The king was employed in his usual exercise of besieging castles,
when the news _was_ brought of Henry’s arrival.”--_Swift._

“The only news you can expect from me _is_ news from heaven.”--_Gay._

“_This_ is all the news talked of.”--_Pope._

Swift, Pope, Gay, with most other classic writers of that age, seem
to have uniformly used it as singular.

A few examples occur of a plural usage.

“When Rhea heard _these_ news.”--_Raleigh_, _Hist. World_.

“_Are_ there any news of his intimate friend?”--_Smollett._

“News _were_ brought to the queen.”--_Hume._

The same rule as that just now recommended in regard to the noun
_means_ might perhaps be useful here also, namely, to consider
the word as singular when only one article of intelligence is
communicated, and as plural when several new things are reported.

_Pains_ is considered as either singular or plural, some of our best
writers using it in either way. This word is evidently of French
extraction, being the same with _peine_, pains or trouble, and was
originally used in a singular form thus, “Which may it please your
highness to take the _payne_ for to write.”--_Wolsey’s Letter to
Henry VIII._ It seems probable, that this word, after it assumed
a plural form, was more frequently used as a singular than as a
plural noun. Modern usage, however, seems to incline the other way.
A celebrated grammarian indeed, has pronounced this noun to be in
all cases plural; but this assertion might be proved erroneous by
numberless examples[12].

“The pains they had taken _was_ very great.”--_Clarendon._

“Great pains _has_ been taken.”--_Pope._

“No pains _is_ taken.”--_Pope._

In addition to these authorities in favour of a singular usage, it
may be observed, that the word _much_, a term of quantity, not of
number, is frequently joined with it, as,

“I found much art and pains employed.”--_Middleton._

“He will assemble materials with much pains.”--_Bolingbroke on
History._

The word _much_ is never joined to a plural noun; _much labours_,
_much papers_, would be insufferable[13].

_Riches_ is generally now considered as a plural noun; though it was
formerly used either as singular or plural. This substantive seems to
have been nothing but the French word _richesse_; and therefore no
more a plural than _gentlenesse, distresse_, and many others of the
same kind. In this form we find it in Chaucer:

      “But for ye spoken of swiche gentlenesse,
      As is descended out of old richesse.
      And he that ones to love doeth his homage,
      Full often times dere bought is the richesse.”

Accordingly he gives it a plural termination, and uses it as a plural
word.

“Thou hast dronke so much hony of swete temporal richesses, and
delices, and honours of this world.”

It seems evident, then, that this word was originally construed
as a substantive singular, and even admitted a plural form. The
orthography varying, and the noun singular assuming a plural
termination, it came in time to be considered by some as a noun
plural.

In our translation of the Bible, it is construed sometimes as a
singular, but generally as a plural noun.

“In one hour is so great riches come to nought.”--_Bible._

“Riches take to themselves wings, and fly away.”--_Ibid._

Modern usage, in like manner, inclines to the plural construction;
there are a few authorities, however, on the other side, as,

“_Was_ ever riches gotten by your golden mediocrities?”--_Cowley._

“The envy and jealousy which great riches _is_ always attended
with.”--_Moyle._

_Alms_ was also originally a noun singular, being a contraction of
the old Norman French _almesse_, the plural of which was _almesses_.

“This almesse shouldst thou do of thy proper things.”--_Chaucer._

“These ben generally the almesses and workes of charity.”--_Ibid._

Johnson says this word has no singular. It was, in truth, a first a
noun singular, and afterwards, by contraction, receiving a plural
form, it came to be considered by some as a noun plural. Johnson
would have had equal, nay, perhaps, better authority for saying that
this word has no plural. Our translators of the Bible seem to have
considered it as singular. “To ask _an_ alms,” “to give _much_ alms,”
and other similar phraseologies, occur in Scripture. Nay, Johnson
himself has cited two authorities, in which the indefinite article is
prefixed to it.

               ... “My arm’d knees,
      Which bow’d but in my stirrup, bend like his
      That hath received _an_ alms.”--_Shakspeare._

“The poor beggar hath a just demand of _an_ alms from the rich
man.”--_Swift._

Lowth objected to the phraseology _a means_, for this reason, that
_means_, being a plural noun, cannot admit the indefinite article, or
name of unity. The objection would be conclusive, if the expressions
_this means, that means_, did not oppose the learned author’s
opinion, that _means_ is a noun plural. To the substantive _alms_,
as represented by Johnson to have no singular, the objection is
applicable.

_Thanks_ is considered to be a plural noun, though denoting only one
expression of gratitude. It occurs in Scripture as a substantive
singular. “What thank have ye?”

It has been observed, that many of those words which have no singular
denote things consisting of two parts, and therefore have a plural
termination. Hence the word _pair_ is used with many of them, as, “_a
pair of bellows_, _a pair of scissors_, _a pair of colours_, _a pair
of drawers_.”


SECTION II.

_Of Genders._

We not only observe a plurality of substances, or of things of
the same sort, whence arises the distinction of number; but we
distinguish also another character of some substances, which we
call sex. Every substance is either male or female, or neither the
one nor the other. In English, all male animals are considered as
masculine; all female animals as feminine; and all things inanimate,
or destitute of sex, are termed neuter, as belonging neither to the
male nor the female sex. In this distribution we follow the order
of nature; and our language is, in this respect, both simple and
animated.

The difference of sex is, in some cases, expressed by different
words, as,

  _Masc._        _Fem._
  Boy            Girl
  Buck           Doe
  Bull           Cow
  Bullock        Heifer
  Boar           Sow
  Drake          Duck
  Friar          Nun
  Gaffer         Gammer
  Gander         Goose
  Gelding }      Mare
  Horse   }
  Milter         Spawner
  Nephew         Niece
  Ram            Ewe
  Sloven         Slut
  Stag           Hind
  Widower        Widow
  Wizard         Witch

Sometimes the female is distinguished by the termination _ess_ or
_ix_.

  _Masc._        _Fem._
  Abbot          Abbess
  Actor          Actress
  Adulterer      Adulteress
  Ambassador     Ambassadress
  Arbiter        Arbitress
  Author         Authoress
  Baron          Baroness
  Chanter        Chantress
  Count          Countess
  Deacon         Deaconess
  Duke           Duchess
  Elector        Electress
  Emperor        Empress
  Governor       Governess
  Heir           Heiress
  Hunter         Huntress
  Jew            Jewess
  Lion           Lioness
  Marquis        Marchioness
  Master         Mistress
  Patron         Patroness
  Prince         Princess
  Peer           Peeress
  Prior          Prioress
  Poet           Poetess
  Prophet        Prophetess
  Shepherd       Shepherdess
  Sorcerer       Sorceress
  Traitor        Traitress
  Tutor          Tutress
  Tiger          Tigress
  Viscount       Viscountess

There are a few whose feminine ends in _ix_, viz.

    _Masc._        _Fem._
  Administrator  Administratrix
  Executor       Executrix
  Testator       Testatrix
  Director       Directrix

Where there is but one word to express both sexes, we add another
word to distinguish the sex; as, _he-goat, she-goat_; _man-servant,
maid-servant_; _cock-sparrow, hen-sparrow_.

It has been already observed, that all things destitute of sex are
in English considered as of the neuter gender; and, when we speak
with logical accuracy, we follow this rule. Sometimes, however,
by a figure in rhetoric, called personification, we assign sex to
things inanimate. Thus, instead of “virtue is _its_ own reward,” we
sometimes say, “virtue is _her_ own reward;” instead of “_it_ (the
sun) rises,” we say, “he rises;” instead of “_it_ (death) advances
with hasty steps,” we say, “_he_ advances.”

This figurative mode of expression, by which we give life and sex to
things inanimate, and embody abstract qualities, forms a singular
and striking beauty in our language, rendering it in this respect
superior to the languages of Greece and Rome, neither of which
admitted this animated phraseology[14].

When we say,

  “The sun _his_ orient beams had shed,”

the expression possesses infinitely more vivacity than

  “The sun _its_ orient beams had shed.”

In assigning sex to things inanimate, it has been supposed that
we have been guided by certain characters or qualities in the
inanimate objects, as bearing some resemblance to the distinctive or
characteristic qualities of male and female animals. Thus, it has
been said, that those inanimate substances, or abstract qualities,
which are characterized by the attributes of giving or imparting,
or which convey an idea of great strength, firmness, or energy, are
masculine; and that those, on the contrary, which are distinguished
by the properties of receiving, containing, and producing, or which
convey an idea of weakness or timidity, having more of a passive
than active nature, are feminine. Hence it has been observed, that
the _sun_, _death_, _time_, the names also of great rivers and
mountains, are considered as masculine; and that the _moon_, a
_ship_, the _sea_, _virtue_, in all its species, are considered as
feminine. Of these and such speculations it may be truly said, as the
learned author of them remarks himself, that they are at best but
ingenious conjectures. They certainly will not bear to be rigorously
examined; for there are not any two languages which harmonize in
this respect, assigning the same sex to the same inanimate objects,
nor any one language in which this theory is supported by fact[15].
Hence it is evident, that neither reason nor nature has any share
in the regulation of this matter; and that, in assigning sex to
inanimate things, the determination is purely fanciful. In Greek,
_death_ is masculine: in Latin, feminine. In those languages the
_sun_ is masculine; in the Gothic, German, Anglo-Saxon, and some
other northern languages, it is feminine; in Russian it is neuter. In
several of the languages of Asia, the _sun_ is feminine. According to
our northern mythology, the sun was the wife of Tuisco. The Romans
considered the winds as masculine; the Hebrews, says Caramuel,
represented them as nymphs. In the Hebrew language, however, they
were of the masculine gender, as were also the _sun_ and _death_. In
short, we know not any two languages which accord in this respect,
or any one language in which sex is assigned to things inanimate
according to any consistent or determinate rule.

In speaking of animals whose sex is not known to us, or not regarded,
we assign to them gender either masculine or feminine, according,
as it would appear, to the characteristic properties of the animal
himself. In speaking, for example, of the horse, a creature
distinguished by usefulness and a certain generosity of nature,
unless we be acquainted with the sex and wish to discriminate, we
always speak of this quadruped as of the male sex; thus,

      “While winter’s shivering snow affects the horse
      With frost, and makes _him_ an uneasy course.”--_Creech._

In speaking of a hare, an animal noted for timidity, we assign to
it, if we give it sex, the feminine gender; thus, “the hare is so
timorous a creature, that _she_ continually listens after every
noise, and will run a long way on the least suspicion of danger: so
that _she_ always eats in terror.”

The elephant is generally considered as of the masculine gender, an
animal distinguished not only by great strength and superiority of
size, but also by sagacity, docility, and fortitude.

      “The elephant has joints, but not for courtesy;
      _His_ legs are for necessity, not flexure.”--_Shakspeare._

To a cat we almost always assign the female sex; to a dog, on the
contrary, or one of the canine species, we attribute the masculine
gender.

“A cat, as _she_ beholds the light, draws the ball of _her_ eye small
and long.”--_Peacham on Drawing._

“The dog is a domestic animal remarkably various in _his_ species.”

It would be easy to illustrate, by more examples, this ascription of
either male or female sex to animals, when we speak of them in the
species, or are not acquainted with the sex of the individual; but
these now adduced will, I presume, be sufficient.

By what principle this phraseology is dictated, or whether it be
merely casual or arbitrary in its origin, it would be of no utility
at present to inquire. It may be necessary, however, to remark that,
when speaking of animals, particularly those of inferior size, we
frequently consider them as devoid of sex. “_It_ is a bold and daring
creature,” says a certain writer, speaking of a cat, “and also cruel
to _its_ enemy; and never gives over, till _it_ has destroyed it, if
possible. _It_ is also watchful, dexterous, swift, and pliable.”

Before I dismiss this subject, I would request the reader’s
attention to an idiom which seems to have escaped the notice of our
grammarians. It frequently happens, as I have already observed,
that our language furnishes two distinct terms for the male and the
female, as _shepherd, shepherdess_. It is to be observed, however,
that the masculine term has a general meaning, expressing both male
and female, and is always employed, when the office, occupation,
profession, &c., and not the sex of the individual is chiefly to be
expressed; and that the feminine term is used in those cases only,
when discrimination of sex is indispensably necessary. This may be
illustrated by the following examples. If I say, “The poets of this
age are distinguished more by correctness of taste, than sublimity
of conception,” I clearly include in the term _poet_, both male and
female writers of poetry. If I say, “She is the best poetess in this
country,” I assign her the superiority over those only of her own
sex. If I say, “She is the best poet in this country,” I pronounce
her superior to all other writers of poetry, both male and female.
“Spinning,” says Lord Kames in his Sketches, “is a female occupation,
and must have had a female inventor.” If he had said “a female
inventress,” the expression would have been pleonastic. If he had
said “must have had an inventress,” he would not have sufficiently
contrasted the male and the female; he would have merely predicated
the necessity of an inventress. He, therefore, properly adopts the
term _inventor_ as applicable to each of the sexes, limiting it to
the female by the appropriate term[16]. When distinction of sex is
necessary for the sake of perspicuity, or where the sex, rather
than the general idea implied by the term, is the primary object,
the feminine noun must be employed to express the female; thus, “I
hear that some _authoresses_ are engaged in this work.”--_Political
Register._ Here the feminine term is indispensable[17]. This subject
will be resumed in “the Critical Remarks and Illustrations.”


SECTION III.

_Of Cases._

The third accident of a noun is case, (_casus_, or fall,) so called
because ancient grammarians, it is said, represented the cases as
declining or falling from the nominative, which was represented by
a perpendicular, and thence called _Casus rectus_, or upright case,
while the others were named _Casus obliqui_, or oblique cases. The
cases, in the languages of Greece and Rome, were formed by varying
the termination; and were intended to express a few of the most
obvious and common relations.

In English there are only three cases, nominative, genitive, and
objective, or accusative case. In substantives the nominative case
and the objective, have, like neuter nouns in Greek and Latin, the
same form, being distinguishable from each other by nothing but their
place; thus,

     Nom.         Obj.
  _Achilles slew Hector_,
  _Hector slew Achilles_,

where the meaning is reversed by the interchange of the nouns, the
nominative or agent being known by its being placed before the verb;
and the subject of the action by its following it. Pronouns have
three cases, that is, two inflexions from the nominative, as, _I,
mine, me_; _thou, thine, thee_.

The genitive in English, by some called the possessive case, is
formed by adding to the nominative the letter s, with an apostrophe
before it, as _king, king’s_. It expresses a variety of relations,
and was hence called by the Greeks the general case[18]. The relation
which it most commonly denotes is that of property or possession,
as, _the king’s crown_; and is, in general, the same with that which
is denoted by the word _of_, as, _the crown of the king_, _the rage
of the tyrant_, _the death of the prince_, equivalent to _the king’s
crown_, _the tyrant’s rage_, _the prince’s death_.

The nature of the relation which the genitive expresses must, in
some instances, be collected from the scope of the context; for, in
English, as in most other languages, this case frequently involves an
ambiguity. When I say, “neither life nor death shall separate us from
the love of God,” it may mean, either from the love which we owe to
God, or the love which he bears to us; for “God’s love” may denote
either the relation which the affection bears to its subject, or that
which it bears to its object. If the latter be the meaning intended,
the ambiguity may be prevented by saying, “love to God.”

An ambiguity likewise arises from it, as expressing either the
relation of the effect to its cause, or that of the accident to its
subject. “A little after the reformation of Luther,” says Swift.
This may import either the change produced by Luther, or a change
produced in him. The latter indeed is properly the meaning, though
not that which was intended by the author. He should have said, “the
reformation by Luther.” It is clear, therefore, that the relation
expressed by the genitive is not uniformly the same, that the phrase
may be interpreted either in an active or passive sense[19], and that
the real import must be collected not from the expression, but the
context.

Mr. Harris has said, that the genitive is formed to express all
relations commencing from itself, and offers the analysis of this
case in all modern languages as a proof. That it expresses more than
this, both in English and Latin, and that it denotes relations,
not only commencing from itself, but likewise directed to itself,
the examples already quoted are sufficient to prove. Nay, were it
necessary, it would be easy to demonstrate, that this ambiguity in
the use of the genitive is not confined to these two languages, but
is found in Greek, Hebrew, Italian, and, I believe, in all the modern
languages of Europe.

Concerning the origin of the English genitive, grammarians and
critics are not agreed. That the cases, or nominal inflexions, in
all languages were originally formed by annexing to the noun in
its simple form a word significant of the relation intended, is a
doctrine which, I conceive, is not only approved by reason, but
also attested by fact. That any people, indeed, in framing their
language, should affix to their nouns insignificant terminations,
for the purpose of expressing any relation, is a theory extremely
improbable. Numerous as the inflexions are in the Greek and Latin
languages, I am persuaded that, were we sufficiently acquainted with
their original structure, we should find that all these terminations
were at first words significant, subjoined to the _radix_, and
afterwards abbreviated. This opinion is corroborated by the structure
of the Hebrew, and some other oriental languages, whose affixes and
prefixes, in the formation of their cases and conjugation of their
verbs, we can still ascertain.

Now the English genitive being formed by annexing to the nominative
the letter _s_, with an apostrophe, several critics, among whom is
Mr. Addison, deliver it as their opinion, that this termination is a
contraction for the possessive pronoun _his_. This opinion appears to
be countenanced by the examples which occur in the Bible, and Book
of Common Prayer, in which, instead of the English genitive, we find
the nominative with the possessive pronoun masculine of the third
person; thus, “for Christ his sake,” “Asa his heart was perfect.” Dr.
Lowth considers these expressions as errors either of the printers
or the authors. That they are not typographical mistakes I am fully
persuaded. They occur in the books now mentioned, and also in the
works of Bacon, Donne, and many other writers, much too frequently to
admit this supposition. If errors, therefore, they are errors not of
the printers, but of the authors themselves.

To evince the incorrectness of this phraseology, and to show that
Addison’s opinion is erroneous, Dr. Lowth observes that, though
we can resolve “the king’s crown” into “the king his crown,” we
cannot resolve “the queen’s crown” into “the queen her crown,”
or “the children’s bread” into “the children their bread.” This
fact, he observes, ought to have demonstrated to Mr. Addison the
incorrectness of his opinion. Lowth, therefore, refers the English
to the Saxon genitive for its real origin, and observes, that its
derivation from that genitive decides the question[20]. Hickes, in
his _Thesaurus_, had previously delivered the same opinion. Speaking
of the Anglo-Saxon genitive in _es_, he observes, “Inde in nostratium
sermone nominum substantivorum, genitivus singularis, et nominativus
pluralis, exeunt in es, vel _s_.” From the introduction of the Saxons
into this island, to the Norman conquest, the Saxon genitive was
in universal use. From the latter period to the time of Henry II.
(1170), though the English language underwent some alterations, we
still find the Saxon genitive. Thus, in a poem, entitled “The Life of
St. Margaret,” in the Normanno-Saxon dialect, we find the following
among other examples, “chrisꞇes angles,” and the pronoun hyꞅ (his)
spelled _is_; thus, “Theodosius was _is_ name.”--See _Hickes_,
_Thes._ vol. i. p. 226.

Webster has asserted that, in the age of Edward the Confessor (1050),
he does not find the Saxon genitive; and as a proof that the pronoun
_his_ was used instead of the Saxon termination, he quotes a passage
from a charter of Edward the Confessor, where the words, “bissop
his land” occur, which he conceives to be equivalent to “bishop’s
land.” Now, had he read but a small part of that charter, he would
have found the Saxon genitive; and what he imagines to be equivalent
to the English genitive is neither that case, nor synonymous with
it. The passage runs thus: “And ich ke þe eu þat Alfred havet iseld
Gise bissop his land at Llyton;” the meaning of which is, “Know that
Alfred hath sold to Bishop Gise his land at Lutton.” In the time
of Richard II. (1385) we find Trevisa and Chaucer using the Saxon
genitive. Thus, in Trevisa’s translation of the Athanasian creed, we
find among other examples, “Godes sight.”

In Gavin Douglas, who lived in the beginning of the sixteenth
century, we find _is_ instead of _es_, thus, _faderis hands_.

In the time of Henry the Eighth we find, in the works of Sir T. More,
both the Saxon and the English genitive; and in a letter, written
in 1559, by Maitland of Lethington, the English genitive frequently
occurs. Had this genitive, then, been an abbreviation for the noun
and the pronoun _his_, the use of the words separately would have
preceded their abbreviated form in composition. This, however, was
not the case.

To form the genitive plural, we annex the apostrophe without the
letter _s_, as _eagles’ wings_, that is, _the wings of eagles_. The
genitive singular of nouns terminating in _s_, is formed in the same
manner, as, _righteousness’ sake_, or _the sake of righteousness_.

I finish this article with observing, that there are in English a
few diminutive nouns, so called from their expressing a small one
of the kind. Some of these end in _kin_, from a Dutch and Teutonic
word signifying a _child_, as _manikin_, a little man, _lambkin_,
_pipkin_, _thomkin_. Proper names ending in _kin_ belonged originally
to this class of diminutives, as, _Wilkin_, Willielmulus; _Halkin,
Hawkin_, Henriculus; _Tomkin_, Thomulus; _Simkin_, _Peterkin_, &c.

Some diminutives end in _ock_, as, _hill, hillock_; _bull, bullock_;
some in _el_, as _pike, pickrel_; _cock, cockrel_; _sack, satchel_;
some in _ing_, as _goose, gosling_. These seem to be the only
legitimate ones, as properly belonging to our language. The rest are
derived from Latin, French, Italian, and have various terminations.




CHAPTER II.

OF THE ARTICLE.


Language is chiefly composed of general terms, most substantives
being the names of _genera_ or species. When we find a number of
substances resembling one another in their principal and most obvious
qualities, we refer them to one species, to which we assign a name
common to every individual of that species. In like manner, when
we find several of these species resembling one another in their
chief properties, we refer them to a higher order, to which also we
assign a common and more general name than that which was affixed
to the inferior class. Thus we assign the general name _man_ to the
human species, as possessing a common form, and distinguished by the
common attributes of life, reason, and speech. If we consider man as
possessed of life only, we perceive a resemblance in this respect
between him and other beings. To this higher class or genus, the
characteristic attribute of which is vitality, we affix the more
generic name of animal[21]. Hence, when we use an appellative or
common noun, it denotes the genus or class collectively, of which it
is the name, as,

“The proper study of mankind is man,” _i.e._ not one man, not many
men, but all men.

Not only, however, has this rule its limitations, though these seem
governed by no fixed principle, but we frequently find the articles
admitted when the whole genus or species is evidently implied. Thus
we may say,

“Metal is specifically heavier than water;” _i.e._ not this or that
metal, but all metals. But we cannot say, “Vegetable is specifically
lighter than water;” or, “Mineral is specifically heavier than
water.” Again; we say, “Man is born unto trouble;” but we cannot
say, “Tiger is ferocious,” or, “Fox is cunning;” but, “The tiger,
or a tiger, is ferocious;” “The fox, or a fox, is cunning;” the
expressions being applicable to the whole species. It would appear,
indeed, that when proper names assume the office of appellatives,
the reverse of the rule takes place. Thus we say, “A Douglas braves
the pointed steel;” the meaning being “every Douglas.” Suppress the
indefinite article, and the general proposition becomes individual.

But, though our words are general, all our perceptions are
individual, having single existences for their objects. It is
often necessary, however, to express two, three, or more of these
individual existences; and hence arises the use of that species
of words which have been called numerals, that is, words denoting
number. To signify unity or one of a class, our forefathers employed
_ae_ or _ane_, as _ae man_, _ane ox_. When unity, or the number
one, as opposed to two or more, was to be expressed, the emphasis
would naturally be laid on the word significant of unity; and when
unity was not so much the object as the species or kind, the term
expressive of unity would naturally be unemphatical; and hence
_ae_, by celerity of pronunciation, would become _a_, and _ane_
be shortened into _an_. These words _a_ and _an_ are now termed
indefinite articles; it is clear, however, that they are truly
numerals, belonging to the same class with two, three, four, &c.;
or, perhaps, more properly, these numerals may be considered as
abbreviations for the repeated expression of the term _one_. By
whatever name these terms, _a_, _an_, may be designed, it seems
evident that they were originally synonymous with the name of unity,
or rather themselves names of unity, emphasis only distinguishing
whether unity or the species were chiefly intended. Hence _a_ and
_an_ cannot be joined with a plural noun.

Some grammarians, indeed, have asserted that in every example where
_a_ or _an_ occurs, the term _one_ may be substituted in its stead,
without in the least degree injuring the sense. As far as the primary
idea denoted by these words is concerned, this opinion is doubtless
incontrovertible, for they each express unity; but with regard to the
secondary or implied ideas which these terms convey, the difference
is obvious. An example will illustrate this: If I say, “Will one man
be able to carry this burden so far?” I evidently oppose one to more:
and the answer might be, “No; but two men will.” Let us substitute
the term _a_, and say, “Will a man be able to carry this burden?” Is
the idea nowise changed by this alteration? I apprehend it is; for
the answer might naturally be, “No; but a horse will.” I have here
substituted _a_, for _one_; the converse will equally show that the
terms are by no means mutually convertible, or strictly synonymous.
If, instead of saying, “A horse, a horse, a kingdom for a horse,”
I should say, “One horse, one horse, one kingdom for one horse,”
the sentiment, I conceive, would not be strictly the same. In both
expressions the species is named, and in both one of that species
is demanded; but with this difference, that in the former the name
of the species is the emphatic word, and it opposes that species to
every other; in the latter, unity of object seems the leading idea,
“one kingdom for one horse.” In this respect, our language appears to
me to have a decided superiority over those languages where one word
performs the office of what we term an article, and at the same time
denotes the idea of unity. _Donnez-moi un livre_ means either “give
me one book,” _i.e._ not two or more books; or “give me a book,” that
is, “a book, not something else; a book, not a pen,” for example.

I acknowledge that, in oral language, emphasis may serve to
discriminate the sentiments, and prevent ambiguity. But emphasis is
addressed to the ear only, not to the eye; it can, therefore, be of
no service in written language. It is true also, that by attending to
the context, error may often be avoided; but let it be remembered,
as Quintilian observes[22], that language should be, not such as
the reader may understand if he will take the trouble to examine
it carefully, but such as he cannot even without effort fail to
comprehend. When it is asserted, therefore, that _one_ may in every
case be substituted for _a_, without in the least degree injuring the
expression, the position appears to me erroneous and false. Whatever
creates ambiguity, whether with respect to the primary or secondary
ideas annexed to words, in some degree, without question, violates
the sense. Be it observed also, that, though _a_, _an_, _ae_, _ane_,
_one_, may have been all etymologically the same, it does not follow,
nor is it practically true, as has been now shown, that they are all
precisely equivalent words. In Scotland, the distinction between
_a_ and _ae_ is well known. “Give me _a_ book,” means any book, in
contradistinction to any other object, as “a chair,” “a pen,” “a
knife;” “give me _ae_ book,” is in contradistinction to one or more.
Such also is the difference between _a_ and _one_.

It seems, therefore, undeniable that the word _a_, termed the
indefinite article, was originally identical with the name of unity,
expressing either one of any species, as opposed to more of that
species, or one of this kind, as opposed to one of that. Whether
the distinction of its noting one or unity, with less emphasis than
the appropriate name of unity, should entitle it to be referred
to a different class of words from the numeral _one_, and called
an article, it is unimportant to inquire. To me, however, I must
acknowledge the distinctive name of article assigned to this word
appears to be useless. Were emphasis to be admitted as the principle
of classification, (and I see no other distinction between _a_ and
_one_,) the parts of speech might be multiplied beyond number.

Besides the words _a_ and _an_, termed indefinite articles, as not
defining which of the species is signified, we have also another
word, _the_, named the definite article, because it is said to point
out the individual object. This word, I doubt not, proceeded from
the word _this_ or _that_, much in the same manner as _a_ and _an_
from _ae_ and _ane_. To what class of words _this_ and _that_ should
be referred has been a subject of controversy[23]. That they are not
pronouns, as some have asserted, seems abundantly evident; for they
never represent a noun. By some they have been called definitives;
and, though this designation be not strictly consonant with their
import, it is perhaps the least exceptionable. When opposed to each
other, they appear to be reducible to that species of words termed
adjectives of order; the only difference between them and ordinary
numerals being this, that the former express the arrangement in
relation to two objects, the latter in relation to a series. _This_
means “the nearer,” “the latter,” or “the second;” _that_, “the more
remote,” “the former,” or “the first.” Their office, in general,
seems to be emphatically to individuate some particular object
whose character was either previously known, or is then described;
hence they have also been named demonstratives. Under which of the
generally received parts of speech they should be comprehended it may
be difficult to determine. As, like simple attributives they accord
with nouns, frequently denoting the accident of place, they may be
grammatically referred to the class of adjectives. Their import will
appear from a few examples.

“That kind Being who is a father to the fatherless, will recompense
thee for this.”

Here a species is referred to, distinguished by benevolence. Of
this species one individual is emphatically particularized: “That
kind being.” Who? his distinctive character follows, “is a father
to the fatherless.” The concluding word _this_, points to something
previously described.

              “---- ’T was idly done
      To tell him of another world; for wits
      Knew better; and the only good on earth
      Was pleasure; not to follow _that_ was sin.”

Here the word _that_ refers with emphasis to a thing previously
specified, namely, pleasure.

“It is no uncommon thing to find a man who laughs at everything
sacred, yet is a slave to superstitious fears. I would not be that
man, were a crown to tempt me.” Here one indefinitely of a species is
mentioned, _a man_. The subject is afterwards limited by description
to one of a certain character, “who laughs at things sacred, and
is a slave to superstitious fears.” The word _that_ selects and
demonstrates the person thus described. The word _the_ has nearly
the same import; but is less emphatical. It seems to bear the same
analogy to _that_, which _a_ does to _one_. Hence in many cases they
may be used indifferently.

“Happy the man whose cautious feet shun the broad way that sinners
go.”

Here, “happy that man” would express the same idea. The Latins
accordingly employed the demonstrative word _ille_; _beatus ille_,
“happy the man.”

What, then, is the difference between _the_ and _that_? To ascertain
this, let us inquire, in what cases _the_ is employed, and whether
_that_ can be substituted in its stead.

The word _the_ is employed,

1st, When we express an object of eminence or notoriety, or the only
one of a kind in which we are interested, as, “the king,” when we
mean “the king of England.” “He was concerned in bringing about the
revolution,” when we mean the revolution in this country. “Virgil
copied the Grecian bard,” or “Homer.” “I am going to the city,” when
I mean “London.” In none of these cases can we substitute _that_
for _the_, without laying a particular emphasis on the subject, and
implying that its character is there described in contradistinction
to some other of the same species. Thus, “he was concerned in that
revolution, which was accomplished by the English barons.” “He copied
that Grecian bard, who disputes the claim of antiquity with Homer.”

2dly, We employ it in expressing objects of repeated perception, or
subjects of previous conversation. I borrow an example from Harris.
If I see, for the first time, a man with a long beard, I say, “there
goes a man with a long beard.” If I see him again, I say, “there goes
the man with the long beard.” Were the word _that_ substituted for
_the_, the same observation would be applicable as in the preceding
examples.

3dly, Mr. Harris has said, that the article _a_ is used to express
objects of primary perception, and _the_ employed to denote those
only of secondary perception. This opinion is controverted by the
author of the article Grammar in the Encyclopedia Britannica, Ed.
3d. who gives the following example to disprove its truth. “I am in
company, and finding the room warm, I say to the servant, Request
_the_ gentleman in the window seat (to whom I am an entire stranger)
to draw down the sash.” The example is apposite, and is sufficient to
overturn the hypothesis of Mr. Harris. There can be no question but
_the_ is frequently employed to denote objects of primary perception;
and merely particularizes, by some discriminating circumstance,
an individual whose character, person, or distinctive qualities,
were previously unknown. In the example now quoted, _that_ may be
substituted for _the_, if we say, “who is in the window seat.”

4thly, The definite article is used to distinguish the explicative
from the determinative sense. In the former case it is rarely
employed: in the latter it should never be omitted, unless when
something still more definite supplies its place. “Man, who is born
of a woman, is of few days, and full of trouble.” Here the relative
clause is explicative, and not restrictive; all men being “born of
a woman;” the definite article therefore is not employed. “The man”
would imply that all men are not thus born; and would confine the
predicating clause to those who are. In the latter sense, _that_
may, without any alteration in the phraseology, be substituted for
the article; for _the man_, and _that man_, are in this instance
equivalent.

5thly, The definite article is often used to denote the measure of
excess. “The more you study, the more learned you will become;” that
is, “by how much the more you study, by so much the more learned you
will become.” “The wiser, the better;” “that (by that) wiser, that
(by that) better.” There also _that_ and _the_ may be considered as
equivalent; and the Latins accordingly said “eo melior.”

From the preceding examples and observations it must appear, that
the definite article, and the word _that_, though not strictly
synonymous, are words nearly of the same import.

Their difference seems to be,

1st, That the article _the_, like _a_, must have a substantive
conjoined with it; whereas _that_, like _one_, may have it
understood. Speaking of books, I may select one and say, “give me
_that_,” but not “give me _the_;” “give me _one_,” but not “give me
_a_.” Here the analogy holds between _a_ and _one_, _the_ and _that_.

2dly, As the difference between _a_ and _one_ seems to be, that _one_
denotes unity in contradistinction to more, with greater emphasis
than _a_, so the distinction in general between _the_ and _that_ is,
that the latter marks the object more emphatically than the former,
being indirectly opposed to _this_. I cannot say, “there goes that
man with that long beard,” without implying a contrast with “this
man with this long beard,” the word _that_ being always emphatical
and discriminative.

The opinion here offered, respecting these words, receives some
corroboration from the following circumstances.

In Latin _ille_ frequently supplies the place of our definite
article. “Thou art the man.” _Tu es ille (iste) homo._

The _le_ in French is clearly a derivative from _ille_, of which the
former syllable _il_ expresses _he_, and the latter denotes _that_
unemphatically, serving as the definite article. From the same source
also proceed the Italian articles _il_, _lo_, _la_.

In Hebrew, in like manner, our definite article is expressed by the
prefix of the pronoun _ille_; thus, _aretz_, _terra_, “earth;”[24]
_ha’aretz_, _illa_ seu _hæc terra_, “the earth,” the letter _he_
abbreviated from _hou_, _ille_, expressing _the_;--_ashri_,
_haish_[25], _beatus ille vir_, “happy the man,” or “that man,” the
_he_ in like manner signifying _the_ or _that_.

It appears to me, then, that as _ae_, _ane_, when not opposed to
_more_, and therefore unemphatical, by celerity of pronunciation were
changed into _a_, _an_; so _that_, when not opposed to _this_, or
when it was unemphatical, was shortened to _the_. Hence, the words
termed articles seem to be the name of unity, and the demonstrative
word _that_ abbreviated.

Besides the words _a_, _an_, _the_, there are others which may
be considered as reducible to the same class with these; such as
_this_, _that_, _any_, _other_, _same_, _all_, _one_, _none_. _This_
and _that_ I have already considered. That they are not pronouns
is evident, for they are never used as the representatives of a
noun, and always require to be associated with a substantive. If
ever they appear without this accompaniment, it will invariably be
found that the expression is elliptical, some substantive or other
being necessarily understood. If I say, “This was a noble action.”
This what? “This action.” “This is true virtue.” This what? “This
practice,” “this habit,” “this temper.” To what class of words I
conceive them to belong has been already mentioned.

_One_ is a word significant of unity, and cannot, without manifest
impropriety, be called a pronominal adjective; unless, by an abuse
of all language, we be disposed to name _two_, _three_, _four_,
pronominal adjectives.

_Some_ is reducible to the same class, denoting an indefinite, but,
comparatively to _many_, a small number.

_Many_, _few_, _several_, are words of the same order, significant of
number indefinitely.

_None_, or _not one_, implies the negation of all number, exclusive
even of unity itself.

_Other_, which is improperly considered by some as a pronoun, is the
Saxon oðer coming from oððe. The Arabic _ahd_, the Hebrew _had_, or
_ahad_, the Saxon oððe, the Teutonic _odo_, and the Swedish _udda_,
with our English word _odd_, seem all to have sprung from the same
origin, the etymon expressing “one separately,” or “one by itself,”
answering nearly to the Latin _singulus_. The English word _odd_
plainly indicates its affinity to these words. We say, “He is an odd
character,” or “singular character.” “He had some odd ones,” that is,
“some separate from the rest,” not paired, or connected with them,
“single.”[26]

      “As he in soueraine dignity is odde,
      So will he in loue no parting fellowes have.”
                              _Sir T. More’s Works._

The same idea of singularity and separation is expressed by _other_;
which is now generally used as a comparative, and followed by _than_.

_Other_ is sometimes used substantively, and has then a plural
number, as, “Let others serve whom they will; as for me and my
house, we will serve the Lord.” The word _one_ has a plural number
when an assemblage of units is expressed, not in the aggregate, but
individually; and then it is used as a substantive, as, “I saw a
great many fine ones.” It is also used indefinitely, in the same
sense with the French _on_, as, “One would imagine these to be
expressions of a man blessed with ease.”--_Atterbury._ And, in using
it in this sense, it may be observed, in passing, that an error is
often committed by employing the personal pronouns as referring to
_one_; thus, “One is apt to exaggerate his own injuries,” instead
of “one’s own injuries.” It is sometimes, though rarely, used as
referring to a plural noun. “The Romans and the Carthaginians now
took the field; the one ambitious of conquest, and the others in
self-defence.” This mode of expression is objectionable. We should
rather say, “the former,” and “the latter.”

_Any_, _an_, _a_, _one_, seem all to be nearly equivalent words, and
derived from one origin, I mean from _ane_, the name of unity. Hence
_a_, or _an_, and _any_, are frequently synonymous. “A considerate
man would have acted differently;” that is, “any considerate man.”
Hence also, like _one_, it is opposed to _none_, as, “Have you a
book (any book) which you can lend me?” “None; my books are in the
country; nor, if they were here, have I any (or one) which would suit
you.” From expressing _one_ indefinitely, like _a_ or _an_, it came,
by an easy and natural transition, to denote “_whatever it be_,”
“_what you please_.” “Give me one (ane), any, no matter which.” In
this sense it corresponds to the Latin _quivis_ or _quilibet_[27]
in affirmative sentences; whereas, in interrogative or negative
sentences, it corresponds to _quisquam_, _quispiam_, or _ullus_. The
preceding observations it may be useful to recapitulate.

Nouns are names of genera, and not of individuals; our perceptions
are, on the contrary, all individual, not general. Hence, to denote
one or more individuals of a species, numerals, or words significant
of number, were invented. Some express a precise number, as _one_,
_two_, _three_; others number indefinitely, as _some_, _few_,
_many_, _several_. Our perceptions being all individual, and one
being the basis of all number, the term significant of unity must
frequently recur in expressing our sentiments. To denote this idea
our forefathers employed _ae_, _ane_. In the progress of language,
where unity was not to be expressed, as opposed to two or more, the
terms, thus becoming unemphatical, would naturally be abbreviated
into _a_, _an_. These latter, therefore, are the offspring of the
names of unity, and belong to the class of words named cardinal
numerals. To what part of speech these are reducible (if they can be
reduced to any) it is difficult to determine. In some languages they
have the form of adjectives; but, if their meaning be considered, it
is clear that they have no claim to this appellation, as they express
no accident, quality, or property whatever. In fact, they appear to
be a species of words totally different in character from any of the
parts of speech generally received; all of them, except the first of
the series, being abbreviations for the name of unity repeated.

It being necessary not only to express an individual indefinitely
of any species, but also to specify and select some particular one,
which at first would probably be done by pointing to the object, if
in sight, the words _this_ and _that_, hence called demonstratives,
were employed; the one to express the nearer, the other the more
distant object. From one of these proceeded the word _the_, having
the same relation to its original as _a_ or _an_ has to the name of
unity. Hence the words synonymous with _this_ and _that_, in those
languages which have no definite article, are frequently employed to
supply its place.

The use of these terms being to express any individual whatever of
a class, and likewise some certain or particular object; we have
also the words _few_, _some_, _many_, _several_, to denote a number
indefinitely, and the cardinal numerals _two_, _three_, _four_, &c.,
a precise number of individuals.




CHAPTER III.

OF PRONOUNS.


Whether we speak of things present, or of things absent, of
ourselves, or of others, and to whomsoever we address our discourse,
the repetition of the names of those persons or things would not only
be tiresome, but also sometimes productive of ambiguity. Besides, the
name of the person addressed may be unknown to the speaker, and the
name of the speaker may be unknown to the person addressed. Hence
appears the utility of pronouns, words, as the etymology of the term
denotes, supplying the place of nouns. They have therefore been
denominated by some grammarians, nouns of the second order.

When the person who addresses speaks of himself, the pronoun _I_,
called the pronoun of the first person, is employed instead of the
name of the speaker, as, “The Lord said to Moses, _I_ (the Lord) am
the God of Abraham.”

When the person addressed is the subject of discourse, the pronoun
_thou_, called the pronoun of the second person, is used instead of
his name, as, “Nathan said unto David, _Thou_ (David) art the man.”

When neither the person who speaks, nor the person addressed, but
some other person or thing, is the subject of discourse, we employ
the pronouns of the third person, namely, _he_, _she_, _it_; as,
“When Jesus saw the multitude, _he_ (Jesus) had compassion on them.”

I have said that pronouns are employed to prevent the tiresome
repetition of names. It is not, however, to be hence inferred, that
even the repetition of the name would, in all cases, answer the
same purpose, or denote the subject with the same precision as the
pronoun. For, as there is hardly any name, strictly speaking, proper
or peculiar to one individual, the employment of a name, belonging to
more persons than one, would not so clearly specify or individuate
the object as the appropriate pronoun. Hence it would often be
necessary to subjoin to the name some distinctive circumstances, to
discriminate the person intended from others of that name; or the
speaker would be obliged to point to the individual if he happened
to be present. Nay, though the person or subject designed might be
thus sufficiently ascertained, it is easy to see that the phraseology
would have nothing of that simplicity and energy which accompany
the pronoun. If, in the first example, instead of saying, “I am
the God,” we should say, “The Lord is the God;” or in the second,
instead of “Thou art the man,” “David is the man,” the energy of
the expression would be entirely destroyed. If any person, speaking
of himself, should distinguish himself from others of the same
name, by subjoining the necessary discriminating circumstances, so
as to leave no doubt in the mind of the hearer, it is obvious that
this phraseology would not only be inelegant, but also feeble and
unimpressive. To be convinced of the truth of this observation, it
is only necessary to compare the exanimate, stiff, and frequently
obscure diction of a common card, with the freedom, perspicuity, and
vivacity of a letter.

Pronouns may be divided into substantive and adjective, personal and
impersonal, relative and interrogative. The personal substantive
pronouns are _I_, _thou_, _he_, _she_. The impersonal substantive
pronoun is _it_.

The personal substantive pronouns have three cases, and are thus
declined:


       _First Person, Masc. and Fem._

                 _Sing._         _Plur._
  _Nom._         I[28]            We
  _Gen._         Mine             Ours
  _Obj._         Me               Us.

       _Second Person, Masc. and Fem._

                 _Sing._          _Plur._
  _Nom._         Thou[29]         Ye or you
  _Gen._         Thine            Yours
  _Obj._         Thee             You.


              _Third Person._

                 _Masc._

  _Nom._         He[30]           They
  _Gen._         His              Theirs
  _Obj._         Him              Them.


                  _Fem._

                 _Sing._         _Plur._
  _Nom._         She[31]          They
  _Gen._         Hers             Theirs
  _Obj._         Her              Them.


              _Third Person._

                 _Neuter._

               _Impersonal._
  _Nom._         It[32]           They[33]
  _Gen._         Its              Theirs
  _Obj._         It               Them.

_My_, _thy_, _our_, _your_, _their_, being the representatives of
nouns, have the essential character of pronouns. Thus, when Decius
says to Cato, “Cæsar is well acquainted with your virtues,” the
pronoun is employed as a substitute for _Cato’s_. As they express not
only the subject, but also the relation of property or possession,
they are by some grammarians considered to be the genitives of
their respective substantive pronouns. In usage, however, they are
distinguished from the English genitive by their incapacity to stand
alone. Thus we say, “It is the king’s,” “It is yours;” but we cannot
say, “It is your,” the presence of a noun being necessary to the last
expression. They are, therefore, more correctly named pronominal
adjectives. For the purpose of denoting emphatically the relation
of possession or property, the word _own_ is frequently joined to
them, as, _my own_, _thy own_, _our own_. And to mark the person with
emphasis, they are compounded with the word _self_; in Saxon, _sylf_;
from the Gothic _silba_, _ipse_: thus, _myself, thyself_; _ourselves,
yourselves_. _Theirselves_ is now obsolete, _themselves_ being used
in its stead.

The pronouns of the first and second persons are either masculine
or feminine. The reason is, says Mr. Harris, because the sex of
the speaker and of the person addressed is generally obvious. This
explanation, which has been adopted by most grammarians, appears to
me unsatisfactory and erroneous. Others have said that the pronouns
of the first and second persons have no distinction of sex, because
all distinction of this kind is foreign to the intention of the
speaker, who, when he uses the pronoun _I_, means the person who
speaks, be it man or woman; and when he employs the pronoun _thou_,
means the person addressed, without any regard to the sex of the
individual. This matter seems sufficiently plain. Language, to be
useful, must be perspicuous and intelligible, exhibiting the subject
and its attributes with clearness and precision. If it should be
asked why the pronoun of the third person has three varieties, Mr.
Harris would answer, “to mark the sex.” If it were inquired whence
arises the necessity of marking the sex, he would answer, and very
justly, “in order to ascertain the subject of discourse.” It is
obvious, therefore, that to note the sex is not the primary object,
and that the principal aim of the speaker is to discriminate and
mark the subject. The pronouns of the first and second persons have
no variety of form significant of sex, because the speaker and the
person addressed are evident without it. Mr. Harris, therefore,
should have said that the pronouns in question have no distinction
of gender, not because the _sex_ of the speaker and of the person
addressed, but because the _persons_ themselves, are in general
obvious, without the aid of sexual designation. The intention of
the speaker is not to denote the sex, but the person spoken of,
whether male or female; to ascertain which person, if absent, the
discrimination of sex is generally necessary. The sex, therefore,
enters not as an essential, but as an explanatory circumstance;
not as the subject of discourse, but to distinguish the subject.
Where the person is present, and is either the speaker or the
person addressed, discrimination of sex becomes unnecessary, the
pronoun itself marking the individuals. When the person or subject
of discourse is absent, the distinction of sex serves frequently to
determine the subject. Hence the pronoun of the third person has
three varieties, _he_ for the masculine, _she_ for the feminine, and
_it_ for the neuter.

The four personal pronouns, _I_, _thou_, _he_, and _she_, have three
cases, viz., the nominative or leading case, expressing the principal
subject, and preceding the verb; the genitive case, whose form and
office have been already defined; and the objective, accusative, or
following case, (for it has obtained these three names,) expressing
the object to which the energy is directed, or the subject acted
upon. This case follows the verb.

_Mine_, _thine_, _hers_, _theirs_, _his_, _yours_, _ours_, are truly
pronouns in the possessive or genitive case. Johnson has indeed said
that _my_ and _mine_ are words precisely synonymous, _my_, according
to him, being used before a consonant, and _mine_ before a vowel; as,
_my sword_, _mine arm_. It is doubtless true that _mine_ and _thine_
are sometimes used as _my_ and _thy_, which are not substantive
pronouns, but pronominal adjectives; but that they are not precisely
synonymous or mutually convertible, is obvious; for _my_ and _thy_
cannot be used for _mine_ and _thine_, though _mine_ and _thine_, as
has been observed, may be used for _my_ and _thy_. Example: “Whose
book is this?” I cannot answer, “it is my,” but “it is mine.” We may
indeed say “it is my book;” but the addition of the substantive is
necessary.

As _my_ and _mine_, _thy_ and _thine_, _our_ and _ours_, _your_ and
_yours_, _their_ and _theirs_, are not mutually convertible, they
cannot be regarded as synonymous each with its fellow.

_This_ and _that_, which have improperly been referred by some to the
class of pronouns, have been considered already. The former makes in
the plural _these_, the latter _those_.

The relative pronouns, so called because they directly relate or
refer to a substantive preceding, which is therefore termed _the
antecedent_, are _who_, _which_, _that_.

The pronoun _who_ is of the masculine or feminine gender, referring
to persons, male or female. The pronoun _which_ is neuter. _That_ is
common to the three genders.

               _Sing. and Plur._    _Sing. and Plur._
  _Nom._            Who[34]              Which
  _Gen._            Whose                Whose
  _Obj._            Whom                 Which.

Lowth and several other grammarians have asserted that the pronoun
_which_ admits no variation. Numberless examples, however, from the
best authors might be cited to disprove this assertion. Shakspeare
occasionally uses _whose_ as the genitive of _which_; and, since his
time, writers of the highest eminence have employed it in the same
manner.

      “Of man’s first disobedience, and the fruit
      Of that forbidden tree, _whose_ mortal taste.”--_Milton._

      “The lights and shades, _whose_ well-accorded strife
      Gives all the strength and colour of our life.”--_Pope._

“A true critic is like a dog at a feast, _whose_ thoughts and stomach
are wholly set on what the guests fling away.”--_Swift._

This usage is favourable to conciseness, and can very seldom create
ambiguity. Where obscurity indeed is apprehended, the periphrasis,
_of which_, should be adopted. I have, therefore, given _whose_ as
the genitive of _which_; not only because this usage is sanctioned
by classical authority, but likewise, because the other form, _of
which_, is frequently awkward and inelegant.

_Who_ is applied to persons, that is, to animals distinguished by
rationality, or represented as possessing it.

      “The man _who_ has no music in himself.”--_Shakspeare._

The antecedent _man_, being a person, is followed by _who_.

“A stag, _who_ came to drink at a river, seeing his own image in the
clear stream, said thus to himself.”

Here the stag is represented as possessing reason and speech, and
therefore the pronoun _who_ is employed. In mythological writings
in general, such as the Fables of Æsop, inferior animals are very
properly denoted by the personal relative.

_Which_ is applied to things inanimate, and creatures either devoid
of all indications of rationality, or represented as such. “The city,
_which_ Romulus built, was called Rome.” Here _which_ is used, the
word _city_ being the antecedent, to which it refers.

“The sloth, _which_ is a creature remarkable for inactivity, lives on
leaves and the flowers of trees.” Here the sloth, an animal hardly
possessing sensation or life, is expressed by _which_.

The rule here given for the use of these pronouns is not uniformly
observed, several good writers occasionally applying them
indifferently to inferior animals, without any determinate principle
of discrimination. It would be better, however, were this rule
universally followed; and if such modes of expression as “frequented
by that fowl, _whom_ nature has taught,” were entirely repudiated.

Priestley, whose doctrine on this subject seems nearly to coincide
with ours, has even objected to the application of the pronoun
_who_ to children, because this pronoun conveys an idea of persons
possessing reason and reflection, of which mere children are
incapable. He, therefore, disapproves of Cadogan’s phraseology, when
he says, “a child who.”

_That_ is applied indiscriminately to things animate and inanimate,
and admits no variation.

The pronouns _who_, _which_, and _that_, are sometimes resolvable
into _and he_, _and she_, _and it_. Mr. Harris, indeed, has said,
that the pronoun _qui_ (who) may be always resolved into _et ille_,
_a_, _ud_ (_and he_, _and she_, _and it_). This opinion, however, is
not perfectly correct; for it is thus resolvable in those examples
only in which the relative clause does not limit or modify the
meaning of the antecedent. If I say, “Man who is born of a woman,
is of few days, and full of trouble,” the relative clause is not
restrictive; I may, therefore, resolve the pronoun, and say, “Man
is of few days, and he is born of woman.” “Light is a body which
moves with great velocity,” is resolvable into “Light is a body,
and it moves with great velocity.” But when the relative clause
limits the meaning of the antecedent, the relative is clearly not
thus resolvable. “Virgil was the only epic poet, among the Romans,
who can be compared to Homer.” The signification of the antecedent
is here restricted by the relative clause: we cannot, therefore, by
resolution, say, “Virgil was the only epic poet among the Romans, and
he can be compared to Homer;” for the former of these propositions is
not true, nor is the sentiment, which it conveys, accordant with the
meaning of the author.

The pronoun _what_, if not employed interrogatively, is equivalent
to _that which_; and is applicable to inanimate things only, as, “I
believe what I see,” or “that which I see.”

_What_ admits no variation.

The relative pronouns _who_, _which_, are often used interrogatively,
and are, therefore, in such cases considered as interrogatives.
When thus employed, it is the opinion of the author of the British
Grammar, that they still retain their relative character. “The only
difference,” says he, “is this, that the relative refers to an
antecedent and definite subject, and the interrogative to something
subsequent and unknown.” The example which he adduces in support
of his opinion is the following: “Who first seduced them to that
foul revolt?” “The very question,” says he, “supposes a seducer, to
which, though unknown, the pronoun _who_ has a reference.” Answer,
“The infernal serpent.” He continues, “Here, in the answer, we have
the subject, which was indefinite, ascertained; so that the _who_
in the interrogation is as much a relative as if it had been said
originally, without any interrogation at all. It was the infernal
serpent who seduced them.” Others adopt an opinion diametrically
opposite, contending that _who_ and _which_ are properly
interrogatives, and that even, when used as relatives, they still
retain their interrogative character. This theory a few examples will
sufficiently illustrate.

“The man who?” (which man?) his character follows, “has no music in
himself.”

“The city which? (what city?) Romulus built was called Rome.”

“Happy the man whose cautious feet.”

“Happy that man who? his (whose) cautious feet.”

“Light is a body which? (body) moves with great velocity.”

Of these two theories I have no hesitation in adopting the former.
My reasons are these. The intention of language is to communicate
our sentiments; to express what we think, feel, perceive, or desire.
Hence its general character is indicative or assertive. “I believe,”
“I wish,” “I see,” are affirmative sentences; and whatever variety of
forms the phraseology may assume, they are all strictly significant
of assertion, and all resolvable into the language of affirmation.
“Go,” “teach,” “read,” are equivalent to, “I desire you to go,” “to
teach,” “to read.” “Have you finished your task?” means, when the
sentiment is fully expressed, “I desire to know, whether you have
finished your task.” Ellipses of this kind are natural. They spring
from an eagerness to impart to the vehicle of our thoughts a degree
of celerity, suited to the promptitude with which the mind conceives
them. Vehemence or passion, impatient of delay, uniformly resorts to
them. The assertive form of expression I therefore conceive to be the
parent whence every other is derived, and to which it is reducible.
If this be the case, no interrogative, conceived purely as such, can
claim so early an origin as definite or affirmative terms. Hence we
may conclude, that _who_, _which_, _when_, _where_, were at first
used as relatives, and came afterwards, by implication, to denote
interrogations.

Again, we know that the meaning of an expression is frequently
collected, not so much from the strict import of the terms, as from
the tone or manner in which it is delivered. If I say, “he did it,”
the sentence is affirmative; yet, by the tone of voice or manner of
the speaker, this affirmative sentence may denote an interrogation.
Thus, “he did it?” by an elevation of the voice, or the mode of
notation, maybe rendered equivalent to “did he do it?” “Who did it”
is in like manner an affirmative clause; but it is obvious that this
form of expression, like the other now adduced, may be likewise
employed to note an interrogation, thus, “Who did it?” And it is
evident, that, if the ellipsis be supplied, the sentence would read
thus, “I want to know who did it.” The preceding clause, however, is
sufficiently supplied by the manner of the speaker. An ellipsis of
this kind seems to be involved in every interrogation. If I say, “did
he do it?” it is equivalent to “tell me, if he did it.” Accordingly,
we find that the Latins, in such interrogations, employed only the
latter clause; for _an_ (whether), which is termed an interrogative,
is, in fact, nothing but the Greek ἂν, synonymous with _si_ (if)
among the Latins. “_An fecit_,” did he do it? is therefore strictly
equivalent to “_si fecit_” if he did it, the former clause “tell
me,” being understood, and its import supplied by the manner of the
speaker, or the mode of notation.

Besides, let any person ask himself what idea he annexes to the word
_who_, considered as an interrogative, and I am persuaded he will be
sensible that he cannot form any distinct conception of its import.

I am inclined therefore to think that interrogatives are strictly
relatives: and that these relatives, by the aid of voice, gesture, or
some explanatory circumstance, answer the purpose of interrogation.

In using these pronouns interrogatively, it is to be observed, that
_who_ and _which_ are each applied to persons, which is not the case
when they are employed as relatives. This difference, however, is to
be observed, that when the pronoun _which_ is used interrogatively,
and applied to persons, it is generally, if not always, understood
that the character of the individual, who is the object of inquiry,
is in presence of the inquirer, or is in some degree known. _Who_ is
more indefinite. If I say, “which is the man?” I mean “who _of those
now before me_?” or of those who have been described? Agreeably to
this notion, we say, “which of _the_ two,” not “who of the two,” was
guilty of this crime?

If I say, “Who is the man that will dare to affirm?” it implies that
I am entirely a stranger to him, and that I even doubt his existence.
“Which is the man?” not only implies his existence, but also that the
aggregate of individuals, whence the selection is made, is known to
me.

_What_ is also used interrogatively, and is employed in introducing
questions, whether the subject be persons or things, as, “What man
is that?” “What book is this?” When no substantive is subjoined, it
is then wholly indefinite, as, “What is man that thou art mindful of
him?” When we inquire, therefore, into the character of any person,
and not for the individual himself, it is to be remembered that we
employ this pronoun, and not _who_ or _which_.

There seems to be the same difference between _who_ and _what_
definite, as between _who_ and _which_. If I say, “What man will dare
to affirm this?” and “Which man will dare?” &c., it is obvious that
the former interrogatory is more indefinite than the latter; the one
implying a total ignorance of the individual, and some doubt of his
existence; the other, that he is one of a number in some degree known
to the inquirer.

When any defining clause is subjoined, either may be used, as, “What,
or which, man among you, having a hundred sheep, and losing one,
would not leave the ninety and nine?”

The pronoun _whether_ is equivalent to “which of the two.” It is the
Teutonic word _wether_, bearing the same relation to _wer_, “who” or
“which,” as _either_ does to _ein_, “one,” and _neither, newether_,
to _nie_ or _nehein_, “none.”

This word, though now generally employed or considered as a
conjunction, is in truth reducible to the class of words which we
are now examining, and is precisely synonymous with _uter_, _tra_,
_trum_, of the Latins. “Whether is it easier to say?”--_Bible._

Here _whether_ is truly a pronoun, and is the nominative to the
following verb.

“Whether is greater, the gold or the temple?”--_Ibid._

In these examples, _whether_ is precisely the same with “which of
the two.” It seems now to be giving place to the word _which_, as
the comparative, when two things are compared, is often supplanted
by the superlative. Thus we often say, when speaking of two,
“which is the best,” instead of “whether is better.” The Latins
almost uniformly observed the distinction:--“Uter dignior, quis
dignissimus?”--_Quint._

The pronoun _it_ is used indefinitely, and applied to persons or
things.

Dr. Johnson has objected to the use of this pronoun in those examples
wherein the pronouns of the first or second persons are employed; and
Dr. Lowth has censured it when referring to a plural number, as in
the following example:

      “’T is these, that give the great Atrides spoils.”--_Pope._

I concur, however, with the learned author of the Philosophy of
Rhetoric, who regards the objections of these critics as, in this
instance, of no weight. For when a question is asked, the subject of
which is totally unknown, there must be some indefinite word employed
to denote the subject of the interrogation. The word which we use for
this purpose is _it_, as, “Who is it?” “What is it?” This phraseology
is established by universal usage, and is therefore unexceptionable.
This being the case, there can be no impropriety in repeating in the
answer the indefinite term employed in the question. We may therefore
reply, “It is I,” “It is he,” “It is she.”

Now, if the term be admitted in questions and answers where the
subject may be either male or female, and of the first, second, or
third person, it surely is admissible in those cases also where the
subject is in the plural number. Nay, to use in the answer any other
word to express the subject than that by which it is signified in
the question, would be in all cases, if not productive of ambiguity,
at least less precise. “Who is it?” says a master to his servant,
hearing a voice in the hall. “It is the gentlemen who called
yesterday,” replies the servant. Who sees not that “they are the
gentlemen,” would be an answer less accordant with the terms of the
question, and would less clearly show that “the gentlemen,” and “the
subject of inquiry,” both being denoted by one term, are one and the
same? Had the master known that it was the voice of a gentleman, and
that there were more than one, and had he accordingly said, “Who are
they?” the answer would have properly been “They are the gentlemen.”
But when the question is “Who is it?” I apprehend the only apposite
answer is, “It is the gentlemen,” the identity of the terms (_it_
being repeated) clearly evincing an identity of subject in the
question and in the answer; in other words, that the subject of the
inquiry, and the subject of the answer, are one and the same.

I conclude with observing, that, though I have here considered the
word _that_ as a pronoun, there can be no question that in its import
it is precisely the same with the demonstrative _that_, which has
been already explained. “The house that you built is burned,” is
resolvable thus, “The house is burned, you built that.”




CHAPTER IV.

OF THE ADJECTIVE.


An adjective has been defined by most grammarians to be “that part
of speech which signifies an accident, quality, or property of a
thing.” This definition appears to me to be somewhat defective and
incorrect: for the adjective does not express the quality simply,
but the quality or property, as conjoined with a substance; or, as
grammarians have termed it, _in concreto_. Thus, when we say “good
man,” _goodness_ is the name of the quality, and _good_ is the
adjective expressing that quality, as conjoined with the subject
_man_. Accordingly, every adjective is resolvable into the name of
the thing implied, and any term of reference or conjunction, as
_of_, _with_. Thus “a prudent man” is equivalent to “a man with” or
“having prudence” or to “a man of prudence.” An adjective, therefore,
is that part of speech which denotes any substance or attribute,
not by itself, but as conjoined with a subject, or pertaining to
its character. This conjunction is generally marked by changing the
termination of the simple name of the substantive or attribute, as
_fool_, _foolish_, _wax_, _waxen_. Sometimes no change is made; and
the simple name of the substance, or attribute, is prefixed to the
name of the subject, as _sea fowl_, _race horse_, _corn field_. In
writing these, and similar expressions, the conjunction is sometimes
marked by a hyphen, as _sea-fowl_, _river-fish_, _wine-vessel_.

As every appellative denotes the whole of a genus or species, the
intention and effect of the adjective is, by limiting the generic
meaning of the substantive, to specify what part of the genus or
species is the subject of discourse. If I say “man,” the term is
universal: it embraces the species. If I say “a man,” the expression
is indefinite, being applicable to any individual of the kind. If I
say “a good man,” I confine the term to an individual distinguished
by goodness. Here _man_ expresses the substance; and _good_ the
quality _in concreto_. Sometimes, on the contrary, the substantive
is the general name of the quality or property; and the adjective
modifies or determines its degree, as, _wisdom_, _little wisdom_. Let
us take another example. The word _stone_ is applicable to a whole
species of substances. If I say _round stone_, I confine the meaning
of the substantive to that part of the genus which is distinguished
by roundness. Here the substantive denotes the matter, or substance,
in general, and the adjective limits its signification, by expressing
the form. Sometimes the converse takes place, as _golden globe_.
Here the substantive is the generic name of a certain figure; and
the adjective, by expressing the matter, confines that figure to the
substance of gold.

Some grammarians have denominated this part of speech by the name of
adjective noun; to others this designation appears inadmissible. The
latter observe, that neither is the adjective the name of anything,
nor is it in English variable, like the substantive. They allow,
that in Greek and Latin, the designation in question is, in some
degree, justifiable, because, though the noun and adjective differ
essentially in office, in these languages, they agree in form; but in
our language they deem it a singular impropriety[35].

I have said that the adjective denotes a substance, quality, or
property, “as pertaining,” or _in concreto_. Now, it is to be
observed, that substances do not admit degrees of _more_ or _less_,
in regard to their essential character. “A wooden table” cannot be
more or less wooden. “An iron bar” cannot be more or less such. In
these cases, the adjective, as I have already remarked, by expressing
the matter, limits the form to one species of substance. The same
observation is applicable to the converse circumstance, in which
the form strictly limits the matter, as “triangular board.” Here
it is obvious, that the substance limited to one form by the term
_triangular_, cannot be more or less triangular. But this is not
the case with qualities or properties, which may exist in different
substances in different degrees. And, as it is sometimes necessary
to express the existence of a quality, as greater or less in one
substance than another, hence arises the utility of some form of
expression to denote these relative degrees of its existence. It
is in this case only, that the termination of the adjective admits
variation; and then it is said to be in a state of comparison.

In all qualities susceptible of intension or remission, the number of
degrees, from the lowest to the highest, may be accounted infinite.
Hardness, for example, gravity, magnitude, genius, wisdom, folly,
are severally diversified by an infinitude of gradations, which it
would elude the capacity of any language to discriminate. To denote
these degrees, is, therefore, utterly impracticable, as it is wholly
unnecessary.

In English, as in most other languages, we employ two variations:
the one to denote simple excess, or a greater degree of the quality
than that which is expressed by the adjective itself; and the other
to denote the greatest excess. Thus, if I compare wood with stone,
as possessing the quality of hardness, I say, “wood is hard,” “stone
is harder.” If I compare these with iron, I say, “wood is hard,”
“stone harder,” “iron the hardest.” Thus, in truth, there are only
two degrees of comparison, viz. the comparative and the superlative,
the positive expressing the quality simply and absolutely.

The comparative is formed by adding _er_ to the positive, if it end
with a consonant; or the letter _r_, if it end with a vowel; as,
_soft, softer_; _safe, safer_.

The superlative is formed by adding _est_, or _st_, as, _soft,
softest_; _safe, safest_[36].

Some adjectives are compared irregularly, as,

  _Pos._         _Comp._        _Super._
  Good           Better         Best
  Bad or Evil    Worse          Worst
  Little         Less           Least
  Much           More           Most
  Many           More           Most
  Near           Nearer         Nearest or next
  Late           Later          Latest or last.

The comparative degree is frequently expressed by the word _more_,
and the superlative by _most_, as,

  _Pos._         _Comp._        _Super._
  Hard           More hard      Most hard.

Monosyllabic adjectives are generally compared by annexing _r_ or
_er_, _st_ or _est_; adjectives of two or more syllables by _more_
and _most_, as, _strong, stronger, strongest_; _certain, more
certain, most certain_.

Dissyllabic adjectives in _y_ form an exception to this rule, as
_happy, happier, happiest_.

Adjectives of two syllables ending in _le_, after a mute, are also
excepted, as, _able, abler, ablest_.

Euphony seems here to be generally consulted, and the ear may be
allowed perhaps to furnish the best rule.

Some form their superlative by adding _most_ to the comparative, as,
_nether, nethermost_; _lower, lowermost_; _under, undermost_: others
by adding _most_ either to the positive or comparative, as, _hind,
hindmost_, or _hindermost_; _up, upmost_ or _uppermost_. From _in_,
we have _inmost_ and _innermost_[37].

Besides this definite and direct kind of comparison, there is
another, which may be termed indefinite or indirect, expressed by the
intensive words _too_, _very_, _exceedingly_, &c., as, _too good_,
_very hard_, _exceedingly great_.

When the word _very_, or any other of the same import, is put before
the positive, it is called by some writers the superlative of
eminence, to distinguish it from the other superlative, which has
been already mentioned, and is called the superlative of comparison.
Thus, _very hard_ is termed the superlative of eminence; _most hard_,
or _hardest_, the superlative of comparison.

I have said that the comparative denotes simple excess, and the
superlative the greatest. It is not, however, to be hence inferred,
that the comparative may not be employed in expressing the same
pre-eminence or inferiority with the superlative. If I say, “Of all
acquirements virtue is the most valuable,” I may also convey the
same sentiment by saying, “Virtue is more valuable than every other
acquirement.” If it be asked, what then is the difference between the
comparative and superlative? I answer,

1st. That the superlative expresses the absolutely highest or
lowest degree of the quality, as when we say, “O God most high;” or
the greatest or least degree, in relation merely to the subjects
of comparison, thus expressing a superiority of excess above the
comparative, as when I say, “In estimating the worth of these human
attainments, learning, prudence, and virtue, it cannot be denied
that learning is valuable, that prudence is more valuable, but that
virtue is the most valuable.” The comparative expresses merely simple
excess, but never the highest or lowest degree of the quality. This
distinction is, perhaps, the most precise, and the most worthy of
attention.

I observe, however, that the sentiment in the last example may be
expressed by the comparative, but not simply, or by itself; thus,
“Learning is valuable, prudence more valuable, and virtue more
valuable still,” the word _still_ implying a continued gradation.
Were this word suppressed, the sentence would imply that prudence
and virtue are each more valuable than learning, but would assert no
superiority of virtue to prudence. The same sentiment may likewise be
expressed by combining the two first, and marking simply the excess
of the third, thus, “virtue is better than both.”

2dly. When we express the superiority or inferiority of one of two
things, or of two aggregates, we almost always use the comparative.
Thus, speaking of Cæsar and Cato, I say, “Cato was the more
virtuous, Cæsar the more eloquent;” or of two brothers, we say, “John
was the elder.”

In such cases the superlative is sometimes employed, as, “the best of
the two,” instead of “the better of the two.” The former phraseology,
however, is more consonant to established usage, and is in every case
to be preferred. “Whether is it easier to say, ‘take up thy bed and
walk,’ or to say, ‘thy sins are forgiven thee?’” that is, which of
the two is “easier,” not “easiest,” the simple excess of one thing
above another being here denoted.

3dly. When we use the superlative, we always compare one thing, or
an aggregate number of things, with the class to which they belong,
or to which we refer them; whereas, when we use the comparative,
except in the case just mentioned, the things compared either
belong, or are conceived as belonging, to different classes, being
placed in opposition to each other. Thus, in comparing Socrates, who
was an Athenian, with the other Athenians, we say, “Socrates was
the wisest of the Athenians;” that is, “of,” “out of,” or “of the
class of Athenians.” Hence in Latin the superlative often takes the
preposition _ex_ (out of) to denote that the object compared belongs
to the order of things with which it is compared; the comparative
very rarely.

Now the same sentiment may be expressed by the comparative; but then
the _Athenians_ and _Socrates_, though belonging to one species, are
conceived as mutually opposed, and referred to different places,
whereas the superlative refers them to one common aggregate. Thus, if
we employ the comparative, we say, “Socrates was wiser than any other
Athenian.”

Agreeably to the observation now made, we cannot say, “Cicero was
more eloquent than the Romans,” or “than any Roman;” because Cicero
was himself a Roman, one of the class with which he is compared,
and could not therefore be more eloquent than himself. As the
objects compared belong, therefore, to one class, and are not two
individuals, nor two aggregates, the comparative cannot be employed,
unless by placing them in opposition, or referring them to different
places, as, “Cicero was more eloquent than any other Roman.” Here
the word _other_ denotes that opposition, that diversity of place
or species, which, in all cases but the one already mentioned, is
essentially implied in the use of the comparative.

I have observed already, that when the superlative is employed, the
things compared are referred to one aggregate; and that when the
comparative is used, they are contradistinguished by a different
reference. This distinction obtains uniformly, unless when we compare
only two individuals, or two classes, both referred to one aggregate,
as “the elder of the Catos,” “of these two nations (speaking of
the Greeks and Romans), the latter were the more warlike.” In
such examples as these, the comparative, while it retains its own
distinctive character, denoting simple excess, partakes also of the
nature of the superlative, the objects compared being referred by the
preposition to one and the same aggregate. But as the superlative
is always followed by _of_, and the comparative, in every case
except the one now mentioned, followed by _than_, some writers say,
“the eldest of the two,” “the latter were the most warlike.” This
phraseology, however conformable to the generally distinguished
usage of the comparative and superlative, is repugnant to the
characteristic power of these degrees, by which one denotes simple
excess, while the other heightens or lessens the quality to its
highest or lowest degree.

From the preceding remarks will appear the impropriety of saying,
“Jacob loved Joseph more than all his children.”[38] Joseph being one
of his children, the sentiment expressed involves an absurdity: it
should be “more than all his other children.” “In the beginning of
the 16th century, Spain is said to have possessed a thousand merchant
ships, a number probably far superior to that of any nation in Europe
in that age.” (Robertson’s America.) It should be, “that of any other
nation in Europe:” for, Spain being one of the European nations, she
could not possess a number superior to her own. The comparative
required the terms to be contrasted by the word _other_.

                          “Adam
      The comeliest of men since born
      His sons. The fairest of her daughters Eve.”--_Milton._

“Adam,” the antecedent subject of comparison, is here improperly
referred to the aggregate of “men since born.” To this aggregate he
cannot be said to belong, not having been “born,” nor being reducible
to the class of “his own sons.” Eve also is referred to a species of
which she was no part. In neither of these comparisons can the second
term include the first; yet the preposition refers them to one class.
Such phraseologies as these, though not ungrammatical, involve an
absurdity, and should therefore be dismissed.

Adjectives, whose signification does not admit intension or
remission, cannot be compared. Among these are to be reckoned,
1st, All words expressive of figure, as _circular_, _square_,
_triangular_, _perpendicular_, _straight_; for it is obvious, that
if a body or figure be triangular, or square, or circular, it
cannot be more or less so. It is either circular, or not circular;
triangular, or not triangular; straight, or not straight. If the
affirmative be the case, gradation from more or less, or conversely,
is impossible; if the negative be true, then the attributes denoted
by these adjectives do not belong to it; and therefore the epithets
_circular_, _triangular_, _straight_, &c., are inapplicable. Hence
such expressions as these, “place the staff more erect,” “make the
field more triangular,” are highly improper. We should say, “set the
staff erect,” “make the field triangular.”

2dly. All adjectives whose signification, in their simple form,
implies the highest or lowest possible degree, admit not comparison,
as, _chief_, _supreme_, _universal_, _perfect_, _extreme_, &c. Hume,
speaking of enthusiasm, says (Essays, vol. i. p. 72), “it begets the
most extreme resolutions.” _Extreme_ implies the farthest, or the
greatest possible, and cannot admit intension.

I am aware that usage may be pleaded in favour of “_more_ and _most
universal_, _more_ and _most perfect_.” This usage, however, is
not such as will sanction the former of these phraseologies; for
good writers generally avoid it. Besides, there is no necessity for
resorting to this mode of expression, as we have an attributive
appropriate to the idea intended: thus, instead of saying,
“Literature is more universal in England than America,” we should
say, “Literature is more general.” It is almost unnecessary to
observe, that literature in England is either universal, or it is
not; if the former be true, it cannot be more than universal; if
the latter, the term is inapplicable. The word _general_ does not
comprise the whole; it admits intension and remission: the adjective
_universal_ implies totality. A general rule admits exceptions; a
universal rule embraces every particular.

The expression “_more perfect_” is, in strictness of speech, equally
exceptionable; usage, however, has given it a sanction which we
dare hardly controvert. It has been proposed, indeed, to avoid this
and similar improprieties, by giving the phraseology a negative,
or indirect form. Thus, instead of saying, “A time-keeper is a
more perfect machine than a watch,” it has been proposed to say,
“A time-keeper is a less imperfect machine than a watch.” This
phraseology is logically correct, perfection being predicable of
neither the one thing nor the other; it might likewise, in many
cases, be adopted with propriety. In the language of passion,
however, and in the colourings of imagination, such expressions would
be exanimate and intolerable. A lover, expatiating with rapture on
the beauty and perfection of his mistress, would hardly call her,
“the _least imperfect of her sex_.”

In all languages, indeed, examples are to be found of adjectives
being compared whose signification admits neither intension nor
remission. It would be easy to assign several reasons for this, did
the discussion belong to the province of the grammarian[39]. Suffice
it to say, that such phraseologies should never be admitted where the
language will furnish correct, and equally apposite, expressions.

I observe also, that as those adjectives whose signification cannot
be heightened or lessened admit not comparison, so, for the same
reason, they exclude all intensive words. The expressions, _so
universal_, _so extreme_, and such like, are therefore improper.
The former is indeed common enough; but it is easy to see, as it
has been already remarked, that whatever is universal cannot be
increased or diminished; and that what is less than universal, cannot
be characterized by that epithet. The phrase _so universal_ implies
a gradation in universality, and that something is less so than an
another; which is evidently impossible.

It has been questioned, whether _prior_, _superior_, _ulterior_,
_exterior_, and several others, which have the form of the Latin
comparative, should be deemed comparatives. I am inclined to think,
they ought not, for these reasons; 1st, They have not the form of the
English comparative; 2dly, They are never followed by _than_, which
uniformly accompanies the English comparative, when the subjects are
opposed to each other, or referred to different classes; 3dly, It is
not to be conceived, that every adjective, which implies comparison,
is therefore a comparative or superlative, otherwise _preferable_
(better than), _previous_ (prior to), might be deemed comparatives;
4thly, Many of these have truly a positive meaning, not implying an
excess of the quality, but merely the quality, as opposed to its
contrary. The _interior_ means simply the _inside_, as opposed to the
_exterior_ or _outside_; the _anterior_, “the one before,” opposed to
_posterior_, “the one behind.”

I dismiss this article with observing, that the signification of the
positive is sometimes lessened by the termination _ish_; as, _white,
whitish_; _black, blackish_. Johnson remarks, that the adjective
in this form may be considered as in a state of comparison; it may
properly be called a diminutive.




CHAPTER V.

OF THE VERB.


A verb has been defined to be “that part of speech which signifies
to be, to do, or to suffer;” or more correctly, “that part of speech
which predicates some action, passion, or state of its subject,”
as “I strike,” “I am wounded,” “I stand.” Its essence consists in
affirmation, and by this property it is distinguished from every
other part of speech. The adjective expresses an accident, quality,
or property of a thing _in concreto_; that is, when joined to the
name of a substance, it expresses that substance, as accompanied by
some attribute: in other words, it limits a generic name, confining
it to that part of the kind, which possesses the character, which
the attributive specifies; but it affirms nothing. Thus, if we say,
“_a wise man_,” which is equivalent to “a man with,” or “having
wisdom,” there is no affirmation; an individual is singled from a
species, under the character of wisdom, but nothing is asserted of
this individual. If we say “the man is wise,” there is something
affirmed of the man, and the affirmation is expressed by _is_. If
the attribute and the assertion be combined in the expression, as
in Latin _vir sapit_, it is obvious that the essence of the verb
consists, not in denoting the attribute wisdom, but in affirming
that quality, as belonging to the subject; for, if you cancel the
assertion, the verb is immediately converted into an adjective, and
the expression becomes _vir sapiens_, a wise man.

The simplest of all verbs is that which the Greeks call a verb of
existence, namely, the verb _to be_. This verb frequently denotes
pure affirmation, as “God is good,” where the verb, or _copula_,
as it has been termed, serves to predicate of the Deity, the
attribute denoted by the following word. Hence, as it expresses
mere affirmation, the Latins call it a substantive verb, in
contradistinction to those verbs which, with an attribute, denote
assertion, and were called by some grammarians adjective verbs.

Sometimes it predicates pure or absolute existence, as “God is,”
that is, “God _exists_.” In the following example it occurs in both
senses. “We believe that thou art, and that thou art the rewarder of
them who diligently seek thee.”

As nouns denote the subjects of our discourse, so verbs predicate
their accidents, or properties. The former are the names of things,
the latter what we say concerning them. These two, therefore, must
be the only essential parts of speech; for to mental communication
nothing else can be indispensably requisite, than to name the subject
of our thoughts, and to express our sentiments of its attributes
or properties. And as the verb essentially expresses affirmation,
without which there could be no communication of sentiment, it has
been hence considered as the principal part of speech, and was
therefore called, by the ancient grammarians, _verb_, or _the word_,
by way of eminence. The noun, however, is unquestionably of earlier
origin. To assign names to surrounding objects would be a matter of
the first necessity: the next step would be to express their most
common actions, or states of being. This indeed is the order of
nature--the progress of intellect.

Mr. Tooke observes that, “the verb does not imply any assertion, and
that no single word can.” “Till one single thing,” says he, “can be
found to be a couple, one single word cannot make an assertion or
affirmation: for there is joining in that operation, and there can be
no junction of one thing.” This theory he illustrates by the tense
_ibo_, which he resolves thus:

  _English_     Hi[40]      Wol         Ich
  _Latin_       I           Vol         O
  _Greek_       Ι           Βουλ        Εω.

The first of each triad are the simple verbs, equivalent to _go_.
The second are the verbs _Wol_, _Vol_, Βουλ, denoting _will_. The
third are the pronouns of the first person. Whatever opinion may be
formed respecting the truth of this analysis, its ingenuity will
not be questioned. There are two objections, however, by which its
justness may possibly be controverted. The first is, if the personal
pronouns are contained, as Mr. Tooke says, in the Greek and Latin
terminations of the three persons of their verbs, why is the pronoun
repeated with the verb? If the _o_ in _volo_ be an abbreviated suffix
for _ego_, why do we redundantly say _ego volo_? Now, in answer to
this objection, it might be observed, were we disposed to indulge
in mere hypothesis, that the involution of the pronoun may have
eluded the attention of the Latins; or, if this explanation should be
deemed too improbable, it may be supposed that usage, against whose
decree there is no appeal, may have established the repetition of the
pronoun at the expense of strict propriety. One thing particularly
deserves attention, that the pronoun was seldom or never used, unless
in cases where emphasis was implied, or an antithesis of persons was
to be strongly marked. But without resorting to conjectures, which
may be deemed vague and unsatisfactory, we may appeal to a fact which
is decisive of the point in question. I have already observed, that
in the Hebrew language we can distinctly mark the pronouns suffixed
to the verb; yet we find the Hebrew writers repeating the pronouns
even in cases where no emphasis is intended. Thus, in Gen. xlviii.
22, _Ve-ani nathatti_, “and I have given;” Job xix. 25, _Ve-ani
iadahgti_, “and I knew;” Deut. ix. 2, _attah iadahghta, ve-atta
shamahgh ta_, “thou knowest, and thou hast heard.” In these examples,
the pronoun is both incorporated with the verb and repeated by
itself. Whatever may be the abstract propriety of this phraseology,
its existence in Hebrew is sufficient to obviate the objection
proposed.

Again, it may be urged, if the pronoun _ego_ be suffixed to the verb,
why do not all the tenses in the first person singular end in _o_?
This second objection may also be partly, if not entirely, removed.
The Latin language appears to be a commixture of Greek and one of the
northern languages. This commixture will account for the first person
singular sometimes ending in _o_, in imitation of the Greeks, and at
other times in _m_, in imitation of the Celts. The present tense of
the Gaelic, a dialect of the Celtic, proceeds thus: _sgriobh-aim_, “I
write,” sgriobh-air, sgriobh-aidh, sgriobh-amoid, sgriobh-aoidhesi,
sgriobh-aidsion. Here, as Whiter observes, we have something
resembling the Latin verb _scribo_: and it is to be remarked that the
first person singular ends in _m_, which the Romans most probably
adopted as one of their verbal terminations. And could we prosecute
the inquiry, and investigate the structure of the Greek and Celtic
tenses themselves, we should doubtless find, that they involve, along
with the radical word, one or more terms expressing the accessary
ideas of action, passion, state, person, time, and so forth. The same
theory, we are persuaded, may be applied to all languages, in which
the tenses are formed by variety of termination.

Nothing, I conceive, can be more evident, than that the inflexions
of nouns and verbs, how inexplicable soever they may now prove,
were not originally the result of systematic art, but were separate
terms significant of the circumstances intended, and afterwards, by
celerity of pronunciation, coalesced with the words of which they now
form the terminations.

It has been observed, that the essence of the verb consists in
affirmation. This theory, I have remarked, is controverted by Mr.
Tooke. It must be obvious, however, from the preceding observations,
that the difference between the opinion of this eminent philologist,
and that which is here delivered, is more apparent than real. For
Mr. Tooke will not deny, that an affirmation is implied in _ibo_; he
merely observes, that every assertion requires “a couple of terms.”
Now it is of little moment to the point in question whether the two
terms be incorporated in one, as in _lego_, or remain separate, as “I
read.” In either case the verb affirms something of its nominative,
whether that nominative appear in a simple or in a compound state.
Sometimes the affirmation is expressed by a separate and appropriate
sign, as _ille est dives_, “he is rich:” and the verb of existence
(_to be_) is supposed, by several critics and philologists, to have
been coeval with the earliest infancy of language. In English, the
affirmation, and also the action, are frequently denoted, simply by
the junction of the name of the attribute with the nominative of
the subject, whether noun or pronoun. Thus, if we say, “my will,”
“the children’s will,” there is no affirmation implied, and the term
_will_ is considered as a mere name. But if we say, “I will,” “the
children will,” it becomes invested with a different character,
and affirms the volition to belong to the subject. Thus also, “the
hero’s might,” “the hero might,” “my ken” (my knowledge or ability),
“I ken,” _I can_, or _I am able_; “my love,” “I love.” Mr. Tooke
observes, that when we say “I love,” there is an ellipsis of the word
_do_. This appears to me a probable opinion, though not entirely
unobjectionable. For though we find the auxiliary more frequently
used in old English than in modern compositions, yet it does not
occur so frequently as, according to this hypothesis, we should
naturally expect. Mr. Tooke indeed admits the fact; but observes,
that Chaucer had less occasion to use it, because in his time the
distinguishing terminations of the verb still remained, though they
were not constantly employed. Now I find, as Mr. Tyrwhitt remarks,
that Chaucer seldom uses the word _do_ as an auxiliary, even in those
cases where the verb and the noun are identical. This circumstance
might lead us to infer that the English present was derived from
the Saxon, by dropping the termination, as _ic lufige_, _I love_;
the affirmation and the action being sufficiently obvious from the
construction, and that it was originally optional to say either “I
love,” or “I do love.” Be that as it may, the assertion expressed by
“I do,” equivalent to “I act,” appears clearly to be signified by the
junction of the nominative pronoun with the sign of action. Whether a
note of affirmation was at first separately employed, and afterwards
involved in the verbal termination, or whether the affirmation be
merely inferred and not signified, this is certain, that it is by the
verb, and the verb only, that we can express affirmation.

As every subject of discourse must be spoken of as either doing or
suffering something, either acting or acted upon; or as neither doing
nor suffering; hence verbs have been divided by all grammarians into
active, passive, and neuter.

The verb active denotes that the subject of discourse is doing
something, as, _I write_; the passive verb, that the subject suffers,
or is acted upon, as, _the book is burned_; and the neuter denotes
neither the one nor the other, but expresses merely the state,
posture, or condition of the subject, as unaffected by anything else,
as, _I sit_, _I sleep_, _I stand_.

Action, energy, or motion may either be confined to the agent, or
pass from him to something extrinsic. Hence active verbs have been
divided into transitive and intransitive. An active transitive verb
denotes that kind of action by which the agent affects something
foreign to himself, or which passes from the agent to something
without him, as, _to beat a drum_, _to whip a horse_, _to kill a
dog_. _Beat_, _whip_, _kill_, are active transitive verbs; and it is
the characteristic of these verbs that they admit a noun after them,
denoting the subject of the action.

An active intransitive verb denotes that species of action or energy,
which passes not from the agent to anything else; that is, it
expresses what has been termed immanent energy. Hence an intransitive
verb does not admit a noun after it, there being no extrinsic subject
or object affected by the action. Thus, _I run_, _I walk_, _the horse
gallops_, are examples of active intransitive verbs[41].

Webster, in his Dissertations on the English Language, delivers it
as his opinion, that the division of verbs into active, passive, and
neuter is incorrect; and that the only accurate distribution is into
transitive and intransitive. “Is not a man,” says he, “passive in
hearing? yet hearing is called an active verb.”

It is doubtless true, that _to hear_, and many other verbs, commonly
called active, denote chiefly, perhaps, the effect of an extrinsic or
foreign act. But whether we view the matter as a question either in
metaphysics or in grammar, we shall perceive but little impropriety
in adopting the common distinction. For, though the verb _to hear_
denotes, perhaps, chiefly, that a certain impression is made on
the mind through the auditory organ, yet even here the mind is not
entirely passive, as, were this the place for such a discussion, it
would be easy to prove. _I see_, _I hear_, _I feel_, _I perceive_,
denote not only the sensation in which we are passive, but also
a perception, to which the consent or activity of the mind is
unquestionably essential. Hence these verbs have, in all languages,
been denominated active. But if the term transitive be the only
correct name, it may be asked, why does Mr. Webster call this verb by
that appellation? He would answer, I doubt not, “because something
passes from the agent to something else.” What, then, is that
something which passes? I am afraid Mr. Webster would have difficulty
in answering this question, so as to justify the term transitive,
without admitting the verb to be active. For, if it be not an act, an
energy, or some operation of the mind, what is it, or how can it pass
from one to another? The truth is, this objection of Mr. Webster to
the term active in such cases, is founded neither on metaphysical nor
grammatical principles; for by an active transitive verb is meant,
that which admits a noun as its regimen; and, for the purposes of
grammar, this name is sufficiently correct. If the point in question
be metaphysically considered, it would be easy to demonstrate that,
though in sensation the mind be passive, in perception it is active.

I would here observe, in passing, that there are many verbs neuter
and intransitive, which, followed by a preposition, may be truly
considered as active transitive verbs. These have been denominated,
by the learned Dr. Campbell, compound active verbs. _To laugh_, for
example, is a neuter verb; it cannot therefore admit a passive voice,
as, “_I am laughed_.” _To laugh at_ may be considered as an active
transitive verb; for it not only admits an objective case after it
in the active voice, but is likewise construed as a passive verb,
as, “_I am laughed at_.” Here an obvious analogy obtains between
these two and the verbs _rideo_, _derideo_, in Latin; the former of
which is a neuter, and the latter an active verb. Nor, as the same
ingenious writer observes, does it matter whether the preposition be
prefixed to the simple verb, as in Latin, in order to form the active
verb, or be put after, and detached, as is the case in English. The
only grammatical criterion in our language between an active and
a neuter verb is this: if the verb admits an objective case after
it, either with or without a preposition, to express the subject or
object of the energy, the verb may be grammatically considered as a
compound active verb; for thus construed it has a passive voice. If
the verb does not thus admit an objective case, it must be considered
grammatically as neuter or intransitive, and has no passive voice.
_To smile_ is a neuter verb; it cannot, therefore, be followed by an
objective case, nor be construed as a passive verb. We cannot say,
_she smiled him_, or _he was smiled_. _To smile on_, according to
the principle now proposed, is a compound active verb; we therefore
say, _she smiled on him_. _He was smiled on by Fortune in every
undertaking[42]._

As all things exist in time, and whatever is predicable of any
subject must be predicated as either past, present, or future, every
action, energy, or state of being, coming under one or other of
these predicaments, hence arises the utility of tenses, to express
the times, or relative order of their existence. In regard to the
number of these tenses[43], necessary to render a language complete,
grammarians have been somewhat divided in opinion.

In our language we have two simple tenses, the present and the
preterperfect[44]. The latter is generally formed by adding _d_
or _ed_ to the present, as _love, loved_; _fear, feared_. That the
suffix here is a contraction for _did_, as Mr. Tooke supposes, I can
easily imagine; thus, _fear_, _fear-did_, _feared_, or _did fear_;
but the question returns, whence comes the termination _ed_ in
_doed_, from which _did_ itself is contracted? This query seems to
have escaped the attention of the learned author[45].

Actions and states of being may be predicated as either certain or
contingent, free or necessary, possible or impossible, obligatory
or optional; in short, as they may take place in a variety of ways,
they may be spoken of, as diversified in their modes of production.
Hence arises another accident of verbs, called a mood, expressing
the mode or manner of existence. These modes are, in some languages,
partly expressed by inflexions, partly by auxiliary verbs, or
words significant of the model diversity. In English there is only
one mood, namely, the indicative. The Greeks and Romans expressed
by inflections the most common modes of action or existence, as
conditionality, power, contingency, certainty, liberty, and duty. In
our language they are denoted by auxiliary verbs.

The English verb has only one voice, namely, the active. Dr.
Lowth, and most other grammarians, have assigned it two voices,
active and passive. Lowth has, in this instance, not only violated
the simplicity of our language, but has also advanced an opinion
inconsistent with his own principles. For, if he has justly excluded
from the number of cases in nouns, and moods in verbs, those which
are not formed by inflexion, but by the addition of prepositions and
auxiliary verbs, there is equal reason for rejecting a passive voice,
if it be not formed by variety of termination. Were I to ask him why
he denies _from a king_ to be an ablative case, or _I may love_ to be
the potential mood, he would answer, and very truly, that those only
can be justly regarded as cases or moods which, by a different form
of the noun or verb, express a different relation or a different mode
of existence. If this answer be satisfactory, there can be no good
reason for assigning to our language a passive voice, when that voice
is formed, not by inflexion, but by an auxiliary verb. _Doceor_ is
truly a passive voice; but _I am taught_ cannot, without impropriety,
be considered as such. Besides, as it is justly observed by Dr. Ash,
our author, when he parses the clause, “I am well pleased,” tells
us that _am_ is the indicative mood, present tense of the verb _to
be_; and _pleased_, the passive participle of the verb to _please_.
Now, in parsing, every word should be considered as a distinct part
of speech: whether, therefore, we admit _pleased_ to be a passive
participle or not, (for this point I shall afterwards examine,) it
is obvious that on the principle now laid down, and acknowledged
by Dr. Lowth, _am pleased_ is not a present passive, nor has the
author himself parsed it in this manner. Into such inconsistencies do
our grammarians run, from a propensity to force the grammar of our
language into a conformity with the structure of Greek and Latin.

The same reasoning will also account for my assigning to English
verbs no more than two tenses and one mood. For, if we consider the
matter, not metaphysically, but grammatically, and regard those only
as moods which are diversified by inflexion, (and, as Lowth himself
observes, as far as grammar is concerned, there can be no others,) we
find that our language has only one mood and two tenses.

This doctrine, in respect to the cases, is very generally admitted.
For though the Greeks and Romans expressed the different relations
by variety of inflexion, which they termed cases, it does not follow
that we are to acknowledge the same number of cases as they had,
when these relations are expressed in English, not by inflexions,
but by prepositions or words significant of these relations. The
Latins would not have acknowledged _absque fructu_, without fruit,
as forming a seventh case, though they acknowledged _fructu_, by
fruit, as making an ablative or sixth case. And why? because the
latter only was formed by inflexion. For this reason, I consider
giving the name of dative case to the combination of words _to a
king_, or of ablative case to the expression _from a king_, to be a
palpable impropriety. Our language knows no such cases; nor would an
Englishman, unacquainted with Greek or Latin, ever dream of these
cases, though perfectly master of his own language.

In the same manner it may be asked, what could lead him to
distinguish a diversity of moods, or a plurality of voices, where
there is no variety of termination to discriminate them? The
distinction of circumstances, respecting the modes of existence, he
expresses by words significant of these accidents; but he would no
more dream of giving these forms of expression the name of moods,
than he would be disposed to call _from a king_ by the name of _casus
ablativus_, or _permit me to go_ the first person singular of the
imperative mood. If, indeed, he were somewhat acquainted with Latin,
he might, in the true spirit of modern grammarians, contend that _let
me go_, or _permit me to go_, is truly the first person singular of
the imperative mood; assigning as a reason for this assertion, that
such is the designation of _eam_ in Latin. With the most correct
knowledge, however, of his own language only, he could never be
seduced into this absurdity. A little reflection indeed might teach
him, that even _eam_ in Latin is an elliptical expression for _sine
ut eam_, the word _eam_ itself denoting neither entreaty nor command.

In truth, we may as reasonably contend that our language has all
the tenses which are to be found in Greek and Latin, because, by
the aid of auxiliaries and definitives, we contrive to express
what they denoted by one word, as to contend that we have a
potential, an optative or imperative mood, or a passive voice;
because by auxiliaries or variety of arrangement we can express the
circumstances of power, liberty, duty, passion, &c. No grammarian
has yet gone so far as to affirm that we have in English a _paulo
post future_, because our language, by definitives or auxiliaries,
is capable of expressing that time. Or, what should we think of
that person’s discernment, who should contend that the Latins had
an optative mood, because _utinam legeres_ signifies “I wish you
would read”? It is equally absurd to say that we have an imperfect,
preterpluperfect, or future tenses; or that we have all the Greek
varieties of mood, and two voices, because by the aid of auxiliary
words and definite terms we contrive to express these accidents,
times, or states of being. I consider, therefore, that we have no
more cases, moods, tenses, or voices in our language, as far as its
grammar, not its capacity of expression, is concerned, than we have
variety of termination to denote these different accessary ideas.

As the terminations of most verbs in languages are varied by tense
and mood, so are they also varied according as the subject is of
the first, second, or third person. Thus, in the only two tenses
that we have in English, namely, the present and the preterperfect
tenses, the second person singular of each is formed from the first,
by adding _st_ or _est_, as, _I love, thou lovest_; _I loved, thou
lovedst_; and the third person singular of the present is formed by
adding _s_, or the syllable _eth_ or _th_, to the first as, _love,
loves_, or _loveth_; _read, reads_, or _readeth_. These are the only
variations which our verbs admit, in concordance with the person of
the nominative singular. The three persons plural are always the same
with the first person singular.

Before I proceed to the conjugation of verbs in general, I shall
first explain the manner in which the auxiliaries are conjugated.
Of these the most extensively useful is the verb _to be_, denoting
simple affirmation, or expressing existence. The next is that which
signifies action, namely, the verb _to do_. The third is the verb _to
have_, implying possession. The others are, _shall_, _will_, _may_,
_can_, &c. I begin with the verb _to be_.


                       _Indicative Mood._

                        _Present Tense._

  _Sing._[46]  I am      Thou art            He, she, or it is
  _Plur._      We are    Ye or you are       They are.


                          _Preterite._

  _Sing._      I was     Thou wast[47]       He was
  _Plur._      We were   Ye or you were      They were.


                    _Imperfect Conditional._

  _Sing._      I were    Thou wert           He were
  _Plur._      We were   Ye or you were      They were.

                          _Infinitive._

                              To be.

It may seem inconsistent with the opinion which I have delivered
concerning moods, to assign an infinitive to this verb; and the
existence of this infinitive may appear, perhaps, a sufficient
refutation of that opinion. I shall, therefore, briefly repeat what
I have said, and offer a few additional observations.

I have remarked that the first care of men, in a rude and infant
state, would be to assign names to surrounding objects; and that the
noun, in the natural order of things, must have been the first part
of speech. Their inventive powers would next be employed to express
the most common energies or states of being, such as are denoted by
the verbs _to do_, _to be_, _to suffer_. Hence, by the help of these
combined with a noun, they might express the energy or state of that
thing, of which the noun was the name. Thus, I shall suppose that
they assigned the word _plant_, as the name of a vegetable set in the
ground. To express the act of setting it, they would say, _do plant_,
that is, _act plant_. The letters _d_ and _t_ being nearly allied, it
is easy to conceive how the word _do_, by a variation very natural
and common to all languages, might be changed into _to_; and thus the
word _to_ prefixed to a noun would express the correspondent energy
or action.

In what light, then, are we to consider the phrase _to plant_, termed
an infinitive, or to what class of words is it reducible? Previously
to my answering this question, it is necessary to remind the reader,
that a verb joined to a noun forms a sentence; that affirmation is
essential to the character of a verb; and that, for this reason,
and this only, it has been pre-eminently distinguished by the
name of verb, or the word. Destroy this characteristic, and it is
immediately confounded with the adjective, or the participle. It is
its power of predication only, which constitutes it a distinct part
of speech, and discriminates it from every other. _Vir sapit_, and
_vir est sapiens_, are equivalent expressions. Cancel the assertion,
and the verb is lost. The expression becomes _vir sapiens_, “a wise
man.” This opinion, I am persuaded, requires only to be examined to
be universally adopted. If this be the case, the infinitive which
affirms nothing, cannot, without impropriety, be deemed a verb. It
expresses merely an action, passion, or state abstractedly. Hence
many grammarians have justly considered it as no part of the verb;
and, in the languages of Greece and Rome, the infinitive was employed
like a common substantive, having frequently an adjective joined with
it, and subject to the government of verbs and prepositions. This
opinion has been lately controverted by a writer of considerable
eminence as a Latin scholar. But, after examining the matter with
attention, I take upon me to affirm, that not a single example can be
produced wherein the infinitive, as used by the Greeks and Romans,
might not be supplied by the substitution of a noun. Wherefore,
admitting the established principle, _voces valent significatione_,
there cannot exist a doubt that the infinitive, which may in all
cases be supplied by a noun, has itself the real character of a
noun. And, if the essence of a verb consist in predication, and not,
as some think, in implying time in conjunction with an attribute,
which is the characteristic of a participle, then the infinitive,
as it can predicate nothing, and joined to a substantive makes no
sentence, cannot therefore be deemed a verb. When I say, _legere est
facile_, “to read is easy,” it is obvious that there is only one
sentence in each of these expressions. But if _legere_ (to read)
were a verb as well as _est_ (is), then there would be two verbs and
also two affirmations, for affirmation is inseparable from a verb.
I remark also, that the verbal noun _lectio_ (reading) substituted
for _legere_ (to read) would precisely express the same sentiment.
For these reasons I concur decidedly with those grammarians who are
so far from considering the infinitive as a distinct mood, that they
entirely exclude it from the appellation of verb[48].

It may be asked, what then is it to be called? In answer to this
query, I observe, that it matters little what designation be assigned
to it, provided its character and office be fully understood. The
ancient Latin grammarians, as Priscian informs us, termed it properly
enough, _nomen verbi_, “the noun or name of the verb.” To proscribe
terms, which have been long familiar to us, and, by immemorial
possession, have gained an establishment, is always a difficult, and
frequently an ungracious task. I shall therefore retain its usual
name, having sufficiently guarded the reader against a misconception
of its character.

Now, in our language, the infinitive has not even the distinction
arising from termination, to entitle it to be ranked in the number
of moods; its form being the same with that of the present tense,
and probably, both in its termination and its prefix, originally
identical. For, if the doctrine just proposed be correct, the word
_do_ was put before each. To this rule the English language furnishes
only one exception, namely, the verb of existence, in which the
present indicative is _am_, whereas the infinitive is _to be_. This,
however, can scarcely be deemed an exception, when it is considered,
that the present indicative of this verb was originally _be_ as
well as _am_; though the former be now in a state of obsolescence,
or rather entirely obsolete. At the same time, as this is the only
verb in which the infinitive differs in form from the present of the
indicative, I have judged it necessary to note the exception, and
assign the infinitive.

  _Present part._          Being
  _Past part._             Been[49].


                         TO DO.

                    _Indicative Mood._

                        _Present._

  _Sing._     I do      Thou doest or dost  He doeth, doth or does
  _Plur._     We do     Ye or you do        They do.


                     _Preterperfect._

  _Sing._     I did     Thou didst          He, she, or it did[50]
  _Plur._     We did    Ye or you did       They did.


                      _Participles._

  _Present_   Doing
  _Past_      Done.


                         TO HAVE.

                    _Indicative Mood._

                        _Present._

  _Sing._     I have    Thou hast           He hath or has
  _Plur._     We have   Ye or you have      They have.


                     _Preterperfect._

  _Sing._     I had     Thou hadst          He had
  _Plur._     We had    Ye or you had       They had.


                      _Participles._

  _Present_   Having
  _Past_      Had.

  Liberty is expressed by the verb
                           MAY.


                     _Indicative Mood._

                        _Present._

  _Sing._     I may     Thou mayest         He may
  _Plur._     We may    Ye or you may       They may[51].


                     _Preterperfect._

  _Sing._     I might   Thou mightest       He might
  _Plur._     We might  Ye or you might     They might.

  Power or ability is expressed by
                           CAN.


                     _Indicative Mood._


                         _Present._

  _Sing._     I can     Thou canst          He can
  _Plur._     We can    Ye or you can       They can[52].


                     _Preterperfect._

  _Sing._     I could   Thou couldst        He could
  _Plur._     We could  Ye or you could     They could.

Futurition and duty are expressed by the verb _shall_, but not each
in the three persons.


                     _Indicative Mood._

                         _Present._

  _Sing._[53]  I shall   Thou shalt          He shall
  _Plur._      We shall  Ye or you shall     They shall.


                     _Preterperfect._

  _Sing._     I should   Thou shouldst      He should
  _Plur._     We should  Ye or you should   They should.

Volition and futurity are expressed by the verb _to will_.


                         _Present._

  _Sing._     I will    Thou wilt           He will
  _Plur._     We will   Ye or you will      They will[54].


                     _Preterperfect._

  _Sing._     I would   Thou wouldst        He would
  _Plur._     We would  Ye or you would     They would.

Priestley and Lowth, who have in this been followed by most other
grammarians, call the tenses _may_, _can_, _shall_, _will_, absolute
tenses; _might_, _could_, _should_, _would_, conditional. That
_might_, _could_, _should_, _would_, frequently imply conditionality,
there can be no question; but I am persuaded that the proper
character of these tenses is unconditional affirmation, and for these
two reasons:

1st. Their formation seems to indicate that they are preterites
indicative, proceeding from their respective presents, in the same
manner as _did_ from _do_, _had_ from _have_, and having therefore
the same unconditional meaning. Thus, _I may_, is equivalent to “I am
at liberty;” _I might_, to “I was at liberty;” _I can_, means “I am
able;” _I could_, “I was able;” _I will_, “I am willing;” _I would_,
“I was willing.”

2dly. They are used to express unconditional meaning. If we say,
“This might prove fatal to your interest,” the assertion of the
possibility of the event is as unconditional as absolute, as, “This
may prove fatal to your interest.” “This, if you do it, _will_ ruin
your cause,” is precisely equivalent to, “This, were you to do
it, _would_ ruin your cause;” equivalent as far, at least, as the
unconditional affirmation of the consequence of a supposed action is
involved[55]. “I may write, if I choose,” is not more absolute than
“I might write, if I chose.” If I say, “I might have gone to the
Continent,” the expression is as unconditional as, “I had it in my
power,” “I was at liberty to go to the Continent.” “Can you construe
Lycophron?” “I cannot now; but once _I could_.” “May you do as you
please?” “Not now; but once I _might_.” Is there any conditionality
implied in the latter clause of each of these answers? Not the least.
They are unconditionally assertive. The formation of these tenses,
therefore, being analogous to that of preterites indicative, and
their import in these examples, as in many others which might be
adduced, being unconditional and absolute, I am inclined to consider
them as preterites indicative, agreeably to their form, and as
properly unconditional in respect to signification.

I observe, however, that though _might_, _could_, _would_, _should_,
are preterite tenses, they are frequently employed to denote present
time[56]; but in such examples care must be taken that congruity of
tense be preserved, and that the subsequent be expressed in the same
tense with the antecedent verb. Thus I say, “I may go if I choose,”
where the liberty and inclination are each expressed as present; or,
“I might go if I chose,” where, though present time be implied, the
liberty is expressed by the preterite, and the inclination is denoted
by the same tense.

Before I proceed to show how these auxiliary verbs are joined with
others, to express the intended accessary ideas, I shall offer a few
observations on the participle.




CHAPTER VI.

OF THE PARTICIPLE.


A participle is a part of speech derived from a verb, agreeing with
its primitive in denoting action, being, or suffering, but differing
from it in this, that the participle implies no affirmation[57].

There are two participles, the present, ending in _ing_, as
_reading_[58]; and the perfect or past, generally ending in _d_ or
_ed_, as _heard_, _loved_.

The present participle denotes the relatively present, or the
contemporary continuation of an action, or state of being. If we
say, “James was building the house,” the participle expresses the
continuation of the action, and the verb may be considered as
active. If we say, “the house was building, when the wall fell,”
the participle, the same as in the preceding example, denotes
here the continuation of a state of suffering, or being acted
upon; and the verb may be considered as passive. This participle,
therefore, denoting either action or passion, cannot with propriety
be considered, as it has been by some grammarians, as entirely an
active participle. Its distinctive and real character is, that in
point of time it denotes the relatively present, and may therefore
be called the present participle; and, in regard to action or
passion, it denotes their continuance or incompletion, and may
therefore be termed imperfect. In respect to time, therefore, it
is present; in respect to the action or state of being, it is
continued or imperfect. But whether it express action or passion can
be ascertained only by inquiring whether the subject be acting or
suffering; and this is a question which judgment only can decide, the
participle itself not determining the point. If we say, “the prisoner
was burning,” our knowledge of the subject only can enable us to
determine whether the prisoner was active or passive; whether he was
employing fire to consume, or was himself consuming by fire.

The other participle, ending generally in _ed_ or _d_, has
been called by some grammarians the passive participle, in
contradistinction to the one which we have now been considering,
and which they have termed the active participle. “This participle
has been so called,” says the author of the British Grammar,
“because, joined with the verb _to be_, it forms the passive
voice.” If the reason here assigned justify its denomination as a
passive participle, there exists the same reason for calling it an
active participle; for, with the verb _to have_, it forms some of
the compound tenses of the active voice. The truth is, that, as
those grammarians have erred who consider the participle in _ing_
as an active participle, when it in fact denotes either action or
passion, so those, on the other hand, commit a similar mistake, who
regard the participle in _ed_ as purely passive. A little attention
will suffice to show that it belongs to neither the one voice nor
the other peculiarly: and that it denotes merely completion or
perfection, in contradistinction to the other participle, which
expresses imperfection or continuation. If it be true, indeed, that
the participle in _ing_ does not belong to the active voice only,
but expresses merely the continuation of any act, passion, or state
of being, analogy would incline us to infer, that the participle
in _ed_, which denotes the completion of an act or state of being,
cannot belong exclusively to the passive voice; and I conceive that,
on inquiry, we shall find this to be the case. If I say, “he had
concealed a poniard under his coat,” the participle here would be
considered as active. If I say, “he had a poniard concealed under his
clothes,” the participle would be regarded as passive. Does not this
prove that this participle is ambiguous, that it properly belongs to
neither voice, and that the context only, or the arrangement, can
determine, whether it denote the perfection of an action, or the
completion of a passion or state of being? When I say, “Lucretia
stabbed herself with a dagger, which she had concealed under her
clothes,” it is impossible to ascertain whether the participle be
active or passive, that is, whether the verb _had_ be here merely
an auxiliary verb, or be synonymous with the verb _to possess_.
If the former be intended, the syntactical collocation is, “she
had concealed (which) dagger under her clothes:” if the latter,
the grammatical order is, “she had which dagger concealed:” and it
requires but little discernment to perceive that “she had concealed
a dagger,” and “had a dagger concealed,” are expressions by no means
precisely equivalent.

I need not here remind the classical scholar, that the Latins had two
distinct forms of expression to mark this diversity; the one, _quem
abdiderat_, and the other _quem abditum habebat_. The latter is the
phraseology of Livy, describing the suicide of Lucretia. His words,
if translated, “which she had concealed,” become ambiguous; for this
is equally a translation of _quem abdiderat_. It is observable also,
that the phrase _quem abdiderat_ would not imply, that the dagger was
in the possession of Lucretia at the time.

The participle in _ed_, therefore, I consider to be perfectly
analogous to the participle in _ing_, and used like it in either an
active or passive sense; belonging, therefore, neither to the one
voice nor the other exclusively, but denoting the completion of an
action or state of being, while the participle in _ing_ denotes its
continuation.

In exhibiting a paradigm of the conjugation of our verbs, many
grammarians have implicitly and servilely copied the Latin grammar,
transferring into our language the names both of tenses and moods
which have formally no existence in English. “I may burn,” is
denominated, by the author of the British Grammar, the present
subjunctive; “I might burn,” the imperfect subjunctive; “I may have
burned,” the preterperfect; and so on. This is directly repugnant to
the simplicity of our language, and is in truth as absurd as it would
be to call “we two love,” the dual number of the present tense; or
“he shall soon be buried,” a paulo post future. Were this principle
carried its full length, we should have all the tenses, moods, and
numbers, which are to be found in Greek or Latin. It appears to me,
that nothing but prejudice or affectation could have prompted our
English grammarians to desert the simple structure of their own
language, and wantonly to perplex it with technical terms, for things
not existing in the language itself.

I purpose, therefore, in exhibiting the conjugation of the English
verb, to give the simple tenses, as the only ones belonging to our
language; and then show how, by the aid of other words combined
with these, we contrive to express the requisite modifications, and
various accessary ideas.

  _Indicative Present._    _Preter._       _Part. Perf._
          Write              Wrote           Written.


_Present Tense._

  _S._    I write       Thou writest        He writes or writeth
  _P._    We write      Ye or you write     They write.

This tense is by some grammarians called the present indefinite;
while by others it is considered as either definite or indefinite.
When it expresses an action now present, it is termed the present
definite, as,

“I write this after a severe illness.”--_Pope’s Letters._

“Saul, why persecutest thou me?”--_Bible._

      “This day begins the woe, others must end.”--_Shakspeare._

If the proposition expressed be general, or true at all times, this
tense is then termed the present indefinite; as, “The wicked flee,
when no man pursueth.”

      “Through tatter’d clothes small vices do appear;
      Robes and furred gowns hide all.”--_Shakspeare._


                     _Preterperfect._

  _S._    I wrote       Thou wrotest        He wrote
  _P._    We wrote      Ye or you wrote     They wrote.

This tense is indefinite, no particular past time being implied.

These are the only two tenses in our language formed by varying the
termination; the only two tenses, therefore, which properly belong to
it.


              _Present Progressive, or continued._

  _S._    I am writing     Thou art writing   He is writing
  _P._    We are writing   You are writing    They are writing.

This tense denotes a present action proceeding. In regard to time, it
has been termed definite; and, in respect to action, it differs from
the other present in this, that the former has no reference either to
the perfection or imperfection of the action; whereas this denotes
that the action is continued and imperfect.


                      _Present Emphatic._

  _S._    I do write    Thou dost write       He doth or does write
  _P._    We do write   Ye or you do write    They do write.

This form of the verb is emphatic, and generally implies doubt or
contradiction on the part of the person addressed, to remove which
the assertion is enforced by the auxiliary verb. In respect to time
and action, it is precisely the same with _I write_.

“You cannot dread an honourable death.”

“I do dread it.”

“Excellent wretch! perdition seize my soul, but I do love thee.”

Cancel the auxiliary verb, and the expression becomes feeble and
spiritless. This is one of those phraseologies, which it would be
impossible to render in a transpositive language. _Di me perdant,
quin te amem_, is an expression comparatively exanimate and insipid.


             _Preterite, Indefinite, and Emphatic._

  _S._    I did write    Thou didst write   He did write
  _P._    We did write   You did write      They did write.

as, “This to me in dreadful secrecy impart they did.” The emphasis
here, however, may partly arise from the inverted collocation. The
following example is therefore more apposite. “I have been told that
you have slighted me, and said, I feared to face my enemy. You surely
did not wrong me thus?” “I _did_ say so.”

This tense is indefinite, in respect both to the time, and the
completion of the action.


                    _Preter. Imp. &c. continued._

  _S._    I was writing     Thou wast writing   He was writing
  _P._    We were writing   Ye were writing     They were writing.

This tense denotes that an action was proceeding, or going on, at a
time past either specified or implied, as “I was writing when you
called.”


                     _Preterperfect._

  _S._    I have        Thou hast         He has    } written.
  _P._    We have       You have          They have }

This tense expresses time as past, and the action as perfect. It is
compounded of the present tense of the verb denoting possession and
the perfect participle. It signifies a perfect action either newly
finished, or in a time of which there is some part to elapse, or
an action whose consequences extend to the present. In short, it
clearly refers to present time. This, indeed, the composition of the
tense manifestly evinces. Thus, “I have written a letter,” means
“I possess at present the finished action of writing a letter.”
This phraseology, I acknowledge, seems uncouth and inelegant; but,
how awkward soever it may appear, the tense is unquestionably thus
resolvable.

1st. It expresses an action newly finished, as, “I understand that a
messenger has arrived from Paris,” that is, “newly,” or “just now,”
arrived.

2dly. An action done in a space of time, part of which is yet to
elapse; as, “It has rained all this week,” “We have seen strange
things this century.”

3dly. An action perfected some time ago, but whose consequences
extend to the present time; as, “I have wasted my time, and now
suffer for my folly.”

This tense has been termed, by some grammarians, the perfect
indefinite, and “I wrote,” the perfect definite. The argument
which they offer for this denomination is, that the latter admits
a definitive, to specify the precise time, and the former rejects
it. Those who reason in this manner seem to me not only chargeable
with a perversion of terms, but also to disprove their own theory.
For what is meant by a definite term? Not surely that which admits
or requires a definitive to give it precision; but that which of
itself is already definite. If, therefore, “I wrote,” not only
admits, but even requires, the subjunction of a defining term or
clause to render the time definite and precise, it cannot surely be
itself a definite tense. Besides, they appear to me to reason in
this case inconsistently with their own principles. For they call _I
am writing_ a definite tense; and why? but because it defines the
action to be imperfect, or the time to be relatively present[59]. But
if they reason here as they do in respect to the preterite tenses,
they ought to call this an indefinite tense, because it admits not
a definitive clause. They must, therefore, either acknowledge that
_I have written_ is a definite tense, and _I wrote_, indefinite; or
they must, contrary to their own principles, call _I am writing_
indefinite.

Dr. Arthur Browne, in an Essay on the Greek Tenses[60], contends,
that _I wrote_ is the perfect definite, and _I have written_ the
perfect indefinite. “_I wrote_,” says he, “is not intelligible
without referring to some precise point of time, _e.g._ when I was
in France. Why, then, does Dr. Beattie say _I wrote_ is indefinite,
because it refers to no particular past time? No: it is indefinite
because the verb in that tense does not define whether the action be
complete or not complete. And why does he say, _I have written_ is
definite in respect of time? for it refers to no particular time at
which the event happened. Put this example: A says to B, ‘I wish you
would write to that man.’ ‘_I have written to him_,’ the sense is
complete; the expression is not supposed to refer to any particular
time, and does not necessarily elicit any further inquiry. But if
B answers, ‘_I wrote to him_,’ he is of course supposed to have in
his mind a reference to some particular time, and it naturally calls
on A to ask when? It is not clear, then, that _I wrote_ refers to
some particular time, and cannot have been called indefinite, as Dr.
Beattie supposes, from its not doing so?”

Dr. Browne’s argument is chargeable with inconsistency. He says, that
because _I have written_ elicits no farther inquiry, and renders the
sense complete, it denotes no determinate time; and that _I wrote_
refers to a particular time, prompting to farther inquiry. This at
least I take to be the scope of his reasoning; for if it be not from
their occasioning, or not occasioning, farther interrogation, that
he deduces his conclusion concerning the nature of these tenses, his
argument seems nothing but pure assertion. Now, so far from calling
that a definite tense, which necessarily requires, as he himself
states, a defining clause to specify the point of time, I should call
it an indefinite tense. He admits that _I wrote_ refers to time past
in general, and that it requires some farther specification to render
the time known, as _I wrote yesterday_. In this case, surely it is
not the term _wrote_, but _yesterday_, which defines the precise
time; the tense itself expressing nothing but past time in general.

For the same reason, if, as he acknowledges, _I have written_ elicits
no farther inquiry, it is an argument that the sense is complete,
and the time sufficiently understood by the hearer. Besides, is it
not somewhat paradoxical to say that a tense which renders farther
explanation unnecessary, and the sense complete, thus satisfying the
hearer, is indefinite? and that a tense which does not satisfy the
hearer, but renders farther inquiry necessary, is definite? This, to
say the least, is somewhat extraordinary.

The observations of Lord Monboddo on this subject are not
inapplicable to the point in question: I shall therefore transcribe
them.

“There are actions,” says he, “which end in energy, and produce no
work which remains after them. What shall we say of such actions?
cannot we say, I have danced a dance, taken a walk, &c., and how can
such actions be said in any sense to be present? My answer is, that
the consequences of such actions, respecting the speaker, or some
other person or thing, are present, and what these consequences are,
appears from the tenor of the discourse. ‘I have taken a walk, and am
much better for it.’ ‘I have danced a dance, and am inclined to dance
no more.’”

The order of nature being maintained, as Mr. Harris observes, by a
succession of contrarieties, the termination of one state of things
naturally implies the commencement of its contrary. Hence this tense
has been employed to denote an attribute the contrary to that which
is expressed by the verb. Thus the Latins used _vixit_, “he hath
lived,” to denote “he is dead;” _fuit Ilium_, “Troy has been,” to
signify _Troy is no more_. A similar phraseology obtains in English;
thus, “I _have_ been young,” is equivalent to “now I am old.”


                        _Preter Imperfect._

  _Sing._   I have been    Thou hast been   He has been    } writing.
  _Plur._   We have been   You have been    They have been }

This tense, in respect to time, is the same as the last, but implies
the imperfection of the action, and denotes its progression.


                        _Preter Pluperfect._

  _Sing._   I had       Thou hadst          He had   } written.
  _Plur._   We had      Ye or you had       They had }

This tense denotes that an action was perfected before another action
was done.


                    _Plusquam Preterite Imperfect._

  _Sing._   I had been    Thou hadst been   He had been   } writing.
  _Plur._   We had been   Ye had been       They had been }

This tense, in respect to time, is more than past, and in respect to
action is imperfect. It denotes that an action was going on, or in a
state of progression, before another action took place, or before it
was perfected; as, “I had been writing before you arrived.”


                     _Future Indefinite._

  _Sing._   I shall     Thou shalt          He shall   } write.
  _Plur._   We shall    Ye or you shall     They shall }
                                 OR
  _Sing._   I will      Thou wilt           He will    } write.
  _Plur._   We will     Ye or you will      They will  }

These compound tenses denote the futurity of an action indefinitely,
without any reference to its completion. The meaning of the several
persons has been already explained.


                   _Future Imp. Progressive._

  I shall or will be        We shall or will be   }
  Thou shalt or wilt be     Ye shall or will be   } writing.
  He shall or will be       They shall or will be }

This tense agrees with the former in respect to time, but differs
from it in this, that the former has no reference to the completion
of the action, while the latter expresses its imperfection and
progression.


                       _Future Perfect._

  I shall have          We shall have   }
  Thou shalt have       Ye shall have   } written.
  He shall have         They shall have }

This tense denotes that a future action will be perfected, before the
commencement or completion of another action, or before a certain
future time; as, “Before you can have an answer, I shall have written
a second letter.” “By the time he shall have arrived, you will have
conquered every difficulty.” In short, it denotes, that at some
future time an action will be perfected.

As it has been a subject of great controversy among grammarians, what
tenses should be called definite and what indefinite, I shall now
offer a few observations which may serve to illustrate the point in
question.

Duration, like space, is continuous and uninterrupted. It is
divisible in idea only. It is past or future, merely in respect
to some intermediate point, which the mind fixes as the limit
between the one and the other. Present time, in truth, does not
exist, any more than a mathematical line can have breadth, or a
mathematical point be composed of parts. This position has, indeed,
been controverted by Dr. Beattie; but, in my judgment, without the
shadow of philosophical argument[61]. Harris, Reid, and several
others, have incontrovertibly proved it. But though present time,
philosophically speaking, has no existence, we find it convenient to
assume a certain portion of the past and the future, as intermediate
spaces between these extremes, and to consider these spaces as
present; for example, the present day, the present week, the present
year, the present century, though part of these several periods be
past, and part to come. We speak of them, however, as present, as
“this month,” “this year,” “this day.” Time being thus in its nature
continuous, and past and future being merely relative terms, some,
portion or point of time being conceived where the one begins and the
other ends, it is obvious that all tenses indicative of any of these
two general divisions must denote relative time, that is, time past
or future, in relation to some conceived or assumed space; thus it
may be past or future, in respect to the present hour, the present
day, the present week.

Again. The term indefinite is applicable either to time or to action.
It may, therefore, be the predicate of a tense denoting either
that the precise time is left undetermined, or that the action
specified is not signified, as either complete or imperfect. Hence
the controversy has been partly verbal. Hence, also, the contending
parties have seemed to differ, while, in fact, they were agreed; and,
on the contrary, have seemed to accord, while their opinions were, in
truth, mutually repugnant.

Dr. Browne confines the term to action only, and pleads the authority
of Mr. Harris in his favour. It is true, indeed, that Mr. Harris
calls those tenses definite which denote the beginning, the middle,
or the perfection of an action: but it is obvious, from the most
superficial examination of his theory, that he denominates the tenses
definite or indefinite, not in respect to action, but to time. When,
in the passage from Milton,

      “Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth,
      Unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep;”

he considers “_walk_” as indefinite, is it in regard to action? No.
“It is,” says he, “because they were walking, not at that instant
only, but indefinitely, at any instant whatever.” And when he terms,
_Thou shalt not kill_, an indefinite tense, is it because it has no
reference to the completion or the imperfection of the action? No;
it is “because,” says he, “this means no particular future time, but
is extended indefinitely to every part of time.” Besides, if Mr.
Harris’s and Dr. Browne’s ideas coincide, how comes it that the one
calls that a definite tense, which the other terms indefinite? This
does not look like accordance in sentiment, or in the application of
terms. Yet the tenses in such examples as these,

“The wicked flee when no man pursueth;”

“Ad pœnitendum properat, cito qui judicat;”

“God is good;” “Two and two are four;”

which Harris and Beattie properly call indefinite, Browne terms
definite. Nay, he denominates them thus for the very reason for which
the others call them indefinite, namely, because the sentiments are
always true, and the time of their existence never perfectly past. So
far in respect to Mr. Harris’s authority in favour of Browne, when he
confines the terms definite and indefinite to action only[62].

But I forbear to prosecute this controversy further, or to point out
the inaccuracies with which I apprehend many writers on this subject
are chargeable. I therefore proceed to review and illustrate the
doctrine of the tenses which I have already offered.

The present time being, as I have already observed, an assumed
space, and of no definite extent, as it may be either the present
minute, the present hour, the present month, the present year, all
of which consist of parts, it follows that, as the present time is
itself indefinite, having no real existence, but being an arbitrary
conception of the mind, the tense significant of that time must be
also indefinite. This, I conceive, must be sufficiently evident.
Hence the present tense not only admits, but frequently requires,
the definitive _now_ to limit the interval between past and future,
or to note the precise point of time.

Time past and time future are conceived as infinitely more extended
than the present. The tenses, therefore, significant of these two
grand divisions of time, are also necessarily indefinite.

Again, an action may be expressed, either as finished, or as
proceeding; or it may be the subject of affirmation, without any
reference to either of these states. In English, to denote the
continuation of the action we employ the present or imperfect
participle; and to denote its completion we use the preterite or
perfect participle. When neither is implied, the tenses significant
of the three divisions of time, without any regard to the action as
complete or imperfect, are uniformly employed.

The tenses, therefore, indefinite as to time and action are these:

  _The Present_         I write
  _The Preterite_       I wrote
  _The Future_          I shall write.

The six following compound tenses are equally indefinite in point of
time; but they denote either the completion or the progress of the
action, and in this respect are definite.

  _Its progress._       _Its perfection_, as
  I am writing          I have written
  I was writing         I had written
  I shall be writing    I shall have written.


  _I write_             _I am writing_      _I have written._

The first is indefinite as to time and action. If I say, “I write,”
it is impossible to ascertain by the mere expression, whether be
signified, “I write now,” “I write daily,” or, “I am a writer in
general.” It is the concomitant circumstances only, either expressed
or understood, which can determine what part of the present time
is implied. When Pope introduces a letter to Lady M. W. Montague
with these words, “I write this after a severe illness,” is it the
tense which marks the time, or is it not the date of the letter,
with which the writing is understood to be contemporary? If you
and I should see a person writing, and either of us should say,
“He writes,” the proposition would be particular, and time present
with the speaker’s observation would be understood: but, is it not
evident, that it is not the tense which defines the _present now_,
but the obvious circumstances of the person’s writing at the time?
And when the king, in Hamlet, says,

      “My words fly up, my thoughts remain below:
      Words, without thoughts, never to heaven go,”

what renders the two first propositions particular, or confines
the tenses to the time then present, while the last proposition is
universally true, and the tense indefinite? Nothing, I conceive, but
the circumstances of the speaker. Nay, does it not frequently happen,
that we must subjoin the word _now_ to this tense, in order to define
the point of time? Did the tense of itself note the precise time,
this definitive would in no case be necessary. If I say, “Apples are
ripe,” the proposition, considered independently on adventitious
circumstances, is general and indefinite. The time may be defined
by adding a specific clause, as, “in the month of October;” or, if
nothing be subjoined, the ellipsis is supplied either by the previous
conversation, or in some other way, and the hearer understands, “are
_now_ ripe.” This tense, therefore, I consider as indefinite in point
of time. That it is indefinite in regard to action, there can be no
question.

  _I am writing._

This tense also is indefinite in respect to time. It derives its
character as a tense from the verb _am_, which implies affirmation
with time, either _now_, _generally_, or _always_. Mr. Harris calls
it the present definite, as I have already remarked; and in regard
to action it is clearly definite. It is this, and this only, which
distinguishes it from the other present, _I write_, the latter
having no reference to the perfection or imperfection of the action,
while _I am writing_ denotes its continuation. Hence it is, that the
latter is employed to express propositions generally or universally
true, the idea of perfection or incompletion being, in such cases,
excluded. Thus we say, _The wicked flee when no man pursueth_; but
not, as I conceive, with equal propriety, _The wicked are fleeing
when no man is pursuing_.

  _I have written._

As _I am writing_ denotes the present continuation of an action, so
_I have written_ expresses an action completed in a time supposed to
be continued to the present, or an action whose consequences extend
to the present time. As a tense, it derives its character from the
tense _I have_, significant of present time; while the perfection of
the action is denoted by the perfect participle. But as I have shown
that every tense significant of present time must be, in regard to
time, indefinite, so this tense, compounded of the present tense _I
have_, must, in this respect, be therefore indefinite.

Lowth, Priestley, Beattie, Harris, and several others, have assigned
it the name of the preterite definite, and _I wrote_ they have
termed the preterite indefinite. Browne, and one or two others,
have reversed this denomination. Now, that _I wrote_ does not of
itself define what part of past time is specified, appears to me
very evident. This is, indeed, admitted by those who contend for
the definite nature of this tense. Why, then, do they call it a
definite tense? Because, they say, it admits a definitive term,
by the aid of which it expresses the precise time, as, “I wrote
yesterday,” “a week ago,” “last month;” whereas we cannot say, “I
have written yesterday.” Now, as I remarked before, this appears
to me a perversion of language; for we do not denominate that term
_definite_, which requires a definitive to render it precise. Why
have the terms _the_, _this_, _that_, been called definitives? Is it
because they admit a defining term? or is it not because they limit
or define the import of general terms? I concur, therefore, with
the author of the article “Aorist,” in the “Nouvelle Encyclopédie,”
when he ridicules a M. Demandre for giving the character of definite
to a tense which marks past time indefinitely. This certainly is a
perversion of terms.

“When we make use of the auxiliary verb,” says Dr. Priestley, “we
have no idea of any certain portion of time intervening between the
time of action and the time of speaking of it; the time of action
being some period that extends to the present, as, ‘I have this year,
this morning, written,’ spoken in the same year, the same morning;
whereas, speaking of an action done in a period past, we use the
preterite tense and say, ‘I wrote,’ intimating that a certain portion
of time is past, between the time of action and the time of speaking
of it.” To the same purpose nearly are the words of the author of
the article “Grammar,” in the “Encyclopedia Britannica.” “_I have
written_,” says he, “is always joined with a portion of time which
includes the present _now_ or _instant_; for otherwise it could not
signify, as it always does, the present possession of the finishing
of an action. But the aorist, which signifies no such possession, is
as constantly joined with a portion of past time, which excludes the
present _now_ or _instant_. Thus we say, ‘_I have written_ a letter
this day,’ ‘this week,’ &c., but ‘_I wrote_ a letter yesterday;’ and
to interchange these expressions would be improper.”

The explanation which these grammarians have given of the tense _I
have written_, appears to me perfectly correct, and I would add,
that, though the interval between the time of action and the time of
speaking of it may be considerable; yet, if the mind, in consequence
of the effect’s being extended to the present time, should conceive
no time to have intervened, this tense is uniformly employed.

That the aorist excludes the present instant is equally true:
but that it is incapable of being joined, as the latter of these
grammarians supposes, to a portion of time part of which is not yet
elapsed, is an assertion by no means correct; for I can say, “I wrote
to-day,” or “this day,” as well as, “_I have written_.” “I dined
to-day,” says Swift, “with Mr. Secretary St. John.” “I took some
good walks in the park to-day.” “I walked purely to-day about the
park.” “I was this morning with Mr. Secretary about some business.”
Numberless other examples might be produced in which this tense is
joined with a portion of time not wholly elapsed.

What then, it may be asked, is the difference between this and the
tense which is termed the preterite definite? I shall endeavour
to explain it, though, in doing this, I may be chargeable with
repetition.

When an action is done in a time continuous to the present instant,
we employ the auxiliary verb. Thus on finishing a letter I say, “I
have written my letter,” “_I possess_ (now) _the finished action of
writing a letter_.”

Again: When an action is done in a space of time which the mind
assumes as present, or when we express our immediate possession of
things done in that space, we use the auxiliary verb. “I have this
week written several letters.” “_I have now the perfection of writing
several letters_, finished this week.”[63]

Again: When an action has been done long ago, but the mind is still
in possession of its consequences, these having been extended to the
present time, unconscious or regardless of the interval between the
time of acting and the time of speaking, we use the auxiliary verb.
Thus, “I, like others, have, in my youth, trifled with my health,
and old age now prematurely assails me.” In all these cases, there
is a clear reference to present time. _I have_ must imply present
possession, and that the action, either as finished or proceeding, is
present to the speaker. This must be admitted, unless we suppose that
the term _have_ has no appropriate or determinate meaning.

On the other hand, the aorist excludes all idea of the present
instant. It supposes an interval to have elapsed between the time of
the action and the time of speaking of it; the action is represented
as leaving nothing behind it which the mind conceives to have any
relation to its present circumstances, as “Three days ago I lodged in
the Strand.”

But, though it unquestionably excludes the present instant, or the
moment of speaking, which the verb _have_ embraces, yet it does not
exclude that portion of present time which is represented as passing.
All that is necessary to the use of this tense is, that the present
_now_ be excluded, that an interval have elapsed between the time of
action and the time of speaking of it, and that these times shall
not appear to be continuous. When Swift says, “It has snowed terribly
all night, and is vengeance cold,” it is to be observed, that though
the former of these events took place in a time making no part of the
day then passing, yet its effects extended to that day; he therefore
employs the auxiliary verb. When he says, “I have been dining to-day
at Lord Mountjoy’s, and am come home to study,” he, in like manner,
connects the two circumstances as continuous.

But when he says, “It snowed all this morning, and was some inches
thick in three or four hours,” it is to be observed that, contrary
to the opinion of the author[64] I have quoted, he joins the aorist
with a portion of time then conceived as present or passing, but the
circumstances which had taken place were nowise connected with the
time of his writing, or conceived as continuous to the date of his
letter. If he had said, “It _has_ snowed all this morning, and is now
two inches thick,” the two times would have appeared as continuous,
their events being connected as cause and effect.

  _I wrote_    _I was writing_    _I had written._

The first of these, as a tense, has been already explained; it
remains, therefore, to inquire, whether it be definite or indefinite
in respect to action.

I observe, then, that a tense may frequently, by inference, denote
the perfection of an action, and thus appear to be definite; though,
in its real import, it be significant neither of completion nor
imperfection, and therefore, in regard to action, is indefinite. This
seems to be the character of the tenses, _I write_, _I wrote_, _I
shall write_.

“Mr. Harris,” says Browne, “truly calls _I wrote_ and _I write_
indefinites, although the man _who wrote_, _has written_, that is,
the action is perfected, and the man _who writes_, _is writing_, that
is, the action is imperfect; but the perfection and imperfection,
though it be implied, not being expressed, not being brought into
view, (to do which the auxiliary verb is necessary,) nor intended to
be so, such tenses are properly called indefinites.”

Though I am persuaded that Harris and Browne, though they concur in
designing certain tenses indefinite, are in principle by no means
agreed, yet the observations of the latter, when he confines the
terms to action, appear to me incontrovertible. I would only remark,
that it is not the presence of the auxiliary, as Browne conceives,
which is necessary to denote the completion of the action, but the
introduction of the perfect participle. Nay, I am persuaded, that,
as it is the participle in _ing_, and this only, which denotes the
progression or continuation of the action, this circumstance in every
other phraseology being inferred, not expressed, so I am equally
convinced, that it is the perfect participle only which denotes the
completion of the action; and that, if any tense not compounded of
this participle, express the same idea, it is by inference, and not
directly. According to this view of the matter, a clear and simple
analogy subsists among the tenses; thus,

  _First class._      _Second._              _Third._
  I write           I am writing           I have written
  I wrote           I was writing          I had written
  I shall write     I shall be writing     I shall have written.

Now, if the progression or the perfection of an action, as present,
past, or future, be all the possible variations, and if these be
expressed by the second and third classes, it follows that, if there
be any precise distinction between these and the first class, or
unless the latter be wholly supernumerary, it differs in this from
the second and third, that while _they_ express, either that the
action is progressive, or that it is complete, the first has no
reference to its perfection, or imperfection.

  _I was writing._

This tense, like _I wrote_, is, in point of time, indefinite; but,
in respect to action, it is definite. It denotes that an action
was proceeding in a time past, which time must be defined by some
circumstance expressed or understood.

  _I had written._

This, as a tense, derives its character from the preterite of the
verb _to have_, implying past possession. _Had_ being an aorist,
this tense, in regard to time, must therefore be indefinite. In
respect to action it is definite, implying, that the action was
finished. As the aorist expresses time past, and by inference
the perfection of the action, while the latter circumstance is
additionally denoted by the participle, this compound tense is
employed to denote, that an action was perfected before another
action or event, now also past, took place.

The character of the remaining tenses seems to require no farther
explanation. I proceed therefore to consider how we express
interrogations, commands, necessity, power, liberty, will, and some
other accessary circumstances.

An interrogation is expressed by placing the nominative after
the concordant person of the tense; thus, “Thou comest” is an
affirmation; “Comest thou?” is an interrogation. If the tense be
compound, the nominative is placed after the auxiliary, as “Dost thou
come?” “Hast thou heard?”

A command, exhortation, or entreaty, is expressed by placing the
pronoun of the second person after the simple form of the verb; as,

   Write thou             Write ye
       or                    or
  Do thou write          Do ye write:

and sometimes by the verb simply, the person being understood; as,
_write_, _run_, _be_, _let_[65]. By the help of the word _let_,
which is equivalent to “permit thou,” or “permit ye,” we express the
persons of the Latin and Greek imperatives; thus, _let me, let us,
let him, let them, write_.

  _Present necessity_ is denoted by the verb _must_, thus,

  I must          Thou must         He must   } write[66].
  We must         Ye must           They must }

This verb having only one tense, namely, the present, _past_
necessity is expressed by the preterite definite of the verb,
significant of the thing necessary, as,

  I must have     Thou must have, &c. } written.
  We must have    Ye must have, &c.   }


                     _Present Liberty._

  I may           Thou mayest       He may   } write.
  We may          Ye may            They may }


                      _Past Liberty._

  I might         Thou mightest     He might   } write.
  We might        Ye might          They might }


                          _Or_,

  I might have    Thou mightest have, &c. } written.
  We might have   Ye might have, &c.      }


                     _Present Ability._

  I can           Thou canst        He can   } write.
  We can          Ye can            They can }


                      _Past Ability._

  I could         Thou couldst      He could   } write.
  We could        Ye could          They could }


                          _Or_,

  I could have    Thou couldst have, &c. } written.
  We could have   Ye could have, &c.     }

_Could_, the preterite of the verb _can_, expressing past power or
ability, is, like the tense _might_ of the verb _may_, frequently
employed to denote present time. Of their denoting past time the
following may serve as examples.

“Can you construe Lycophron now? No; but once I could.”

“May you speak your sentiments freely? No; but once I might.”

That they likewise denote present time, I have already adduced
sufficient evidence. _Might_ and _could_, being frequently used
in conjunction with other verbs, to express present time, past
liberty and ability are generally denoted by the latter phraseology;
thus, “I might have written,” “I could have written.” Some farther
observations respecting the nature of these tenses I purpose to make,
when I come to consider what has been termed the subjunctive or
conjunctive mood.


                _Present Duty or Obligation._

  I ought         Thou oughtest     He ought   } to write.
  We ought        Ye ought          They ought }


                        _Past Duty._

  I ought         Thou oughtest     He ought   } to have
  We ought        Ye ought          They ought } written.

The same is expressed by the verb _should_. _Ought_ being now always
considered as a present tense, past duty is expressed by taking the
preterite definitive of the following verb.

Having shown how most of the common accessary circumstances are
signified in our language, I proceed to explain how we express the
circumstance of suffering, or being acted upon.

The manner of denoting this in English is simple and easy. All that
is necessary is to join the verb _to be_ with the present participle,
if the state of suffering be imperfect or proceeding; and with the
perfect participle, if it be complete; thus,

  I am            Thou art          He is    } written to.
  We are          Ye are            They are }


                       _Preterite._

  I was           Thou wast         He was    } written to.
  We were         Ye were           They were }

  I have been     I had been        I shall be } written to.
  I may be        I might be        I could be }

If the state be imperfect, the participle in _ing_ must be
substituted; thus,

  The house is building       }
  The house was building      } Progressive.
  The house shall be building }

  The house is built          }
  The house was built         } Perfect.
  The house shall be built    }

Neuter verbs, expressing neither action nor passion, admit, without
altering their signification, either phraseology; thus, _I have
arisen_, or _I am arisen_; _I was come_, or _I had come_.

I conclude this part of the subject with a few observations
concerning the subjunctive or potential mood.

Various disputes have arisen respecting the existence and the use
of this mood; nor is there, perhaps, any other point in grammar, on
which respectable authorities are so much divided.

That there is not in English, as in Latin, a potential mood properly
so called, appears to me unquestionable. _Amarem_ signifies ability
or liberty[67], involving the verbs _possum_ and _licet_, and may
therefore be termed a potential mood; but in English these accessary
circumstances are denoted by the preterites of the verbs _may_ and
_can_; as, _I might_ or _could love_.

That there is no subjunctive mood, we have, I conceive, equal
authority to assert. If I say in Latin, _cum cepisset_, “when he had
taken,” the verb is strictly in the subjunctive mood; for, were not
the verb subjoined to _cum_, it must have taken the indicative form;
but I hesitate not to assert, that no example can be produced in
English, where the indicative form is altered _merely_ because the
verb is preceded by some conjunctive particle. If we say, “though he
were rich, he would not despise the poor,” _was_ is not here turned
into _were_ because subjoined to _though_; for _though_ is joined
to the indicative mood, when the sentiment requires it; the verb
therefore is not in the subjunctive mood.

In respect to what has been denominated the conditional form of the
verb, I observe, that the existence of this form appears to me highly
questionable. My reasons are these:

1st. Several of our grammarians have not mentioned it; among these
are the celebrated Dr. Wallis, and the author of the British Grammar.

2dly. Those, who admit it, are not agreed concerning its extent.
Lowth and Johnson confine it to the present tense, while Priestley
extends it to the preterite.

3dly. The example which Priestley adduces of the conditional
preterite, _if thou drew_, with a few others which might be
mentioned, are acknowledged by himself to be so stiff and so harsh,
that I am inclined to regard them rather as anomalies, than as
constituting an authority for a general rule.

4thly. If then this form be, agreeably to the opinions of Lowth and
Johnson, confined to the present tense, I must say that I have not
been able to find a single example, in which the present conditional,
as it is termed, is anything but an ellipsis of the auxiliary verb.

5thly. Those who admit this mood make it nothing but the plural
number of the correspondent indicative tense without variation; as
_I love_, _thou love_, _he love_, &c. Now as this is, in fact, the
radical form of the verb, or what may be deemed the infinitive, as
following an auxiliary, it forms a presumption that it is truly an
infinitive mood, the auxiliary being suppressed.

The opinion here given will, I think, be confirmed by the following
examples.

“If he say so, it is well,” _i.e._ “if he shall say so.”

“Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him,” (_Bible_) _i.e._
“though he should slay.”

“Though thou detain me, I will not eat,” (_Ibid._) _i.e._ “shouldst
detain me.”

“If thy brother trespass against thee,” (_Ibid._) _i.e._ “should
trespass.”

“Though he fall, he shall not utterly be cast down,” (_Ibid._) _i.e._
“though he should fall.”

“Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath day,” (_Ibid._) _i.e._
“thou shouldst keep.”

There are a few examples in the use of the auxiliaries _do_ and
_have_, in which, when the ellipsis is supplied, the expression
appears somewhat uncouth; but I am persuaded that a little attention
will show, that these examples form no exception to this theory.

“If now thou do prosper my way.”--_Bible._ It is here obvious, that
the event supposed was future; the appropriate term, therefore, to
express that idea, is either _shall_ or _will_. If the phrase were,
“if thou prosper my way,” it would be universally admitted that the
auxiliary is suppressed, thus, “if thou shalt or wilt prosper my
way.” Again, when we say, “if thou do it, I shall be displeased,”
it is equally evident that the auxiliary is understood, thus, “if
thou shalt do it.” Now, if these examples be duly considered,
and if the import of the verb _to do_, as formerly explained, be
remembered, I think it will appear that the expression is elliptical,
and truly proceeds thus, “if thou (shalt) do prosper my way.” The
same observations are applicable to Shakspeare’s phraseology, when
he says, “if thou do pardon, whosoever pray.” Again; when Hamlet
says, “if damned custom have not brazed it so,” it is obvious that
the auxiliary verb _may_ is understood; for, if the expression be
cleared of the negative, the insertion of the auxiliary creates no
uncouthness; thus, “if damned custom may have brazed it so.”

I am therefore inclined to think, that the conditional form, unless
in the verb _to be_[68], has no existence in our language.

Though this be not strictly the proper place, I would beg the
reader’s attention to a few additional observations.

Many writers of classic eminence express future and contingent events
by the present tense indicative. In colloquial language, or where
the other form would render the expression stiff and awkward, this
practice cannot justly be reprehended. But where this is not the
case, the proper form, in which the note of contingency or futurity
is either expressed or understood, is certainly preferable. Thus,

“If thou neglectest, or doest unwillingly, what I command thee, I
will rack thee with old cramps.”--_Shakspeare._ Better, I think, “if
thou shalt neglect or do.”

“If any member absents himself, he shall forfeit a penny for the use
of the club.”--_Spectator._ Better, “if any member absent, or shall
absent.”

“If the stage becomes a nursery of folly and impertinence, I shall
not be afraid to animadvert upon it.”--_Spectator._ Preferably thus,
“If the stage become, or shall become.”

I observe also, that there is something peculiar and deserving
attention in the use of the preterite tense[69]. To illustrate the
remark, I shall take the following case. A servant calls on me for a
book; if I am uncertain whether I have it or not, I answer, “if the
book _be_ in my library, or if I _have_ the book, your master shall
be welcome to it:” but if I am certain that I have not the book, I
say, “if the book _were_ in my library, or if I had the book, it
should be at your master’s service.” Here it is obvious that when we
use the present tense it implies uncertainty of the fact; and when we
use the preterite, it implies a negation of its existence. Thus also,
a person at night would say to his friend, “if it _rain_, you shall
not go,” being uncertain at the time whether it did or did not rain;
but if, on looking out, he perceived it did not rain, he would then
say, “if it _rained_, you should not go,” intimating that it did not
rain.

“Nay, and the villains march wide between the legs, as if they had
gyves on.”--_Shakspeare._ Where _as if they had_ implies that “they
had not.”

In the same manner, if I say, “I will go, if I can,” my ability is
expressed as uncertain, and its dependent event left undetermined.
But if I say, “I would go, if I could,” my inability is expressly
implied, and the dependent event excluded. Thus also, when it is
said, “if I may, I will accompany you to the theatre,” the liberty
is expressed as doubtful; but when it is said, “if I might, I would
accompany you,” the liberty is represented as not existing.

In thus expressing the negation of the attribute, the conjunction is
often omitted, and the order inverted; thus, “if I had the book,” or
“had I the book.” “Were I Alexander,” said Parmenio, “I would accept
this offer;” or, “if I were Alexander, I would accept.” _Were_ is
frequently used for _would be_, and _had_ for _would have_; as, “it
_were_ injustice to deny the execution of the law to any individual;”
that is, “it would be injustice.” “Many acts, which _had_ been
blameable in a peaceable government, were employed to detect
conspiracies;” where _had_ is put for _would have_[70].--_Hume’s
History of England._

Ambiguity is frequently created by confounding fact with hypothesis,
or making no distinction between dubitative and assertive
phraseologies. Thus, if we employ such expressions as these, “if
thou knewest,” “though he was learned,” not only to express the
certainty of a fact, but likewise to denote a mere hypothesis as
opposed to fact, we necessarily render the expression ambiguous.
It is by thus confounding things totally distinct, that writers
have been betrayed not into ambiguity only, but even into palpable
errors. In evidence of this, I give the following example: “Though he
were divinely inspired, and spoke therefore as the oracles of God,
with supreme authority; though he were endowed with supernatural
powers, and could, therefore, have confirmed the truth of what
he asserted by miracles; yet in compliance with the way in which
human nature and reasonable creatures are usually wrought upon, he
reasoned.”--_Atterbury’s Sermons._

Here the writer expresses the inspiration and the supernatural powers
of Jesus, not as properties or virtues which he really did possess,
but which, though not possessing them, he might be supposed to
possess. Now, as his intention was to ascribe these virtues to Jesus,
as truly belonging to him, he should have employed the indicative
form _was_, and not _were_, as in the following sentence: “though
he _was_ rich, yet for our sakes he became poor.” “Though he _were_
rich,” would imply the non-existence of the attribute; in other
words, “that he was _not_ rich.”

A very little attention would serve to prevent these ambiguities and
errors. If the attribute be conceived as unconditionally certain,
the indicative form without ellipsis must be employed, as, “I
teach,” “I had taught,” “I shall teach.” If futurity, hypothesis, or
uncertainty, be intended, with the concessive term, the auxiliary
may be either expressed or understood, as perspicuity may require,
and the taste and judgment of the writer may dictate; thus, “if any
man teach strange doctrines, he shall be severely rebuked.” In the
former clause the auxiliary verb _shall_ is unnecessary, and is
therefore, without impropriety, omitted. “Then hear thou in heaven,
and forgive the sin of thy servants, and of thy people Israel, that
thou teach them the good way wherein they should walk.”--_Bible._
In this example the suppression of the auxiliary verb is somewhat
unfavourable to perspicuity, and renders the clause stiff and
awkward. It would be better, I think, “thou mayest teach them the
good way.” Harshness, indeed, and the appearance of affectation,
should be particularly avoided. Where there is no manifest danger
of misconception, the use of the assertive for the dubitative form
is far preferable to those starched and pedantic phraseologies
which some writers are fond of exhibiting. For this reason, such
expressions as the following appear to me highly offensive: “if thou
have determined, we must submit;” “unless he have consented, the
writing will be void;” “if this have been the seat of their original
formation;” “unless thou shall speak, we cannot determine.” The last
I consider as truly ungrammatical. In such cases, if the dubitative
phraseology should appear to be preferable, the stiffness and
affectation here reprehended may frequently be prevented by inserting
the note of doubt or contingency.

I observe farther, that the substitution of _as_ for _if_ when
the affirmation is unconditional, will often serve to prevent
ambiguity[71]. Thus, when the ant in the fable says to the
grasshopper who had trifled away the summer in singing, “if you sung
in summer, dance in winter;” as the first clause, taken by itself,
leaves the meaning somewhat ambiguous, “as you sung,” would be the
better expression.


IRREGULAR VERBS.

The general rule for the formation of the preterite tense, and the
perfect participle, is to add to the present the syllable _ed_, if
the verb end with a consonant, or _d_, if it end with a vowel, as

  Turn, Turned, Turned; Love, Loved, Loved.

Verbs, which depart from this rule, are called irregular, of which I
believe the subsequent enumeration to be nearly complete[72].

   _Present._          _Preterite._        _Perfect Participle._
  Abide                  Abode                Abode
  Am                     Was                  Been
  Arise                  Arose                Arisen
  Awake                  Awoke R              Awaked

  Bake                   Baked                Baken R
  Bear, to bring forth   Bore, or Bear        Born[73]
  Bear, to carry         Bore, or Bear        Borne
  Beat                   Beat                 Beaten
  Begin                  Began                Begun
  Become                 Became               Become
  Behold                 Beheld               Beheld, or Beholden[74]
  Bend                   Bent R               Bent R
  Bereave                Bereft R             Bereft R
  Beseech                Besought             Besought
  Bid                    Bade, or Bid         Bidden
  Bind                   Bound                Bound
  Bite                   Bit                  Bitten, Bit[75]
  Bleed                  Bled                 Bled
  Blow                   Blew                 Blown
  Break                  Broke, or Brake      Broken[76]
  Breed                  Bred                 Bred
  Bring                  Brought              Brought
  Build                  Built R              Built[77] R
  Burst                  Burst                Burst
  Buy                    Bought               Bought

  Can                    Could
  Cast                   Cast                 Cast
  Catch                  Caught R             Caught R
  Chide                  Chid[78]             Chidden
  Choose                 Chose                Chosen
  Cleave, to stick       Clave R              Cleaved
      or adhere
  Cleave, to split       Clove, or Clave,     Cloven,
                           or Cleft             or Cleft
  Cling                  Clung                Clung
  Climb                  Clomb[79] R          Climbed
  Clothe                 Clad[80] R           Clad R
  Come                   Came                 Come
  Cost                   Cost                 Cost
  Crow                   Crew R               Crowed
  Creep                  Crept                Crept
  Cut                    Cut                  Cut

  Dare, to venture       Durst R              Dared
  Dare, to challenge, is regular.
  Deal                   Dealt R              Dealt R
  Dig                    Dug R                Dug R
  Do                     Did                  Done
  Draw                   Drew                 Drawn
  Drive                  Drove                Driven
  Drink                  Drank                Drunk
  Dwell                  Dwelt R              Dwelt R

  Eat                    Ate                  Eaten

  Fall                   Fell                 Fallen
  Feed                   Fed                  Fed
  Feel                   Felt                 Felt
  Fight                  Fought               Fought
  Find                   Found                Found
  Flee                   Fled                 Fled
  Fly                    Flew                 Flown
  Fling                  Flung                Flung
  Forget                 Forgot               Forgotten
  Forgo[81]                                   Forgone
  Forsake                Forsook              Forsaken
  Freeze                 Froze                Frozen
  Freight                Freighted            Freighted, or Fraught[82]

  Get                    Gat, or Got          Gotten, or Got
  Gild                   Gild R               Gilt R
  Gird                   Girt R               Girt R
  Give                   Gave                 Given
  Go                     Went                 Gone
  Grave                  Graved               Graven R
  Grind                  Ground               Ground
  Grow                   Grew                 Grown

  Have                   Had                  Had
  Hang[83]               Hung R               Hung R
  Hear                   Heard                Heard
  Heave                  Hove[84] R           Hoven R
  Help                   Helped               Holpen[85] R
  Hew                    Hewed                Hewn R
  Hide                   Hid                  Hidden[86], or Hid
  Hit                    Hit                  Hit
  Hold                   Held                 Holden[87], or Held
  Hurt                   Hurt                 Hurt

  Keep                   Kept                 Kept
  Kneel                  Knelt                Knelt
  Knit                   Knit, or Knitted     Knit, or Knitted
  Know                   Knew                 Known

  Lade                   Laded                Laden[88]
  Lay                    Laid                 Laid[89]
  Lead                   Led                  Led
  Leave                  Left                 Left
  Lend                   Lent                 Lent
  Let                    Let                  Let
  Lie, to lie down       Lay                  Lien, or Lain[90]
  Lift                   Lifted, or Lift      Lifted, or Lift
  Light                  Lighted, or Lit[91]   Lighted, or Lit
  Load                   Loaded               Loaden, or Loaded
  Lose                   Lost                 Lost

  Make                   Made                 Made
  May                    Might
  Mean                   Meant R              Meant R
  Meet                   Met                  Met
  Mow                    Mowed                Mown[92] R
  Must

  Pay                    Paid                 Paid
  Put                    Put                  Put

  Quit                   Quit, or Quitted[93]  Quit

  Read                   Read                 Read
  Rend                   Rent                 Rent
  Ride                   Rode, or Rid         Rid[94], or Ridden
  Rid                    Rid                  Rid
  Ring                   Rang, or Rung        Rung
  Rise                   Rose                 Risen
  Rive                   Rived                Riven
  Roast                  Roasted              Roasted, or Roast[95]
  Rot                    Rotted               Rotten R
  Run                    Ran                  Run

  Saw                    Sawed                Sawn R
  Say                    Said                 Said
  See                    Saw                  Seen
  Seek                   Sought               Sought
  Seethe                 Seethed, or Sod      Sodden
  Sell                   Sold                 Sold
  Send                   Sent                 Sent
  Set                    Set                  Set
  Shake                  Shook                Shaken[96]
  Shall                  Should
  Shape                  Shaped               Shapen R
  Shave                  Shaved               Shaven R
  Shear                  Shore                Shorn
  Shed                   Shed                 Shed
  Shine                  Shone R              Shone R
  Shew                   Shewed               Shewn
  Show                   Showed               Shown
  Shoe                   Shod                 Shod
  Shoot                  Shot                 Shot
  Shrink                 Shrank[97], or Shrunk   Shrunk
  Shred                  Shred                Shred
  Shut                   Shut                 Shut
  Sing                   Sang[98], or Sung    Sung
  Sink                   Sank, or Sunk        Sunk
  Sit                    Sat                  Sitten[99], or Sat
  Slay                   Slew                 Slain
  Sleep                  Slept                Slept
  Slide                  Slid                 Slidden
  Sling                  Slang, or Slung      Slung
  Slink                  Slank, or Slunk      Slunk
  Slit                   Slit R               Slit, or Slitted
  Smite                  Smote                Smitten
  Sow                    Sowed                Sown R
  Speak                  Spoke, or Spake      Spoken
  Speed                  Sped                 Sped
  Spend                  Spent                Spent
  Spill                  Spilt R              Spilt R
  Spin                   Spun, or Span        Spun
  Spit                   Spat, or Spit        Spitten, or Spit
  Split                  Split, or Splitted   Split, Splitted
  Spread                 Spread               Spread
  Spring                 Sprang, or Sprung    Sprung
  Stand                  Stood                Stood
  Steal                  Stole                Stolen
  Stick                  Stuck                Stuck
  Sting                  Stung                Stung
  Stink                  Stank, or Stunk      Stunk
  Stride                 Strode, or Strove    Stridden
  Strike                 Struck               Struck, or Stricken
  String                 Strung               Strung
  Strive                 Strove               Striven
  Strew, or              Strewed, or }        Strown
    Strow                  Strowed   }
  Swear                  Swore, or Sware      Sworn
  Sweat                  Sweat                Sweat
  Sweep                  Swept                Swept
  Swell                  Swelled              Swelled, or Swollen
  Swim                   Swam, or Swum        Swum
  Swing                  Swang                Swung

  Take                   Took                 Taken
  Teach                  Taught               Taught
  Tear                   Tore, or Tare        Torn
  Tell                   Told                 Told
  Think                  Thought              Thought
  Thrive                 Throve[100]            Thriven
  Throw                  Through              Thrown
  Thrust                 Thrust               Thrust
  Tread                  Trod                 Trodden

  Wax                    Waxed                Waxen R
  Wash                   Washed               Washed[101]
  Wear                   Wore                 Worn
  Weave                  Wove                 Woven
  Weep                   Wept                 Wept
  Will                   Would
  Win                    Won                  Won
  Wind                   Wound[102] R         Wound
  Work                   Wrought R            Wrought R
  Wring                  Wrung R              Wrung
  Write                  Wrote                Written[103]
  Writhe                 Writhed              Writhen.


DEFECTIVE VERBS.

These, as Lowth observes, are generally not only defective, but also
irregular, and are chiefly auxiliary verbs.

  _Present._            _Preterite._      _Perfect Participle._

  Must
  May                     Might
  Quoth                   Quoth
  Can                     Could
  Shall                   Should
  Wit[104], or Wot        Wot
  Will[105]               Would
  Wis[106]                Wist
  Ought[107]


OF IMPERSONAL VERBS.

The distinctive character of impersonal verbs has been a subject of
endless dispute among grammarians. Some deny their existence in the
learned languages, and others as positively assert it. Some define
them to be verbs devoid of the two first persons; but this definition
is evidently incorrect: for, as Perizonius and Frischlinus observe,
this may be a reason for calling them defective, but not for naming
them impersonal verbs. Others have defined them to be verbs, to which
no certain person, as the subject, can be prefixed. But with the
discussion of this question, as it respects the learned languages,
the English grammarian has no concern. I proceed, therefore, to
observe, that impersonal verbs, as the name imports, are those which
do not admit a person as their nominative. Their real character
seems to be, that they assert the existence of some action or state,
but refer it to no particular subject. In English we have very few
impersonal verbs. To this denomination, however, may certainly be
referred, _it behoveth_, _it irketh_; equivalent to, _it is the
duty_, _it is painfully wearisome_. That the former of these verbs
was once used personally, we have sufficient evidence; and it is not
improbable that the latter also was so employed, though I have not
been able to find an example of its junction with a person. They are
now invariably used as impersonal verbs. We cannot say, _I behove_,
_thou behovest_, _he behoves_; _we irk_, _ye irk_, _they irk_.

There are one or two others, which have been considered as
impersonal verbs, in which the personal pronoun in the objective
case is prefixed to the third person singular of the verb, as
_methinks_, _methought_, _meseems_, _meseemed_; analogous to the
Latin expressions _me pœnitet_, _me pœnituit_. _You thinketh_, _him
liketh_, _him seemeth_, have long been entirely obsolete. _Meseems_
and _meseemed_ occur in Sidney, Spenser, and other contemporary
writers; but are now universally disused. Addison sometimes says
_methoughts_, contrary, I conceive, to all analogy.




CHAPTER VII.

OF ADVERBS.


An adverb is that part of speech which is joined to a verb,
adjective, or other adverb, to express some circumstance, quality,
degree, or manner of its signification; and hence adverbs have been
termed attributives of the second order.

“As the attributives hitherto mentioned,” says Mr. Harris, “viz.
adjective and verb, denote the attributes of substances, so there
is an inferior class of them, which denote the attributes only of
attributes. If I say, ‘Cicero was eloquent,’ I ascribe to him the
attribute of eloquence simply and absolutely; if I say, ‘he was
exceedingly eloquent,’ I affirm an eminent degree of eloquence,
the adverb _exceedingly_ denoting that degree. If I say, ‘he died,
fighting _bravely_ for his country,’ the word _bravely_ here added to
the verb denotes the manner of the action.” An adverb is, therefore,
a word joined to a verb, or any attributive, to denote some
modification, degree, or circumstance, of the expressed attribute.

Adverbs have been divided into a variety of classes, according to
their signification. Some of those which denote

  _Quality_ simply, are,    Well, ill, bravely, prudently, softly,
                              with innumerable others formed from
                              adjectives and participles.
  _Certainty_ or          { Verily, truly, undoubtedly, yea, yes,
    _Affirmation_         {   certainly.
  _Contingence_             Perhaps, peradventure, perchance.
  _Negation_                Nay, no, not, nowise.
  _Explaining_              Namely.
  _Separation_              Apart, separately, asunder.
  _Conjunction_             Together, generally, universally.
  _Indication_              Lo.
  _Interrogation_           Why, wherefore, when, how.
  _Excess_ or             } Very, exceedingly, too, more, better,
    _Preeminence_         }   worse, best, worst.
  _Defect_                  Almost, nearly, less, least.
  _Preference_              Rather, chiefly, especially.
  _Likeness_ or           } So, thus, as, equally.
    _Equality_            }
  _Unlikeness_ or         } Else, otherwise.
    _Inequality_          }
  _Abatement_ or          } Piecemeal, scarcely, hardly.
    _Gradation_           }
  _To_ or _in a place_      Here, there, where.
  _To a place, only_        Hither, thither, whither.
  _Towards a place_         Hitherward, thitherward, whitherward.
  _From a place_            Hence, thence, whence.
  _Time present_            Now, to-day.
  _---- past_             { Yesterday, before, heretofore, already,
                          {   hitherto, lately.
  _---- future_           { To-morrow, hereafter, presently,
                          {   immediately, afterwards.
  _Repetition of          } Often, seldom, frequently.
    times indef._         }
  _---- Definitely_         Once, twice, thrice, again.
  _Order_                   First[108], secondly, thirdly, &c.
  _Quantity_                Much, little, enough, sufficiently.

On inquiring into the meaning and etymology of adverbs, it will
appear, that most of them are abbreviations or contractions for two
or more words. Thus, _bravely_, or “in a brave manner,” is probably
derived by abbreviation from _brave-like_, _wisely_ from _wise-like_,
_happily_ from _happy-like_[109]. Mr. Tooke, indeed, has proved, as
I conceive incontrovertibly, that most of them are either corruptions
of other words, or abbreviations of phrases or of sentences. One
thing is certain, that the adverb is not an indispensable part of
speech, as it serves merely to express in one word what perhaps would
otherwise require two or more words. Thus,

  Where[110]  denotes  In what place
  Here                 In this place
  There                In that place
  Whither              To what place
  Hither               To this place
  Thither              To that place.




CHAPTER VIII.

OF PREPOSITIONS.


A preposition has been defined to be “that part of speech which shows
the relation that one thing bears to another.” According to Mr.
Harris, it is a part of speech devoid itself of signification, but
so formed as to unite words that are significant, and that refuse to
unite or associate of themselves. He has, therefore, compared them to
pegs or pins, which serve to unite those parts of the building which
would not, by their own nature, incorporate or coalesce. When one
considers the formidable objections which present themselves to this
theory, and that the ingenious author now quoted has, in defence of
it, involved himself in palpable contradictions, it becomes matter
of surprise that it should have so long received from grammarians
an almost universal and implicit assent. This furnishes one of
many examples, how easily error may be imposed and propagated by
the authority of a great name. But, though error may be repeatedly
transmitted from age to age, unsuspected and unquestioned, it
cannot be perpetuated. Mr. Horne Tooke has assailed this theory by
irresistible arguments, and demonstrated that, in our language at
least, prepositions are significant of ideas, and that, as far as
import is concerned, they do not form a distinct species of words.

It is not, indeed, easy to imagine, that men, in the formation
of any language, would invent words insignificant, and to which,
singly, they attached no determinate idea; especially when it is
considered, that, in every stage of their existence, from rudeness
to civilization, new words would perpetually be wanting to express
new ideas. It is not, therefore, probable that, while they were
under the necessity of framing new words, to answer the exigences of
mental enlargement, and while these demands on their invention were
incessantly recurring, they would, in addition to this, encumber
themselves with the idle and unnecessary task of forming new words
to express nothing.

But, in truth, Harris himself yields the point, when he says, that
prepositions, when compounded, transfuse something of their meaning
into the compound; for they cannot transfuse what they do not
contain, nor impart what they do not possess. They must, therefore,
be themselves significant words.

But it is not so much their meaning with which the grammarian
is concerned, as their syntactical character, their capacity of
affecting other words, or being affected by them. In both these
lights, however, I propose to consider them.

The name of preposition has been assigned to them, because they
generally precede their regimen, or the word which they govern. What
number of these words ancient and modern languages contain, has been
much disputed; some grammarians determining a greater and some a less
number. This, indeed, of itself affords a conclusive proof that the
character of these words has not been clearly understood; for, in the
other parts of speech, noun, adjective, and verb, the discriminative
circumstances are so evident, that no doubt can arise concerning
their classification.

That most of our English prepositions have signification _per se_,
and form no distinct species of words, Mr. Tooke has produced
incontrovertible evidence: nor is it to be doubted, that a perfect
acquaintance with the Northern languages would convince us, that all
of them are abbreviations, corruptions, or combinations of other
words. A few of Mr. Tooke’s examples I shall now present to the
reader.

  _Above_, from the Anglo-Saxon _ufa_, high; hence _bufan_, _on
  bufan_, bove, above.

  _With_, from _withan_, to join, of which _with_ is the imperative;
  thus, “_a house with a party wall_,”--“a house, _join_ a party
  wall;” or it is sometimes the imperative of _wyrthan_, “to be;”
  hence, _by_ and _with_ are often synonymous, the former being
  derived from _beon_, “to be.”

  _Without_, from the Saxon preposition _withutan_, _extra_, _sine_,
  which is properly the imperative of the verb _wyrthanutan_, “to
  be out.” _Withutan_, _beutan_, “without,” “be out,” or “but.” The
  Saxon preposition occurs frequently in the writings of Chaucer, and
  is still used in Scottish poetry[111].

  _From_[112], is simply the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic noun _frum_,
  “beginning,” “source,” “origin;” thus, “Figs came _from_ Turkey;”
  that is, Figs came; “the source,” or “beginning,” Turkey; to which
  is opposed the word.

  _To_, the same originally as _do_, signifying finishing or
  completion; thus “Figs came _from_ Turkey _to_ England;” “the
  beginning,” or “source,” Turkey; “the finishing,” or “end,” England.

  _Beneath_, is the imperative _be_, compounded with the noun
  _neath_, of the same import with _neden_ in Dutch, _ned_ in Danish,
  _niedere_ in German, and _nedre_ or _neder_ in Swedish, signifying
  the lower place; hence, the astronomical term _Nadir_, opposed to
  _Zenith_. Hence also _nether_ and _nethermost_.

  _Between_, “be twain,” “be two,” or “be separated.”[113]

  _Before_,  }
  _Behind_,  }  Imperative _be_, and the nouns, _fore_, _hind_, _side_,
  _Beside_,  }    _low_.
  _Below_,   }

  _Under_, i.e. _on neder_.

  _Beyond_, imperative _be_, and the participle past _goned_ of the
  verb _gan_, “to go:” as, “beyond the place,” i.e. “be passed the
  place.”

  _Among_, from _gemong_, the preterperfect of the verb _mengan_, to
  mix, used as a participle, and signifying “mixed.”

Many other examples might be produced from Tooke’s ingenious
illustration of his theory; but those which I have now offered
suffice to prove, that our prepositions, so far from being words
insignificant, belong to the class of nouns or verbs either single or
compounded.

Besides, if prepositions denote relations, as Harris admits, it
is surely absurd to suppose, that they have no meaning; for the
relation, whether of propinquity, contiguity, approach, or regress,
&c., may be expressed, and apprehended by the mind, though the
objects between which the relation subsists be not specified. If I
hear the word _with_, I naturally conceive the idea of conjunction;
the reverse takes place when I hear _without_. If it be said _a
soldier with_, I have the idea of a soldier associated with something
else, which association is denoted by _with_. What is conjoined to
him I know not, till the object be specified, as, “a soldier _with_ a
musquet;” but the mere association was before sufficiently expressed,
and clearly apprehended. Again, if a person say, “_he threw a glass
under_,” I have instantly an idea of a glass, and of inferiority
of place, conceiving a glass removed into a situation lower than
something else. To ascertain that _something_, I ask, _under what?_
and the answer may be, _under the table_. Now, if _under_ had no
meaning, this question would be insignificant, or rather impossible.

From the examples given, I trust the young reader sufficiently
understands the difference between the doctrine of Harris on this
subject, and that of Horne Tooke; nay, I think, he must perceive,
that the former is merely a theory, while the latter is supported by
reason and fact. The syntax of our prepositions will be afterwards
explained. I shall only observe at present, that the words which are
in English considered as prepositions, and joined to the objective
case are these:

  Above           Beneath       Since
  About           Below         Through    }
  After           Beside        Throughout }
  Against         By            Till  }
  Among   }       Down          Until }
  Amongst }       For           To   }
  Amid   }        From          Unto }
  Amidst }        In            Toward  }
  Around  }       Into          Towards }
  Round   }       Near }        Under      }
  At              Nigh }        Underneath }
  Between }       Of            Up
  Betwixt }       Off           With
  Beyond          Over          Within
  Before          On   }        Without
  Behind          Upon }

Some of these, though they are commonly joined to an objective case,
and may therefore be deemed prepositions, are, notwithstanding, of
an equivocal character, resembling the Latin adverbs _procul_ and
_prope_, which govern a case by the ellipsis of a preposition. Thus
we say, “near the house” and “near _to_ the house,” “nigh the park,”
and “nigh _to_ the park,” “off the table,” and “off _from_ the table.”

Several are used as adverbs, and also as prepositions, no ellipsis
being involved, as, _till_, _until_, _after_, _before_.

There are certain particles, which are never found single
or uncompounded, and have therefore been termed inseparable
prepositions. Those purely English are, _a_, _be_, _fore_, _mis_,
_un_. The import of these, and of a few separable prepositions when
prefixed to other words, I proceed to explain.

  _A_, signifies _on_ or _in_, as, _a foot_, _a shore_, that is, _on
  foot_, _on shore_. Webster contends, that it was originally the
  same with _one_.

  _Be_, signifies _about_, as, _bestir_, _besprinkle_, that is, _stir
  about_; also _for_ or _before_, as, _bespeak_, that is, _speak
  for_, or _before_.

  _For_, denies, or deprives, as, _bid, forbid_, _seek, forsake_,
  i.e. _bid, bid not_; _seek, not seek_.

  _Fore_, signifies _before_, as, _see, foresee_, that is, _see
  beforehand_.

  _Mis_, denotes defect or error, as, _take, mistake_, or _take
  wrongly_; _deed, misdeed_, that is, _a wrong_ or _evil deed_.

  _Over_, denotes eminence or superiority, as, _come, overcome_; also
  excess, as, _hasty_, _over hasty_, or _too hasty_.

  _Out_, signifies excess or superiority, as, _do, outdo_, _run,
  outrun_, that is, “to surpass in running.”

  _Un_, before an adjective, denotes negation, or privation, as,
  _worthy, unworthy_, or “_not_ worthy.” Before verbs it denotes
  the undoing or the destroying of the energy or act, expressed
  by the verb, as, _say, unsay_, that is, “affirm,” retract the
  “affirmation.”

  _Up_, denotes motion upwards, as, _start, upstart_; rest in a
  higher place, as, _hold, uphold_; sometimes subversion, as, _set,
  upset_.

  _With_, signifies _against_, as, _stand, withstand_, that is,
  “stand against, or resist.”

The Latin prepositions used in the composition of English words are
these, _ab_ or _abs_, _ad_, _ante_, _con_, _circum_, _contra_, _de_,
_di_, _dis_, _e_ or _ex_, _extra_, _in_, _inter_, _intro_, _ob_,
_per_, _post_, _præ_, _pro_, _præter_, _re_, _retro_, _se_, _sub_,
_subter_, _super_, _trans_.

  _A, ab, abs_, signify _from_ or _away_, as, _to abstract_, that is,
  “to draw away.”

  _Ad_, signifies _to_ or _at_, as, _to adhere_, that is, “to stick
  to.”

  _Ante_, means _before_, as, _antecedent_, that is, “going before.”

  _Circum_, round, _about_, as, _circumnavigate_, or “sail round.”

  _Con, com, co, col_, signify _together_, as, _convoke_, or “call
  together,” _co-operate_, or “work together,” _colleague_, “joined
  together.”

  _Contra_, _against_, as, _contradict_, or “speak against.”

  _De_, signifies _down_, as, _deject_, or “throw down.”

  _Di, dis_, _asunder_, as _distract_, or “draw asunder.”

  _E_, _ex_, _out of_, as, _egress_, or “going out,” _eject_, or
  “throw out,” _exclude_, or “shut out.”

  _Extra_, _beyond_, as, _extraordinary_, or “beyond the ordinary or
  usual course.”

  _In_, before an adjective, like _un_, denotes privation, as,
  _active_, _inactive_, or “not active;” before a verb, it has its
  simple meaning.

  _Inter_, _between_, as, _intervene_, or “come between,”
  _interpose_, or “put between.”

  _Intro_, _to within_, as, _introduce_, or “lead in.”

  _Ob_, denotes opposition, as, _obstacle_, that is, “something
  standing in opposition,” “an impediment.”

  _Per_, _through_, or _thoroughly_, as, _perfect_, or “thoroughly
  done,” to _perforate_, or “to bore through.”

  _Post_, _after_, as, _postscript_, or “written after,” that is,
  after the letter.

  _Præ_, _before_, as, _prefix_, or “fix before.”

  _Pro_, _forth_, or _forwards_, as, _promote_, or “move forwards.”

  _Præter_, _past_, or _beyond_, as, _preternatural_, or “beyond the
  course of nature.”

  _Re_, _again_, or _back_, as, _retake_, or “take back.”

  _Retro_, _backwards_, as, _retrograde_, or “going backwards.”

  _Se_, _apart_, or _without_, as, _to secrete_, “to put aside,” or
  “to hide,” _secure_, “without care or apprehension.”

  _Subter_, _under_, as, _subterfluous_, or “flowing under.”

  _Super_, _above_, or _over_, as, _superscribe_, or “write above, or
  over.”

  _Trans_, _over_, _from one place to another_, as, _transport_, that
  is, “carry over.”

The Greek prepositions and particles compounded with English words
are, _a_, _amphi_, _anti_, _hyper_, _hypo_, _meta_, _peri_, _syn_.

  _A_, signifies privation, as, _anonymous_, or “without a name.”

  _Amphi_, _both_, or _the two_, as, _amphibious_, “having both
  lives,” that is, “on land and on water.”

  _Anti_, _against_, as, _anti-covenanter_, _anti-jacobin_, that is,
  “an opponent of the covenanters,” “an enemy to the jacobins.”

  _Hyper_, _over and above_, as, _hypercritical_, or “over,” that is,
  “too critical.”

  _Hypo_, _under_, implying concealment or disguise, as, _hypocrite_,
  “one dissembling his real character.”

  _Meta_, denotes change or transmutation, as, _to metamorphose_, or
  “to change the shape.”

  _Para_, denotes sometimes propinquity or similarity, and sometimes
  contrariety. It is equivalent to the Latin terms _juxta_ and
  _præter_, as, “to paraphrase,” παραφράζειν, _juxta alterius
  orationem loqui_; “to speak the meaning of another.” _Paradox_,
  “beyond,” or “contrary to, general opinion,” or “common belief.”

  _Peri_, _round about_, as, _periphrasis_, that is, “circumlocution.”

  _Syn_, _together_, as _synod_, “a meeting,” or “coming together,”
  _sympathy_, or “feeling together.”




CHAPTER IX.

OF CONJUNCTIONS.


A conjunction has been defined to be “that part of speech which
connects words and sentences together.”

Mr. Ruddiman, and several other grammarians, have asserted, that
conjunctions never connect words, but sentences. This is evidently
a mistake; for if I say, “a man of wisdom and virtue is a perfect
character,” it implies not “that a man of wisdom is a perfect
character, and a man of virtue a perfect character,” but “a man who
combines wisdom and virtue.” The farther discussion of this question,
however, I shall at present postpone, as it will form a subject of
future inquiry.

Conjunctions have been distributed, according to their significations,
into different classes:

  _Copulative_,        And, also, but, (bot).
  _Disjunctive_,       Either, or.
  _Concessive_,        Though, although, albeit, yet.
  _Adversative_,       But, however.
  _Exclusive_,         Neither, nor.
  _Causal_,            For, that, because, since.
  _Illative_,          Therefore, wherefore, then.
  _Conditional_,       If.
  _Exceptive_,         Unless.

This distribution of the conjunctions I have given, in conformity
to general usage, that the reader may be acquainted with the common
terms by which conjunctions have been denominated, if these terms
should occur to him in the course of reading. In respect to the real
import, and genuine character of these words, I decidedly adopt the
theory of Mr. Tooke, which considers conjunctions as no distinct
species of words, but as belonging to the class of attributives, or
as abbreviations for two or more significant words.

Agreeably to his theory, _and_ is an abbreviation for _anad_, the
imperative of _ananad_, “to add,” or “to accumulate;” as, “two and
two make four;” that is, “two, add two, make four.” _Either_ is
evidently an adjective expressive of “one of two;” thus, “it is
either day or night,” that is, “one of the two, day or night.” It is
derived from the Saxon _ægther_, equivalent to _uterque_, “each.”[114]

_Or_ is a contraction for _other_, a Saxon and English adjective
equivalent to _alius_ or _alter_, and denotes diversity, either of
name or of subject. Hence _or_ is sometimes a perfect disjunctive,
as when it expresses contrariety or opposition of things; and
sometimes a subdisjunctive, when it denotes simply a diversity in
name. Thus, when we say, “It is either even or odd,” _or_ is a
perfect disjunctive, the two attributives being directly contrary,
and admitting no medium. If I say, “Paris or Alexander” (these being
names of the same individual); or if I say, “Gravity or weight,”
“Logic, or the art of reasoning;” _or_ in these examples is a
subdisjunctive or an explicative, as it serves to define the meaning
of the preceding term, or as it expresses the equivalence of two
terms. The Latins express the former by _aut_, _vel_, and the latter
by _seu_ or _sive_. In the following sentence both conjunctions are
exemplified: “Give me _either_ the black _or_ the white;” _i.e._
“Give me one of the two--the black--other, the white.”

To these are opposed _neither_, _nor_, as, “Give me _neither_ poverty
_nor_ riches;” _i.e._ “Give me not one of the two, poverty--nor,
_i.e._ not the other, riches.”

According to Mr. Tooke, the conjunction _if_ is the imperative of
the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic verb _gifan_, “to give.” Among others, he
quotes the following example. “How will the weather dispose of you
to-morrow? If fair, it will send me abroad; if foul, it will keep me
at home”--_i.e._ “Give,” or “grant it to be fair;” “give,” or “grant
it to be foul.”

_Though_ is the same as _thaf_, an imperative from _thafan_, to
allow, and is in some parts of the country pronounced _thof_; as,
“Though he should speak truth, I would not believe him;” _i.e._
“allow or grant, what? he should speak truth,” or “allow his speaking
truth, I would not believe him.”

_But_, from _beutan_, the imperative of _beon utan_, to _be out_, is
the same as _without_ or _unless_, there being no difference between
these in respect to meaning. Grammarians, however, in conformity
to the distinction between _nisi_ and _sine_, have called _but_ a
conjunction, and _without_ a preposition. _But_, therefore, being
a word signifying exception or exclusion, I have not termed it an
“adversative,” as most grammarians have, but an “exceptive.” In this
sense it is synonymous with _præter_, _præterquam_, or _nisi_; thus,
“I saw nobody but John,” _i.e._ “unless,” or “except John.”

_But_, from _bot_, the imperative of _botan_, to _boot_ or
_superadd_, has a very different meaning. This word was originally
written _bot_, and was thus distinguished from but[115]. They are
now written alike, which tends to create confusion. The meaning of
this word is, “add,” or, “moreover.” This interpretation is confirmed
by the probable derivation and meaning of synonymous words in other
languages. Thus, the French _mais_ (but) is from _majus_, or _magis_,
“more,” or “in addition;” the Italian _ma_, the Spanish _mas_, and
the Dutch _maar_, are from the same etymon, signifying “more.”
And it is not improbable, that _adsit_ (be it present, or be it
added) by contraction became _ast_ and _at_: thus, _adsit_, _adst_,
_ast_, _at_. In this sense _but_ is synonymous with _at_, _autem_,
_cæterum_, “moreover,” or “in addition.”

It is justly observed by Mr. Tooke, that _bot_ or _but_ allays or
mitigates a good or bad precedent, by the addition of something;
for _botan_ means “to superadd,” “to supply,” “to atone for,” “to
compensate,” “to add something more,” “to make amends,” or “make up
deficiency.” Thus,

      “Once did I lay an ambush for your life,
      A trespass, that doth vex my grieved soul:
      But (bot), ere I last received the sacrament,
      I did confess...”
                               _Richard II._

“Add (this) ere I last received.”

When _but_ means _be out_, or _without_, it should, says Mr. Tooke,
be preceded by a negative; thus, instead of saying, “I saw but John,”
which means, “I saw John be out,” we should say, “I saw none but
John,” _i.e._ “none, John be out,” or “had John been out,” or, “John
being excluded.” This, observes the ingenious author, is one of the
most faulty ellipses in our language, and could never have obtained,
but through the utter ignorance of the meaning of the word _but_
(bot).

_Yet_, from the imperative of _getan_, “to get.”

_Still_, from _stell_ or _steall_, the imperative of _stellan_,
_ponere_, “to suppose.”

Horne Tooke observing that these words, like _if_ and _an_[116],
are synonymous, accounts for their equivalence by supposing them to
be derived from verbs of the same import. His mode of derivation,
however, appears at first hearing to be incorrect: the meaning of
the conjunctions have little or no affinity to that of the verbs.
Mr. Tooke himself does not seem perfectly satisfied with its truth.
Both these conjunctions are synonymous with “notwithstanding,”
“nevertheless;” terms, the obvious meaning of which does not accord
with verbs denoting “to get,” or “to suppose.” I am inclined,
however, to think that Tooke’s conjecture is founded in truth. If
I say, “he was learned, yet modest,” it may be expressed, “he was
learned, notwithstanding this, or this being granted, even thus, or
_be it so_ (_licet ita esset_) he was modest;” where the general
incompatibility between learning and modesty is conceived, not
expressed, the expression denoting merely the combination of the
qualities in the individual mentioned. _Notwithstanding_ indirectly
marks the repugnance, by signifying that the one quality did not
prevent the co-existence of the other; _yet_ or _still_ supposes
the incompatibility to be sufficiently known. This derivation is
rendered the more probable, as the word _though_ (_thof_, _grant_)
may be substituted to express the same idea, as “_though_ (grant) he
was learned, he was modest;” which is equivalent to “he was learned,
yet (this granted) he was modest.” Hence many repeat the concessive
term, and say, “_though_ he was learned, _yet_ he was modest.”

_Unless._ Mr. Horne Tooke is of opinion that this exceptive
conjunction is properly _onles_, the imperative of the verb
_onlesan_, to dismiss; thus, “you cannot be saved _unless_ you
believe;” _i.e._ “dismiss your believing, and you cannot be saved,”
or, “you cannot be saved, your believing being dismissed.”

_Lest_ is contracted for _lesed_, the participle of the same verb,
_onlesan_ or _lesan_, signifying “dismissed;” as, “Young men should
take care to avoid bad company, _lest_ their morals be corrupted, and
their reputation ruined;” that is, “Young men should take care to
avoid bad company, _lest_ (this being dismissed, or omitted) their
morals be corrupted,” &c.

_That_ is evidently in all cases an adjective, or, as some consider
it, a demonstrative pronoun; as, “They say _that_ the king is
arrived;” “They say that (thing) the king is arrived.”

_Whether_ is an adjective, denoting “which of two;” thus, “Whether he
live or die;” that is, “Which of the two things, he live or die.”

_As_ is the same with _es_, a German article, meaning _it_, _that_,
or _which_.

_So_ is _sa_ or _so_, a Gothic article of the same import.

_Than_, which Mr. Tooke does not seem to have noticed, is supposed to
be a compound of the definitive _tha_, and the additive termination,
_en_, thus, _tha en, thænne, then_, and now spelled _than_[117].

These few examples will serve to explain Mr. Tooke’s theory on this
subject; and I am persuaded, that the further we investigate the
etymology and real import of conjunctions, the more probable will it
appear that they are all nouns or attributives, some belonging to
kindred languages, and others compounds or abbreviations in our own.
I am persuaded, also, that from a general review of this subject, it
must be evident that adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions, form
no distinct species of words, and that they are all reducible to the
class either of nouns or attributives, if their original character
and real import be considered. But, as many of them are derived
from obsolete words in our own language, or from words in kindred
languages, the radical meanings of which are, therefore, either
obscure, or generally unknown--and as the syntactical use of several
of them has undergone a change--it can be no impropriety, nay, it is
even convenient, to regard them not in their original character, but
their present use. When the radical word still remains, the case is
different. Thus _except_ is by some considered as a preposition; but
as the verb _to except_ is still in use, _except_ may, and indeed
should, be considered as the imperative of the verb[118]. But in
parsing, to say that the word _unless_ is the imperative of the verb
_onlesan_, “to dismiss,” that verb belonging to a different language,
would serve only to perplex and to confound, were it even true
that the etymology is correct. For this reason, though I perfectly
concur with Mr. Tooke as to the proper and original character of
these words, I have distributed them under the customary head of
prepositions, adverbs, and conjunctions.




CHAPTER X.

OF INTERJECTIONS.


An interjection has been defined to be, “that part of speech which
denotes some affection or emotion of the mind.” It is clearly not a
necessary part of speech; for, as Tooke observes, interjections are
not to be found in books of history, philosophy, or religion: they
occur in novels only, or dramatic compositions. Some of these are
entirely instinctive and mechanical, as, _ha! ha! ha!_ sounds common
to all men, when agitated with laughter. These physical emissions
of sound have no more claim to be called parts of speech than the
neighing of a horse, or the lowing of a cow. There are others which
seem arbitrary, and are expressive of some emotion, not simply by
the articulation, but by the accompanying voice or gesture. Grief,
for example, is expressed in English by the word _ah!_ or _oh!_ in
Latin by _oi_, _ei!_ and in Greek by οἶ, οἶ, αἶ, αἶ! Here the sounds
are not instinctive, or purely mechanical, as in laughing; but the
accompanying tone of voice, which is the same in all men, under the
influence of the same emotion, indicates clearly the feeling or
passion of the speaker. Others, which have been deemed interjections,
are, in truth, verbs or nouns, employed in the rapidity of thought
and expression, and under the influence of strong emotion, to denote,
what would otherwise require more words to express: as, _strange!_
for _it is strange_; _adieu!_ for _I recommend you to God_; _shame!_
for _it is shame_; _welcome!_ for _you are welcome_.

The words which have been considered by our English grammarians as
interjections, are the following, expressive of

  1. _Joy_, as, Hey, Io.

  2. _Grief_, Ah, alas, alack.

  3. _Wonder_, Vah! hah! aha!

  4. _Aversion_, Tush, pish, pshaw, foh, fie, pugh.

  5. _Laughter_, Ha, ha, ha.

  6. _Desire of attention_, Hark, lo, halloo, hem, hip.

  7. _Languor_, Heigh ho.

  8. _Desire of silence_, Hush, hist, mum.

  9. _Deliberation_, Hum.

  10. _Exultation_, Huzza.

  11. _Pain_, Oh! ho!

  12. _Taking leave_, Adieu.

  13. _Greeting_, Welcome.




PART II.

SYNTAX.


Syntax is the arrangement of words in sentences or phrases, agreeably
to established usage, or to the received rules of concord and
government.

Sentences are either simple or complex.

A simple sentence consists of only one member, containing therefore
but one subject, and one finite verb, as, “Alexander the Great is
said to have wept.”

A complex sentence consists of two or more members, as, “Alexander,
when he had conquered the world, is said to have wept, because there
were not other worlds to subdue.”

Complex sentences are divided into members; and these, if complex,
are subdivided into clauses, as, “The ox knoweth his owner | and the
ass his master’s crib || but Israel doth not know | my people doth
not consider.” This complex sentence has two members, each of which
contains two clauses.

When a member of a complex sentence is simple, it is called
indifferently a member, or a clause; as, “I have called, but ye have
refused.” The two parts, into which this sentence divides itself, are
termed each either a member or a clause.

When a complex sentence is so framed, that the meaning is suspended
till the whole be finished, it is called a period; otherwise the
sentence is said to be loose. The following sentence is an example
of a period: “If Hannibal had not wintered at Capua, by which
circumstance his troops were enervated, but had, on the contrary,
after the battle of Cannæ, proceeded to Rome, it is not improbable
that the great city would have fallen.”

The criterion of a period is, that you cannot stop before you reach
the end of the sentence, otherwise the sentence is incomplete. The
following is an example of a loose sentence. “One party had given
their whole attention during several years, to the project of
enriching themselves, and impoverishing the rest of the nation; and,
by these and other means, of establishing their dominion, under the
government, and with the favour of a family, who were foreigners: and
therefore might believe, they were established on the throne, by the
good-will and strength of this party alone.” In this sentence you may
stop at the words _themselves_, _nation_, _dominion_, _government_,
or _foreigners_; and these pauses will severally complete the
construction, and conclude perfect sentences. Thus, in a period, the
dependence of the members is reciprocal; in a loose sentence, the
preceding are not necessarily dependent on the subsequent members;
whereas the following entirely depend on those which are antecedent.
The former possesses more strength, and greater majesty; hence it is
adapted to the graver subjects of history, philosophy, and religion.
The latter is less artificial, and approaches nearer to the style
of conversation; hence it is suited to the gayer and more familiar
subjects of tales, dialogues, and epistolary correspondence.

Concord is the agreement of one word with another, in case, gender,
number, or person; thus, “I love.” Here _I_ is the pronoun singular
of the first person, and the verb is likewise in the first person,
and singular number; they agree therefore in number and person.

Government is the power which one word hath over another in
determining its state; thus, “he wounded us.” In this sentence,
_wounded_ is an active transitive verb, and governs the pronoun in
the objective case.




CHAPTER I.

OF CONCORD.


RULE I.--A verb agrees with its nominative in number and person, as,

    _We teach_
    _He learns_

where _we_ and _teach_ are each plural, and of the first person; _he_
and _learns_ are each singular, and of the third person.

  _Note_ 1.--This rule is violated in such examples as these, “I
  likes,” “thou loves,” “he need,” “you was.” In reference to the
  last example, the reader should observe, that _you_ is plural,
  whether it relate to only one individual or to more, and ought
  therefore to be joined with a plural verb. It is no argument to
  say, that when we address a single person, we should use a verb
  singular; for were this plea admissible, we ought to say, “you
  wast,” for _wast_ is the second person singular, and not “you was,”
  for _was_ is the first or third. Besides, no one says, “you is,” or
  “you art,” but “you are.”

  _Note_ 2.--The nominative to a verb is known by putting the
  question, Who? or What? to the verb, as, _I read_; Who reads? Ans.
  _I_.

  _Note_ 3.--The infinitive often supplies the place of a nominative
  to a verb, thus, “To excel in every laudable pursuit should be the
  aim of every one.” What should be the aim? Ans. “To excel.”

  _Note_ 4.--_As_, considered now as a conjunction, but being, in its
  primitive signification, equivalent to _it_, _that_, or _which_,
  likewise supplies the place of a nominative, thus, “As far as
  regards his interest, he will be sufficiently careful not to
  offend.” Some grammarians suppose _it_ to be understood

  _Note_ 5.--A verb is frequently construed with a whole clause as
  its nominative, thus, “His being at enmity with Cæsar was the cause
  of perpetual discord;” where, _his being at enmity_, the subject of
  the affirmation, forms the nominative to the verb.

  _Note_ 6.--The nominative, when the verb expresses command or
  entreaty, is often suppressed, as, “speak,” for “speak thou,”
  “honour the king,” for “honour ye the king.” It is also frequently
  suppressed in poetry, as “Lives there, who loves his pain?”
  _Milton_:--_i.e._ “Lives there a man?” “To whom the monarch;”
  _replied_ being understood.

  _Note_ 7.--A noun singular, used for a plural, is joined to a
  plural verb, as, “Ten _sail_ of the line _were_ descried at
  a distance.” It has been already observed, that the plural
  termination is sometimes suppressed, as, “ten thousand,” “three
  brace,” “four pair.”

  _Note_ 8.--Priestley has said, that when the particle _there_ is
  prefixed to a verb singular, a plural noun may follow, “without a
  very sensible impropriety.” But, if there be an impropriety at all,
  why should the phraseology be adopted? His example is this, “There
  necessarily follows from thence these plain and unquestionable
  consequences.” Nothing, we apprehend, can justify this violation
  of analogy. It should be, “follow.” Would Dr. Priestley have said
  “There _is_ men who never reason?”

  _Note_ 9.--The nominative generally precedes the verb, and is, in
  some examples, known by nothing but its place. This arrangement,
  however, is sometimes altered, and the verb placed before the
  nominative.

  1st. Where the sentence is interrogative, as, “Does wealth make
  men happy?” Here the nominative _wealth_ follows the auxiliary:
  “wealth does” would denote affirmation. “Stands Scotland where
  it did?” Here also the nominative follows the verb, to denote
  interrogation[119].

  2ndly. In expressing commands or request, as “go thou,” “read ye.”

  3rdly. When a supposition is elliptically expressed, the
  conditional particle _if_ being understood, as, “Were I Alexander,”
  said Parmenio, “I would accept the offer,” where “were I,” is
  equivalent to “if I were.”

  4thly. After the introductory word _there_, as “There was a man
  sent by God, whose name was John.” “There are many who have
  the wisdom to prefer virtue to every other acquirement.” This
  arrangement is preferable to “a man was sent,” “many are,” &c.;
  and, as a general rule, I observe, that this collocation is not
  only proper but requisite, when a sentiment of importance is to be
  introduced to the hearer’s particular attention.

  5thly. When the speaker is under the influence of vehement emotion,
  or when vivacity and force are to be imparted to the expression,
  the nominative energetically follows the verb, as, “Great is Diana
  of the Ephesians.” Alter the arrangement, saying, “Diana of the
  Ephesians is great,” and you efface the signature of impetuosity,
  and render the expression frigid and unaffecting. “Blessed is
  he, that cometh in the name of the Lord.” “He is blessed” would
  convert, as Campbell judiciously observes, a fervid exclamation
  into a cold aphorism. “Fallen, fallen is Babylon, that great city.”
  The energy of the last expression arises partly, I acknowledge,
  from the _epijeuxis_ or reduplication[120].

  6thly. The auxiliary verb is placed before the nominative, when the
  sentence or member begins with _nor_ or _neither_, as, “Nor _did
  we_ doubt that rectitude of conduct would eventually prove itself
  the best policy.” Thus also is placed the principal verb, as, “Nor
  left he in the city a soul alive.”

  Besides the cases now enumerated, in which the verb should precede
  the nominative, there are several others not easily reducible
  to any precise rule. In general, however, it may be remarked,
  that the place of the nominative depends, in some degree, on its
  connexion with other parts of the sentence. “Hence appears the
  impossibility, that this undertaking should be carried on in a
  monarchy.” _Impossibility_ being here in sense closely connected
  with the following words, this arrangement is preferable to that
  in the original. Hume says, “Hence the impossibility appears, that
  this undertaking should be carried on in a monarchy.”

  Priestley has said, that nouns, whose form is plural, but
  signification singular, require a singular verb, as, “Mathematics
  is a useful study.” This observation, however, is not justified by
  general usage, reputable writers being in this case much divided.
  (See p. 19.)


RULE II.--Two or more substantives singular, denoting different
things, being equivalent to a plural, take a plural verb; or, when
two or more substantives singular are collectively subjects of
discourse, they require a plural verb, and plural representatives,
as, “Cato and Cicero _were_ learned men; and _they_ loved _their_
country.”

  _Note_ 1.--This rule is violated in such examples as this, “I do
  not think, that leisure of life and tranquillity of mind, which
  fortune and your own wisdom _has_ given you, could be better
  employed.”--_Swift._

  _Note_ 2.--It was customary with the writers of antiquity, when the
  substantives were nearly synonymous, to employ a verb singular, as,
  _mens, ratio, et consilium in senibus est_, “understanding, reason,
  and prudence _is_ in old men.” In imitation of these, some English
  authors have, in similar instances, employed a verb singular. I
  concur, however, with L. Murray in disapproving this phraseology.
  For either the terms are synonymous, or they are not. If their
  equivalence be admitted, all but one are redundant, and there is
  only one subject of discourse; only one term should therefore be
  retained, and a verb singular be joined with it. If they be not
  equivalent, there are as many distinct ideas as there are terms,
  and a plurality of subjects requires a plural verb.

  This observation, however, requires some limitation. It
  occasionally happens that one subject is represented by two names,
  neither of which singly would express it with sufficient strength.
  In such cases, the two nouns _may_ take a verb singular; and if
  the noun singular should be in juxta-position with the verb, the
  singular number _should_ be used; as “Why _is_ dust and ashes
  proud?”--_Ecclesiasticus_, chap. x.

  _Note_ 3.--In such expressions as the following, it has been
  doubted, whether the verb should be in the singular or in the
  plural number: “Every officer and soldier claim a superiority
  in regard to other individuals.”--_De Lolme on the British
  Constitution._ Here, I conceive, the phraseology is correct. Such
  an expression as “every officer and soldier claims” might signify
  one individual under two different designations. Whether we should
  say, “Every officer, and every soldier, claim,” is a point more
  particularly questioned. We often hear correct speakers say, in
  common conversation, “Every clergyman, and every physician, is by
  education a gentleman;” and there seems to be more ease, as well as
  more precision, in this, than in the other mode of expression. It
  is unquestionably, however, more agreeable to analogy to say, “are
  gentlemen.”

  _Note_ 4.--It is not necessary, that the subjects of discourse
  be connected, or associated by conjunctions: it is sufficient,
  if the terms form a plurality of subjects to a common predicate,
  whether with or without any connexive word, as “Honour, justice,
  religion itself, were derided and blasphemed by these profligate
  wretches.”[121] In this example the copulative is omitted. “The
  king, with the lords and commons, constitute an excellent form of
  government.” Here the connexive word is not a conjunction, but a
  preposition; and though _the lords and commons_ be properly in
  the objective case, and _the king_ therefore the only nominative
  to the verb, yet as the three subjects collectively constitute
  the government, the verb without impropriety is put in the plural
  number. This phraseology, though not strictly consonant with the
  rules of concord, frequently obtains both in ancient and modern
  languages; in some cases, indeed, it seems preferable to the
  syntactical form of expression.

  _Note_ 5.--It is to be observed, that, when a pronominal adjective,
  compounded with _self_, is joined to a verb, the simple pronoun,
  which is the real nominative, is sometimes understood. “If there
  be in me iniquity, slay me thyself:” (_Bible_:) _i.e._ “Do thou
  thyself slay me.”

      “To know but this, that thou art good,
      And that myself am blind:”--_Pope._

  that is, “that I myself am blind.”

  _Note_ 6.--Where comparison is expressed or implied, and not
  combination, the verb should be singular; thus, “Cæsar, as well as
  Cicero, _was_ remarkable for eloquence.”

      “As she laughed out, until her back,
      As well as sides, _was_ like to crack.”--_Hudibras._

  _Note_ 7.--When the nominatives are of different persons, the first
  person is preferred to the second, and the second to the third. In
  other words, _I and you_, _I and he_, are sylleptically the same
  as _we_; _you and he_ the same as _ye_. This observation, however,
  is scarcely necessary, as the verb plural admits no personal
  inflexion: it can be useful only in determining what pronoun should
  be the representative of the terms collectively, as, “he and I
  shared it between _us_.”

  _Note_ 8.--In the learned languages the pronoun of the first person
  is deemed more worthy than that of the second, and the second than
  that of the third; and hence arises the syllepsis of persons which
  obtains in Greek and Latin. But, though we admit the figure in
  English, we do not precisely adopt the arrangement of the Latins;
  for though, like them, we place the pronoun of the second person
  before that of the third, we modestly place the pronoun of the
  first person after those of the second and third. Thus, where a
  Roman would say, _Si tu et Tullia valetis, ego et Cicero valemus_,
  we should say, “If you and Tullia are well, Cicero and I are well.”


RULE III.--When, of two or more substantives singular, one
exclusively is the subject of discourse, a verb singular is required,
as, “John, James, or Andrew, intends to accompany you;” that is, one
of the three, but not more than one.

  _Note._--When the predicate is to be applied to the different
  subjects, though they be disjoined by the conjunction, they may
  be followed by a plural verb. “Neither you, nor I, are in fault.”
  This is the usual form of expression. If we consider _neither_
  in its proper character, as a pronoun, we should say, “neither
  you nor I, is in fault:” _neither_ being the nominative to the
  verb. The former, however, is the common phraseology, and is
  analogous to the Latin idiom. “Quando nec gnatus, nec hic, mihi
  quicquam obtemperant.”--_Ter. Hec._ “Id neque ego, neque tu,
  fecimus.”--_Id._ “Num Lælius, aut qui duxit ab oppressa meritum
  Carthagine nomen, ingenio offensi?”--_Hor._


RULE IV.--Nouns of number, or collective nouns, may have a singular
or plural verb, thus,

    “My people _do_ not consider,”
    “My people _does_ not consider.”

  This licence, however, as Priestley observes, is not entirely
  arbitrary. If the term immediately suggest the idea of number, the
  verb is preferably made plural; but, if it suggest the idea of a
  whole or unity, it should be singular. Thus it seems harsh and
  unnatural to say, “In France the peasantry _goes_ barefoot, and
  the middle sort _makes_ use of wooden shoes.” It would be better
  to say, “the peasantry _go_”--“the middle sort _make_;” because
  the idea is that of number. On the contrary, there is something
  incongruous and unnatural in these expressions: “The court of Rome
  _were_ not without solicitude--The house of commons _were_ of small
  weight--Stephen’s party _were_ entirely broken up.”--_Hume._


RULE V.--The adjectives _this_ and _that_ agree with their
substantives in number, as,

    _This man_        _These men_
    _That woman_      _Those women_.

All other adjectives are inflexible, as,

    _Good man_        _Good men_.

  _Note_ 1.--This rule is violated in such expressions as these,
  which too frequently occur, “_These_ kind of people.” “_Those_ sort
  of goods.”

  _Note_ 2.--The substantive, with which the adjective is connected,
  is ascertained by putting the question, who, or what? to the
  adjective, as, “a ripe apple.” What is ripe? Ans. “The apple.”

  _Note_ 3.--The inflexibility of the English adjective sometimes
  occasions ambiguity, rendering it doubtful to which of two or
  more substantives the adjective refers. The defect is sometimes
  supplied by the note termed _hyphen_. If, for example, we hear a
  person designated “an old bookseller,” we may be at a loss to know,
  whether the person intended be an old man who sells books, that
  is, “an old book-seller,” or one who sells old books, that is, “an
  old-book seller.” When we read the notice, “Lime, slate, and coal
  wharf,” we are indebted to the exercise of common sense, and not
  to the perspicuity of the diction, for understanding what is meant
  by attaching the term wharf to all the preceding nouns, while in
  strict grammatical construction the notice might bear a different
  signification.

  _Note_ 4.--Every adjective has a substantive, either expressed or
  understood, as “the just shall live by faith,” _i.e._ “the just
  man;” “few were present,” _i.e._ “few persons.”

  _Note_ 5.--The adjective is generally placed immediately before the
  substantive, as, “a learned man,” “a chaste woman.”

  _Exc._ 1.--When the adjective is closely connected with some other
  word, by which its meaning is modified or explained, as, “a man
  loyal to his prince,” where the attributive _loyal_ is closely
  connected with the following words.

  _Exc._ 2.--When the verb _to be_ expresses simple affirmation, as,
  “thou art good;” or when any other verb serves as a mere copula to
  unite the predicate with its subject, as, “he seems courageous,”
  “it looks strange.”

  _Exc._ 3.--For the sake of harmony, as, “Hail! bard divine.”

  _Exc._ 4.--When there are more adjectives than one connected with
  the substantive, as, “a man wise, valiant, and good.”

  _Exc._ 5.--Adjectives denoting extent, whether of space or of time,
  are put after the clause expressing the measure, as, “a wall ten
  feet high,” “a child three years old,” “a speech an hour long.”

  _Note_ 6.--It has been doubted whether the cardinal should precede
  or follow the ordinal numeral. Atterbury says, in one of his
  letters to Pope, “Not but that the four first lines are good.” We
  conceive the expression to be quite correct, though the other form,
  namely, “the first four,” be often employed to denote the same
  conception. There is no contrast intended between these four and
  any other four, otherwise he should have said, “The first four.” If
  we say, “the first seven years,” it implies a division into sevens,
  as takes place, for example, in the terms of a lease; “the seven
  first years” implies no such division. The Latins, as far as I have
  observed, had only one mode of arrangement. “Itaque quinque primis
  diebus.”--_Cæs._ _B. C._ i. 5. “Tribus primis diebus.”--_Ib._ i.
  18. That the adoption of one and the same collocation, in all
  cases, would sometimes mislead the reader, is evident. If we take,
  for example, seven objects, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and say “the
  first, and the three last,” we clearly refer to A, and E, F, G; but
  if we say “the first and the last three,” we may indicate A, B, C,
  the first three, and E, F, G, the last three.

  _Note_ 7.--_Each_ is employed to denote two things taken
  separately, and is therefore used as singular[122]. _Either_ is
  also singular, and implies only one of two; as, _take either_,
  that is “the one or the other, but not both.” _Both_ is a plural
  adjective, and denotes the two collectively.

  _Note_ 8.--_Every_ is an adjective singular, applied to more than
  two subjects taken individually, and comprehends them all. It is
  sometimes joined to a plural noun, when the things are conceived
  as forming one aggregate, as, _every twelve years_, _i.e._ “every
  period of twelve years.”

  _Note_ 9.--_All_ is an adjective either singular or plural,
  denoting the whole, whether quantity or number, as, “All men are
  mortal.” “Six days shalt thou labour and do all thy work.”

  _Note_ 10.--_Much_ is an adjective of quantity, and of the singular
  number, as, “much fruit.” _Many_ an adjective of number, and
  therefore plural, as, “many men.” This word, however, is sometimes
  construed with a noun singular, as,

      “Many a poor man’s son would have lain still.”--_Shakspeare._

  _Note_ 11.--_More_, as the comparative of _much_, is singular,
  denoting a greater quantity; as the comparative of _many_, it is
  plural, and signifies a greater number, as _more fruit_, or, “a
  greater quantity;” _more men_, “or a greater number.”

  _Note_ 12.--_Enough_ is an adjective singular, and denotes
  quantity, as, “bread enough:” _enow_ denotes number, as “books
  enow.”

  _Note_ 13.--The correlative word to the adjective _such_, is _as_,
  and not _who_. There is an impropriety in saying, with Mr. Addison,
  “Such, who are lovers of mankind,” instead of “Such as,” or, “Those
  who.”

  _Note_ 14.--The superlative degree is followed by _of_, and also
  the comparative, when selection is implied, as, “Hector was the
  bravest of the Trojans.” “Africanus was the greater of the (two)
  Scipios.” When opposition is signified, the comparative is followed
  by _than_, as, “Wisdom is better than wealth.”

  _Note_ 15.--There is an ambiguity in the adjective _no_, against
  which it is necessary to guard, and which Priestley seems to think
  that it is impossible to avoid in any language. Thus, if we say,
  “No laws are better than the English,” it may mean either, that the
  absence of all law is better than the English laws, or that no code
  of jurisprudence is superior to the English. If the latter be the
  meaning intended, the ambiguity is removed by saying, “There are no
  laws better than the English.” If the former is the sentiment to be
  expressed, we might say, “The absence of all law is preferable to
  the English system.”

  _Note_ 16.--Adjectives are sometimes improperly used for adverbs,
  as _indifferent well_, _extreme bad_, for _indifferently well_,
  _extremely bad_. An example of this error is also found in
  the following sentence. “He was interrogated relative to that
  circumstance.” _Relative_ is an adjective, and must have a
  substantive expressed or understood; the question is then, what,
  or who was relative? The answer, according to the rules of
  construction, should be _he_. This, however, is not the meaning.
  The word ought to be _relatively_.

  I am somewhat, however, inclined to think that our grammarians have
  been hypercritical, if not chargeable with error, in condemning
  such expressions as these, _exceeding great_, _exceeding strong_.
  This phraseology, I apprehend, has been reprobated, partly because
  not conformable to the Latin idiom, and partly because such
  expressions as these, _excessive good_, _extreme dear_, _excellent
  well_, are justly repudiated. Neither of these, however, can be
  deemed a sufficient reason for condemning this phraseology. For
  when it is said, “His strength was exceeding great,” may not the
  expression be considered as elliptical, the word _exceeding_ being
  construed as a participle, thus, “his strength was exceeding,” or
  “surpassing great strength,” that is, “his strength exceeded great
  strength.”[123] So Shakspeare says, “it was passing strange.”
  Though _exceedingly strong_, _exceedingly good_, are now considered
  to be the preferable phraseologies, there can be no doubt, as
  Webster has observed, that adjectives are sometimes used to modify
  the sense of other adjectives; thus we say, “red hot,” “a closer
  grained wood,” “a sharper edged sword.”

  In connection with the preceding note, we would here observe, that
  adjectives are used to modify the meaning of the verbs to which
  they refer; thus we say, “Open thy hand wide.”--_Bible._ “Cry
  shrill with thy voice.”--_Ib._ “He fought hard for his life.” The
  use of the kindred adverbs, as will be afterwards shown, would in
  many instances materially alter the meaning.


RULE VI.--The article _a_ or _an_ is joined to nouns of the singular
number only, or nouns denoting a plurality of things in one
aggregate, as,

    _A man_    _An army_    _A thousand_    _A few_.

  _Note_ 1.--To distinguish between the use of _a_ and _an_, it
  is usually given as a general rule that _a_ be placed before
  consonants and _h_ aspirated, and _an_ before vowels and _h_ not
  aspirated, as _a table_, _a hat_, _an oak_, _an heir_. In respect
  to _a_ before _h_ aspirated, it must be observed, that usage is
  divided. It would appear that, when the Bible was translated, and
  the Liturgy composed, _an_ was almost universally used before _h_,
  whether the aspirate belonged to an emphatic or an unemphatic
  syllable. A change has since taken place; and some give it as a
  rule, to put _a_ before _h_, when the syllable is emphatic, and
  _an_ when the syllable has not the emphasis. This rule, however,
  is not universally observed; some writing “a history,” others “an
  history;” some writing “a hypothesis,” others “an hypothesis.” As
  far as easy pronunciation is concerned, or the practice of Greek
  and Roman writers may furnish a precedent, there seems to be no
  solid objection to either of these modes. The former is more common
  in Scotch and Irish writers than it is in English authors, with
  whom the aspiration is less forcible, and less common.

  _An_ is used before a vowel; but from this rule two deviations are
  admitted. Before the simple sound of _u_, followed by another vowel
  sound, whether signified or not, _a_ and not _an_ is used. Thus
  we say, “such _a_ one,” “such a woman.” If the sound of “one” be
  analyzed, we shall find it resolvable into _oo-un_ or _won_, as
  some orthoepists have expressed it; and _woman_ into _oo-umman_.
  Again, before the diphthongal sound of _eu_, in whatsoever manner
  that sound may be noted, _a_ may be, and frequently is, used. Thus
  we say, “a youth,” “a yeoman,” “a eunuch,” “a unicorn.” Sheridan,
  indeed, contends, that all words beginning with _u_, when it has
  the diphthongal sound of _eu_, should be preceded by _a_ and not
  _an_. And here I must remark, that it is with no common surprise, I
  find Webster, in his introduction to his Dictionary, denying that
  the vowel _u_ is anywhere equivalent to _eu_ or _e-oo_. Who those
  public speakers are, whom, he says, he heard in England, and to
  whose authority he appeals, we are utterly at a loss to conjecture.
  But this we confidently affirm, that there is no orthoepist, no
  public orator, nay, not an individual in any rank of society,
  who does not distinguish between the sound of _u_ in _brute_,
  _rude_, _intrude_, and in _cube_, _fume_, _cure_. His reference
  to Johnson, who says that _u_ is long in _confusion_, and short
  in _discussion_, is irrelevant and nugatory. Dr. Webster surely
  has not to learn, that the vowel may be long, whether the sound be
  monophthongal, or diphthongal. It is strange, too, that in the very
  example which he quotes from Johnson, the _u_ has the diphthongal
  sound, which he, notwithstanding, denies as anywhere existing.

  _Note_ 2.--_A_ is employed to express one individual of a species
  without determining who or which; _the_ denotes some particular
  individual or individuals; thus, “a book” means any book, “the
  book” some particular book; and when both articles are omitted
  the whole class is signified, as, “Man is born unto trouble,”
  _i.e._ “all men.” Hobbes errs against this rule when he says, “God
  Almighty has given reason to _a_ man, to be a light to him.” The
  article should be suppressed. Pope commits a similar error when he
  writes,

      “Who breaks a butterfly upon _a_ wheel.”

  It is not any wheel that he meant to express, but a known
  instrument of torture, or “the wheel.”

  The article _a_ serves to distinguish between two subjects
  compared with each other, and two subjects compared with a third.
  “He is the author of two works of a different character.” If
  the writer meant to say that he was the author of two works of
  a different character from that of one previously mentioned,
  the expression would be correct. But he intended to signify a
  dissimilarity between the two productions. He should, therefore,
  have omitted the article, and said, “of different character,” or
  “of different characters.”

  _Note_ 3.--The indefinite article, though generally placed before
  the adjective, as, “a good man,” is put after the adjective _such_;
  and where these words of comparison occur, _as_, _so_, _too_,
  _how_, its place is between the adjective and substantive, thus,
  “Such a gift is too small a reward for so great a service.” When
  the order is inverted, this rule is not observed, as “a reward so
  small,” “a service so great.” The definite article is likewise
  placed before the adjective, as “the great king.” _All_ is the only
  adjective which precedes the article. “All the servants,” “all the
  money.”

  _Note_ 4.--Pronouns and proper names do not admit the definite
  article, themselves sufficiently determining the subject of
  discourse; thus we cannot say, _the I_, _the Alexander_. If we
  employ the definite article with a proper name, an ellipsis is
  involved; thus, if I say, _he commands the Cæsar_, I mean, he
  commands the ship called “Cæsar.”

  _Note_ 5.--The definite article is used to distinguish the
  explicative from the determinative sense. The omission of the
  article, when the sense is restricted, creates ambiguity. For this
  reason the following sentence is faulty: “All words, which are
  signs of complex ideas, furnish matter of mistake.”--_Bolingbroke._
  Here the clause, “which are signs of complex ideas,” is not
  explicative, but restrictive; for all words are not signs of
  complex ideas. It should, therefore, be “all the,” or “all those
  words, which are signs of complex ideas, furnish matter of mistake.”

  “In all cases of prescription, the universal practice of judges
  is to direct juries by analogy to the Statute of Limitations, to
  decide against incorporeal rights, which for many years have been
  relinquished.”--_Erskine on the Rights of Juries._ This sentence
  is chargeable at once with ambiguity and error. In the first
  place, it is doubtful whether a regard to this analogy governs
  the directions of the judge, or is to rule the decision of the
  jury. 2ndly. By the omission of the definite article, or the word
  _those_ before the antecedent, he has rendered the relative clause
  explicative, instead of being restrictive; for, as all incorporeal
  rights are not abolished, he should have said, “against those
  incorporeal rights.”

  There are certain cases, indeed, in which the antecedent clause
  admits the definite article, though the relative clause be not
  restrictive, thus,

      “Blest are the pure, whose hearts are clean
      From the defiling power of sin.”

  Here the relative clause is merely explanatory, yet the antecedent
  admits the article. Thus also, in the following sentence, “My
  goodness extendeth not to thee, but to the saints, and the
  excellent ones, in whom is all my delight.” The relative clause
  is not intended to limit the meaning of the antecedent terms, and
  yet they admit the definite article. In all examples, therefore,
  like these, where the explanatory meaning admits the article, it is
  necessary, for the sake of perspicuity, to mark the determinative
  sense by the emphatic words _that_ or _those_. Thus, had the clause
  been determinative in the latter of these examples, it would have
  been necessary to say, “those saints, and those excellent ones, in
  whom is my delight.”

  _Note_ 6.--The definite article is likewise used to distinguish
  between things which are individually different, but have one
  generic name, and things which are, in truth, one and the same,
  but are characterized by several qualities. For example, if I
  should say, “the red and blue vestments were most admired,” it
  may be doubtful whether I mean that the union of red and blue in
  the same vestments was most admired, or that the red and the blue
  vestments were both more admired than the rest. In strictness of
  speech, the former is the only proper meaning of the words, though
  the latter sentiment be often thus expressed. If the latter be
  intended, we should say, “the red vestments and the blue,” or “the
  red and the blue vestments,” where the article is repeated. If
  I say, “the red and blue vestments,” it is obvious that only one
  subject is expressed, namely, “vestments,” characterized by two
  qualities, “redness,” and “blueness,” as combined in the subject.
  Here the subject is one; its qualities are plural. If I say, “the
  red vestments and the blue,” or “the red and the blue vestments,”
  the subjects are plural, expressed, however, by one generic name,
  _vestments_.

  In the same manner, if we say, “the ecclesiastical and secular
  powers concurred in this measure,” the expression is ambiguous,
  as far as language can render it such. The reader’s knowledge,
  as Dr. Campbell observes, may prevent his mistaking it; but, if
  such modes of expression be admitted, where the sense is clear,
  they may inadvertently be imitated in cases, where the meaning
  would be obscure, if not entirely misunderstood. The error might
  have been avoided, either by repeating the substantive, or by
  subjoining the substantive to the first adjective, and prefixing
  the articles to both adjectives; or by placing the substantives
  after both adjectives, the article being prefixed in the same
  manner; thus, “the ecclesiastical powers, and the secular powers,”
  or better, “the ecclesiastical powers, and the secular,” or “the
  ecclesiastical, and the secular powers.” The repetition of the
  article shows, that the second adjective is not an additional
  epithet to the same subject, but belongs to a subject totally
  different, though expressed by the same generic name. “The lords
  spiritual and temporal,” is a phraseology objectionable on the
  same principle, though now so long sanctioned by usage, that we
  dare hardly question its propriety. The subjects are different,
  though they have but one generic name. It should therefore be, “the
  spiritual and the temporal lords.”

  On the contrary, when two or more adjectives belong as epithets to
  one and the same thing, the other arrangement is to be preferred.
  Thus, “the high and mighty states.” Here both epithets belong to
  one subject. “The states high and mighty,” would convey the same
  idea.

  Where the article is not used, the place of the substantive
  ought to show, whether both adjectives belong to the same thing,
  or to different things having the same generic name. “Like an
  householder, who bringeth out of his treasure things new and old.”
  This arrangement is faulty; both epithets cannot belong to the same
  subject. It should be, “new things and old.”

  If both adjectives belong to one and the same subject, the
  substantive ought either to precede both adjectives, or to follow
  both, the article being uniformly omitted before the second
  adjective, whether prefixed to the substantive before the first,
  or suppressed. If, on the contrary, they belong to different
  subjects, with the same name, the substantive ought to follow the
  first adjective, and may be either repeated after the second, or
  understood; or it should follow both adjectives, the article being
  prefixed to each of them.

  _Note_ 7.--The omission, or the insertion of the indefinite
  article, in some instances, nearly reverses the meaning; thus,

      “Ah, little think the gay, licentious proud.”--_Thomson._

  Here _little_ is equivalent to “not much,” or rather by a common
  trope it denotes _not at all_. Locke says, “I leave him to
  reconcile these contradictions, which may be plentifully found in
  him by any one, who reads with but a little attention.” Here, on
  the contrary, where the indefinite article is inserted, “a little”
  means “not none,” or “some.”

  In like manner, when it is said, “Strait is the gate, and narrow
  is the way, and few there be that find it;” _few_ is opposed to
  _many_. Thus also, “_Many_ are called, but _few_ are chosen.”
  But when it is said, “Tarry a few days, till thy brother’s fury
  turn;” _a few_ is here equivalent to _some_, not as opposed to
  _many_, but as opposed to _not none_. If we say, “_few_ accompanied
  the prince,” we seem to diminish the number, and represent it
  as inconsiderable, as if we said, “not many,” or “fewer than
  expectation:” if we say, _a few_, we seem to amplify;--we represent
  the number as not unworthy of attention, or as equal, at least, if
  not superior to expectation. In short, if the article be inserted,
  the clause is equivalent to a double negative, and thus it serves
  to amplify; if the article be suppressed, the expression has either
  a diminutive or a negative import.

  _Note_ 8.--The indefinite article has, sometimes, the meaning of
  _every_ or _each_; thus, “they cost five shillings a dozen,” that
  is, “every dozen.”

      “What makes all doctrines plain and clear?
      About two hundred pounds a year.”--_Hudibras._

  That is, “every year.”

  _Note_ 9.--There is a particular use of this article, which merits
  attention, as ambiguity may thus, in many cases, be avoided. In
  denoting comparison, when the article is suppressed before the
  second term, the latter, though it may be an appellative, assumes
  the character of an attributive, and becomes the predicate of the
  subject, or first term. If, on the contrary, the second term be
  prefaced with the article, it continues an appellative, and forms
  the other subject of comparison. In the former case, the subject,
  as possessing different qualities in various degrees, is compared
  with itself; in the latter, it is compared with something else.

  Thus, if we say, “he is a better soldier than scholar,” the article
  is suppressed before the second term, and the expression is
  equivalent to, “he is more warlike than learned,” or “he possesses
  the qualities, which form the soldier, in a greater degree than
  those, which constitute the scholar.” If, we say, “he would make
  a better soldier, than _a_ scholar,” here the article is prefixed
  to the second term; this term, therefore, retains the character
  of an appellative, and forms the second subject of comparison.
  The meaning accordingly is, “he would make a better soldier, than
  a scholar would make;” that is, “he has more of the constituent
  qualities of a soldier, than are to be found in any literary man.”

  Pope commits a similar error, when, in one of his letters to
  Atterbury, he says, “You thought me not a worse man than a poet.”
  This strictly means “a worse man than a poet is;” whereas he
  intended to say, that his moral qualities were not inferior to his
  poetical genius. He should have said, “a worse man than poet.”

  These two phraseologies are frequently confounded, which seldom
  fails to create ambiguity. Baker erroneously considers them as
  equivalent, and prefers that, in which the article is omitted
  before the second substantive. When there are two subjects with one
  predicate, the article should be inserted; but when there is one
  subject with two predicates, it should be omitted.

  _Note_ 10.--Perspicuity in like manner requires, that, when an
  additional epithet or description of the same subject is intended,
  the definite article should not be employed. It is by an attention
  to this rule, that we clearly distinguish between subject and
  predicate. For this reason the following sentence appears to me
  faulty: “The apostle James, the son of Zebedee, and the brother of
  St. John, would be declared the apostle of the Britons.”--_Henry’s
  History of Britain._ It should be rather, “and brother of St.
  John.” When a diversity of persons, or a change of subject is
  intended to be expressed, the definite article is necessarily
  employed, as “Cincinnatus the dictator, and the master of horse,
  marched against the Æqui.” The definite article before the latter
  appellative marks the diversity of subject, and clearly shows that
  two persons are designed. Were the article omitted, the expression
  would imply, that the dictator, and the master of horse, were one
  and the same individual.


RULE VII.--Substantives signifying the same thing agree in case,
thus, “I, George the Third, king of Great Britain, defender of
the faith.” The words _I_, _George_, _king_, _defender_, are all
considered as the nominative case. “The chief of the princes, _he_
who defied the bravest of the enemy, was assassinated by a dastardly
villain:” where the pronoun _he_ agrees in case with the preceding
term _chief_. This rule, however, may be deemed unnecessary, as all
such expressions are elliptical; thus, “the chief of the princes was
assassinated,” “he was assassinated.” “He was the son of the Rev.
Dr. West, perhaps _him_ who published Pindar at Oxford.”--_Johnson’s
Life of West._ That is, “the son of him.” Were the pronoun in the
nominative case, it would refer to the son, and not the father, and
thus convey a very different meaning.

  _Note_ 1.--As proper names are, by the trope antonomasia,
  frequently used for appellatives, as when we say, “the Socrates of
  the present age,” where _Socrates_ is equivalent to “the wisest
  man,” so also appellatives have frequently the meaning and force of
  attributives. Thus, if we say, “he is a soldier,” it means either
  that he is by profession a soldier, or that he possesses all the
  qualities of a military man, whether professionally a soldier or
  not. According to the former acceptation of the term, it is a
  mere appellative; agreeably to the latter, it has the force of an
  attributive.

  _Note_ 2.--Two or more substantives in concordance, and forming
  one complex name, or a name and title, have the plural termination
  annexed to the last only, as, “_the two Miss Louisa Howards_,
  _the two Miss Thomsons_.” Analogy, Dr. Priestley observes, would
  plead in favour of another construction, and lead us to say, _the
  two Misses Thomson_, _the two Misses Louisa Howard_; for if the
  ellipsis were supplied, we should say, “the two young ladies of the
  name of Thomson,” and this construction he adds, he has somewhere
  met with.

  The latter form of expression, it is true, occasionally occurs;
  but, general usage, and, I am rather inclined to think, analogy
  likewise, decide in favour of the former; for, with a few
  exceptions, and these not parallel to the examples now given[124],
  we almost uniformly, in complex names, confine the inflexion to
  the last substantive. Some proofs of this we shall afterwards have
  an opportunity of offering. I would also observe, in passing,
  that ellipsis and analogy are different principles, and should be
  carefully distinguished.


RULE VIII.--One substantive governs another, signifying a different
thing, in the genitive, as,

    The tyrant’s rage.      The apostle’s feet.

  _Note_ 1.--This rule takes place when property, possession, or the
  general relation, by which one thing appertains to another, is
  implied.

  _Note_ 2.--It may be considered as violated in such examples as
  these, “Longinus his Treatise on the Sublime.”--_Addison._ “Christ
  his sake.”--_Common Prayer._

  _Note_ 3.--Substantives govern not only nouns, but likewise
  pronouns, as, “its strength,” “his reward.”

  _Note_ 4.--This case is generally resolvable into the objective
  with the preposition _of_, as, “the king’s sceptre,” or “the
  sceptre of the king;” “his head,” or “the head of him.” I have said
  _generally_, for it is not _always_ thus resolvable. For example,
  the Christian sabbath is sometimes named, “the Lord’s day;” but
  “the day of the Lord” conveys a different idea, and denotes “the
  day of judgment.”

  _Note_ 5.--The latter or governing substantive is frequently
  understood, as, “the king will come to St. James’s to-morrow,” that
  is, “St. James’s palace.” “I found him at the stationer’s,” that
  is, “the stationer’s shop,” or “the stationer’s house.”

  _Note_ 6.--When a single subject is expressed as the common
  property of two or more persons, the last only takes the sign of
  the genitive, as, “this is John, William, and Richard’s house;”
  that is, “this is the house of John, William, and Richard.”
  But when several subjects are implied, as severally belonging
  to various individuals, the names of the individuals are all
  expressed in the genitive case, as “these are John’s, William’s,
  and Richard’s houses.” In such examples as these, the use of the
  genitive involves an ambiguity, which it is sometimes difficult
  to prevent. Thus, if we say, agreeably to the first observation
  in this note, “Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob’s posterity were carried
  captive to Babylon,” one unacquainted with the history of these
  patriarchs, might be at a loss to determine whether “the patriarch
  Abraham,” “the patriarch Isaac,” and “the posterity of Jacob,”
  were carried captive; in other words, whether there be three
  subjects of discourse, namely, _Abraham_, _Isaac_, and _the
  posterity of Jacob_, or only one subject, _the posterity of the
  patriarchs_. Nor will the insertion of the preposition in all
  cases prevent the ambiguity. For, in the example before us, were
  the word “descendants” substituted for “posterity,” and the phrase
  to proceed thus, “the descendants of Abraham, of Isaac, and of
  Jacob,” an ignorant reader might be led to suppose that not one
  generation of descendants, but three distinct generations of these
  three individuals were carried into captivity. If we say, “the
  posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” the expression appears to
  me liable to the same misconstruction with the one first mentioned.
  If we say, “the common posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,
  were carried captive to Babylon,” all ambiguity of expression is
  prevented.

  Instead also of saying, “John, William, and Richard’s house,”
  I should prefer “a house belonging in common to John, William,
  and Richard.” This expression, though laborious and heavy, is
  preferable to the inelegance and harshness of three inflected
  substantives, while it removes the ambiguity, which might in some
  cases be occasioned by withholding the inflexion from the two first
  substantives. Where neatness and perspicuity cannot possibly be
  combined, it will not be questioned which we ought to prefer. I
  observe, also, that though such phraseologies as this, “John’s,
  William’s, and Richard’s houses,” be perfectly consonant with
  syntactical propriety, and strictly analogous to the established
  phraseology, “his, Richard’s, and my houses,” yet, as there appears
  something uncouth in the former expression, it would be better to
  say, “the houses belonging in common, or severally (as the meaning
  may be) to John, William, and Richard.”

  _Note_ 7.--When a name is complex, that is, consisting of more
  terms than one, the last only admits the sign of the genitive, as,
  “Julius Cæsar’s Commentaries,” “John the Baptist’s head,” “for
  Herodias’ sake, his brother Philip’s wife.”

  _Note_ 8.--When a short explanatory term is subjoined to a name,
  it matters little to which the inflexion be annexed, as, “I left
  the parcel at Mr. Johnson, the bookseller’s,” or “at Mr. Johnson’s,
  the bookseller.” But if the explanatory term be complex, or if
  there are more explanatory terms than one, the sign of the genitive
  must be affixed to the name, or first substantive, thus, “I left
  the book at Johnson’s, a respectable bookseller, a worthy man,
  and an old friend.” In the same manner we should say, “this psalm
  is David’s, the king, priest, and prophet of the people,” and
  not “this psalm is David, the king, priest, and prophet of the
  people’s.”

  _Note_ 9.--In some cases we employ both the genitive and a
  preposition, as “this is a friend of the king’s,” elliptically, for
  “this is a friend of the king’s friends.” We say also, “this is a
  friend of the king.” These forms of expression, however, though
  in many cases equivalent, sometimes imply different ideas. Thus,
  if I say, “this is a picture of my friend,” it means, “this is an
  image, likeness, or representation of my friend.” If I say, “This
  is a picture of my friend’s,” it means, “this picture belongs to my
  friend.”

  As the double genitive involves an ellipsis, and implies part of
  a whole, or one of a plurality of subjects, I think the use of it
  should be avoided, unless in cases where this plurality may be
  implied. Thus we may say, “a kinsman of the traitor’s waited on
  him yesterday,” it being implied that the traitor had several or
  many kinsmen. The expression is equivalent to “a kinsman of the
  traitor’s kinsmen.” But, if the subject possessed were singular, or
  the only one of the kind, I should recommend the use of the simple
  genitive; thus, if he had only one house, I should say, “this is
  the house of the traitor,” or “this is the traitor’s house;” but
  not “this is a house of the traitor’s.”

  _Note_ 10.--The recurrence of the analytical expression, and
  likewise of the simple genitive, should be carefully avoided.
  Thus, there is something inelegant and offensive in the following
  sentence, “the severity of the distress of the son of the king
  touched the nation.” Much better, “the severe distress of the
  king’s son touched the nation.”

  _Note_ 11.--There is sometimes an abrupt vulgarity, or uncouthness,
  in the use of the simple genitive. Thus, in “the army’s name,” “the
  commons’ vote,” “the lords’ house,” expressions of Mr. Hume, there
  is a manifest want of dignity and of elegance. Much better, “the
  name of the army,” “the vote of the commons,” “the house of lords.”


RULE IX.--Pronouns agree with their antecedents, or the nouns which
they represent, in gender, number, and person, as, “They respected
Cato and his party,” where _Cato_ is singular and masculine, and
_his_ agrees with it in gender and number. “He addressed you and me,
and desired _us_ to follow him,” where _us_ sylleptically represents
the two persons. “Thou, who writest.” Here the antecedent _thou_
being a person, the relative _who_, not _which_, is employed. The
antecedent also being of the second person and singular number, the
relative is considered as of the same character, and is therefore
followed by the verb in the second person and singular number. “Vice,
which no man practises with impunity, proved his destruction.” Here
the antecedent _vice_ not being a person, the pronoun _which_, of
the neuter gender, is therefore employed. “The rivers, which flow
into the sea.” Here also the antecedent not being a person, the
relative is _which_. It is also considered as in the plural number;
and, as all substantives are joined to the third person, _which_, the
representative of _rivers_, is joined to the third person plural of
the verb.

  _Note_ 1.--This rule is transgressed in the following examples:
  “Beware of false prophets, _which_ come to you in sheep’s
  clothing.” “The fruit tree bearing fruit after _his_ kind.” “There
  was indeed in our destinies such a conformity, as seldom is found
  in _that_ of two persons in the same age.” Here that, referring
  to _destinies_, is put for _those_. “The crown had it in _their_
  power to give such rewards as they thought proper.”--_Parliamentary
  Debates._

  _Note_ 2.--The relative should be placed as near as possible to the
  antecedent, otherwise ambiguity is sometimes occasioned.

  _Note_ 3.--In the earlier editions of Murray’s Grammar, we find the
  following rule: “When the relative is preceded by two nominatives
  of different persons, it may agree in person with either, as, ‘I
  am the man who commands you,’ or ‘I am the man who command you.’”
  The rule here given is erroneous. The construction is by no means
  arbitrary. If we say, “I am the man who commands you,” the relative
  clause, with the antecedent _man_, form the predicate; and the
  sentence is equivalent to “I am your commander.” If we say, “I am
  the man who command you,” _the man_ simply is the predicate, and
  _I who command you_ the subject; thus, “I who command you,” or “I
  your commander am the man.” This error, sufficiently obvious to
  every discerning reader, I pointed out in the former edition of
  this Treatise. Murray’s rule, as it stood, is clearly repugnant to
  perspicuity, and syntactical correctness.

  In the last edition of his Grammar, and, I believe, in every
  edition posterior to the publication of the “Etymology and Syntax,”
  the rule is altered; but whether from a disinclination to expunge
  a rule, which he had once delivered--a disinclination perhaps
  accompanied with a belief, that it might be corrected with little
  prejudice to its original form, or from what other motive he has
  left it in its present state, I will not presume to determine;
  but in the alteration, which he has introduced, he appears to me
  to have consulted neither usefulness nor perspicuity. He says,
  “When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different
  persons, it _may_ agree in person with either.” So far he has
  transcribed the former rule; but he adds, “according to the
  sense.” Now it cannot be questioned, and the learner needs not to
  be informed, that the relative _may_ agree with either. If after
  having taught the learner, that a Latin adjective _must_ agree
  with its substantive, we were to add, as a distinct rule, that it
  _may_ agree with either of the two substantives, according to the
  sense, I apprehend, we should be chargeable with vain repetition,
  or with extreme inattention to correctness and precision. For what
  would our rule imply? Clearly nothing more, than that the adjective
  is capable of agreeing with the substantive to which it belongs;
  and of this capacity no scholar, who had learned to decline an
  adjective, could possibly be ignorant; or it might convey some
  idea, that the concord is optional. Now, is it not certain, that
  the adjective must agree with its proper substantive, namely, that
  whose meaning it is intended to modify, and no other? The relative,
  in like manner, _must_ agree with that antecedent, and that only,
  whose representative it is in the relative clause. There is nothing
  arbitrary in either the one case, or the other.

  Perhaps it may be answered that, though the former part of the
  altered rule leaves the concord as it first stood, discretionary,
  the latter confines the agreement of the relative to its proper
  antecedent. But why this apparent contrariety? Why is that
  represented as arbitrary, which is determined by the sense? This,
  however, is not the only objection; for it may be affirmed,
  without hesitation, that the rule, thus considered, is completely
  superfluous. For the learner has been already told, that the
  relative agrees with the antecedent in gender, number, and person.
  And can the antecedent be any other, than that which the sense
  indicates? And what does this rule teach? Precisely the same
  thing. The rule, therefore, is either calculated to mislead by
  representing as arbitrary what is fixed and determinate, or it is
  purely a rule of supererogation. As it stood originally, it gave
  some new information; but that information was erroneous: as it
  stands now, it is either indefinite, or it is useless.

  The scholar may require an admonition, when there are two
  antecedents of different persons, to be careful in referring
  the relative to its proper antecedent; but to tell him that it
  may agree with the one, or the other, according to the sense,
  is to tell him nothing, or tell him that, which he already
  knows. In the examples just now adduced, the termination of the
  verb, by indicating the person of the relative, clearly shows
  the antecedent; but, where the substantives are of the same
  person, and the verb cannot therefore by its termination indicate
  the antecedent, ambiguity should be precluded by the mode of
  arrangement. Thus, “He is the hero who did it,” and “He who did it
  is the hero.” In the former, _he_ is the subject, and the _hero who
  did it_ the predicate; and in the latter, _he who did it_ is the
  subject, and the _hero_ the predicate.

  _Note_ 4.--The relative, instead of referring to any particular
  word as its antecedent, sometimes refers to a whole clause, thus,
  “the bill was rejected by the lords, which excited no small degree
  of jealousy and discontent,” that is, “which thing,” namely, the
  rejection of the bill.

  _Note_ 5.--The antecedent pronoun of the third person is often
  suppressed, when no particular emphasis is implied; as, “Who
  steals my purse, steals trash,” _i.e._ “he,” or “the man, who.”
  “Whom he would he slew; and whom he would he kept alive,” _Bible_;
  _i.e._ “Those whom he would.” “Whosoever committeth sin, is
  the servant of sin.” In this example the antecedent _he_, and
  nominative to the principal verb, is understood.

  Priestley has remarked that the pronouns _whoever_ and _whosoever_
  have sometimes a double construction. He gives the two following
  examples. “Elizabeth publicly threatened that she would have
  the head of whoever had advised it.”--_Hume._ “He offered a
  great recompense to whomsoever would help him to a sight of
  him.”--_Hume._ Though the learned author seems to admit both
  these modes of construction, we apprehend that only one of them
  is grammatical. It has been just now observed that the antecedent
  is often understood to the relative _who_, and to the compounds
  _whoever_ and _whosoever_. If the antecedent be supplied, it will
  be found that the construction is not arbitrary, as Priestley
  supposes, but definite and fixed. The first sentence is correct.
  “She would have the head of him, or them, whoever had advised,”
  the relative being the nominative to the verb. “He offered a
  great recompense to him, or them, whosoever should help him.”
  _Whomsoever_ is a solecism: though close to the preposition _to_,
  it is not under its government. (_See the following rules._)


RULE X.--If no nominative intervene between the relative and the
verb, the relative shall be the nominative to the verb, as, “Solomon,
who was the son of David, built the temple of Jerusalem.” Here _who_
is the nominative to the verb _was_.


RULE XI.--But, if a nominative intervene between the relative
and the verb, the relative shall be under the government of the
preposition going before, or the noun or verb following, as, “God,
whom we worship, is the Lord, by whose gift we live, and by whom
all things were made.” In the first relative clause, where _we_ is
the intervening nominative, the relative is in the objective case,
and governed by the verb following: in the second clause, where the
intervening nominative is likewise _we_, the relative is in the
genitive case, and governed by the noun following, thus, “by whose
gift,” or “by the gift of whom;” and in the third clause, where
_things_ is the intervening nominative, the relative is in the
objective case, and governed by the preposition.

  _Note_ 1.--The case of the relative may always be ascertained
  by repeating the antecedent, and arranging the clause in the
  natural order, thus, “the city, which is called Rome, was founded
  by Romulus,” _i.e._ “the city, which city is called Rome.” The
  antecedent repeated is the nominative to the verb _is_, _which_
  therefore agrees with it in case. “God, who sees all things, will
  punish the wicked,” _i.e._ “God, which God sees all things;” the
  relative, therefore, is the nominative to the verb _sees_, that
  is, it is in the same case in which the antecedent would be put,
  if again expressed. “Solomon, whom David loved, was the wisest of
  princes.” Here, if we arrange the relative clause in the natural
  order, beginning with the nominative and the verb, it will run
  thus, “David loved whom,” an expression analogous to “David loved
  him,” or “David loved which Solomon.” Many solecisms in the
  construction of the relative would be easily avoided, by a little
  attention to the natural arrangement. Thus, instead of committing
  the error involved in the following examples, “The philosopher, who
  he saw to be a man of profound knowledge,” “’Twas my brother, who
  you met with,” “I was a stranger to the person, who I spoke to,”
  we should be led by the natural order to the correct phraseology;
  “he saw whom,” “you met with whom,” “I spoke to whom.” It is to be
  observed, however, that, though the personal pronouns, when under
  the government of a verb, may either precede or follow it, the
  relative in the same state of government must invariably go before
  it.

  _Note_ 2.--The relatives _who_ and _which_ are often understood,
  especially in colloquial language: “The friend I visited yesterday
  is dead to-day,” _i.e._ “the friend whom I visited yesterday is
  dead to-day.”

  _Note_ 3.--After a comparative, both relative and antecedent are
  often understood. “The damage was far greater than he knew.” Here
  there is a comparison of two objects, the damage suffered, and
  the damage known; but only one is expressed. The sentence, if
  the ellipsis were supplied, would run thus, “The damage was far
  greater, than what,” or “that, which he knew.”

  _Note_ 4.--There are a few cases, which are considered by some
  distinguished critics and grammarians, as requiring the use of
  _that_ in preference to the pronouns _who_ and _which_.

  1st. After superlatives the pronoun _that_ is generally used, as,
  “The wisest man, that ever lived, is liable to error.”

  2ndly. After the word _same_, _that_ is generally used, as, “he
  is the same man, that you saw yesterday.” But, if a preposition
  should precede the relative, one of the other two pronouns must be
  employed, the pronoun _that_ not admitting a preposition prefixed
  to it, as, “he is the same man, with whom you were acquainted.”
  It is remarkable, however, that when the arrangement is somewhat
  changed, the word _that_ admits the preposition, as, “he is the
  same man, that you were acquainted with.”

  3rdly. _That_ is used after _who_, taken interrogatively, as, “Who,
  that has the spirit of a man, would suffer himself to be thus
  degraded?”

  4thly. When persons and things are referred to, as, “the _men_
  and _things_, _that_ he hath studied, have not contributed to the
  improvement of his morals.”


RULE XII.--An active transitive verb governs the accusative or
objective case, as,

    “He teaches me.”
    “We honour him.”

  _Note_ 1.--As examples of transgression against this
  rule, we may adduce the following: “_Who_ do I love so
  much?”--_Shakspeare._ “_Who_ should I meet the other day, but my
  old friend?”--_Spectator._ “Those, _who_ he thought true to his
  party.”--_Clarendon._

  _Note_ 2. As substantives have no objective case, the subject
  or object of the energy or affection is distinguished by its
  place, which is after the verb, as “Achilles slew Hector,” where
  _Achilles_, the agent, precedes, and _Hector_, the subject of the
  action, follows the verb. Reverse this order, and the meaning is
  reversed, as “Hector slew Achilles.” Where the proper arrangement
  is not observed, ambiguity or misconstruction is frequently
  produced. Thus, when Pope says, Odyss. xix.

      “And thus the son the fervent sire address’d,”

  it may be asked, did the son address the sire, or the sire address
  the son? A little attention would have prevented the ambiguity. If
  the sire addressed the son, the line should run thus,

      “And thus his son the fervent sire address’d.”

  If the son addressed the sire,

      “And thus the son his fervent sire address’d.”

  _Note_ 3.--An active intransitive verb sometimes governs the
  objective case of a noun, of the same or a kindred signification,
  as, “Let us run the race, which is set before us.” “If any man
  see his brother sin a sin, which is not unto death.”--_Bible._
  The latter verb, however, though thus used, must not be employed
  in a transitive sense. It is an error, therefore, to say, “What
  have I sinned?”--_Bible._ It should be, “How?” or “In what?” Some
  intransitive verbs also, when used in a reflex sense, are joined
  to an objective case, as, “Then having shown his wounds, he’d sit
  him down.”--_Home’s Douglas._ This is a poetic licence, which, in a
  prose writer, would not be tolerated, unless in colloquial and very
  familiar language.

  _Note_ 4.--The objective case should not, if possible, be separated
  from its verb. This rule is violated in the following sentence:
  “Becket could not better discover, than by attacking so powerful an
  interest, his resolution to maintain,” &c.--_Hume._ The regimen is
  here unnecessarily, and very inelegantly, separated from its verb.


RULE XIII.--Verbs signifying to ask, teach, offer, promise, pay,
tell, allow, deny, and some others of like signification, are
sometimes, especially in colloquial language, followed in the passive
voice by an objective case.

  _Note_ 1.--This rule seems to have escaped the attention of all our
  English grammarians, except Priestley, who observes, “that in some
  familiar phrases, the subject and object of our affirmation seem
  to be transposed.” This idiom, except in a very few instances, is
  not to be found in Latin, though it occurs pretty often in Greek:
  it therefore particularly merits the attention of the junior Latin
  scholar, lest in his Anglo-Latin translations it should betray him
  into an egregious solecism. “He allowed me great liberty,” turned
  passively, in concurrence with the Latin idiom, “great liberty
  was allowed me.” But we say also in English, “I was allowed great
  liberty.” “He promised (to) me a ship in five days,” passively, “a
  ship was promised me,” and “I was promised _her_ in five days.”
  “She would not accept the jewels, though they were offered to her
  by her mother,” or, “though she was offered _them_ by her mother.”

  _Note_ 2.--After verbs of _giving_, _telling_, _sending_,
  _promising_, _offering_, and others of like signification, the
  thing is very generally placed before the person. In the time of
  Swift and Addison this rule was not uniformly observed. We find
  authors of that period saying indiscriminately, “Give it us,”
  and “Give us it;” “Tell him it,” and “Tell it him;” “He promised
  me it,” and “He promised it me.” In Scotland these two modes of
  expression still obtain. In England they are now reduced under one
  general rule. We say, “Give it me,” “Tell it him,” “He sent it us.”


RULE XIV.--The verb _to be_ has the same case after it as it has
before it, thus denoting that the subjects are identical, or that the
one term is the predicate of the other, as, “It is he,” “You believed
it to be him.” In the former example, _it_ is the nominative to the
verb, the nominative case _he_ therefore follows the verb. In the
latter, _it_ is the regimen of the verb _believed_, the verb _to be_
is therefore followed by the objective case.

  _Note_ 1.--This rule is violated in such examples as “it is _me_,”
  “it was _him_,” “I believed it to be _he_,” “_whom_ do men say that
  I am?” In the last example, the natural arrangement is, “men say
  that I am whom,” where, contrary to the rule, the nominative _I_
  precedes, and the objective case _whom_ follows the verb.

  _Note_ 2.--Priestley has asked, “Who would not say, ‘If it be me,’
  rather than ‘If it be I?’” Our ears are certainly more familiar
  with the former than with the latter phraseology, and those who
  consult the ear only, may prefer it: but, where no advantage is
  gained by a departure from analogy, every deviation is at once idle
  and reprehensible.

  _Note_ 3.--The verb _to be_ is called by logicians the _copula_, as
  connecting the subject with the predicate. Thus, when we say, “he
  is wise,” “they are learned,” _he_ and _they_ are the subjects;
  _wise_ and _learned_ the predicates. Now, it particularly deserves
  the attention of the classical scholar, that in English almost
  any verb may be used as a _copula_. This circumstance is the more
  worthy of his notice, as a conformity to the Latin idiom may lead
  him to reject expressions, which are unexceptionable, and to adopt
  others not strictly correct[125]. Thus we say, “it tastes good,”
  “he strikes hard,” “I remember right,” “he feels sick;” “we came
  late,” “they rise early,” “he drinks deep.” I am aware that the
  words _late_, _early_, are in such examples considered as adverbs.
  It appears to me they are adjectives,--that the idiom is truly
  English, and that all these expressions are perfectly analogous.


RULE XV.--When two verbs come together, the attribute signified by
the one verb being the subject or object of the action, energy, or
affection expressed by the other, the former is governed in the
infinitive mood, as, “he taught me to read,” “I knew him to be.”

  _Note_ 1.--The infinitive thus frequently supplies the place of an
  objective case after the verb, as it often stands for a nominative
  before it, as, “he loves to study,” or “he loves study.”

  _Note_ 2.--In such examples as, “I read to learn,” where the latter
  phrase, though in the same form as _to study_, in the preceding
  example, has, notwithstanding, a different meaning, and cannot be
  resolved like it into “I read learning,” in such examples, as Tooke
  justly observes, the preposition _for_ denoting the object, and
  equivalent to _pour_ in French, is understood, as, “I read for to
  learn.” Our southern neighbours indeed, in these examples, never
  omit the casual term; and Trusler has not improperly observed,
  that, when the verb does not express the certain and immediate
  effect, but something remote and contingent, the words _in order
  to_, which are nearly equivalent to _for_, may be pertinently
  introduced as, “in order to acquire fame, men encounter the
  greatest dangers.”

  _Note_ 3.--The verbs to _bid_, _dare_, _need_, _make_, _see_,
  _hear_, _feel_, _let_, are not followed by the sign of the
  infinitive, as, “He bade me go,” “I saw him do it.” It is to be
  observed, however, that in the language of Scripture the verb
  “to make” is often followed by _to_, as, “He maketh his sun _to_
  rise.” The verb “to dare,” for “to challenge,” or “to defy,” is
  also construed with _to_, “I dare thee but _to_ breathe upon my
  love.”--_Shakspeare._

  _Note_ 4.--Nouns, adjectives, and participles, are often followed
  by an infinitive, as, “your _desire to improve_ will ultimately
  contribute to your happiness.” “Good men are _desirous to do_ good.”

  _Note_ 5.--As the proper tense of the subsequent or secondary
  verb has, in certain cases, been a subject of dispute, it may be
  necessary to observe, that, when the simple attribute, or merely
  the primary idea expressed by the subsequent verb, is intended
  to be signified, it should then be put in the present tense: but
  when the idea of perfection or completion is combined with the
  primary idea, the subsequent verb should have that form, which
  is termed the perfect of the infinitive. Or, perhaps, this rule
  may, more intelligibly to the scholar, though less correctly, be
  thus expressed, that when the action or state, denoted by the
  subsequent verb, is contemporary with that of the primary verb,
  then the secondary verb must be put in the present tense; but when
  the action or state is prior to that expressed by the secondary
  verb, the latter must be put in the preterite tense. Usage, indeed,
  and the opinions of grammarians, are divided on this subject. But
  when nothing but usage can be pleaded in favour of one phraseology,
  and when reason concurs with usage to recommend another, it will
  not be questioned that the latter deserves the preference. Thus,
  we should say, “I expected to see you,” and not “I expected to
  have seen you;” because either the expectation and the seeing must
  be regarded as contemporary, or the former must be considered as
  prior to the latter. But why, it may be asked, must the seeing
  be considered as contemporary with the expectation? Might not
  the former have been anterior to the latter? This is certainly
  possible; I may see a friend before I expect him. But though the
  sight, abstractedly considered, may precede the expectation, it
  cannot possibly, as an object of expectation, be prior to it. The
  idea involves absurdity, equal and analogous to the assertion, that
  the paper, on which I write, existed as an object of my perception,
  previously to my perceiving it. Agreeably to the second form of
  the rule here given, we find that the Latins very generally used
  the present of the infinitive, to express an action or state
  contemporary with the attribute of the primary verb. Thus, _dixit
  me scribere_, “he said that I wrote,” or “was writing,” that is, at
  the time of his saying so: _dixit me scripsisse_, “he said that I
  had written.”

  I have observed, that, when the simple attribute denoted by the
  subsequent verb is implied, we should use the present of the
  infinitive. This phraseology should not only be used in all cases,
  where contemporary actions or states are to be signified, but
  may also be sometimes employed, where the secondary verb denotes
  something posterior to what is implied by the first. For though in
  no instance, where the simple action or state is to be expressed,
  should we use the sign of past or future time, yet for obvious
  reasons we may, and often do, employ the present infinitive,
  or simple name, to denote what is future, when the primary verb
  necessarily implies the futurity of its object. Thus, instead of
  saying, “he promised that he would pay,” where the constructive
  sign of futurity is used to denote the posteriority of the payment,
  we often say, “he promised to pay,” employing the present tense,
  synonymous with the simple name, as, “he promised payment.” The
  Latins also, though they almost universally, unless in colloquial
  language, preferred the former mode of expression, sometimes
  adopted the latter, as, _denegavit se dare_.--_Plaut._ _Jusjurandum
  pollicitus est dare._--_Id._ “He refused to give,” “he promised to
  give,” or “he promised giving,” the secondary verb expressing the
  act simply, and the time being necessarily implied.

  _Note_ 6.--The infinitive mood is sometimes used in an absolute
  or independent sense, as, “to speak the truth, we are all liable
  to error.” “Not to trespass on your time, I will briefly explain
  the whole affair,” that is, “that I may speak,” “that I may not
  trespass.”


RULE XVI.--The imperative, agreeably to the general rule, agrees with
its nominative, as,

    “Love thou;” “listen ye,” or “you.”

  _Note_ 1.--The imperative is frequently used, without its subject,
  that is, the nominative being suppressed, but the person or persons
  being perfectly understood. “And Samuel said to the people, Fear
  not,” _i.e._ “Fear ye not.”

  _Note_ 2.--It is employed in the same way, in an absolute sense,
  without its subject. “Our ideas are movements of the nerves of
  sense, as of the optic nerve, in recollecting visible ideas,
  _suppose_ of a triangular piece of ivory.”--_Darwin._ I agree with
  Webster in thinking, that there is “a peculiar felicity” in such
  absolute forms of expression, the verb being thus applicable to any
  of the three persons, thus, “I may suppose,” “you may suppose,”
  “one may suppose.”


RULE XVII.--Participles are construed as the verbs to which they
belong, as,

    “_Teaching us_ to deny ungodliness.”

  _Note_ 1.--The imperfect participle is frequently used like a
  substantive, and is, in such examples, of the same import with the
  infinitive of the verb; as, “they love reading,” _i.e._ “they love
  to read.” In some examples it becomes a real noun, and has a plural
  number, as, _the outgoings of the morning_.

  _Note_ 2.--Lowth contends that, when the imperfect participle
  of a transitive verb is not preceded by the definite article,
  it properly governs the objective case, and is analogous to the
  Latin gerund, as, “much advantage will be derived from observing
  this rule;” in which example, _this rule_ is the regimen of the
  participle _observing_; and that, when the definite article
  precedes the participle, it becomes then a pure noun, and,
  therefore, cannot have the regimen of a verb. He therefore condemns
  this expression, “by the sending them the light of thy holy
  Spirit.” Some of our grammarians consider Lowth, in this instance,
  as fastidiously critical; but to me he appears chargeable with
  error. Let us examine the reasons, which the author adduces in
  support of his opinion.

  In this inquiry, the first and most pertinent question is, does
  usage justify the opinion of the author? He acknowledges the
  contrary: he even admits that there is not a single writer who
  does not violate this rule. Were it necessary, indeed, after
  this concession, it would be easy to evince, that not only our
  translators of the Bible, whose authority surely is of great
  weight, but also other writers of the highest eminence, employ the
  phraseology which he condemns.

  Again. Does the distinction, which he wishes to establish, favour
  perspicuity? The very reverse appears to me to be the case; for he
  admits an identity of sense in two distinct phraseologies, which
  are incontestably, in many instances, susceptible of different
  meanings. And, though this ambiguity may not be involved in every
  example, we have surely good reasons for repudiating a phraseology
  which may, in any instance, be liable to misconstruction. We are to
  prescribe, not what may be perspicuous in some instances, but what
  must be intelligible in all.

  Lowth says, that we may express the sentiment, either by inserting
  the article before the participle and the preposition after it, or
  by the omission of both; in other words, that these phraseologies
  are equivalent. Thus, according to him, we may say either, “_by
  sending_ his Son into the world,” or “by the sending _of_ his Son.”
  Here, perhaps, the meaning is sufficiently clear, whichsoever of
  these forms of expression be adopted. But let us take another
  example, as, “he expressed the pleasure he had, in hearing the
  philosopher.” Now, according to Lowth, we may also say, “he
  expressed the pleasure he had, in the hearing of the philosopher.”
  Is there no difference of sentiment here? Are these expressions
  equivalent? The contrary must be obvious to the most inattentive
  reader. According to the former phraseology, the philosopher was
  heard--he is represented as passive; agreeably to the latter, he
  was active--he heard.

  Again. “When the Lord saw it, he abhorred them, because of the
  provoking of his sons and daughters.” Our translators have
  correctly exhibited the sentiment. The sons and daughters had given
  offence; they had provoked the Deity. But, if Lowth’s opinion be
  correct, the expression might be “because of provoking his sons and
  daughters;” a phrase which evidently conveys a very different idea.

  Again. When it is said, “at the hearing of the ear, they will
  believe,” is this expression convertible, without violating the
  sense, into, “at hearing the ear they will believe?” Many more
  examples might be produced to prove that these phraseologies, which
  Lowth considers of the same import, are by no means equivalent. It
  appears, then, that perspicuity is not consulted by adopting this
  rule.

  Again. He considers the participle, with a preposition before it,
  as correspondent to the Latin gerund, and therefore governing
  an objective case; but the participle preceded by an article,
  he considers as a substantive, and therefore incapable of any
  regimen. Now, as the author reasons from one language to another,
  we may pertinently ask, is not the Latin gerund a noun, a verbal
  substantive, not only having the form, and the inflexions of a
  noun, but governed like it, by nouns, adjectives, verbs, and
  prepositions, itself likewise governing the case of its verb? This
  position, were this the place for it, we could easily prove,
  notwithstanding the objections which Scioppius, Vossius, with some
  other grammarians, have alleged against it. Nay, whatever theory
  be adopted respecting the nature of the gerund, there cannot exist
  a doubt, that, in the early ages of Roman literature, the verbal
  nouns in _io_ governed an accusative, like the verbs whence they
  were derived. _Quid tibi curatio est hanc rem_, is one example from
  Plautus out of many, which might be produced[126]. That the supines
  also were, in truth, substantives admitting a regimen, is equally
  clear: _Difficile dictu_ was originally _difficile in dictu_; and
  _misit oratum opem_, _misit ad oratum opem_. Nor can the structure
  of the future infinitive passive be so satisfactorily resolved,
  notwithstanding a few repugnant examples, as on this supposition:
  _Dixit libros lectum iri_ is resolved into _dixit (id) iri ad
  lectum libros_, where _libros_ is the regimen of the verbal noun
  _lectum_.

  Thus it is evident, that the Latin gerunds, supines, and verbal
  nouns in _io_, though in form and inflexion substantives, governed
  an accusative case. It matters not, indeed, to the point in
  question, what was the practice of the ancients in this respect;
  nor should I, therefore, have dwelt so long on this subject, did I
  not conceive, that the very authority to which Dr. Lowth seems to
  appeal, militates against him; and that the very language, to which
  in this, as in most other cases, he strives to assimilate ours, had
  nouns governing cases, like the verbs from which they came.

  From the preceding observations, I think it must appear, that the
  rule given by Dr. Lowth, is neither sanctioned by general usage,
  nor friendly to perspicuity; while the violation of it is perfectly
  reconcilable with the practice of the Roman writers, if their
  authority can, in this question, be deemed of any value.

  Having attempted to prove the invalidity of Lowth’s argument,
  and the impropriety of his rule, as establishing an identity of
  meaning, where a difference must exist, I would submit to the
  candid and judicious critic the following remarks.

  The participle in _ing_ has either an active or passive
  signification; its import must, therefore, be determined by the
  judgment of the reader, or by explanatory adjections. Whatever,
  then, is calculated to remove all misconstruction, and to render
  its import clear and unequivocal, merits attention. Consistently,
  then, with some of the examples already adduced, I am inclined to
  suggest, that, when the noun, connected with the participle, is
  active or doing something, the preposition should be inserted, as,
  “in the hearing of the philosopher,” that is, _the philosopher
  hearing_; and that, when the noun represents the subject of an
  action, or what is suffering, the preposition should be omitted,
  as, “in hearing the philosopher,” or _the philosopher being heard_.
  An attention to this rule will, I conceive, in most cases prevent
  ambiguity.

  If it should be said that I have admitted Lowth’s phraseologies,
  I answer, it is true; but with this difference, that he considers
  them as equivalent, and I as diametrically opposite. I observe,
  likewise, that, though I prefer the suppression of the article when
  the participle is not followed by _of_, and its insertion when
  it is followed by the preposition, it is not because I perceive
  any impropriety in the other phraseology, but because, since the
  publication of Lowth’s Grammar, it has been less employed; and
  because also it less forcibly marks the distinction, which I
  have recommended. That it has the sanction of good authority, is
  unquestionable; and that it is not inconsistent with analogy, will
  still further appear from the following note.

  _Note_ 3.--The participle in _ing_ is construed like a noun,
  governing the genitive case, and, at the same time, having the
  regimen of its proper verb, as, “Much depends on Richard’s
  observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his
  neglecting it.” In this example, the words _Richard’s_ and _his_
  are in the genitive case, governed by the participles _observing_
  and _neglecting_, while these participles, having here every
  character of a noun, admit the objective case. This form of
  expression has been received as unexceptionable; the following
  phraseology, however, has been censured, though, in truth,
  precisely analogous to the one now exemplified: “Much depends on
  the rule’s being observed, and error will be the consequence of
  its being neglected.” “Here,” said a certain writer, “is a noun
  with a pronoun representing it, each in the possessive case, that
  is, under the government of another noun, but without any other
  noun to govern it; for _being observed_ and _being neglected_ are
  not nouns, nor can you supply the place of the possessive case by
  the preposition _of_, before the noun or pronoun.”

  I concur with Dr. Campbell, who has examined this objection, in
  thinking, that the expression is not only sanctioned by good usage,
  but is also agreeable to analogy, and preventive of circumlocution.
  The objector, indeed, does not seem to have been aware, that his
  opinion is at variance with itself; and that the reason, which he
  assigns for rejecting this phraseology, would, with equal force,
  conclude against another mode of expression, which he himself
  approves. For he would have no objection to say, “Much depends on
  his observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his
  neglecting it.” Now let us try whether this sentence be not liable
  to the same objection as the other. In the former, he says, you
  cannot possibly supply the place of the possessive case, by the
  preposition _of_ before the noun or pronoun. This is true; for it
  would not be English to say, “Much depends on the being observed of
  the rule; and error will be the consequence of the being neglected
  of it.” But will his own approved phraseology admit this? Let us
  see; “Much depends on the observing of him of the rule, and error
  will be the consequence of the neglecting of him of it.” Were
  the example simpler, the argument would be equally strong; as,
  “Much depends on your pupil’s composing, but more on his reading
  frequently.” This sentence, the author alluded to, would have
  approved. Let us try if it can be resolved by _of_: “Much depends
  on the composing of your pupil, but more on the reading of him
  frequently.”

  The author’s argument, then, if it prove anything, proves too much;
  it cannot, therefore, have any weight.

  In addition to these observations, I would remark, that the
  writer’s argument involves another inconsistency. He admits that
  the participle in _ing_ may be thus construed; for he approves
  the phrases, “his observing the rule,” and “his neglecting it.”
  Why then does he reject “his being” and “its being?” for the past
  or perfect participles _observed_ and _neglected_ have no share
  in the government, _rule’s_ and _it’s_ being under the regimen of
  the participle in _ing_. In fact, then, the phrase seems no more
  objectionable than “his being a great man did not make him a happy
  man;” which our author would admit to be wholly unexceptionable.

  Some late writers, reasoning doubtless on a principle similar to
  that, the absurdity of which we have been attempting to expose,
  have discarded a phraseology which appears unobjectionable, and
  substituted one which seems less correct. Many writers, instead
  of saying, “his being smitten with the love of Orestilla was the
  cause of his murdering his son,” would say, “he being smitten with
  the love of Orestilla was the cause.” This seems to me an idle
  affectation of the Latin idiom, less precise than the common mode
  of expression, and less consonant with the genius of our language.
  For, ask what was the cause; and, according to this phraseology,
  the answer must be _he_; whereas the meaning is, that not _he_, but
  _his being smitten_, was the cause of his murder.

  “This jealousy accounts for Hall charging the Duke of Gloucester
  with the murder of Prince Edward.” “This,” says Mr. Baker, very
  justly, “is, in my opinion, a very uncouth way of speaking, though
  much used by ignorant people, and often affected by those who are
  not ignorant.” The writer should have said, “for Hall’s charging.”
  “His words being applicable to the common mistake of our age
  induce me to transcribe them.” Here I agree with the same writer
  in thinking, that it would be better to consider _words_ as in
  the genitive case plural, governed by the participle, as _Hall’s_
  in the preceding example, and join _his words’ being applicable_,
  equivalent to _the applicability of his words_, with the verb
  singular; thus, “his words’ being applicable to the common mistake
  of our age, induces me to transcribe them.” A ridiculous partiality
  in favour of the Latin idiom, which in this case is not so correct
  as our own, not exhibiting the sentiment with equal precision, has
  given birth to this phraseology, which in many cases conveys not
  the intended idea. For, as Priestley remarks, if it is said, “What
  think you of my horse’s running to-day?” it is implied, that the
  horse did actually run. If it is said, “What think you of my horse
  running to-day?” it is intended to ask, whether it be proper for my
  horse to run to-day. This distinction, though frequently neglected,
  deserves attention; for it is obvious, that ambiguity may arise
  from using the latter only of these phraseologies, to express both
  meanings.

  _Note_ 4.--This participle is sometimes used absolutely, in the
  same manner as the infinitive mood, as, “this conduct, _viewing
  it in the most favourable light_, reflects discredit on his
  character.” Here the participle is made absolute, and is equivalent
  to the infinitive in that state, as, “to view it in the most
  favourable light.” Both these modes of expression are resolvable,
  either by the hypothetical, or the perfective conjunctions; thus,
  “if we view it in the most favourable light.” “To confess the
  truth, I have no merit in the case;” _i.e._ “that I may confess.”


RULE XVIII.--A noun or pronoun joined to a participle, its case being
dependent on no word in the sentence, is put in the nominative.

  _Note_ 1.--This rule will be perfectly understood by the classical
  scholar, when we say, that the absolute case in English is the
  nominative. Thus, “We being exceedingly tossed the next day, they
  lightened the ship.” The pronoun of the first person, joined to the
  participle, _being_, is neither the nominative to any verb, nor is
  it connected with any word, of which it can be the regimen. It is
  therefore put in the nominative case.

  _Note_ 2.--This rule is violated in such examples as the following,
  “Solomon made as wise proverbs as anybody has done, _him_ only
  excepted, who was a much wiser man than Solomon.”--_Tillotson._

      “For only in destroying I find ease
      To my relentless thoughts; and, _him_ destroy’d,
      Or won to what may work his utter loss,
      For whom all this was made, all this will soon
      Follow,”--_Milton._

  This seems to be the only example in which the poet has
  transgressed this rule; and in several instances, in which he has
  observed it, Bentley would erroneously substitute the objective
  case.


RULE XIX.--Prepositions are joined with the objective case, or govern
nouns and pronouns in the accusative, as, “he ran to me,” “he was
loved by us.”

  _Note_ 1.--This rule is violated in such expressions as these, “Who
  servest thou under?” “Who do you speak to?” for the syntactical
  arrangement is, “thou servest under who?” “thou speakest to who?”
  instead of “under whom?” “to whom?”

  _Note_ 2.--The preposition is frequently separated from its
  regimen, as, “Horace is an author, whom I am much delighted with,”
  _i.e._ “with whom I am much delighted.”

  _Note_ 3.--The prepositions _to_ and _for_ are often understood,
  as, “he gave me a book,” “he told me the news:” _i.e._ “he gave to
  me,” “he told to me.”

  Lowth has, indeed, observed, that in such examples, the pronouns,
  _me_, _thee_, &c., may be considered to be in the dative case,
  as, in truth, they are in Saxon the datives of their respective
  pronouns, and in their form include _to_, as, “woe is to me.” This
  phrase, he observes, is pure Saxon, the same as, “wae is me,” in
  which _me_ is a dative case.

  The preposition _by_ is also, in a few colloquial expressions,
  omitted, as, “he went across the bridge,” “he crossed the bridge,”
  for “he crossed (the river) by the bridge.”

  _Note_ 4.--A preposition, following a verb, constituting with
  it what has been termed a compound active verb, is sometimes
  suppressed. We say, “he hoped for a reward,” “you wondered at
  his courage.” Addison, Steele, and Johnson, with several other
  reputable writers, say, “It is to be hoped,” instead of “to
  be hoped for;” and Johnson very generally says, “It is not to
  be wondered,” for “not to be wondered at.” The latter form of
  expression seems to have been adopted, in order to avoid the abrupt
  and inelegant conclusion of the clause, especially when followed by
  the word _that_.

  _Note_ 5.--The prepositions _in_, _on_, _for_, and _from_, are
  often understood before nouns of time and place; thus, “this day,”
  “next month,” “last year,” are often used elliptically for “on
  this day,” “in next month,” “in last year.” We say, also, “He was
  banished England,” _i.e._ “_from_ England.”

  Care, however, should be taken that the omission create no
  ambiguity. If we say, “He was deaf some years before he died,”
  referring to a temporary deafness, and a point of time at which it
  occurred, the expression is not improper, though the meaning might
  be more clearly expressed; but if we intend to signify a continued
  deafness, we ought to say, “for” or “during some years.”

  _Note_ 6.--The preposition is improperly omitted in the following
  line of Pope’s:

      “And virgins smiled at what they blush’d before.”

  It should be, according to the rules of syntax, “smiled at what
  they blushed at before,” both verbs requiring _at_ after them,
  thus, “they smiled at that, at which they blushed before.”

  _Note_ 7.--Prepositions should be placed as near as possible to
  each of the words, whose relation they express. The following
  sentence from Hume is, in this respect, faulty: “The ignorance
  of the age in mechanical arts, rendered the progress very slow
  of this new invention.” It should be, “the progress of this new
  invention.” The following sentence from Johnson, is, for the same
  reason, chargeable with faulty arrangement: “The country first
  dawned, that illuminated the world, and beyond which the arts
  cannot be traced of civil society or domestic life.”--_Rasselas._
  It should be, “the arts of civil society or domestic life cannot be
  traced.” Priestley has censured the following clause from Harris,
  “being in no sense capable of either intention or remission.” If
  it be considered, however, that the word _either_ properly means
  “the one or the other,” and in truth denotes the subject, being,
  therefore, in strict propriety, the regimen of the preposition, the
  arrangement of Harris, though now not so common as the other, will
  not appear exceptionable. Nay, whatever may be the future decision
  of usage, that great arbitress of all language, (for at present she
  is divided,) Harris’s arrangement seems more conformable to the
  strict meaning of the words, as well as to Priestley’s own rule,
  than that, which the latter recommends; thus, “capable of either
  (_i.e._ of the one or of the other), intension, or remission.”


RULE XX.--Adverbs have no government.

  _Note_ 1.--They are sometimes improperly used for adjectives, as,
  “After those wars of which they hoped for a soon and prosperous
  issue.”--_Sidney._ “A soon issue” is not English; an adverb
  cannot agree with a substantive; it should be “a speedy and
  prosperous issue.” Such expressions likewise as the following,
  though not destitute of authority, are exceedingly inelegant, and
  irreconcilable with analogy: “the then ministry,” for “the ministry
  of that time;” “the above discourse,” for “the preceding discourse.”

  _Note_ 2.--They are sometimes used like substantives, as, “a little
  while,” for “in a little time,” or “for a little time.” “Worth
  while,” “some how,” “any how,” “any where,” are examples of the
  same kind.

  _Note_ 3.--The adverbs _whence_, _thence_, _hence_, are equivalent
  to, “from which place,” “from that place,” “from this place;” _from
  whence_, _from thence_, _from hence_, are therefore chargeable with
  redundancy.

  _Note_ 4.--_Never_ is sometimes erroneously used for _ever_, as,
  “they might be extirpated, were they never so many.” It should be,
  “ever so many,” _i.e._ “how many soever.” “Who will not hearken to
  the voice of the charmer, charm he _never_ so sweetly.” It should
  be, “_ever_ so sweetly;” _i.e._ “however sweetly,” or “how sweetly
  soever.”

  _Note_ 5.--_Ever_ is likewise sometimes improperly used for
  _never_, as, “I seldom or ever see him now.” It should be, “seldom
  or _never_,” the speaker intending to say, “that rarely, or rather
  at no time, does he see him now;” not “rarely,” or “at any time.”

  _Note_ 6.--Priestley remarks, that the French always place their
  adverbs immediately after their verbs, which order, he observes,
  by no means suits the English idiom. “His government gave courage
  to the English barons to carry farther their opposition.”--_Hume._
  It would be better, “to carry their opposition farther.” “Edward
  obtained a dispensation from his oath, which the barons had
  compelled Gaveston to take, that he would abjure for ever the
  realm;” better “the realm for ever.”

  _Note_ 7.--The adverb is generally placed between the auxiliary
  verb and the participle, as, “this is perfectly understood.” When
  there are more auxiliaries than one, the same author observes, that
  the adverb should be placed after the first. This rule, however,
  is by no means universally followed; for many of our best writers
  employ a different arrangement, and, I think, with great propriety;
  as, “this will be perfectly understood,” where the adverb follows
  both auxiliaries. The place of the adverb may, in general, be
  ascertained, by considering what word it is intended to qualify:
  and, in the last example, it should be closely connected with
  _understood_. But more on this subject in the following note.

  _Note_ 8.--The adverb, as its name imports, is generally placed
  close to the word, which it modifies or affects: its force,
  therefore, very much depends upon its position. Inattention to
  the proper collocation of adverbs is frequently the cause of much
  obscurity and misconception. To this inattention we may ascribe
  the ambiguity in the following sentence: “He was not honoured
  with this reward, but with the approbation of the people.” This
  sentence may imply, either that he was honoured with this reward,
  not without the approbation of the people; or that he was not
  honoured with this reward, but was honoured with the approbation
  of the people. The latter is the meaning intended. It should
  therefore be, “he was honoured, not with this reward, but with the
  approbation of the people.” By this arrangement the sentiment is
  correctly exhibited--the two subjects, reward and approbation, are
  perspicuously contrasted, and while the former is negatived, the
  latter is affirmed[127].

  _Note_ 9.--Lowth observes that “the adverb should be for the
  most part placed before adjectives, and after verbs;” thus, “he
  was excessively modest,” “he fought bravely.” This is, indeed,
  the general arrangement; but it admits many exceptions. In no
  case are writers so apt to err as in the position of the word
  _only_. Its place, in my opinion, is after the substantive to
  which it refers, or which it exclusively implies, and before the
  attributive. In the following sentence of Steele’s, the collocation
  is faulty: “The bridegroom sits with an aspect which intimates
  his thoughts were not only entertained with the joys with which
  he was surrounded, but also with a noble gratitude, and divine
  pleasure.” This collocation of the two adverbs implies that his
  thoughts were something more than entertained: whereas it is the
  author’s intention to say, that his thoughts were entertained with
  something more than joys. The sentence, therefore, should proceed
  thus: “The bridegroom sits with an aspect, which intimates, that
  his thoughts were entertained not with the joys only, with which
  he was surrounded, but also with a noble gratitude and divine
  pleasure.”[128]

  When Addison says (_Spec._ No. 412), “By greatness I do not only
  mean the bulk of any single object, but the largeness of a whole
  view,” the question naturally occurs, what does he more than mean?
  It is evident that, agreeably to this arrangement, the adverb
  refers to _mean_, exclusively of all other attributes or actions,
  and being prefaced by a negative, implies “that he does something
  more than mean.” In this criticism I concur with Blair, who has
  expressed his disapprobation of this arrangement.

  Had he, as the same author observes, placed the adverb after
  _bulk_, it would have still been wrong. For if he had said, “I
  do not mean the bulk only,” then the adverb, following a noun
  substantive, must refer to it exclusively of every other, and the
  clause being negative, the question would be, what does he mean
  more than the bulk? Is it the colour, the beauty, or what else?

  Now, as Mr. Addison intended to say that he did not mean one
  thing, the word _only_ should have followed the name of that
  thing, whether its designation was simple or complex. He should,
  therefore, have said, “the bulk of any single object only, but the
  largeness of a whole view.” According to this arrangement, the word
  _only_ refers, as it ought, to “the bulk of any single object” as
  one idea; and the question occurs, what does he mean more than
  the bulk of any single object? to which the answer follows, “the
  largeness of a whole view.” It may, however, at the same time be
  observed that, consistently with the practice of some of our best
  writers, who place the adverb before its subject, there seems no
  impropriety here in saying, “I do not mean only,” _i.e._ “one
  thing,” “the bulk of a single object, but the largeness of a whole
  view.”

  “The perfidious voice of flattery reminded him,” says Gibbon, “that
  by exploits of the same nature, by the defeat of the Nemean lion,
  and the slaughter of the wild boar of Erymanthus, the Grecian
  Hercules had acquired a place among the gods, and an immortal
  memory among men.” “_They only_ forgot to observe that, in the
  first ages of society, a successful war against savage animals is
  one of the most beneficial labours of heroism.” In the beginning
  of the latter sentence the adverb _only_ is misplaced. As it
  stands, the meaning is that they were the only persons who forgot:
  it should be “_only_ they forgot to observe;” _i.e._ “one thing
  they forgot,” namely, “to observe.” To this erroneous collocation
  in Gibbon, I shall oppose a similar example from Pope, in which
  the adverb is correctly placed. In a letter to Hughes, speaking
  of the compliments which this gentleman had paid to him on his
  translation of Homer, he acquaints him, that he should be ashamed
  to attempt returning these compliments; one thing, however, he
  would observe, namely, that he esteemed Mr. Hughes too much not to
  be pleased with the compliments which he had received from him. His
  words, therefore, are, “I should be ashamed to offer at saying
  any of those civil things, in return to your obliging compliments,
  in regard to my translation of Homer: _only_ I have too great a
  value for you not to be pleased with them;” where the word _only_
  introduces the clause, and is equivalent to “one thing is true,”
  or “thus much (_tantum_), I say, I have too great a value,” &c.
  Here it is obvious that the adverb, as it precedes the pronoun,
  does not refer to it; and that Mr. Pope’s collocation of it is
  perfectly correct, to express the sentiment, which he intended. Had
  he said, “I only,” the adverb would have referred to the pronoun,
  and implied that he was the only person who valued. Had he intended
  to say, that he merely entertained an esteem for him, but could not
  manifest it, then the presence of the auxiliary would have been
  necessary, and he would have expressed himself thus, “I do only
  entertain too great an esteem for you;” that is, “I do only (one
  thing) entertain too great an esteem.” Had he said, “I have only
  too great a value for you,” it would be properly opposed to, “and
  not too little.” Had he said, “I have too great a value only,” then
  _value_ would be contrasted with some other sentiment, as when one
  says, he “has wealth only, but not virtue,” for example, or any
  other acquirement. As a violation of this rule, I adduce also the
  following expression of a reviewer. “We only discharge our duty
  to the public;” a declaration which, strictly interpreted, means
  “we are the only persons who discharge.” It should be, “we do only
  (one thing) discharge our duty;” for the writer intended to say,
  that he did nothing but discharge his duty to the public[129].
  In justification of such inaccuracies, it is impertinent to
  plead, that a little attention will prevent misconception. It is
  the business of every author to guard his reader, as far as the
  language in which he writes will permit, from the possibility of
  misconstruction, and to render that attention to the language
  unnecessary. Quintilian’s maxim cannot be too often repeated to
  those who, by such apologies, attempt to defend any avoidable
  ambiguity[130].

  The following sentence is justly censured by Blair, and also by
  Baker, in his “Remarks.” “Theism,” says Shaftesbury, “can only be
  opposed to polytheism or atheism.” He ought to have said, observes
  Baker, “Theism can be opposed only to polytheism or atheism.”
  Dr. Blair concurs in opinion with the remarker. I am inclined,
  however, to differ from both; and think, that the sentence should
  run thus: “Theism can be opposed to polytheism only, or atheism;”
  where the adverb _only_ refers to the noun immediately preceding,
  and is understood to the other, implying, that these two systems
  of belief are the only creeds to which theism can be opposed. If
  this be not the proper arrangement, it is obvious, that no definite
  rule can be given on the subject. For, if the adverb may be placed
  either before or after the substantive, to which it refers, then
  precision becomes impossible, and we may say, “_he only_” or “_only
  he_” to express the same sentiment; which collocations, I have
  already shown, denote ideas materially different. But, if there
  be a definite and precise rule for the position of this word, and
  if the sense be different, according to the collocation of the
  adverb, then I think it will appear, that it ought to be subjoined
  to the substantive or pronoun to which it refers; and this opinion
  is supported by the authority of Blair himself, in the examples
  which I have just now adduced. For why, unless on this principle,
  does he contend that the word _only_ should be placed after _the
  bulk of a single object_? If the adverb then be, in this example,
  rightly placed after the substantive or complex name, to which it
  refers, it ought to have the same position assigned to it in every
  similar instance. That the adverb, in the last example, refers to
  “polytheism,” there can be no question; it should therefore follow,
  and not precede, it.

  I am well aware, that many examples may be produced, wherein, with
  an arrangement different from that here recommended, the sense
  would, notwithstanding, be perfectly clear; and, perhaps, Blair’s
  collocation, in the last example, may be adduced as an instance.
  But when a rule, conducive to perspicuity, is once established,
  every unnecessary deviation from it should be studiously avoided,
  or, at least, not wantonly adopted.

  The sentence, as it stands in Shaftesbury, implies that theism is
  capable of nothing, but of being opposed to polytheism, or atheism;
  “Theism can only (one thing, namely) be opposed to polytheism or
  atheism;” where it is evident that _only_ refers to _be opposed_,
  agreeably to the rule now given. In the same manner, if I say, “he
  was only great,” it is implied, that he was nothing but great, the
  adverb being placed before the attributive, to which it refers.
  Hence the question naturally is, what was he not besides? The
  answer may be, “not good,” “not wise,” “not learned.” Were the
  adverb placed after the pronoun, it would imply, that “he was the
  only person who was great.”[131]

  I am perfectly aware, that the rule here given will not, in all
  cases, preclude ambiguity; but whenever it becomes doubtful,
  whether the adverb is intended to affect the preceding substantive,
  or the following attributive, a different form of expression may be
  adopted, and the use of the auxiliary, along with the principal
  verb, will, in many instances, ensure perspicuity. This expedient,
  however, cannot always be employed. If we say, “The manufacturer
  only was prosperous,” it may be uncertain, whether the adverb is to
  restrict the predicate “prosperous” to the manufacturer, implying
  that he was the only prosperous man, or to the verb expressing past
  time, signifying that he was then, but is not now prosperous. If
  the former be the meaning intended, we may say, “he was the only
  prosperous man;” if the latter, we may say, “the manufacturer was
  once,” or “was then, the only prosperous man.”

  It would have contributed much to perspicuity, if authors had
  adopted one uniform practice, placing the adverb constantly,
  either before or after its subject, whether a substantive or an
  attributive[132]. But, where usage is so divided, and where
  the adoption of a new and general rule would be now liable to
  insuperable objections, all that can be successfully attempted is,
  in accommodation to existing circumstances, to reduce the evil
  within narrow limits, if we cannot, by any precise rule, entirely
  remove it. With this view we would recommend, that when the adverb
  refers not to a word, but to a sentence or clause, it be placed
  at the beginning of that sentence or clause; where it refers to
  a predicate, it precede the predicating term; and when it has a
  reference to a subject, it follow its name or description. An
  observation, however, already made, may be here repeated, namely,
  that in the last case, a different collocation may often be adopted
  without the risk of ambiguity, and even with advantage to the
  structure of the sentence.

  _Note_ 10.--Adverbs, as Lowth observes, are generally placed
  before the adjective to which they refer. This rule, however,
  admits a few exceptions. The adverb _enough_ is always placed
  after its adjective, as, “the reward was small enough.” The
  proper position of this adverb, indeed, seems to be immediately
  after the adjective; it is frequently, however, placed at some
  distance from it, as, “a large house enough.” Usage is, indeed,
  somewhat divided on this point, Mr. Baker, and a few others,
  pleading for the following arrangement, “a large enough house.” The
  former collocation, however, seems far the more general; and is
  recommended by that rule, by which the substantive and adjective
  should be placed in juxta-position, or as near as possible to each
  other. The latter is defended by the principle, that the qualifying
  adverb should be placed close to the adjective, whose signification
  it modifies. This collocation is generally, however, pronounced a
  Scotticism; but it is not peculiar to Scotch writers.


RULE XXI.--Conjunctions have no government.

  _Note_ 1.--In giving this rule, I differ from all other
  grammarians, who have erroneously, as I conceive, assigned them a
  regimen. Some conjunctions, says Lowth, govern the indicative, and
  some the subjunctive mood. This I affirm without hesitation to be
  a great mistake; for not a single example, I venture to assert,
  can be produced, in which the verb is divested of its indicative
  form, in consequence of its being subjoined to any conjunction.
  The Latins had a form of the verb, which they properly enough
  denominated the subjunctive mood; because, where the meaning
  was unconditionally assertive, they employed this form, if the
  clause was preceded by some particular conjunctive or adverbial
  term. Thus, when they said, _adeo benevolus erat, ut omnes eum
  amarent_, “he was so benevolent, that all men loved him,” though
  the assertion in the latter clause, be evidently unconditional, as
  the English shows, they changed the indicative into another form,
  because the verb is preceded by the conjunction _ut_. No similar
  example can be produced in English.

  Lowth informs us, that, when hypothesis, conditionality, or
  contingency is implied, the mood should be subjunctive; if
  certainty, or something determinate and absolute be signified,
  the verb should be indicative. Now surely, if the sense require a
  form different from the indicative, the verb cannot be said to be
  under the government of the conjunction; for the verb assumes that
  form, not because preceded by the conjunctive term, or because it
  is under its government, but because the sentiment to be expressed
  requires that phraseology. Whether the conditional, or what Lowth
  terms the subjunctive, be a distinct form of the verb, or only an
  elliptical mode of expression, we have already inquired. See p. 126.

  _Note_ 2.--Mr. Harris says, that the chief difference between
  prepositions and conjunctions is, that the former couple words, and
  the latter sentences. This opinion is erroneous; for conjunctions
  frequently couple words, as in the following example: “A man of
  wisdom and virtue is a perfect character.” Here it is not implied,
  that “a man of wisdom is a perfect character;” but “a man of
  wisdom combined with virtue, or a man of wisdom and virtue.” That
  conjunctions, indeed, do not couple at all, in that sense, at
  least, in which grammarians have understood the term, Mr. Tooke
  seems to have incontestably proved. That they sometimes couple
  sentences, or that instances may be produced, in which Harris’s
  definition will appear correct, the following example will serve
  as an evidence: “You, and I, and John rode to town;” _i.e._ “you
  rode,” “and I rode,” “and John rode.” But to assert, that this is
  their distinctive property, is to affirm what may be disproved by
  numberless examples. If we say, “two and two are four.” Are two
  four, and two four? “A B, B C, and C A, form a triangle.” Is A B a
  triangle? or B C? or C A? “John and Mary are a handsome couple.” Is
  John a couple? and Mary a couple? The common theory, therefore, is
  false; nor is it to be doubted, that conjunctions are, in respect
  to signification, and were originally in regard to their regimen,
  verbs, or words compounded of nouns and attributives. In explaining
  them, however, I divided them, as the reader may remember, into
  the several classes of adversative, concessive, conditional, &c.
  This I did, not only in conformity to general usage, and that he
  might not be a stranger to the names assigned to them; but likewise
  for this reason, that, though they originally formed no distinct
  species of words, but were either verbs, or compounds of nouns and
  verbs, they have now assumed another character, and are construed
  in a different manner. It is necessary, however, that he should be
  acquainted not only with their present use, but also with their
  primitive import, and classification.

  How these words were degraded from their original rank, and deemed
  insignificant, while some, perhaps, lost their syntactical power,
  is a matter, I conceive, of no difficult inquiry. For, when the
  verbs, to which any of these words belonged, became obsolete,
  the words themselves, thus separated from their parent stock,
  and stripped of that consequence and authority which they thence
  derived, their extraction becoming daily more dubious, and their
  original value more obscure, sunk by degrees into inferior note,
  and at last dwindled into comparative insignificance. Besides, many
  of them, doubtless, were transplanted into our language without the
  _radices_; their etymology, therefore, being little known, their
  primitive character, and real import, would soon be involved in
  increasing darkness.

  It is to be considered, also, that those who have dispensed
  the laws of grammar in our language, or assumed the office of
  critics, have been generally such as, though perhaps sufficiently
  conversant in Greek and Latin, were entirely unacquainted with
  the Northern languages. Accustomed, therefore, to render the
  conjunctions and prepositions in Greek or Latin, by synonymous
  English words, and unacquainted with the true character of these
  vernacular terms, their _etymons_ being obsolete, or having never
  been used in our language, it is easy to conceive how they would
  naturally assign to the English words the same character and the
  same name which were affixed to the synonymous Latin terms. Nay,
  this has been so much the case, that we have ascribed an ambiguous
  character to several English words, referring them now to one
  class, then to another, merely because they agree in signification
  with certain Greek and Latin terms, which have been severally
  referred by classical grammarians to different orders. That the
  word _whether_ has uniformly, in our language, the same import and
  the same character, denoting “which of the two,” there can be no
  doubt; yet, because this word answers sometimes to _an_, _anne_,
  _num_, and sometimes to _uter_, grammarians and lexicographers have
  accounted it both a conjunction and a pronoun. _Utrum_ in Latin has
  shared the same fate. So far, indeed, has this spirit been carried,
  that we will not admit _except_, _according_, _concerning_,
  _respecting_, with many similar terms, to be verbs or participles,
  because _præter_, _secundum_, _de_, are prepositions. It is from
  this propensity to assimilate ours with the Latin language, that
  all these errors have arisen.

  That the words now termed prepositions and conjunctions were
  originally verbs, or nouns, or compounds of these, Tooke has, in
  my judgment, incontrovertibly proved. This being admitted, it
  appears to me highly probable, that they were primitively construed
  as such, joined either with the nominative or the objective case,
  as the verbs had either a transitive or intransitive meaning;
  and that they were followed by either single words or clauses.
  This, however, is merely conjecture, founded indeed in the nature
  of the words, but not supported by any evidence. In process of
  time, in consequence of that assimilation which naturally takes
  place between a living language and a dead one, much read, much
  written, and much admired, these words, when their origin became
  obscure, would, as I have remarked, be divested of their primitive
  character, and be considered as belonging to those classes, to
  which the synonymous Latin words were referred. Hence their
  regimen would likewise undergo a change. It would appear awkward
  and vicious to say now, “I saw nobody but he;” is not improbable,
  however, that the mode of expression was originally, “I saw
  nobody, be out he,” _i.e._ “he be out.” But I am now indulging
  in conjecture, the very error which chiefly has misled us in our
  grammatical researches. One thing, however, is certain, that
  several words, which were originally employed as prepositions
  or conjunctions indifferently, have now acquired a more fixed
  character, and are used but seldom in a double capacity. Of this
  the word _without_ is an example. Thus, it was not unusual to
  say, “without you go, I will not,” where the term of exclusion,
  though in truth a preposition prefixed to a clause, was considered
  as a conjunction synonymous with _nisi_. This usage, unless in
  conversation, is now almost entirely relinquished; and the term
  _without_ is now generally employed as a preposition, being
  prefixed to single words. It is likewise certain that in respect
  to signification there is no difference between conjunctions and
  prepositions: _vidi neminem nisi eum_, is equivalent to _vidi
  neminem præter eum_. In like manner, “I saw nobody but him,” is
  synonymous with “I saw nobody besides him;” in which examples
  the conjunctions _nisi_ and _but_ are perfectly synonymous with
  _præter_ and _besides_, which are termed prepositions.

  It may be asked, if then prepositions and conjunctions be alike
  verbs, or nouns, or compounds of these, and if many prepositions
  and conjunctions be in point of meaning identical, what forms the
  ground of distinction between them? It is simply this, that the
  former are prefixed to single words only, as nouns and pronouns,
  or to clauses involving an infinitive mood[133], the infinitive
  being strictly the name of the verb; and that they have a regimen;
  while the latter are prefixed to clauses, and have no regimen.
  This is the only distinction between prepositions and conjunctions
  as discriminated in modern use. Their original character is
  sufficiently established by Mr. Tooke.

  I have said that some of these words have, in our language, an
  ambiguous character, being employed both as prepositions and
  conjunctions. Of this the word _than_ is an example. Priestley
  seems to consider it as a preposition, and pleads in favour of the
  following expression, “you are taller than him,” not “taller than
  he.” “Since it is allowed,” says the Doctor, “that the oblique case
  should follow prepositions, and since the comparative degree of an
  adjective, and the particle _than_, have certainly between them
  the force of a preposition, expressing the relation of one word
  to another, they ought to require the oblique case of the pronoun
  following, so that, _greater than me_ will be more grammatical than
  _greater than I_.” Here I cannot concur with the learned author.
  The same argument would prove that _major quam me_, would be more
  grammatical than _major quam ego_; a conclusion which is opposed
  by universal authority. The truth is, _than_ must be either a
  conjunction or a preposition, or both. If a conjunction, it can
  have no government, any more than the Latin _quam_; unless we
  confound the distinction which has been just now explained, and is
  universally admitted, namely, that conjunctions are distinguished
  from prepositions, by their having no government. If it be a
  preposition, no argument is necessary to prove that it may be
  joined with an objective case; for such is the distinguishing
  character of prepositions. If it be either a preposition or a
  conjunction, it follows, that it may be construed either with or
  without a regimen. Lowth, with greater propriety, considers it as a
  conjunction; and Campbell, in his “Rhetoric,” recommends this usage
  as the only means of preventing that ambiguity, which necessarily
  arises from the employment of this word as a preposition only. For,
  if we use it as a preposition, we should say, “I love you better
  than him,” whether it be meant “I love you better than I love him,”
  or “I love you better than he does.” By using it as a conjunction,
  the ambiguity is prevented. For, if the former sentiment be
  implied, we say, “I love you better than him,” _i.e._ “than I love
  him;” if the latter, we say, “I love you better than he,” _i.e._
  “than he loves you.” Whatever may have been the original character
  or syntax of this word, since usage is now divided, some writers
  employing it as a conjunction, and others as a preposition, the
  grammarian may, consistently with his duty, plead for that usage
  only, which prevents ambiguity.

  The rule here recommended is generally violated, when _than_
  is joined with the relative pronoun, as, “Alfred, than whom
  a greater king never reigned.” “Beelzebub, than whom, Satan
  excepted, none higher sat.” Salmon has attempted to account for
  this almost universal phraseology, by saying, that the expression
  is elliptical, being the same as, “than compared with whom.” This
  explanation is forced and unnatural. It is likewise unnecessary.
  The simple fact is, that the word _than_ was formerly used as a
  preposition, and, I believe, more frequently than it is now. Hence,
  doubtless, arose this phraseology.


RULE XXII.--Derivatives are generally construed like their
primitives; as, “it was a happy thing _for_ this country, that the
Pretender was defeated;” or “happily _for_ this country the Pretender
was defeated.” Thus also, “to compare _with_,” and “in comparison
_with_ riches;”--“to depend _on_,” and his “dependence on the court.”


RULE XXIII.--One negative destroys another; or two negatives are
equivalent to an affirmative; as, “nor have I no money, which I can
spare;” that is, “I have money, which I can spare.”--“Nor was the
king unacquainted with his designs;” that is, “he was acquainted.”

  _Note_ 1.--Here our language accords with the Latin. In Greek and
  French, two negatives render the negation stronger.

  _Note_ 2.--This rule is violated in such examples as this, “Nor
  is danger ever apprehended in such a government, no more than we
  commonly apprehend danger from thunder or earthquakes.” It should
  be _any more_.


RULE XXIV.--Interjections are joined with the objective case of the
pronoun of the first person, and with the nominative of the pronoun
of the second, as, “ah me,” “oh me,” “ah thou wretch,” “O thou who
dwellest.”

  _Syntax_ being that part of grammar, which teaches rules not only
  for the concord and government, but also for the order of words
  in clauses and sentences, I shall subjoin the few following brief
  directions for the guidance of the scholar, respecting arrangement.

  1st. The collocation should never invert the natural order of
  events, or violate the principles of reason and metaphysical
  propriety. It is obvious, for example, that no person can write,
  who cannot read. The ability to do the former necessarily implies
  a capacity to do the latter. It is preposterous, therefore, to
  say with Addison, “There will be few in the next generation, who
  will not at least be able to write and read.” He should have
  said, “to read and write.” “He was the son of a mother, who had
  nursed him with maternal tenderness, and had borne him in an hour
  of the deepest affliction.” The natural order of events should
  have dictated the reverse arrangement. There would be a manifest
  impropriety in saying “Our father is well, and alive;” the former
  state necessarily implying the latter. In the following passage,
  however, it is perhaps excusable, the answers particularly
  corresponding to the questions: Joseph says to his brothers, “Is
  your father well? The old man, of whom ye spake, is he yet alive?”
  They answer, “Thy servant, our father, is in good health; he is yet
  alive.” This error was termed by the ancient grammarians _hysteron
  proteron_; and, though not so palpably as in the preceding
  examples, it occurs much more frequently than an inattentive reader
  is apt to imagine.

  2nd. The English language admits but few inflexions, and therefore
  little or no room for variety of arrangement. The connection of
  one word with another is not to be perceived, as in Greek and
  Latin, by correspondence of termination, but by relative position.
  This renders it indispensably necessary, that those words which
  are intimately related by sense one to another, should be closely
  connected by collocation. “The cunning of Hannibal was too powerful
  for the Pergamenians, who by the same kind of stratagem had
  frequently obtained great victories at land.” The relative here, by
  its position, must be understood as referring to the Pergamenians;
  whereas it is intended to refer to Hannibal. The relative clause,
  therefore, should have followed the name of the Carthaginian. “His
  picture, in distemper, of calumny, borrowed from the description
  of one painted by Apelles, was supposed to be a satire on that
  cardinal.”--_Walpole._ The error here is obvious. He should have
  said, “His picture of calumny.” “It is folly to pretend to arm
  ourselves against the accidents of life, by heaping up treasures,
  which nothing can protect us against, but the good providence of
  our heavenly Father.”--_Sherlock._ Here the grammatical antecedent
  is _treasures_; but it is intended to be _accidents_. The relative
  is removed from its proper subject.

  3rd. As the converse of the preceding rule, it may be observed,
  that those words should be separated, which in juxta-position
  may, at first sight, or first hearing, possibly convey a meaning
  which the speaker or writer does not intend. “I, like a well-bred
  man, who is never disposed to mortify or to offend, praised both
  sorts of food.” As the two introductory words are capable of two
  meanings, would it not be better to say, “Like a well-bred man
  ... I praised both sorts of food.” I am aware, that the other
  collocation is preferable, where a particular stress is to be laid
  on the principal subject; but ambiguity is an error, which should
  be studiously avoided, and the meaning should not be left to the
  determination of a comma.

  4th. From the preceding rules, it follows as a corollary, that
  no clause should be so placed in a sentence, as to be referable
  either to what precedes, or what follows. “The knight, seeing his
  habitation reduced to so small a compass, and himself in a manner
  shut out of his own house, _on the death of his mother_, ordered
  all the apartments to be flung open.” The clause in italics is
  ambiguously placed.

  5th. When each of two arrangements is equally favourable to
  perspicuity, and equally consistent with metaphysical propriety,
  that should be preferred which is the more agreeable to the ear.

  6th. Harsh and abrupt cadences should be avoided; and in elevated
  style, the clauses should swell towards the close of the sentence.
  This latter rule, however, which requires some limitations, belongs
  to the province of the rhetorician, rather than to that of the
  grammarian.




PART III.




CHAPTER I.

CANONS OF CRITICISM.


Having explained and illustrated the etymology and syntax of the
English language, as fully as the limits, which I have prescribed to
myself, will permit, I would now request the reader’s attention to
some additional observations.

The grammar of every language is merely a compilation of those
general principles, or rules, agreeably to which that language is
spoken. When I say, a compilation of rules, I would not be understood
to mean, that the rules are first established, and the language
afterwards modelled in conformity to these. The very reverse is
the fact: language is antecedent to grammar. Words are framed and
combined to express sentiment, before the grammarian can enter on
his province. His sole business is, not to dictate forms of speech,
or to prescribe law to our modes of expression; but, by observing
the modes previously established, by remarking their similarities
and dissimilarities, his province is to deduce and explain the
general principles, and the particular forms, agreeably to which the
speakers of that language express themselves. The philosopher does
not determine by what laws the physical and moral world should be
governed; but, by the careful observation and accurate comparison
of the various phenomena presented to his view, he deduces and
ascertains the general principles, by which the system is regulated.
The province of the grammarian seems precisely similar. He is a mere
digester and compiler, explaining what _are_ the modes of speech, not
dictating what they _should be_. He can neither assign to any word a
meaning different from that which custom has annexed to it; nor can
he alter a phraseology, to which universal suffrage has given its
sanction. Usage is, in this case, law; usage _quem penes arbitrium
est, et jus et norma loquendi_. If it were now the practice to say,
“I loves,” instead of “I love,” the former phraseology would rest on
the same firm ground, on which the latter now stands; and “I love,”
would be as much a violation of the rules of grammar, or, which is
the same thing, of established usage, as “I loves” is at present.
_Regula est, quæ rem, quæ est, breviter enarrat; non ut ex regula jus
sumatur, sed ex jure, quod est, regula fiat._--_Paul. Leg. 1, de Reg.
Jur._

Having said thus much to prevent misconception, and to define the
proper province of the grammarian, I proceed to observe, that this
usage, which gives law to language, in order to establish its
authority, or to entitle its suffrage to our assent, must be, in the
first place, _reputable_.

The vulgar in this, as in every other country, are, from their want
of education, necessarily illiterate. Their native language is known
to them no farther, than is requisite for the most common purposes
of life. Their ideas are few, and consequently their stock of words
poor and scanty. Nay, their poverty, in this respect, is not their
only evil. Their narrow competence they abuse and pervert. Some
words they misapply, others they corrupt; while many are employed
by them, which have no sanction, but provincial or local authority.
Hence the language of the vulgar, in one province, is sometimes
hardly intelligible in another. Add to this, that debarred by their
occupations from study, or generally averse to literary pursuits,
they are necessarily strangers to the scientific improvements of a
cultivated mind; and are therefore entirely unacquainted with that
diction, which concerns the higher attainments of life. Ignorant of
any general principles respecting language, to which they may appeal;
unable to discriminate between right and wrong; prone therefore to
adopt whatever usage casual circumstances may present; it is no
wonder, if the language of the vulgar be a mixture of incongruity and
error, neither perfectly consistent with itself, nor to themselves
universally intelligible. Their usage, therefore, is not the
standard, to which we must appeal for decisive authority; a usage so
discordant and various, that we may justly apply to it the words of
a celebrated critic,

      Bellua multorum es capitum; nam quid sequar, aut quem?

The question then is, what is reputable usage? On this subject
philologists have been divided. Dr. Campbell appears to me to
decide judiciously, when he says, that the usage, to which we must
appeal, is not that of the court, or of great men, nor even of
authors of profound science, but of those, whose works are esteemed
by the public, and who may, therefore, be denominated _reputable_
authors. By referring to their practice, he appeals to a standard
less equivocal, than if he had resorted to the authority of good
writers; for, as he justly observes, there may be various opinions
respecting the merits of authors, when there may be no disagreement
concerning the rank which they hold in the estimation of the public;
and, because it is the esteem of the public, and not their intrinsic
merit, (though these go generally hand in hand,) that raises them to
distinction, and stamps a value on their language. Besides, it is to
be observed, that consummate knowledge is not always accompanied with
a talent for communicating it: hence the sentiment may be confessedly
valuable, while the language is regarded as of no authority.

This usage must be, in the second place, _national_. It must not be
confined to this or that province; it must not be the usage of this
or that district, the peculiarities of which are always ridiculous,
and frequently unintelligible beyond its own limits; but it must
be the general language of the country, intelligible everywhere,
and in no place ridiculous. And, though the variety of dialects may
collectively form a greater number of authorities than national
usage can boast, taken singly they are much fewer. Those, to use
Campbell’s apposite similitude, who deviate from the beaten road, may
be incomparably more numerous than those who travel in it; yet, into
whatever number of by-paths the former may be divided, there may not
be found in any one of these tracks so many as travel in the king’s
highway.

In the third place, this usage must be _present_. Here it may be
asked, what is meant by present usage? Is it the usage of the
present year, the present age, or the present century? How is it
defined, or by what boundary is it limited? In short, how far may we
revert in search of decisive authority? may we go back, for example,
as far as Chaucer, or must we stop at the age of Addison?

In determining this matter, the same learned and judicious critic
observes, that regard must be had to the species of composition and
the nature of the subject. Poetry is properly allowed a greater
latitude than prose; and therefore, a word, which in prose we should
reject as a barbarism, may, with strict propriety, be admitted in
verse. Here, also, there are limits which must not be passed; and,
perhaps, any word, which cannot plead the authority of Milton, or of
any contemporary or later poet, may be justly regarded as obsolete.
In prose, no word, unless the subject be art or science, should be
employed, which has been disused for a period greater than the age of
man. This is the judgment of the same critic. Against this answer,
indeed, it is possible to raise a thousand cavils; and, perhaps, we
shall be reminded of the poet’s strictures on the term _ancient_ in
his days[134]. One thing, however, is certain, that, though it be
difficult to fix a precise limit, where the authority of precedent
terminates, and legislative usage commences, or to define with
precision the age of man, it must be acknowledged, that there are
limits, in respect to usage, which we must not overleap, as there is
a certain term, which the life of man cannot surpass.

As there is a period, beyond which precedent in language ceases to
have authority; so, on the contrary, the usage of the present day
is not implicitly to be adopted. Mankind are fond of novelty; and
there is a fashion in language, as there is in dress. Whim, vanity,
and affectation, delight in creating new words. Of these, the far
greater part soon sink into contempt. They figure for a little, like
ephemeral productions, in tales, novels, and fugitive papers; and
are shortly consigned to degradation and oblivion. Now, to adopt
every new-fangled upstart at its birth, would argue not taste,
nor judgment, but childish fondness for singularity and novelty.
On the contrary, if any of these should maintain its ground, and
receive the sanction of a reputable usage, to reject it, in this
case, would be to resist that authority, to which every critic and
grammarian must bow with submission. The term _mob_, for example,
was, at its introduction, zealously opposed by Dean Swift. His
resistance, however, was ineffectual; and to reject it now would
betray prudish affectation, and fruitless perversity. The word
_inimical_, previously to the American war, could, I believe, plead,
in its favour, only one authority. In some dictionaries, accordingly
it was omitted; and in others stigmatized as a barbarism. It has now
obtained a permanent establishment, and is justly admitted by every
lexicographer.

      “In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold;
      Alike fantastic, if too new or old:
      Be not the first, by whom the new are tried,
      Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.”
                              _Pope’s Essay on Criticism._

In short, in this, as in every other question on this subject,
perspicuity should be our guide. If the subject be art or science,
or if the composition be intended for literary men, then a greater
latitude may be allowed, as the reader is supposed to be master
of the language, in all its varieties. But if the subject be
accommodated to common capacity, and the composition designed for
ordinary readers, the rule now given, not to employ a word, which
has been disused for a period greater than the age of man, will be
deemed, I conceive, rational and necessary.

The usage, then, which gives law to language, and which is generally
denominated “good usage,” must be _reputable_, _national_, and
_present_. It happens, however, that “good usage” is not always
uniform in her decisions, and that unquestionable authorities are
found for different modes of expression. In such cases, the following
canons, proposed by the same author, will be of considerable service,
in enabling the reader to decide, to which phraseology the preference
is due. These canons I shall give, nearly in the words of the author;
and illustrate them, as I proceed, by a few apposite examples, partly
his, and partly my own.


CANON I.--When the usage is divided, as to any particular words
or phrases, and when one of the expressions is susceptible of a
different meaning, while the other admits only one signification, the
expression, which is strictly univocal, should be preferred.

For this reason, _aught_[135], for “anything,” is better than
_ought_; _scarcely_, as an adverb, better than _scarce_; _by
consequence_ is preferable to _of consequence_, which signifies also
“of importance;” and _exceedingly_, as an adverb, is preferable to
_exceeding_.

For the same reason, _to purpose_, for “to intend,” is better than
_to propose_, which signifies also “to lay before,” or “submit to
consideration;” and _proposal_, for “a thing offered or proposed,”
is better than “proposition,” which denotes also “a position,”
or the “affirmation of any principle or maxim.” Thus we say, “he
demonstrated Euclid’s _proposition_,” and “he rejected the _proposal_
of his friend.”

Agreeably also to this canon, _disposal_, in common language, when a
grant, or giving away is denoted, or when the management of anything
is to be expressed, is preferable to _disposition_, which signifies
also _arrangement_, and likewise _temper of mind_; and _exposure_,
as the verbal noun from _expose_, is better than _exposition_, the
verbal noun of _expound_. We should say, “the exposure of a fault,”
and “the exposition of a text.” The analogous words _composure_,
from _compose_, and _composition_, from _compound_, or _compose_,
have been suffered to retain their distinct significations.
“To speak _contemptuously_ of a person,” is better than “to
speak _contemptibly_;” the latter term meaning generally, “in a
contemptible manner,” or, “in a manner worthy of contempt;” whereas
the former is univocal, and denotes _disrespectfully_, or “in a
manner significant of contempt.”

For the same reason, _obvious_, for “evident,” is better than
_apparent_, which means also “seeming,” as opposed to “real.”

The term _primitive_, as equivalent to _original_, is preferable
to _primary_. The latter is synonymous with _principal_, and is
opposed to _secondary_; the former is equivalent to _original_,
and is opposed to _derivative_ or _acquired_. I shall illustrate
this distinction by a few examples. The words _falsehood_ and _lie_
agree in expressing the same primary idea, namely, “contrariety to
fact;” but they differ in their secondary ideas, the former implying
simply, “inconsistency with physical truth,” the latter being a term
of reproach, expressing “a wilful breach of veracity, or of moral
truth.” _To kill_, and _to murder_, agree also in their primary
ideas, both denoting “the deprivation of life;” but they differ
in their secondary, the former implying no moral turpitude, the
latter denoting an immoral act. From these examples it will appear,
that _primary_ denotes “what is principal or chief,” as opposed to
“secondary,” or “subordinate.”

_Primitive_ is equivalent to _original_; thus we say, the _primitive_
meaning of the word _villain_, was “a nearer tenant to the lord of
the manor;” custom has altered its signification, and it now denotes
“a wicked fellow.” Thus the _primary_ and the _primitive_ meaning of
words may be very different; these terms, therefore, ought to be duly
discriminated.

_Intension_, for “the act of stretching or straining,” is for
the same reason, preferable to _intention_, which signifies also
“purpose,” or “design.” “I am mistaken,” is frequently used to denote
“I misunderstand,” or “I am in error;” but as this expression may
also signify, “I am misunderstood,” it is better to say, “I mistake.”

This canon I would earnestly recommend to the observance of every
writer, who is solicitous to exclude all unnecessary ambiguity, but
more emphatically to my junior readers, who are peculiarly prone to
the violation of this rule, misled by false notions of elegance and
dignity. There prevails at present a foolish and ridiculous, not to
say absurd, disposition in some writers, to prefer in every instance,
with no discrimination, long to short words. They seem to entertain
an inveterate antipathy to monosyllabic terms; and disdaining
whatever savours of Saxon origin, are incessantly searching after the
_sesquipedalia verba_ of Greek or Latin extraction, with no regard
whatever to precision and perspicuity. Thus many words, which cannot
be dismissed without detriment to the language, are falling into
disuse, and their places supplied by equivocal and less appropriate
terms.


CANON II.--In doubtful cases analogy should be regarded.

For this reason, _contemporary_ is better than _cotemporary_,
_con_ being used before a consonant, and _co_ before a vowel; as,
_concomitant_, _coeval_.

For the same reason, “_he needs_,” “_he dares_,” “_whether he will
or not_,” are better than “_he need_,” “_he dare_,” “_whether he
will or no_.” The last of the three phraseologies, here recommended,
Priestley thinks exceptionable. To me, as to Campbell, the ellipsis
appears evident; thus, “whether he will, or will not:” hence “will
not” seems the only analogical expression.


CANON III.--When expressions are in other respects equal, that should
be preferred, which is most agreeable to the ear. This requires no
illustration.


CANON IV.--When none of the preceding rules take place, regard should
be had to simplicity. On this ground, “accept,” “approve,” “admit,”
are preferable to “accept of,” “approve of,” “admit of.”

I have already observed, that no expression, or mode of speech,
can be justified, which is not sanctioned by usage. The converse,
however, does not follow, that every phraseology, sanctioned by
usage, should be retained; and, in such cases, custom may properly
be checked by criticism, whose province it is, not only to
remonstrate against the introduction of any word or phraseology,
which may be either unnecessary or contrary to analogy, but also
to extrude whatever is reprehensible, though in general use. It is
by this exercise of her prerogative, that languages are gradually
refined and improved; and were this denied, language would soon
become stationary, or more probably would hasten to decline. In
exercising this authority, she cannot pretend to degrade instantly
any phraseology, which she may deem objectionable; but she may,
by repeated remonstrances, gradually effect its dismission. Her
decisions in such cases may be properly regulated by the following
canons, as delivered by the same author.


CANON I.--All words and phrases, particularly harsh, and not
absolutely necessary, should be dismissed; as, “shamefacedness,”
“unsuccessfulness,” “wrongheadedness.”


CANON II.--When the etymology plainly points to a different
signification from what the word bears, propriety and simplicity
require its dismission. For example, the word “beholden,” taken for
“obliged,” or the verb “to unloose,” for “to loose,” or “untie,”
should be rejected.


CANON III.--When words become obsolete, or are never used, but in
particular phrases, they should be repudiated; as they give the style
an air of vulgarity and cant, when their general disuse renders them
obscure. Of these “lief,” “dint,” “whit,” “moot,” “pro and con,”
furnish examples; as, “I had as lief go,” “by dint of argument,” “not
a whit better,” “a moot point,” “it was argued pro and con.” These
phraseologies are vulgar, and savour too much of cant to be admitted
in good writing.


CANON IV.--All words and phrases, which, analyzed grammatically,
include a solecism, should be dismissed; as, “I had rather go.”
The expression should be, “I would,” or “I’d rather go:” and from
the latter, the solecism “I had go,” seems by mistake to have
arisen, _I’d_ being erroneously conceived to be contracted for _I
had_, instead of a contraction for _I would_. This is the opinion
of Campbell, and to this opinion I expressed my assent, in the
former edition of this Treatise. I acknowledge, however, that it
now appears to me not strictly correct; and that Webster has not
questioned its accuracy on insufficient grounds. In the phrases
adduced by Campbell, such as “I’d go,” “I’d rather stay,” we can
readily perceive the probability that _I’d_ is a contraction for “I
would.” But in such expressions as “I had like to have been caught,”
which occur not only in colloquial language, but also in authors of
considerable name, it is impossible to admit Campbell’s explanation.
I must observe also, that the phraseology, which he censures, occurs
in some of our earliest writers, and is so frequently found in
Pope and Swift, that one is tempted to infer, notwithstanding its
solecistic appearance, that it is genuine English. It is difficult,
however, nay, perhaps impossible, to reconcile it to analogy. Were I
to offer conjecture on the subject, I should be inclined to say, that
in such phrases as “I had go,” _I had_ is, by a grammatical figure
very common in English, put for _I would have_, or _I would possess_,
and that the simple name of the act or state, by an ellipsis perhaps
of the verbal sign, is subjoined, as the object wished, no regard
being had to the completion of the action; in the same manner as we
say, I would have _gone_, when we wish the action perfected. But
by whatever authority this phraseology may be recommended, and in
whatever way it may be reconciled to the rules of syntax, it has
so much the appearance of solecism, that I decidedly prefer with
Campbell the unexceptional form of expression, _I would_. The phrase
_I had like_ appears to me utterly irreconcilable with any principle
of analogy.


CANON V.--All expressions, which, according to the established rules
of the language, either have no meaning, or involve a contradiction,
or, according to the fair construction of the words, convey a meaning
different from the intention of the speaker, should be dismissed.
Thus, when a person says, “he sings a good song,” the words strictly
imply that “the song is good,” whereas the speaker means to say, “he
sings well.” In like manner, when it is said, “this is the best part
he acts,” the sentence, according to the strict interpretation of the
words, expresses an opinion, not of his manner of acting, but of the
part or character which he acts. It should be, “he acts this part
best,” or “this is the part which he acts best.” “He plays a good
fiddle,” for “he plays well on the fiddle,” is, for the same reason,
objectionable.

Of expressions involving a contradiction, the following will serve as
an example. “There were four ladies in company, every one prettier
than another.” This is impossible. If A was prettier than B, B
must have been less pretty than A; but by the expression every one
was prettier than another, therefore B was also prettier than A.
Such absurdities as this ought surely to be banished from every
language[136].

Of those, which have little or no meaning, Campbell has given us
examples, “currying favour,” “having a month’s mind,” “shooting
at rovers.” Such modes of expression, he justly calls trash, the
disgrace of any language.

These canons I have extracted from “Campbell on Rhetoric,” a book
which I would recommend to the reader’s attentive perusal.

I proceed to observe, that to write any language with grammatical
purity, implies these three things:

1st. That the words be all of that language.

2ndly. That they be construed and arranged, according to the rules of
syntax in that language.

3rdly. That they be employed in that sense, which usage has annexed
to them.

Grammatical purity, therefore, may be violated in three ways:

1st. The words may not be English. This error is called barbarism.

2ndly. Their construction may be contrary to the English idiom. This
error is termed solecism.

3rdly. They may be used in a sense different from their established
acceptation. This error is named impropriety[137].

The barbarism is an offence against lexicography, by admitting new
words, as, “volupty,” “connexity,” “majestatic;” or by using obsolete
words, as, “uneath,” “erst;” or an offence against etymology, by
improper inflection, as, “teached” for “taught,” “oxes” for “oxen.”

The solecism is an offence against the rules of syntax, as, “I
reads,” “you was.”

The impropriety is an offence against lexicography, by mistaking the
meaning of words or phrases.

A solecism is regarded by grammarians as a much greater offence than
either of the others; because it betrays a greater ignorance of the
principles of the language. Rhetorically considered, it is deemed
a less trespass; for the rhetorician and grammarian estimate the
magnitude of errors by different standards; the former inquiring
only how far any error militates against the great purpose of his
art--persuasion; the latter, how far it betrays an ignorance of
the principles of grammar. Hence with the former, obscurity is the
greatest trespass; with the latter, solecism, and that species of
barbarism which violates the rules of etymology[138].




CHAPTER II.

CRITICAL REMARKS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.


Having, in the preceding chapter, explained the nature of that usage
which gives law to language; and having proposed a few rules for the
student’s direction in cases where usage is divided, and also where
her authority may be justly questioned and checked by criticism; I
intend, in the following pages, to present the young reader with a
copious exemplification of the three general species of error against
grammatical purity, arranging the examples in the order of the parts
of speech.


SECTION I.

THE NOUN.


BARBARISM.

“I rode in a one-horse chay.” It ought to be “a one-horse chaise.”
There is no such word as _chay_.

“That this has been the true and proper acception of this word, I
shall testify by one evidence.”--_Hammond._ _Acception_ is obsolete;
it ought to be _acceptation_.

“Were the workmen to enter into a contrary combination of the same
kind, not to accept of a certain wage.”--_Wealth of Nations._ _Wage_
is obsolete; the plural only is used.

“Their alliance was sealed by the nuptial of Henry, with the daughter
of the Italian prince.”--_Gibbon._ _Nuptial_ has not, I believe, been
used as a substantive since the days of Shakspeare, and may be deemed
obsolete. The plural _nuptials_ is the proper word.

“He showed that he had a full comprehension of the whole of
the plan, and of the judicious adaption of the parts to the
whole.”--_Sheridan’s Life of Swift._ _Adaption_ is obsolescent,
if not obsolete: _adaptation_ is the proper term. _Adaption_ is
frequently employed by Swift, from whom Sheridan seems to have copied
it.

... “Which even his brother modernists themselves, like ungrates,
whisper so loud that it reaches up to the very garret I am now
writing in.”--_Swift._ “Ungrate” is a barbarism. “Ingrate” is to be
found in some of our English poets as an adjective, and synonymous
with “ungrateful;” but “ungrate,” as a substantive, is truly
barbarous. Almost equally objectionable is Steele’s use of _stupid_
as a substantive plural. “Thou art no longer to drudge in raising the
mirth of stupids.”--_Spectator_, No. 468. And also of _ignorant_,
“the ignorants of the lowest order.”--_Ibid._

Pope also says, in one of his letters, “We are curious impertinents
in the case of futurity.” This employment of the adjective as a noun
substantive, though never sanctioned by general use, is now properly
avoided by our most reputable writers. It tends to confusion, where
distinction is necessary.

“The Deity dwelleth between the cherubims.” The Hebrews form the
plural of masculines by adding _im_; “cherubims,” therefore, is a
double plural. “Seraphims,” for the same reason, is faulty. The
singular of these words being “cherub” and “seraph,” the plural is
either “cherubs” and “seraphs,” or “cherubim” and “seraphim.” Milton
has uniformly avoided this mistake, which circumstance Addison, in
his criticisms on that author, has overlooked; nay, he has, even
with Milton’s correct usage before him, committed the error. “The
zeal of the _seraphim_,” says he, “breaks forth in a becoming warmth
of sentiments and expressions, as the character which is given of
_him_,” &c. Here “seraphim,” a plural noun, is used as singular. It
should be, “the zeal of the seraph.”

“Nothing can be more pleasant than to see virtuosoes about a cabinet
of medals descanting upon the value, the rarity, and authenticalness
of the several pieces.” _Authenticalness_, though used by Addison,
is obsolescent, and may, perhaps, be deemed a barbarism. It may be
properly dismissed, as a harsh and unnecessary term.

“He broke off with Lady Gifford, one of his oldest acquaintances
in life.”--_Sheridan’s Life of Swift._ _Acquaintances_ is now
deemed a Scotticism, being almost peculiar to the northern
parts of the island. Johnson, however, did not disclaim it. “A
young student from the inns of court, who has often attacked
the curate of his father’s parish, with such arguments as his
acquaintances could furnish.”--_Rambler._ We find it also in Steele;
thus, “she pays everybody their own, and yet makes daily new
acquaintances.”--_Tatler_, No. 109.

“I am sure that the farmeress at Bevis would feel emotions of
vanity ... if she knew you gave her the character of a reasonable
woman.”--_Lord Peterborough to Pope._ This, I believe, is the only
passage in which _farmeress_ is to be found; but, though it may
therefore be pronounced a barbarism, the author could not have
expressed himself so clearly and so concisely, in any other way. We
every now and then, as Johnson observes, feel the want of a feminine
termination.

“The bellowses were broken.” The noun, as here inflected, is
barbarous. “Bellows” is a plural word denoting a single instrument,
though consisting of two parts. There is, therefore, no such word as
“bellowses.”


SOLECISM[139].

“I have read Horace Art of Poetry.” This expression may be deemed
solecistical, being a violation of that rule, by which one
substantive governs another in the genitive. It should be, “Horace’s
Art of Poetry.” “These are ladies ruffles,” “this is the kings
picture,” are errors of the same kind, for “ladies’ ruffles,” “the
king’s picture.”

“These three great genius’s flourished at the same time.” Here
“genius’s,” the genitive singular, is improperly used for “geniuses,”
the nominative plural.

“They have of late, ’tis true, reformed, in some measure, the gouty
joints and darning work of _whereunto’s_, _whereby’s_, _thereof’s_,
_therewith’s_, and the rest of this kind.”--_Shaftesbury._ Here
also the genitive singular is improperly used for the objective
case plural. It should be, _whereuntos_, _wherebys_, _thereofs_,
_therewiths_.

“Both those people, acute and inquisitive to excess, corrupted the
sciences.”--_Adams’s History of England._

“Two rival peoples, the Jews and the Samaritans, have preserved
separate exemplars of it.”--_Geddes’ Preface to his Translation of
the Bible._ The former of these passages involves a palpable error,
the word “people,” here equivalent to _nation_, and in the singular
number, being joined with _both_ or “the two,” a term of plurality.
In the latter, this error is avoided, the noun being employed in
the plural number. This usage, however, though sanctioned by the
authority of our translators of the Bible in two passages, seems
now to be obsolete. _States_, _tribes_, _nations_, appear to be
preferable.

“I bought a scissars,” “I want a tongs,” “it is a tattered colours,”
involve a palpable solecism, the term significant of unity being
joined with a plural word. It should be “a pair of scissars,” “a pair
of tongs,” “a pair of colours.”

“They tell us, that the fashion of jumbling fifty things together
in a dish was at first introduced, in compliance to a depraved and
debauched appetite.”--_Swift._

We say, “comply with;” therefore, by Rule xvii. “in compliance
with” is the analogical form of expression, and has the sanction of
classical usage.

“The fortitude of a man, who brings his will to the obedience of
his reason.”--_Steele._ Analogy requires “obedience to.” We say,
_obedient to command_: the person obeying is expressed in the
genitive, or with the preposition _of_; and the person or thing
obeyed with the preposition _to_, as, “a servant’s obedience,” or
“the obedience of a servant to the orders of his master.”

“Give attendance to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine.”--_Bible._
“Attendance” and “attention” are verbal nouns, derived from “attend.”
When the verb signifies “to regard,” or “to fix the mind upon,” it
is followed by _to_, as, “he attends to his studies,” and the verbal
noun is “attention,” construed, agreeably to Rule xvii. in the same
manner as the verb. Thus, “he gives attention to his studies.” But
when “to attend” signifies “to wait on,” or “be present at,” it is
followed by _on_, _upon_, or _at_, and is sometimes used without the
preposition.

Thus, “if any minister refused to admit a lecturer recommended to
him, he was required to attend _upon_ the committee.”--_Clarendon._

“He attended _at_ the consecration with becoming gravity.”--_Hume._
In this sense the verbal noun is “attendance,” and construed like the
verb, when it bears this signification. In the sentence, therefore,
last quoted, syntax requires, either “attendance at” or “attention
to.” The latter conveys the meaning of the original.


IMPROPRIETY.

“The observation of the Sabbath is a duty incumbent on every
Christian.” It should be, “the observance.” Both substantives are
derived from the verb “to observe.” When the verb means “to keep,”
or “obey,” the verbal noun is “observance;” when “to remark,” or “to
notice,” the noun is “observation.”

“They make such acquirements, as fit them for useful
avocations.”--_Staunton’s Embassy to China._

The word _avocation_ is frequently, as in the example before us,
confounded with _vocation_. By the latter is clearly signified
“calling,” “trade,” “employment,” “business,” “occupation;” and by
the former is meant whatever withdraws, distracts, or diverts us from
that business. No two words can be more distinct; yet we often see
them confounded.

“A supplication of twenty days was decreed to his honour.”--_Henry’s
History of Britain._ The term _supplication_ is in our language
confined to what Johnson calls “petitionary worship,” and always
implies request, entreaty, or petition. The Latin term _supplicatio_
has a more extensive meaning, and likewise _supplicium_, each
denoting not only _prayer_, strictly so called, but also
_thanksgiving_. The latter of these should have been employed by the
author.

“Our pleasures are purer, when consecrated by nations, and cherished
by the greatest _genii_ among men.”--_Blackwell’s Mythology._ _Genii_
means spirits. (See p. 18.) It ought to be _geniuses_.

I have already remarked (see p. 31), that, when the primary idea
implied in the masculine and feminine terms is the chief object
of attention, and when the sex does not enter as a matter of
consideration, the masculine term should be employed, even when the
female is signified. Thus, the Monthly Reviewer, in giving a critique
on the poems of Mrs. Grant, says, in allusion to that lady, “such
is the poet’s request.” This is strictly proper. He considers her
merely as a writer of poetry. But, were we to say, “as a poet she
ought not to choose for her theme the story of Abelard,” we should
be chargeable with error. For this would imply, that the story of
Abelard is not a fit subject for a poem,--a sentiment manifestly
false. There is no incongruity between the subject and poetry, but
between the subject and female delicacy. We ought, therefore, to say,
“as a poetess, she ought not to choose for her theme the story of
Abelard.”

“It was impossible not to suspect the veracity of this story.”
“Veracity” is applicable to persons only, and properly denotes that
moral quality or property, which consists in speaking truth, being
in its import nearly synonymous with the fashionable, but grossly
perverted term, _honour_: it is, therefore, improperly applied to
things. It should be “_the truth_ of this story.” The former denotes
moral, and the latter physical truth. We therefore say “the truth”
or “verity of the relation or thing told,” and “the veracity of the
relater.”

Pope has entitled a small dissertation, prefixed to his translation
of the Iliad, “A View of the Epic Poem,” misled, it is probable, by
Bossu’s title of a similar work, “Traité du Poëme Epique.” _Poem_
denotes the work or thing composed; “the art of making,” which is
here intended, is termed _poesy_.

An error similar to this occurs in the following passage: “I
apprehend that all the _sophism_ which has been or can be employed,
will not be sufficient to acquit this system at the tribunal of
reason.”--_Bolingbroke._ “Sophism” is properly defined by Johnson,
“a fallacious argument;” sophistry means “fallacious reasoning,”
or “unsound argumentation.” The author should have said “all the
sophistry,” or “all the sophisms.”

“The Greek is, doubtless, a language much superior in riches,
harmony, and variety to the Latin.”--_Campbell’s Rhet._ As the
properties or qualities of the languages are here particularly
compared, I apprehend, that the abstract “richness” would be a more
apposite term. “Riches” properly denotes “the things possessed,” or
“what constitutes the opulence of the owner;” “richness” denotes the
state, quality, or property of the individual, as possessed of these.
The latter, therefore, appears to me the more appropriate term.

“He felt himself compelled to acknowledge the justice of my remark.”
The _justness_ would, agreeably to Canon 1st, be the preferable word,
the former term being confined to persons, and the latter to things.

“The negligence of this leaves us exposed to an uncommon levity in
our usual conversation.”--_Spectator._ It ought to be “the neglect.”
“Negligence” implies a habit; “neglect” expresses an act.

“For I am of opinion that it is better a language should not be
wholly perfect, than it should be perpetually changing; and we must
give over at one time, or at length infallibly change for the worse;
as the Romans did when they began to quit their simplicity of style
for affected refinements, such as we meet with in Tacitus, and other
authors, which ended, by degrees, in many barbarities.” _Barbarity_,
in this sense, is obsolescent. The univocal term, _barbarism_, is
much preferable.

Gibbon, speaking of the priest, says, “to obtain the acceptation
of this guide to salvation, you must faithfully pay him tythes.”
_Acceptation_ in this sense is obsolete, or at least nearly out of
use; it should be _favour_ or _acceptance_.

“She ought to lessen the extravagant power of the duke and
duchess, by taking the disposition of employments into her own
hands.”--_Swift._ _Disposal_, for reasons already assigned[140], is
much better.

“The conscience of approving one’s self a benefactor to mankind, is
the noblest recompense for being so.” “Conscience” is the faculty
by which we judge our own conduct. It is here improperly used for
“consciousness,” or the perception of what passes within ourselves.

“If reasons were as plenty as blackberries, I would give no man a
reason on compulsion.”--_Shakspeare._ Here _plenty_, a substantive,
is improperly used for _plentiful_.

“It had a prodigious _quantity_ of windows.”--_Spence’s Excursions._
It should be _number_. This error frequently occurs in common
conversation. We hear of “a quantity of people,” of “a quantity of
troops,” “a quantity of boys and girls,” just as if they were to
be measured by the bushel, or weighed in the balance.--“To-morrow
will suit me equally well.” If we enquire here for a nominative to
the verb, we find none, _morrow_ being under the government of the
preposition. This error is so common, that we fear its correction
is hopeless. The translators of the Bible seem carefully to have
avoided this inaccuracy:--“_To_-morrow (_i.e._ ‘on the morrow’) the
Lord shall do this;” “And the Lord did that thing on _the_ morrow.”
Analogy requires, that we should say, “_The_ morrow will suit me
equally well.”

“I have the Dublin copy of Gibbon’s History.” This is a Scotticism
for _Dublin edition_; and so palpable, that I should not have
mentioned it, were it not found in authors of no contemptible merit.
“I have no right to be forced,” said a citizen to a magistrate, “to
serve as constable.” This perversion of the word _right_, originally,
we believe, a cockneyism, is gradually gaining ground, and is found
in compositions, into which nothing but extreme inattention can
account for its introduction. A _right_ implies a just claim, or
title to some privilege, freedom, property, or distinction, supposed
by the claimant to be conducive to his benefit. We should smile,
if we heard a foreigner, in vindication of his innocence, say, “I
have no right to be imprisoned;” “I have no right to be hanged.” The
perversion here is too palpable to escape our notice. But we hear a
similar, though not so ridiculous, an abuse of the word, in common
conversation without surprise. “I have no right,” says one, “to be
taxed with this indiscretion;” “I have no right,” says another, “to
be subjected to this penalty.” These phraseologies are absurd. They
involve a contradiction; they presume a benefit, while they imply an
injury. The correlative term on one side is _right_, and on the other
_obligation_; a creditor has a right to a just debt, and the debtor
is under an obligation to pay it. Instead of these indefensible
phraseologies we should say, “I am not bound,” or “I am under no
obligation to submit to this penalty;” “I ought not to be taxed with
this indiscretion,” or “you have no right to subject me,” “you have
no right to tax me.”

Robertson, when speaking of the Mexican form of government (Book
viith), says, “But the description of their policy and laws is so
inaccurate and contradictory, that it is difficult to delineate the
form of their constitution with any precision.” I should here prefer
the appropriate and univocal term _polity_, which denotes merely the
form of government; _policy_ means rather wisdom or prudence, or the
art of governing, which may exist where there is no settled _polity_.

“A letter relative to certain calumnies and misrepresentations which
have appeared in the Edinburgh Review, with an exposition of the
ignorance of the new critical junto.”--Here, agreeably to Canon I.
(see p. 229), I should prefer _exposure_, as being a word strictly
univocal. It would conduce to perspicuity were we to consider
_exposition_ as the verbal noun of _expound_, and confine it entirely
to _explanation_, and _exposure_ as the verbal noun of _expose_,
signifying the act of setting out, or the state of being set out or
exposed.


SECTION II.

THE ADJECTIVE.


BARBARISM.

“Instead of an able man, you desire to have him an insignificant
wrangler, opiniatre in discourse, and priding himself on
contradicting others.”--_Locke._ _Opiniatre_ is a barbarism; it
should be _opinionative_.

      “And studied lines, and fictious circles draw.”--_Prior._

The word _fictious_ is of Prior’s own coining; it is barbarous.

“The punishment that belongs to that great and criminous guilt is
the forfeiture of his right and claim to all mercies.”--_Hammond._
_Criminous_ is a barbarism.

“Which, even in the most overly view, will appear incompatible with
any sort of music.”--_Kames’s Elements._ _Overly_ is a Scotticism;
in England it is now obsolete. The proper term is _cursory_ or
_superficial_.

“Who should believe, that a man should be a doctor for the cure
of bursten children?”--_Steele._ The participle _bursten_ is now
obsolete.

“Callisthenes, the philosopher, that followed Alexander’s court, and
hated the king, being asked, how one should become the _famousest_
man in the world, answered, By taking away him that is.”--_Bacon’s
Apophth._ The superlative is a barbarism; it should be, “most famous.”


SOLECISM.

“I do not like these kind of men.” Here the plural word _these_ is
joined to a noun singular; it should be, “this kind.” “Those sort,”
“these kind of things,” are gross solecisms.

“Neither do I see it is any crime, farther than ill manners, to
differ in opinion from the majority of either, or both houses; and
that ill manners I have often been guilty of.”--_Swift’s Examiner._
Here is another egregious solecism. He should have said, “those ill
manners,” or “that species of ill manners.”

“The landlord was quite unfurnished of every kind of
provision.”--_Sheridan’s Life of Swift._ We say, “to furnish _with_,”
not “to furnish _of_.” _Furnished_ and _unfurnished_ are construed in
the same manner. It should be, “unfurnished _with_.”

“A child of four years old was thus cruelly deserted by its parents.”
This form of expression frequently occurs, and is an egregious
solecism. It should be, “a child four years old,” or “aged four
years,” not “of four years.” Those who employ this incorrect
phraseology, seem misled by confounding two very different modes
of expression, namely, “a child of four years of age,” or “of the
age of four years,” and “a child four years old.” The preposition
_of_ is requisite in the two first of these forms, but inadmissible
in the third. They would not say, “I am of four years old,” but
“I am four years old;” hence, consistently, they ought to say, “a
child four years old.” “At ten years old, I was put to a grammar
school.”--_Steele._ Grammatically this is, “I old at ten years.”

“This account is very different _to_ what I told you.” “I found
your affairs had been managed in a different manner _than_ what I
advised.” Both these phraseologies are faulty. It should be in each,
“different _from_.” The verb “to differ” is construed with _from_
before the second object of disparity; the adjective therefore should
(by Rule xvii.) be construed in the same manner.

“These words have the same sense of those others.” _Same_ should be
followed with _as_, _with_, or the relatives _who_, _which_, _that_.
It ought, therefore, to be, “as those,” or “with those,” or “have the
sense of those others.”

“I shall ever depend on your constant friendship, kind memory, and
good offices, though I were never to see or hear the effects of them,
like the trust we have in benevolent spirits, who, though we never
see or hear them, we think are constantly serving and praying for
us.”--_Pope’s Letters to Atterbury._ _Like_ can have no grammatical
reference to any word in the sentence but _I_, and this reference
is absurd. He should have said, “_as_, or _just as_, we trust in
benevolent spirits.”

“This gentleman rallies the best of any man I know.”--_Addison._
The superlative must be followed by _of_, the preposition implying
_out of_ a plurality, expressed either by a collective noun, or a
plural number. But here we have a selection denoted by _of_, and
the selection to be made out of one. This is absurd. It should
be, “better than any other”--the best of all men--“I know;” “this
gentleman, of all my acquaintance, rallies the best;” or “of all my
acquaintance, there is no one, who rallies so well as this gentleman.”

“Besides, those, whose teeth are too rotten to bite, are best,
of all others, qualified to revenge that defect with their
breath.”--_Preface to A Tale of a Tub._

“Here,” says Sheridan, “the disjunction of the word _best_ from the
word _qualified_ makes the sentence uncouth, which would run better
thus, ‘are, of all others, best qualified.’” So far Mr. Sheridan
is right; but he has left uncorrected a very common error. The
antecedent subject of comparison is here absurdly referred at once to
the same, and to a different aggregate, the word _of_ referring it to
_others_, to which it is opposed, and to which therefore it cannot,
without a contradiction, be said to belong. The sentence, therefore,
involves an absurdity: either the word _others_ should be expunged,
when the sentence would run thus, “Those, whose teeth are too rotten
to bite, are, of all, best qualified to revenge that defect;” or,
if the word _others_ be retained, the clause should be, “are better
qualified than all others.”[141]

The phraseology here censured is admissible in those cases only
where a previous comparison has been made. If we say, “To engage a
private tutor for a single pupil is, perhaps, of all others, the
least eligible mode of giving literary instruction,” (_Barrow on
Education_,) without making that previous discrimination, which
the word _others_ implies, we commit an error. But we may say with
propriety, “I prefer the mode of education adopted in our public
schools; and of all _other modes_, to engage a private tutor appears
to me the least eligible.”


IMPROPRIETY.

“They could easier get them by heart, and retain them in
memory.”--_Adams’s History of England._ Here the adjective is
improperly used for the adverb; it ought to be “more easily.” Swift
commits a similar error, when he says, “Ned explained his text so
full and clear,” for “so fully and clearly.”

“Thus much, I think, is sufficient to serve, by way of address, to
my patrons, the true modern critics, and may very well atone for my
past silence as well as for that, which I am like to observe for the
future.”--_Swift._ _Like_, or _similar_, is here improperly used for
_likely_, a word in signification nearly synonymous with _probable_.
We say, “he is likely to do it,” or “it is probable he will do it.”

“Charity vaunteth not itself, doth not behave itself unseemly.” Here
the adjective _unseemly_ is improperly used for the adverb, denoting
“in an unseemly manner.” _Unseemlily_ not being in use, the word
_indecently_ should be substituted.

“The Romans had no other subsistence but the scanty pillage of a
few farms.” _Other_ is redundant; it should be, “no subsistence
but,” or “no other subsistence than.” In the Saxon language, and the
earlier English writers, the word _other_ is not uniformly followed
by _than_, but sometimes with _but_, _before_, _save_, _except_[142],
thus, Mark xii. 32, “thær an God is, and nis other butan him,” thus
rendered in the Bishops’ Translation, “there is one God, and there
is none but he,” and in the common version, “none other but he.” In
the Book of Common Prayer we have, “Thou shalt have no other Gods
but me;” and the same form of expression occurs in Addison, Swift,
and other contemporary writers. Usage, however, seems of late to
have decided almost universally in favour of _than_. This decision
is not only consistent with analogy, if the word _other_ is to be
deemed a comparative, but may also, in some cases, be subservient to
perspicuity. _No other but_, _no other beside_, _no other except_,
are equivalent expressions, and do not perhaps convey precisely the
same idea with _none but_, _no other than_. Thus, if we take an
example similar to Baker’s, and suppose a person to say “A called
on me this morning,” B asks, “No one else?” “No other,” answers A,
“but my stationer.” Here the expression, as Baker remarks, seems
strictly proper, the words _no other_ having a reference to A. But
if the stationer had been the only visitor, he should say, “none
but,” or “no other _than_ the stationer called on me this morning.”
This is the opinion of Baker. The distinction, which he wishes to
establish, is sufficiently evident; but that it is warranted by
strict analysis, I do not mean to affirm.

“He has eaten no bread, nor drunk no water, these two days.” _No_ is
here improperly used for _any_, two negatives making an affirmative:
it should be, “nor drunk any water.”

“The servant must have an undeniable character.” _Undeniable_ is
equivalent to _incontrovertible_, or “not admitting dispute.”
An “undeniable character,” therefore, means, a character which
cannot be denied or disputed, whether good or bad: it should be
“unexceptionable.”

“But you are too wise to propose to yourselves an object inadequate
to your strength.”--_Watson’s History of Philip III._ _Inadequate_
means “falling short of due proportion,” and is here improperly used
in a sense nearly the reverse. It should be “to which your strength
is inadequate,” or “superior to your strength.”

“I received a letter to-day from our mutual friend.” I concur with
Baker in considering this expression to be incorrect. A may be a
friend to B, and also to C, and is therefore a friend common to both;
but not their mutual friend: for this implies reciprocity between
two individuals, or two parties. The individuals may be mutually
friends; but one cannot be the mutual friend of the other. Locke
more properly says, “I esteem the memory of our common friend.” This
is, doubtless, the correct expression; but, as the term _common_ may
denote “ordinary,” or “not uncommon,” the word _mutual_, though not
proper, may, perhaps, as Baker observes, be tolerated.

The superlatives _lowest_ and _lowermost_, _highest_ and _uppermost_,
appear to me to be frequently confounded. Thus we say, “the lowest
house in the street,” when we mean the lowest in respect to
measurement, from the basement to the top, and also the lowest in
regard to position, the inferiority being occasioned by declivity.
Now it appears to me, that when we refer to dimension, we should say,
_lowest_ or _highest_; and when we refer to site or situation, we
ought to say, _lowermost_ or _uppermost_.

“It was due, perhaps, more to the ignorance of the scholars, than to
the knowledge of the masters.”--_Swift._ It should be rather, “it
was owing,” or “it is ascribable.” The author had previously been
speaking of the first instructors of mankind, and questioning their
claim to the title of sages. To say, then, that their right to this
title, or that the appellation itself, “was due more to ignorance
than to knowledge,” is manifestly improper. Swift, however, was not
singular in using the adjective in this sense. Steele, and some
other contemporary writers, employed it in the same acceptation.
“The calamities of children are due to the negligence of the
parents.”--_Spectator_, No. 431. It is now seldom or never employed
as equivalent to “owing to,” or “occasioned by.”

“Risible,” “ludicrous,” and “ridiculous,” are frequently confounded.
_Risible_ denotes merely the capacity of laughing, and is applied
to animals having the faculty of laughter, as, “man is a risible
creature.” _Ludicrous_ is applicable to things exciting laughter
simply; _ridiculous_ to things exciting laughter with contempt. The
tricks of a monkey are _ludicrous_, the whimsies of superstition are
_ridiculous_. “The measure of the mid stream for salmon among our
forefathers is not less risible.”--_Kames’s Sketches._ He should have
said “ridiculous.”

We have already expressed our doubt of the propriety of using the
numeral adjective _one_, as referring to a plurality of individuals,
denoted by a plural noun. (_See_ p. 48.) There is something which is
not only strange to the ear, but also strikes us as ungrammatical,
in saying[143], “The Greeks and the Trojans continued the contest;
the one were favoured by Juno, the other by Venus.” At the same time,
it must be acknowledged, that there seems to be an inconsistency
in questioning this phraseology, and yet retaining some others,
which appear to be analogous to it, and can plead in their defence
reputable usage. We say, “The Romans and the Carthaginians contended
with each other;” and “The English, the Dutch, and the Spaniards
disputed, one with another, the sovereignty of the sea.” Here _each_
and _one_ clearly refer to a plurality, expressed by a noun plural.
A similar example occurs in the following sentence: “As the greatest
part of mankind are more affected by things, which strike the senses,
than by excellences, that are discovered by reason and thought, they
form very erroneous judgments, when they compare _one_ with the
other.”--_Guardian._ If we inquire, what one? we find the answer to
be “things.” Here is a manifest incongruity, which might have been
prevented, by saying, “one subject with the other,” or “when they
compare them together.” As this construction of _one_, referring to a
noun plural, seems irreconcilable with the notion of unity, and may
be avoided, it becomes a question, whether this phraseology ought to
be imitated. The subject, as far as I know, has not been considered
by any of our grammarians.

“That this was the cause of the disaster, was apparent to all.”
_Apparent_ is sometimes used in this sense. The word, however, is
equivocal, as it denotes _seeming_, opposed to _real_; and _obvious_,
opposed to _doubtful_ or _obscure_. “I consider the difference
between him and the two authors above mentioned, as more apparent
than real.”--_Campbell._ Here _apparent_ is opposed to _real_; and
to this sense it would be right to confine it, as thus all ambiguity
would be effectually prevented. “But there soon appeared very
apparent reasons for James’s partiality.”--_Goldsmith._ _Obvious_, or
_evident_, would unquestionably be preferable.

“How seldom, then, does it happen, that the mind does not find itself
in similar circumstances? Very rare indeed.”--_Trusler’s Preface to
Synon._ The adjective _rare_ is here improperly used for the adverb.
As the question, indeed, is adverbially proposed, it is somewhat
surprising that the author should answer _adjectively_: it ought to
be, “very rarely.”

“No man had ever _less_ friends, and more enemies.” _Less_ refers to
quantity, _fewer_ to number; it should be, “_fewer_ friends.”

“The mind may insensibly fall off from this relish of virtuous
actions, and by degrees exchange that pleasure, which it takes in the
performance of its duty, for delights of a much more inferior and
unprofitable nature.”--_Addison._ _Inferior_ implies comparison, but
it is grammatically a positive. When one thing is, in any respect,
lower than another, we say, “it is inferior to it;” and if a third
thing were still lower, we should say, “it is still more inferior.”
But the author is comparing only two subjects; he should therefore
have said, “of a much inferior, and more unprofitable nature.” The
expression “more preferable” is for the same reason faulty, unless
when two degrees of excess are implied.

The adjectives _agreeable_, _suitable_, _conformable_, _independent_,
_consistent_, _relative_, _previous_, _antecedent_, and many others,
are often used, where their several derivative adverbs would be
more properly employed; as, “he lives _agreeable_ to nature,” “he
wrote to me _previous_ to his coming to town,” “_tolerable_ good,”
“he acted _conformable_ to his promise.” It is worthy of remark,
however, that the idiom of our language is not repugnant to some of
these phraseologies; a circumstance which many of our grammarians
have overlooked, if we may judge from the severity with which they
have condemned them. If I say, “he acted according to nature,” the
expression is deemed unobjectionable: but is not _according_ a
participle, or, perhaps, here more properly a _participial_? “He
acted contrary to nature” is also considered as faultless; but is not
_contrary_ an adjective? Were we to reason on abstract principles, or
to adopt what is deemed the preferable phraseology, we should say,
“contrarily” and “accordingly to nature.” This, however, is not the
case. “Contrary to nature,” “according to nature,” and many similar
phraseologies, are admitted as good: why, then, is “conformable to
nature,” an expression perfectly analogous, so severely condemned?
Johnson has, indeed, uselessly enough, in my opinion, called
_according_ a preposition; fearful, however, of error, he adds, it
is properly a participle, for it is followed by _to_. _According_
is always a participle, as much as _agreeing_, and can be nothing
else. Because _secundum_ in Latin is termed a preposition, hence some
have referred _according_ to the same species of words. With equal
propriety might _in the power of_ be deemed a preposition, because
_penes_ in Latin is so denominated. Now, if “he acted contrary
to nature” and “according to nature” be deemed unexceptionable
expressions, with many others of the same kind, which might be
adduced, it follows that, “he acted agreeable,” “conformable,”
“suitable to nature,” may plead in their favour these analogous
phraseologies. I offer these observations, in order to show that,
misled by abstract reasonings, or by the servile imitation of another
language, we sometimes hastily condemn, as altogether inadmissible,
modes of expression, which are not repugnant to our vernacular idiom.
I would not, however, be understood to mean, that the adverb is
not, in these cases, much to be preferred, when it can be employed
consistently with good usage. For, if we say, “he acts agreeable
to the laws of reason,” the question is, who or what is agreeable?
the answer, according to the strict construction of the sentence,
is _he_; but it is not _he_, but _his mode of acting_, of which the
accordance is predicated; _agreeably_ is, therefore, the preferable
term.

I observe also, that, wherever the adjective is employed to
modify the meaning of another adjective, it becomes particularly
exceptionable, and can scarcely, indeed, plead aught in its favour,
as, “indifferent good,” “tolerable strong,” instead of “indifferently
good,” and “tolerably strong.” The following phraseology is
extremely inelegant, and is scarcely admissible on any principle
of analogy: “Immediately consequent to the victory, Drogheda was
invested.”--_Belsham’s History._ What was consequent? Grammatically
“Drogheda.”

“No other person, besides my brother, visited me to-day.” Here the
speaker means to say that no person, besides his brother, visited him
to-day; but his expression implies two exceptions from _none_, the
terms _other_ and _besides_ each implying one, and can, therefore, be
correct on this supposition only, that some one besides his brother
had visited him. It should be rather, “no person besides.”

“The old man had, some fifty years ago, been no mean performer
on the vielle.”--_Sterne._ This phraseology appears to me very
objectionable; and can be proper in no case, except when the date of
the period is to be expressed as uncertain. The word _some_ should be
cancelled. We may say, “I was absent some days,” because the period
is indefinite; but to say, “I was absent some five days,” either
involves an incongruity, representing a period as at once definite
and indefinite; or denotes “some five days or other,” a meaning
which the expression is rarely intended to signify.

“Brutus and Aruns killed one another.” It should be, “each other:”
“one another” is applied to more than two. “The one the other” would
be correct, though inelegant.

“It argued the most extreme vanity.”--_Hume._ _Extreme_ is derived
from a Latin superlative, and denotes “the farthest,” or “greatest
possible:” it cannot, therefore, be compared.

“Of all vices pride is the most universal.” _Universal_ is here
improperly used for _general_. The meaning of the latter admits
intension and remission, and may, therefore, be compared. The
former is an adjective, whose signification cannot be heightened or
lessened; it therefore rejects all intensive and diminutive words,
as, _so_, _more_, _less_, _least_, _most_. The expression should be,
“Of all vices pride is the most general.”

      “Tho’ learn’d, well-bred; and tho’ well-bred, sincere:
      Modestly bold, and humanly severe.”--_Pope._

_Human_ and _humane_, as Dr. Campbell observes, are sometimes
confounded. The former properly means “belonging to man;” the latter,
“kind and compassionate:” _humanly_, therefore, is improperly, in the
couplet now quoted, used for _humanely_.


SECTION III.

THE PRONOUN.


BARBARISM.

Pronouns are so few in number, and so simple, that this species
of error, in respect to them, can scarcely occur. To this class,
however, may perhaps be reduced such as, _his’n_, _her’n_, _our’n_,
_your’n_, _their’n_, for _his own_, _her own_, _our own_, &c., or for
_his one_, _her one_, &c.


SOLECISM.

“Who calls?” “’T is me.” This is a violation of that rule, by which
the verb _to be_ has the same case after it that it has before it. It
should be, “It is I.”

“You were the quarrel,” says Petulant in “The Way of the World.”
Millamant answers, “Me!” For the reason just given it should be “_I_.”

“Spare thou them, O God, which confess their faults.” As the relative
refers to persons, it should be _who_.

“Nor is mankind so much to blame, in his choice thus determining
him.”--_Swift._ _Mankind_ is a collective noun, and is uniformly
considered as plural; _his_, therefore, is a gross solecism.

“By this institution, each legion, to whom a certain portion of
auxiliaries was allotted, contained within itself every species of
lighter troops, and of missile weapons.”--_Gibbon._ It ought to be,
_to which_--the pronoun _itself_, which follows, referring to a noun
of the neuter gender. _To whom_ and _itself_ cannot each agree with
one common antecedent.

“The seeming importance given to every part of female dress, each of
which is committed to the care of a different sylph.”--_Essay on the
Writings of Pope._ This sentence is ungrammatical. _Each_ implying
“one of two,” or “every one singly of more than two,” requires the
correlative to be considered as plural; yet the antecedent _part_,
to which it refers, is singular. It should be “all parts of female
dress.”

“To be sold, the stock of Mr. Smith, left off business.” This is an
ungrammatical and very offensive vulgarism. The verb _left off_, as
Baker observes, has no subject, to which it can grammatically belong.
It should be, “who has left off,” or “leaving off business” “A. B.
lieutenant, _vice_ C. D. resigned.” Here is a similar error. Is C. D.
resigned? or is it the office which has been resigned? An excessive
love of brevity gives occasion to such solecisms.

“He was ignorant, the profane historian, of the testimony which he is
compelled to give.”--_Gibbon’s Decline of the Roman Empire._

“The youth and inexperience of the prince, he was only fifteen years
of age, declined a perilous encounter.”--_Ib._

In the former sentence _the historian_ appears neither as the
nominative, nor the regimen to any verb. If it be intended to agree
with _he_ by apposition, it should have immediately followed the
pronoun. If it be designed emphatically, and ironically, to mark the
character of the historian, it should have been thrown into the form
of a parenthetic exclamation. In the latter sentence a phraseology
occurs, which, notwithstanding its frequency in Gibbon, is extremely
awkward and inelegant. The fault may be corrected either by throwing
the age of the prince into a parenthesis, or, preferably, by the
substitution of _who_ for _he_.

“Fare thee well” is a phraseology which, though sanctioned by the
authority of a celebrated poet, and also by other writers, involves
a solecism. The verb is intransitive, and its imperative is _fare
thou_. No one would say, “I fare me well,” “we fare us well.”

“That faction in England, who most powerfully opposed his arbitrary
pretensions.”--_Mrs. Macaulay._ It ought rather to be, “that faction
in England, _which_.” It is justly observed by Priestley, “that a
term, which only implies the idea of persons, and expresses them by
some circumstance or epithet, will hardly authorize the use of _who_.”

“He was certainly one of the most acute metaphysicians, one of the
deepest philosophers, and one of the best critics, and most learned
divines, which modern times have produced.”--_Keith on the Life and
Writings of Campbell._

“Moses was the mildest of all men, which were then on the face of the
earth.”--_Geddes._

“Lord Sidney was one of the wisest and most active governors, whom
Ireland had enjoyed for several years.”--_Hume._

In the two first of these passages, _which_ is improperly applied
to persons; in the last, the author has avoided this impropriety,
and used _whom_. The pronoun _that_, however, is much preferable to
_who_, or _which_, after a superlative.

“Such of the Morescoes might remain, who demeaned themselves
as Christians.”--_Watson’s Life of Philip III._ _Such_ is here
improperly followed by _who_ instead of _as_. The correlative terms
are _those who_, and _such as_.

“It is hard to be conceived, that a set of men could ever be chosen
by their contemporaries, to have divine honours paid to them,
while numerous persons were alive, who knew their imperfections,
and who themselves, or their immediate ancestors, might have as
fair a pretence, and come in competition with them.”--_Prideaux’s
Connexion._ The identity of subject, in the relative clauses of this
sentence, requires the repetition of the same pronoun. It should be,
“who themselves, or whose immediate ancestors.”

“If you were here, you would find three or four in the parlour,
after dinner, whom you would say past their afternoons very
agreeably.”--_Swift._ The pronoun _whom_ should not be under the
government of the verb _would say_, having no connection with it; but
should be a nominative to the verb _passed_; thus, “who, you would
say, passed their afternoons.”

“By these means, that religious princess became acquainted with
Athenias, whom she found was the most accomplished woman of her age.”
_Whom_, for the reason already assigned, should be _who_, being the
nominative to the verb _was_. If it were intended to be a regimen to
the verb _found_, the sentence should proceed thus, “whom she found
to be.”

“Solomon was the wisest man, him only excepted, who was much greater
and wiser than Solomon.” In English the absolute case is the
nominative; it should, therefore, be, “he only excepted.”

“Who, instead of being useful members of society, they are pests
to mankind.” Here the verb _are_ has two nominatives, _who_ and
_they_, each representing the same subjects of discourse. One of
them is redundant; and by the use of both, the expression becomes
solecistical, there being no verb to which the relative _who_ can be
a nominative.

      “My banks, they are furnish’d with bees,”

is faulty for the same reason, though here, perhaps, the poetic
licence may be pleaded in excuse.

“It is against the laws of the realm, which, as they are preserved
and maintained by your majesty’s authority, so we assure ourselves,
you will not suffer them to be violated.” _Which_ is neither a
regimen nor a nominative to any verb; the sentence, therefore, is
ungrammatical--_Them_ is redundant.

“Whom do men say that I am?” The relative is here in the objective
case, though there be no word in the sentence by which it can be
governed. In such inverted sentences, it is a good rule for those who
are not well acquainted with the language to arrange the words in the
natural order, beginning with the nominative and the verbs, thus,
“men say, that I am who,” a sentence precisely analogous to “men say,
that I am he,” the verb requiring the same case after it, as before
it. Hence it is obvious, that it should be, “Who do men say that I
am?”

“Who do you speak to?” It ought to be _whom_, the relative being
under the government of the preposition, thus, “To whom do you speak?”

“Who she knew to be dead.”--_Henry’s Hist. of Britain._ Here also the
relative should be in the objective case, under the government of the
verb, thus, “whom she knew,” or “she knew whom to be dead.”

      “Than whom, Satan except, none higher sat.”--_Milton._

      “The king of dykes, than whom no sluice of mud,
      With deeper sable blots the silver flood.”--_Pope._

This phraseology I have already examined. In answer to Mr. Baker’s
reason for condemning the phrase “than whom,” Story’s observations
betray, as I conceive, extreme ignorance, and require correction.
“The English,” says he, “is strictly good; for the relative _whom_
is not in the same case with _sluice_, (which is the nominative to
the verb _blots_,) but referring to its antecedent, _the king of
dykes_, is very properly in the objective case, even though the
personal pronoun _he_, if substituted in its place, would be in the
nominative.”

If Mr. Story conceives that the relative must agree with its
antecedent in case, he labours under an egregious mistake. Every page
of English evinces the contrary. Yet, such must be his opinion, or
his argument means nothing; for the only reason, which he offers for
_whom_, is, that its antecedent is in the objective case. Besides,
if _than whom_ be admissible, nay proper, he will have difficulty in
assigning a good reason, why it should not be also _than him_. But
Mr. Story should have known, that, when two nouns are coupled by a
conjunction, the latter term is not governed by the conjunction, but
is either the nominative to the verb, or is governed by it, or by the
preposition understood. The sentence proceeds thus, “no sluice of
mud blots with deeper sable, than _he_ or _who_ blots.”

“It is no wonder if such a man did not shine at the court of
Queen Elizabeth, who was but another name for prudence and
economy.”--_Hume._ The word _Elizabeth_, as represented in the
latter clause, is here a mere word, _nuda vox_, and not the sign
of a person; for it is said to be another name for _prudence_ and
_economy_. Not the person, but the word, is said to be significant of
this quality. The pronoun, therefore, should be _which_, not _who_.
The sentence, however, even thus corrected, would be inelegant.
Better thus, “Queen Elizabeth, whose name was but another word for
prudence and economy.”

“Be not diverted from thy duty by any idle reflections the silly
world may make upon you.” Consistency requires either “_your_ duty,”
or “upon _thee_.” _Thy_ and _your_, a singular and a plural pronoun,
each addressed to the same individual, are incongruous.

A similar error occurs in the following passage: “I pray _you_, tarry
all night, lodge here, that _thy_ heart may be merry.”--_Bible._

“It is more good to fall among crows than flatterers, for these only
devour the dead, those the living.” The pronoun _this_ always refers
to the nearer object, _that_ to the more remote. This distinction is
here reversed. It should be, “those (crows) devour the dead; these
(flatterers) the living.” I observe also, in passing, that those
adjectives, whose mode of comparison is irregular, are not compared
by _more_ and _most_. It ought to be, “it is better.”

“It is surprising, that this people, so happy in invention, have
never penetrated beyond the elements of geometry.” It should be
_has_, _this people_ being in the singular number. We may say,
“people have,” the noun being collective, but not “this people have.”

“I and you love reading.” This is a Latinism, and not accordant with
our mode of arrangement. Wolsey was right, when he said, “Ego, et rex
meus;” but in English we reverse the order. It should be, “you and
I.” We say also, “he and I,” “they and I.” _You_ always precedes.

“Each of the sexes should keep within its proper bounds, and
content themselves with the advantages of their particular
districts.”--_Addison._ Here the pronoun does not agree with the
word to which it refers, the word _each_ being singular; whereas
_themselves_ and _their_ are plural. It should be, _itself_ and _its_.

A similar error occurs in the following sentence: “Some of
our principal public schools have each a grammar of _their_
own.”--_Barrow on Education._ It ought to be, “each a grammar of
_its_ own.” The expression is elliptical, for “schools have each
(has) a grammar of its own.” Thus we say, “Simeon and Levi took each
man _his sword_,” not _their swords._--_Gen._ xxxiv. 25.

“Let each esteem other better than themselves.”--_Bible._ For the
reason just given, it ought to be _himself_.

“So likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if
ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their
trespasses.”--_Bible._ Here is a manifest solecism, the pronoun
_their_ referring to “his brother,” a singular subject.

“I wonder that such a valiant hero as you should trifle away your
time in making war upon women.”--_Essay on the Writings of Pope._
Here the pronoun disagrees in person with the noun to which it
refers, _hero_ being of the third person, and _your_ of the second.
The connexion is, “I wonder that such a valiant hero should trifle
away _his_ time.”

“The venison, which I received yesterday, and was a present from
a friend,” &c. _Which_ is here in the objective case, and cannot
properly be understood as the nominative to the verb _was_: better,
therefore, “and which was a present.” The following sentence is
still more faulty: “It was happy for them, that the storm, in which
they were, and was so very severe, lasted but a short time.” This is
ungrammatical, the verb “was” having no nominative. It should be,
“which was.”

“There is not a sovereign state in Europe, but keeps a body of
regular troops in their pay.” This expression, to say the least of
it, is inelegant and awkward. Better, “its pay.” “Is any nation
sensible of the lowness of their own manners?”--_Kames. Nation_ is
here improperly construed as both singular and plural. It should be
rather “its own.”

“The treaty he concluded can only be considered as a temporary
submission, and of which he took no care to secure the continuance
of it.”--_Dryden._ The redundancy of the words _of it_, renders the
sentence somewhat ungrammatical. It should run thus, “The treaty he
concluded can only be considered as a temporary submission, of which
he took no care to secure the continuance.”

An improper reference occurs in the following sentence: “Unless
one be very cautious, he will be liable to be deceived.” _One_
here answers to the indefinite word _on_ in French, and cannot be
represented by any pronoun. It must, therefore, be repeated, thus,
“Unless one be very cautious, one will be liable to be deceived.”


IMPROPRIETY.

“Give me them books.” Here the substantive pronoun is used
adjectively, instead of the demonstrative _those_ or _these_.
The substantive pronouns, which are, strictly speaking, the
only pronouns, cannot be construed as adjectives agreeing with
substantives. We cannot say, “it book,” “they books,” “them books:”
but “this” or “that book,” “these” or “those books.” The former
phraseology may be deemed solecistical.

“Great numbers were killed on either side.”--_Watson’s Philip III._
“The Nile flows down the country above five hundred miles from the
tropic of Cancer, and marks on either side the extent of fertility by
the measure of its inundation.”--_Gibbon._

It has been already observed, that the Saxon word _ægther_ signifies
_each_, as Gen. vii. 2. “Clean animals thou shalt take by sevens
of each kind,” _ægthres gecyndes_. The English word _either_ is
sometimes used in the same sense. But as this is the only word in our
language, by which we can express “one of two,” “which of the two you
please,” and as it is generally employed in that sense, perspicuity
requires that it be strictly confined to this signification. For,
if _either_ be used equivocally, it must, in many cases, be utterly
impossible for human ingenuity to ascertain, whether only “one of
two,” or “both,” be intended. In such expressions, for example,
as “take either side,” “the general ordered his troops to march on
either bank,” how is the reader or hearer to divine, whether _both
sides_, _both banks_, or _only one_, be signified? By employing
_each_ to express “both,” taken individually, and _either_ to denote
“one of the two,” all ambiguity is removed.

“The Bishop of Clogher intends to call on you this morning, as well
as your humble servant, in my return from Chapel Izzard.”--_Addison
to Swift._ After the writer has spoken of himself in the third
person, there is an impropriety in employing the pronoun of the
first. Much better “in his return.”

“The ends of a divine and human legislator are vastly
different.”--_Warburton._ From this sentence it would seem, that
there is only one subject of discourse, _the ends_ belonging to one
individual, _a divine and human legislator_. The author intended to
express two different subjects, namely, “the objects of a divine,”
and “the objects of a human legislator.” The demonstrative _those_ is
omitted. It should be, “the ends of a divine, and those of a human
legislator, are vastly different.” This error consists in defect,
or an improper ellipsis of the pronoun: in the following sentence
the error is redundancy. “They both met on a trial of skill.” _Both_
means “they two,” as _ambo_ in Latin is equivalent to “οἱ δύο” It
should therefore be, “both met on a trial of skill.”

“These two men (A and B) are both equal in strength.” This, says
Baker, is nonsense; for these words signify only, that A is equal
in strength, and B equal in strength, without implying to whom; so
that the word _equal_ has nothing to which it refers. “A and B,”
says he, “are equal in strength,” is sense; this means, that they
are equal to each other. “A and B are both equal in strength to C,”
is likewise sense. It signifies, that A is equal to C, and that B
likewise is equal to C. Thus Mr. Baker. Now, it appears to me, that,
when he admits the expression, “are both equal,” as significant
of the equality of each, he admits a phraseology which does not
strictly convey that idea. For if we say, “A and B are both equal,”
it seems to me to imply, that the two individuals are possessed of
two attributes or qualities, one of which is here expressed; and in
this sense only, as I conceive, is this phraseology correct. Thus we
may say, with strict propriety, “A and B are both equal in strength,
and superior in judgment to their contemporaries.” Or it may denote,
that “they two together, namely, A and B, are equal to C singly.”
In the former case, _both_ is necessarily followed by _and_, which
is in Latin rendered by _et_. Thus, “A and B are the two things,
(both) _equal in strength_, and (add) _superior in judgment_ to their
contemporaries.” In the latter case, it is equivalent to _ambo_,
expressing two collectively, as, “they two _together_ are equal to C,
but not _separately_.” I am aware, that the word _both_ in English,
like _ambo_ in Latin, is an ambiguous term, denoting either “the two
collectively,” or “the two separately,” and that many examples of
the latter usage may be adduced. But that surely cannot be deemed
a correct or appropriate term, which, in its strict signification,
conveys an idea different from that intended by the speaker; or which
leaves the sentiment in obscurity, and the reader in doubt. The word
_each_, substituted for _both_, renders the expression clear and
precise, thus, “A and B are each equal to C, in strength.”[144]

An error the reverse of this occurs in the following sentence:
“This proves, that the date of each letter must have been nearly
coincident.” Coincident with what? Not surely with itself; nor can
the date of each letter be coincident with each other. It should be,
“that the dates of both letters must have been nearly coincident with
each other.”

“It’s great cruelty to torture a poor dumb animal.” Better, _’Tis_,
in order to distinguish the contraction from the genitive singular of
the pronoun _it_.

“Neither Lady Haversham, nor Miss Mildmay, will ever believe but
what I have been entirely to blame.” The pronoun _what_, equivalent
to _that which_, is here improperly used for _that_. This mode of
expression still obtains among the lower orders of the people, and is
not confined to them in the northern parts of the island. It should
be, “_that_ I have been.” The converse of this error occurs in the
following passages:

“That all our doings may be ordered by thy governance, to do always
that is righteous in thy sight.”--_Book of Common Prayer._

“For, if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted, according to
that a man hath.”--_Bible._

The pronouns _it_ and _that_ were formerly used as including the
relative. “This submission is it implieth them all.” “This is it men
mean by distributive justice.”--_Hobbes._ “To consider advisedly of
that is moved.”--_Bacon._ This usage is now obsolete. The clauses
should therefore proceed thus, “to do always what,” or “that, which
is righteous.” “According to what,” or “that, which a man hath.”


SECTION IV.

THE VERB.


BARBARISM.

“Thus did the French ambassadors, with great show of their king’s
affection, and many sugared words, seek to _addulce_ all matters
between the two kings.”--_Bacon._ The verb “to addulce” is obsolete.

      “Do villany, do; since you profess to
      Like workmen, I’ll example you with thievery.”
                                   _Shakspeare._

The verb “to example,” as equivalent to the phrase “to set an
example,” is obsolete; and when used for “to exemplify,” may be
deemed obsolescent. “The proof whereof,” says Spencer in his _State
of Ireland_, “I saw sufficiently exampled;” better “exemplified.”

“I called at noon at Mrs. Masham’s, who desired me not to let the
prophecy be published, for fear of angering the queen.”--_Swift._ The
verb “to anger” is almost obsolete. In Scotland, and in the northern
part of England, it is still colloquially used; but in written
language, of respectable authority, it now rarely occurs. I have met
with it once or twice in Swift or Pope; since their time it appears
to have been gradually falling into disuse.

“Shall we once more go to fight against our brethren, or shall we
surcease?”--_Geddes’s Transl._ The verb to “surcease” is obsolete.

“And they and he, upon this incorporation and institution, and onyng
of themself into a realme, ordaynyd,” &c.--_Fortescue._ Here we have
the participle of the verb “to one,” now obsolete, for “to unite.”

“For it is no power to may alien, and put away; but it is a power
to may have, and kepe to himself. So it is no power to may syne,
and to do ill, or to may be syke, or wex old, or that a man may
hurt himself; for all thees powers comyne of impotencye.”--_Ib._ It
has been already observed, that the verb _may_ is derived from the
Saxon mægan, _posse_.--_See_ p. 97. From the passage before us it
appears, that in the time of Fortescue (anno 1440) the infinitive “to
may,” for “to be able,” was in use. It has now been long obsolete.
In the following passage, it forms what is called a compound
tense with the word _shall_, the sign of the infinitive being
suppressed. “Wherthorough the parlements schall may do more good in
a moneth.”--_Ib._ That is, “shall be able to do.”

“Wherefor al, that he dothe _owith_ to be referryed to his
kingdom.”--_Ib._ The verb to _owe_, as expressive of duty, is now
obsolete. It has been supplanted by _ought_, formerly its preterite
tense, and now used as a present. We should now say, “ought to be
referred.”

“Both these articles were unquestionably true, and could easily
have been proven.”--_Henry’s History of Britain._ “Admitting the
charges against the delinquents to be fully proven.”--_Belsham’s
History._ _Proven_ is now obsolete, having given place to the regular
participle. It is still, however, used in Scotland, and is therefore
deemed a Scotticism.

“Methoughts I returned to the great hall, where I had been the
morning before.” _Methoughts_ is barbarous, and also violates
analogy, the third person being _thought_, and not _thoughts_.


SOLECISM.

“You was busy, when I called.” Here a pronoun plural is joined with
a verb in the singular number. It should be, “you were.”

“The keeping good company, even the best, is but a less shameful
art of losing time. What we here call science and study are little
better.” _What_ is equivalent to _that which_. It should be _is_, and
not _are_; thus, “that, which we call ... is little better.”

“Three times three _is_ nine,” and “three times three are nine,” are
modes of expression in common use; and it has become a question,
which is the more correct. The Romans admitted both phraseologies.
“Quinquies et vicies duceni quadrageni singuli _fiunt_ sex millia
et viginti quinque.”--_Colum._ Here the distributive numerals
are the nominatives to the verb. “Ubi _est_ septies millies
sestertium.”--_Cic._ Here the adverbial numerals make the nominative,
and the verb is singular. Plurality being evidently implied, the
plural verb seems more consonant with our natural conception of
numbers, as well as with the idiom of our language.

“This is one of those highwaymen, that was condemned last sessions.”
According to the grammatical construction of this sentence, “one of
those highwaymen” is the predicate; for the syntactical arrangement
is, “This (highwayman), that was condemned last sessions, is one of
those highwaymen.” But this is not the meaning which this sentence
is in general intended to convey: for it is usually employed to
denote, that several highwaymen were condemned, and that this is one
of them. The sentence, therefore, thus understood, is ungrammatical;
for the antecedent is, in this case, not _one_, but _highwaymen_. The
relative, therefore, being plural, should be joined with a plural
verb, thus, “This is one of those highwaymen, that _were_ condemned
last sessions.”

“I had went to Lisbon, before you knew that I had arrived in
England.” This is an egregious solecism, the auxiliary verb _had_,
which requires the perfect participle, being here joined with the
preterite tense. It should be, “I had gone.”

“He would not fall the trees this season.” The verb “to fall” is
intransitive, and cannot therefore be followed by an objective case,
denoting a thing acted upon. It should be, “he would not fell.”

“Let him know, that I shall be over in spring, and that by all means
he sells the horses.”--_Swift._ Here we have in the latter clause a
thing expressed as done or doing, for a thing commanded. It should
be, “that he should sell;” or elliptically, “that he sell.”

“It is very probable that neither of these are the meaning of the
text.” Neither, means, “not the one, nor the other,” denoting the
exclusion of each of two things. It should, therefore, be, “neither
_is_ the meaning of the text.”

“He was a man, whose vices were very great, and had the art to
conceal them from the eyes of the public.” According to the
grammatical construction of this sentence, _vices_ understood is the
nominative to the verb _had_; thus, “whose vices were very great, and
whose vices had the art to conceal them.” It should be, “and who had
the art to conceal them.”

“At the foot of this hill was soon built such a number of houses,
that amounted to a considerable city.” Here the verb _amounted_ has
no nominative. To render the sentence grammatical, it should be,
“that they amounted,” or “as amounted to a considerable city.”

“It requires more logic than you possess, to make a man to believe
that prodigality is not a vice.” After the verb “to make,” the sign
of the infinitive should be omitted. _See_ Rule xv. note 3.

“He dare not,” “he need not,” may be justly pronounced solecisms, for
“he dares,” “he needs.”

“How do your pulse beat?” _Pulse_ is a noun singular, and is here
ungrammatically joined with a verb plural. It should be, “how _does_
your pulse beat?”

“The river had overflown its banks.” _Overflown_ is the participle of
the verb _to fly_, compounded with _over_. It should be “overflowed,”
the participle of “overflow.”

“They that sin rebuke before all.” The pronoun, which should be the
regimen of the verb _rebuke_, is here put in the nominative case. It
should, therefore, be _them_. The natural order is, “rebuke them,
that sin.”

“There are principles innate in man, which ever have, and ever will
incline him to this offence.” If the ellipsis be supplied, the
sentence will be found to be ungrammatical; thus “which ever have
incline, and ever will incline.” It should be, “which ever have
inclined, and ever will incline.”

“Nor is it easy to conceive that in substituting the manners of
Persia to those of Rome, he was actuated by vanity.”--_Gibbon._
“Substitute _to_,” is a Latinism. It should be, “substitute _for_.”

“I had rather live in forty Irelands, than under the frequent
disquiets of hearing, that you are out of order.”--_Swift’s Letters._
“You had better return home without delay.” In both these examples
_would_ is far preferable, thus, “I would rather live,” “you would
better return,” or “you would do better to return.”

“That he had much rather be no king at all, than have heretics for
his subjects.”--_Watson’s Philip III._ Here is involved the same
error. It should be, “he would.”

“The nobility of England consisted only of one duke, four earls, one
viscount, and twenty-nine barons, all the nobles of the Lancastrian
party having been either killed in battles, or on scaffolds, or
had fled into foreign parts.”--_Henry’s History._ This sentence is
ungrammatical. The word _nobles_ joined to the participle _having_
must be regarded as put absolutely, and therefore to the verb
_had_ there is strictly no nominative. But, even were a nominative
introduced, the structure of the sentence would be still highly
objectionable, the two last clauses, “having been killed,” and “they
had fled,” being utterly discordant one with the other. The primary
idea to be expressed is the _fewness of the nobility_; this forms
the subject of the principal clause. There are two reasons to be
assigned for this fewness, _their destruction_ and _their flight_;
these form the subjects of the two subordinate clauses. Between these
two, therefore, there should be the strictest congruity; and in this
respect the sentence is faulty. It ought to proceed either thus,
“The nobility of England consisted only of one duke, four earls,
one viscount, and twenty-nine barons; for all the nobles of the
Lancastrian party had either been killed in battles, or on scaffolds,
or had fled into foreign parts;” or thus, “all the nobles having been
killed, or having fled.” The latter is the preferable form.

“He neglected to profit of this occurrence.” This phraseology occurs
frequently in Hume. “To profit of,” is a Gallicism; it ought to be,
“to profit _by_ this occurrence.”

“The people of England may congratulate _to_ themselves, that
the nature of our government and the clemency of our king, secure
us.”--_Dryden._ “Congratulate to,” is a Latinism. The person
congratulated should be in the objective case governed by the verb;
the subject is preceded by the preposition _on_, as, “I congratulate
you _on_ your arrival.”

“You will arrive to London before the coach.”

“A priest newly arrived to the north-west parts of
Ireland.”--_Swift’s Sacr. Test._

In these examples the verb “to arrive,” is followed by _to_, instead
of _at_, an error which should be carefully avoided. Good writers
never construe it with the preposition significant of motion or
progression concluded, but with those prepositions which denote
propinquity or inclusion, namely, _at_ or _in_. Hence also to join
this verb with adverbs, expressive of motion to, or towards a place,
is improper. We should say, “he arrived _here_, _there_, _where_,”
not--“_hither_, _thither_, _whither_.”

“Elizabeth was not unconcerned; she remonstrated to
James.”--_Andrew’s Continuation of Henry’s History._ This is
incorrect. We remonstrate _with_ and not _to_ a person, and _against_
a thing.

“I am the Lord that maketh all things, that stretcheth forth the
heavens alone, that spreadeth the earth abroad by myself.” According
to the structure of the second and third clauses of this sentence,
_the Lord_ is the antecedent to _that_, which is, therefore, properly
joined with the third person of the verbs following, “maketh,”
“spreadeth;” but the pronoun of the first person, _myself_, in the
last clause, does not accord with this structure; for as we cannot
say, “he spreadeth the earth by myself,” there being only one agent
implied, and where _he_ and _myself_ are supposed to allude to
one person, so we cannot say, “that (Lord) spreadeth the earth by
myself,” but “by himself,” an identity of person being indispensably
requisite. The sentence, therefore, should conclude thus, “that
spreadeth abroad the earth by himself.” If _myself_ be retained, the
pronoun _I_ must be considered as the antecedent, and the sentence
will then run thus: “I am the Lord, that make all things, that
stretch forth the heavens alone, that spread abroad the earth by
_myself_.”

      “Thou great First Cause, least understood,
        Who all my sense confin’d
      To know but this, that thou art good,
        And that myself am blind.”--_Pope._

The antecedent to the pronoun _who_ is the pronoun of the second
person singular. The relative, therefore, being of the same person,
should be joined to the second person singular of the verb, namely,
“confinedst.”

“The executive directory, to prove that they will not reject any
means of reconciliation, declares,” &c.--_Belsham’s Hist._ The
nominative is here joined to a verb singular, and at the same time
represented by a pronoun plural. The error may be corrected either
by the substitution of _it_ for _they_, or _declare_ instead of
_declares_.

“These friendly admonitions of Swift, though they might sometimes
produce good effects, in particular cases, when properly timed, yet
could they do but little towards eradicating faults.”--_Sheridan._
The nominative _admonitions_ is connected with no verb, the pronoun
_they_ being the nominative to the verb _could_. The sentence,
therefore, is ungrammatical; nor can the figure _hyperbaton_ be
here pleaded in excuse, as the simplicity and shortness of the
sentence render it unnecessary. _They_ in the third clause should be
suppressed.

“This dedication may serve for almost any book, that has, is, or
shall be published.”--_Bolingbroke._ _Has_ being merely a part of
a compound tense, conveys no precise meaning without the rest of
the tense. When joined, then, to the participle, here belonging to
the three auxiliaries, the sentence proceeds thus, “This dedication
may serve for almost any book, that _has_ published.” It ought to
be “has been, is, or shall be published.” The following sentence is
chargeable with an error of the same kind.

“This part of knowledge has been always growing, and will do so,
till the subject be exhausted.” Do what? The auxiliary cannot refer
to _been_, for the substantive verb, or verb of existence, does not
imply action, nor can we say, “do growing.” It ought to be, “has been
growing, and will still be so.”

“All that can be now urged, is the reason of the thing, and this I
shall do.”--_Warburton._ Here is a similar incongruity. He should
have said, “and this shall be done.”

Some of the preceding errors, with those which follow under this
head, may be denominated rather inaccuracies, than solecisms.

“’T was twenty years and more, that I have known him,” says Pope to
Gay, speaking of Congreve’s death. It ought to be, “It is twenty
years and more,” the period concluding with the present time, or the
time then present. He might have said, “It is now twenty years,”
where the adverb _now_, being obviously admissible, points to present
time, and necessarily excludes the preterite tense. Pope says, “’T
was twenty years.” When? not surely in some part of the past time,
but at the time of writing.

“It _were_ well for the insurgents, and fortunate for the king, if
the blood, that was now shed, had been thought a sufficient expiation
for the offence.”--_Goldsmith._ “It were,” which is equivalent to “it
would be,” is evidently incongruous with the following tense, “had
been thought.” It ought to be, as he was speaking of past time, “it
would have been,” or, “it had been, well for the insurgents.”

“Was man like his Creator in wisdom and goodness, I should be for
allowing this great model.”--_Addison._ This form of expression
cannot be pronounced entirely repugnant to analogy, the preterite
of the auxiliary “to have” being used in a similar sense. But
the verb “to be” having a mood appropriate to the expression of
conditionality, the author should have said, “Were man like his
Creator.”

“If you please to employ your thoughts on that subject, you
would easily conceive the miserable condition many of us are
in.”--_Steele._ Here there is obviously an incongruity of tense. It
should be either, “if you please to employ, you _will_ conceive,” or
“if it pleased you to employ, you _would_ conceive.”

“James used to compare him to a cat, who always fell upon her
legs.”--_Adam’s Hist. of England._ Here the latter clause, which is
intended to predicate an attribute of the species, expresses simply a
particular fact; in other words, what is intended to be signified as
equally true of all, is here limited to one of the kind. It should
be, “always _falls_ upon her legs.”

“This is the last time I shall ever go to London.” This mode of
expression, though very common, is certainly improper after the
person is gone, and can be proper only before he sets out. The French
speak correctly when they say, “la dernière fois que je vais,” _i.e._
the last time of my going. We ought to say, “this is the last time I
shall be in London.”

“He accordingly draws out his forces, and offers battle to Hiero,
who immediately accepted it.” Consistency requires, that the last
verb be in the same tense with the preceding verbs. The actions are
described as present; the language is graphical, and that which has
been properly enough denominated the “historical tense” should not be
employed. It ought to be, “who immediately accepts it.”

“I have lost this game, though I thought I should _have won_ it.” It
ought to be, “though I thought I should _win_ it.” This is an error
of the same kind, as, “I expected to have seen you,” “I intended
to have written.” The preterite time is expressed by the tenses
“expected,” “intended;” and, how far back soever that expectation or
intention may be referred, the seeing or writing must be considered
as contemporary, or as soon to follow; but cannot, without absurdity,
be considered as anterior. It should be, “I expected to see,” “I
intended to write.” Priestley, in defending the other phraseology,
appears to me to have greatly erred, the expression implying a
manifest impossibility. The action, represented as the object of
an expectation or intention, and therefore, in respect to these,
necessarily future, cannot surely, without gross absurdity, be
exhibited as past, or antecedent to these. In the following passage
the error seems altogether indefensible. “The most uncultivated
Asiatics discover that sensibility, which, from their situation on
the globe, we should expect them to have felt.”--_Robertson’s History
of America._ The author expresses himself, as if he referred to a
past sensation, while the introductory verb shows that he alludes
to a general fact. The incongruity is obvious. He should have said,
“expect them to feel.”

      “Fierce as he moved, his silver shafts resound.”--_Pope._

Much better, “Fierce as he moves.” Congruity of tense is thus
preserved; and there is, besides, a peculiar beauty in employing the
present,--a beauty, of which the preterite is wholly incapable. The
former imparts vivacity to the expression; it presents the action,
with graphical effect, to the mind of the reader; and thus, by
rendering him a spectator of the scene, impresses the imagination,
and rouses the feelings with greater energy. Compared to the latter,
it is like the pencil of the artist to the pen of the historian.

“Jesus answering said unto him, What wilt thou, that I should do unto
thee?” The blind man said unto him: “Lord, that I might receive my
sight.” It ought to be, “that I may receive my sight,” _I will_ being
understood; thus, “I will, that I may receive my sight,” where the
present wish, and the attainment of it, are properly represented as
contemporary.

“These things have I spoken unto you, that your joy might be full.”
Better, “that your joy may be full.”

“If an atheist would peruse the volume of nature, he would confess,
that there was a God.” Universal, or abstract truths, require the
present tense; it should be, “that there _is_ a God.”

“ ... impresses us with a feeling, as if refinement was nothing,
as if faculties were nothing, as if virtue was nothing, as if all
that was sweetest, and all that was highest in human nature was
an idle show.”--_Godwin’s Life of Chaucer._ This sentence errs
at once against elegance and accuracy. The former offence may be
partly corrected, by substituting the conditional for the indicative
tense, in the hypothetical clauses. But the author’s principal error
consists in converting a general proposition into a particular fact,
by representing that as past which is always present and immutable.
The sentence should proceed thus: “Impresses us with a feeling, as
if refinement _were_ nothing, as if faculties _were_ nothing, as if
virtue _were_ nothing, as if all that _is_ sweetest, and all that
_is_ highest in human nature, _were_ an idle show.”

A similar error occurs in this passage: “He proceeded to demonstrate,
that death _was_ not an evil;” and also in this, “I have frequently
been assured by great ministers, that politics _were_ nothing, but
common sense.”

“Tom has wit enough to make him a pleasant companion, _was_ it
polished by good manners.” As the latter clause is intended to be
purely hypothetical, the verb should not be in the indicative mood.
“_Were_ it polished,” is the proper expression.

“He understood the language of Balnibarbi, although it were different
from that of this island.”--_Swift’s Voyage to Laputa._ From the
phraseology here employed, the reader might naturally infer, that
the language of the island, and that of Balnibarbi, were identical;
for a concessive term, as I have already said, when joined to what
is called the conjunctive form of the verb, implies pure hypothesis,
as contrary to fact; or, in other words, implies a negation of the
attribute expressed. The author’s intention was to signify, that
the languages _were not_ the same. He should, therefore, have said,
“although it _was_ different.”

“The circumstances were as follows.” Several grammarians and critics
have approved this phraseology; I am inclined, however, to concur
with those, who prefer “as follow.” To justify the former mode of
expression, the verb must be considered as impersonal. This, I own,
appears to me a very questionable solution of the difficulty; for
I am convinced, that we have no impersonal verbs in English, but
such as are uniformly preceded by _it_. We frequently, indeed, meet
with sentences, where verbs occur without a nominative, and in the
singular number. These are, by some, considered as impersonal verbs,
to which the nominative _it_ is understood. I apprehend, however,
that, on strict inquiry, some one or other of the preceding words,
which are now considered as conjunctions, adverbs, or particles, was
originally the nominative; and that it is only since the primitive
and real character of these words has been obliterated and lost, that
we have found it necessary to inquire for another nominative. Thus,
if the word _as_ be equivalent to _it_, _that_, or _which_[145],
then it is obvious, that, when we say, “the circumstances were _as
follows_,” there is no real ellipsis of the nominative involved, nor,
therefore, any ground for asserting the impersonality of the verb,
in order to explain the syntax, or construction of the phrase; for
the word _as_, equivalent to _it_, _that_, or _which_, is the true
nominative. It is evident, then, that this solution of the difficulty
must be rejected as false; and that the argument in favour of “as
follows,” resting on the supposed impersonality of the verb, and the
suppression of the pronoun, is entirely unfounded.

If _as_ then be the nominative to the verb, and be synonymous with
_it_, _that_, or _which_, it is of importance to determine, whether
_as_ be a singular, or a plural word; or whether it be either the
one, or the other. That it is construed as singular, there can be
no doubt. We say, “his insensibility is such, _as excites_ our
detestation.” That it is also joined to a verb plural is equally
certain, thus, “his manners are such, _as are_ universally pleasing.”
In the former example, _such as_ is equivalent to _that which_, and
in the latter to _those which_. If _as_, then, be either singular
or plural, and synonymous with _it_, _that_, or _which_, I conceive
that, when it refers to a plural antecedent, it must, like _which_,
be considered as plural, and joined to a plural verb. Now, it is
surely more consonant with analogy to say, “the circumstances were,
which follow,” than _it follows_, or _that follows_. Besides, when
the demonstrative _such_ precedes, and is joined to a plural noun, it
is universally admitted, that _as_ must then be followed by a plural
verb. If so, the construction of the word _as_ cannot, I apprehend,
be in the least degree affected by the ellipsis of the correlative
term. Let us now hear those who adopt the contrary opinion.

Baker prefers the verb singular, and remarks “that there are
instances in our language of verbs in the third person without a
nominative case, as, ‘he censures her, so far as regards.’” In
answer to this it may be observed, that, if the word _as_ is to be
considered in no other light, than as a conjunctive particle, it is
certainly true, that the verb _regards_ has no nominative. But I am
persuaded, no person who has examined the theory of Mr. Tooke can
entertain a doubt respecting the original and real character of this
word. Nay, if we investigate the true and primitive import of the
correspondent Latin terms _ut_ and _uti_, we shall find, that these,
which are termed adverbs, are, in fact, the pronouns ὅτι, ὁτ’, and
that _quod_ (anciently written _quodde_) is nothing else than καὶ
ὅττι, which, like our word _that_, is sometimes called a conjunction,
and sometimes a pronoun. Why the original character and real import
of the word _as_ have been completely merged in the name of adverb,
while the word _that_ has been assigned the double character of
pronoun and conjunction, it would be easy to show, if the discussion
were essential to the question before us. But in answer to Baker’s
remark, it is sufficient to observe, that _as_ means properly _it_,
_that_, or _which_.

Campbell adopts the opinion of Baker. “When a verb,” says he, “is
used impersonally, it ought undoubtedly to be in the singular
number, whether the neuter pronoun be expressed or understood.” But
a question naturally arises, whence has the author learned that the
verb is impersonal? There appears to me to be no more impersonality
in the verb, when we say, “it is as follows,” than when we say, “it
is such, as follows,” or, “they are such, as follow.” If _as_ be
admitted as the nominative in two of these examples, I can perceive
no reason for rejecting it in the third. But here lies, as will
presently appear, the author’s great error. Unacquainted with the
true meaning of the word _as_, he conceived it as incapable of
becoming a nominative to a verb, as _ut_ or _uti_ is deemed in Latin;
and he therefore immediately recurs to _ellipsis_.

“For this reason” (that is, because the verb is impersonal), he
proceeds to observe, “analogy as well as usage favour this mode of
expression, _The conditions of the agreement were as follows_, and
not _as follow_.”

How analogy favours this mode of expression, I am utterly at a loss
to conceive. The general rule surely is, that to every verb there
shall be a nominative, and that this nominative shall be expressed,
unless its presence in some preceding clause shall render the
repetition of it unnecessary. But how is it consonant with analogy,
that no nominative shall appear; or that the supposed nominative
shall not be found in any part of the sentence? This surely is
repugnant to analogy.

“A few late writers,” he observes, “have inconsiderately adopted
this last form (as follow) through a mistake of the construction.”
But, if the verb be not impersonal, the error is his, not theirs.
I must observe, likewise, that from the manner in which the author
expresses himself, one would naturally infer, that a few writers,
either contemporary, or immediately preceding his own time, had
inconsiderately introduced a solecism into our language. When he
offered this observation, he surely was not aware that Steele
and Addison, nearly seventy years before the publication of “The
Philosophy of Rhetoric,” used the plural form. “The most eminent
of the kennel,” says Steele, “are blood-hounds, which lead the
van, and are _as follow_.”--_Tatler_, No. 62. “The words were _as
follow_.”--_Ibid._ No. 104. “The words are _as follow_.”--_Addison_,
_Spectator_, No. 513.

“For the same reason,” continues he, still presuming the verb to
be impersonal, “we ought to say, _I shall consider his censures so
far only, as concerns my friend’s conduct_, not _concern_. It is
manifest,” he observes, “that the word _conditions_ in the first
case, and _censures_ in the second, cannot serve as nominatives.”
This observation demonstrates that the author’s argument is founded
in his ignorance of the real character of the word _as_. The most
extraordinary part of his reasoning follows. “But,” says he, “if we
give either sentence another turn, and instead of _as_, say _such
as_, the verb is no longer impersonal. The pronoun _such_ is the
nominative, whose number is determined by its antecedent. Thus we
must say, _they were such as follow_; _such of his censures only as
concern my friend_.” This is truly an extraordinary assertion. The
antecedent correlative term _such_ can have no connexion whatever
with the subsequent verb, but must agree with the principal subject
of discourse. Not only does analogy require this, but the usage of
every language with which I am acquainted. If we say, _Perseverantia
fuit tanta, quantus erat furor._ _Is est, quem dicimus._ _Talis est,
qualem esse creditis._ _Illæ erant conditiones, quæ sequuntur_,--the
antecedent correlative terms _tanta_, _is_, _talis_, _illæ_,--have no
connexion whatever with the verbs in the subsequent clause, _erat_,
_dicimus_, _creditis_, _sequuntur_. The truth of this observation
must be sufficiently obvious to every classical scholar.

But to illustrate the extreme inaccuracy of the learned author’s
opinion, let us change the correlative terms, and say, “I will
consider those censures only, which concern my friend.” In this
sentence it will not be questioned that _those_ and _censures_ are in
the objective case, under the government of the verb. And can it be
doubted, if we say, “I will consider such censures,” that _censures_
with its concordant adjective are in the same case? It is impossible,
I conceive, to make this plainer; but we shall suppose, for the sake
of illustration, if this should yet be deemed necessary, the example
in question to be thus rendered in Latin, _eas tantum reprehensiones
perpendam, quæ ad amicum meum attinent_. Now, what should we think
of his classical attainments who should contend that _eas_ or
_reprehensiones_ is the nominative to the verb? If we revert, then,
to the original terms, and say, “I will consider such of his censures
as concern my friend,” by what rule of grammar, by what principle of
analysis, can we suppose _such_ to be the nominative to the verb? For
let me ask, what is he to consider? Is it not _such censures_? And
are we, contrary to every principle of English grammar, to represent
the object or subject after an active verb, as in the nominative
case? The absurdity is too monstrous for a moment’s consideration.
The very argument, therefore, by which the author defends his
doctrine is founded in error, and involves an absurdity. Murray, as
usual, adopts the opinion of Campbell.

If it should be inquired how _as_, an adverb or a conjunctive
particle, can be the nominative to a verb, it may be answered, that
to whatever order of words we reduce this term, it was evidently at
first what we denominate a pronoun; and that it still so far retains
its primitive character as to supply the place of a nominative.
It is of little moment by what designation it be called, if its
character and real import are well understood, any more than it can
be of consequence whether we call _that_ a conjunction or a pronoun,
provided we know, that it is truly and essentially the same word in
the same meaning wherever it occurs. I would observe, also, though
my limits will not permit me to illustrate the principle, that those,
who disapprove the verb singular in the examples in question, may
notwithstanding admit it in such expressions as _so far as_, _so long
as_, and all similar phraseologies.

“To illustrate, and often to correct him, I have meditated Tacitus,
examined Suetonius, and consulted the following moderns.”--_Gibbon._
_To meditate_, when a regimen is assigned to it, as here, means _to
plot_, _to contrive_, as, “he meditated designs against the state.”
When it signifies _to ponder_, or _to reflect seriously_, it should
be followed by the preposition _on_, as, “he meditates _on_ the law
of God day and night.”


IMPROPRIETY.

“They form a procession to proceed the palanquin of the
ambassador.”--_Anderson’s Embassy to China._ Here the verb _to
proceed_, or _go forward_, is improperly used for _to precede_, or
_to go before_.

“He waved the subject of his greatness.”--_Dryden._ “To wave” is
properly “to move loosely,” and should be distinguished from “to
waive,” _i.e._ “to leave” or “to turn from.”--_See_ _Skinner’s Etym._

“It lays on the table; it laid on the table.” This error is very
common, and should be carefully avoided. The verb _to lay_ is an
active verb; _to lie_ is a neuter verb. When the subject of discourse
is active, the former is to be used; when the subject is neither
active nor passive, the latter ought to be employed. Thus, “he
lays down the book,” “he laid down the book,” where the nominative
expresses an agent, or a person acting. “The book lies there,” “the
book lay there,” where the nominative expresses something, neither
active, nor passive. When we hear such expressions as these, “he lays
in bed,” “he laid in bed,” a question naturally occurs, what does
he lay? what did he lay? This question demonstrates the impropriety
of the expressions. The error has originated, partly in an affected
delicacy, rejecting the verb “to lie,” as being synonymous with the
verb “to tell a falsehood wilfully,” and partly from the identity of
the one verb in the present with the other in the preterite sense;
thus, “_lay_,” “laid,” “laid;” “lie,” “_lay_,” “lain.”

“The child was overlain.” The participle, for the reason now given,
should be _overlaid_.

“It has been my brother you saw in the theatre, and not my cousin.”
This use of the preterite definite is, I believe, confined to
Scotland, where, in colloquial language, it is very common. The Scots
employ it in those cases, in which an Englishman uses either the
preterite indefinite, or the verb signifying necessity. Thus, in the
preceding instance, an Englishman would say, “it _must have been_ my
brother, you saw in the theatre.”

“Without having attended to this, we will be at a loss in
understanding several passages in the classics.”--_Blair’s Lectures._
“In the Latin language, there are no two words we would more readily
take to be synonymous, than _amare_ and _diligere_.”--_Ib._ This
error occurs frequently in Blair. In the former example it should be
_shall_, and in the latter _should_. (See p. 98.)

An error, the reverse of this, occurs in the following passage.
“There is not a girl in town, but let her have her will, in going
to a mask, and she shall dress like a shepherdess.”--_Spectator_,
No. 9. It should be, _she will_. The author intended to signify mere
futurity; instead of which he has expressed a command.

“He _rose_ the price of bread last week.” Here _rose_, the preterite
of the neuter verb _to rise_, and, therefore, unsusceptible of a
regimen, is ungrammatically joined with an objective case, instead of
_raised_, the preterite of the active verb _to raise_. This error,
therefore, involves a solecism, as well as an impropriety.

“Does the price of bread raise this week?” This error is the converse
of the former, the active verb being here used instead of the neuter.
The question, What does it raise? shows the impropriety of the
expression. It ought to be, “Does the price of bread rise this week?”
These verbs, like the verb _to lay_ and _to lie_, are very often
confounded in vulgar use.

“It would be injurious to the character of Prince Maurice, to
suppose, that he would demean himself so far, as to be concerned in
those anonymous pamphlets.”--_Watson’s Philip III._ Here the verb
_to demean_, which signifies “to behave,” is used as equivalent to
the verb _to debase_, or “to degrade.” This impropriety is now, I
believe, almost entirely confined to Scotland; it has, therefore,
been ranked in the number of Scotticisms. “I demean myself” is
equivalent to “I behave myself;” and in this sense the author last
quoted has, in another passage, very properly used it. “Such of the
Morescoes might remain, who, for any considerable time, demeaned
themselves as Christians.”--_Ibid._

“Considerable arrears being now resting to the soldiers.”--_Ibid._
“Resting,” which is equivalent to “being quiet,” or “remaining,” is,
in the sense in which it is here employed, a rank Scotticism: it
should be, “due,” or “owing.”

“The reason will be accounted for hereafter.”--_Warburton._
_Accounted for_ is here improperly used for _assigned_. “To account
for a reason,” is “to account for an account.”

“But no evidence is admitted in the house of lords, this being a
distinct jurisdiction, which differs it considerably from these
instances.”--_Blackstone._ The verb _to differ_ is a neuter verb,
and cannot admit a regimen. The author has improperly used it in
an active sense, for “to make to differ.” It should be, “by which
it differs,” or “which makes it differ considerably from these
instances.”[146]

“In order to have this project reduced to practice, there seems to
want nothing more, than to put those in mind,” &c.--_Swift._ Here,
“to want,” that is, “to need,” “to require,” is improperly used
for “to be wanting,” “to be required,” “to be wanted.” It should
be, “there seems to be nothing wanting.” The verb _to want_ was
frequently employed by Pope and Swift in the sense in which we here
find it. Johnson, likewise, in one or two passages, has adopted
the same usage, thus, “there had never wanted writers to talk
occasionally of Arcadia and Strephon.”--_Life of Phillips._ But in
this sense it may now be deemed obsolescent, if not entirely obsolete.

The reader will here permit me to observe, that there is an idiom
in our language, respecting the use of active for passive verbs,
which seems worthy of attention, and which I do not recollect to
have seen remarked by any of our grammarians. In the languages of
antiquity, the distinction between active and passive was strictly
observed; but in English the active is frequently employed for the
passive voice. Of this remarkable idiom numberless examples might
be produced; but the few following will suffice. Thus we say, “the
sentence _reads_ ill,” “the wine _drinks_ harsh,” “the grass _cuts_
easily,” “the apples _eat_ hard,” “the drum _beats_ to arms,” “the
metal _works_ well.” In these examples, the subject clearly is
acted upon; the verb, therefore, must be considered as having a
passive signification. It is almost unnecessary to observe, that
this phraseology should be avoided, whenever it is likely to create
ambiguity.

“Lead me forth in thy truth, and learn me.”--_Book of Common Prayer_,
Psal. xxv. The verb _to learn_ formerly denoted, either “to teach,”
or “to acquire knowledge.” In the former sense it is now obsolete. It
should therefore be, “lead me forth in thy truth, and _teach_ me.”

“Prevent us, O Lord, in all our doings by thy most gracious
favour.”--_Book of Common Prayer._ “He had prevented the hour,
because we might have the whole day before us.”--_Bacon._ The verb
_to prevent_, as signifying “to go before,” or “come before,” is now
obsolete.

“There was no longer any doubt, that the king was determined to wreck
his resentment on all concerned.”--_Watson’s Philip II._

“They not only wrecked their vengeance on the living, but on the
ashes of the dead heretics.”--_Henry’s Britain._

Here the verb _to wreck_, or “to destroy, by dashing on rocks,”
is improperly used for “to wreak,” or “to discharge.” In the last
example the adverbs _not only_ are improperly placed. It should be,
“they wreaked their vengeance not only,” &c.

“We outrun our present income, not doubting to disburse ourselves out
of the profits of some future plan.”--_Addison._ “To disburse,” or
“to expend money,” is here improperly used for “to reimburse,” or “to
repay.”

“And wrought a great miracle conform to that of the
apostles.”--_Bacon._

“The last is the most simple, and the most perfect, as being conform
to the nature of knowledge.”--_Hutton’s Investigation_, vol. i. p.
643. _Conform_, here used for _conformable_, is, in this sense,
deemed a Scotticism.


SECTION V.

THE ADVERB.


BARBARISM.

“Friendship, a rare thing in princes, more rare between princes,
that so holily was observed to the last, of those two excellent
men.”--_Sidney on Government._ _Holily_ is obsolete.

“Enquire, what be the stones, that do easiliest melt.”--_Bacon._
The adverb _easily_ is not compared,--see p. 70. _Easiliest_ is,
therefore, a barbarism.

“Their wonder, that any man so near Jerusalem should be a stranger
to what had passed there, their acknowledgment to one they met
accidently, that they believed in this prophet,” &c.--_Guardian._
Steele has here used _accidently_, for _accidentally_. The former is
a barbarism, and its derivation is repugnant to analogy.

      “Uneath may she endure the flinty street,
      To tread them with her tender feeling feet.”--_Shakspeare._

_Uneath_ is now obsolete, and may therefore be deemed a barbarism.

      “In northern clime, a val’rous knight
      Did whilom kill his bear in fight,
      And wound a fiddler.”--_Hudibras._

_Whilom_ is now entirely disused. The adverbs _whilere_, _erst_, and
perhaps also _anon_, may be ranked in the class of barbarisms.

“And this attention gives ease to the person, because the clothes
appear unstudily graceful.”--_Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories._ The
word _unstudily_ is barbarous, and its mode of derivation contrary to
analogy.


SOLECISM.

“Use a little wine for thy stomach’s sake, and thine often
infirmities.” _Often_, an adverb, is here improperly used as an
adjective, in accordance with the substantive “infirmities.” It ought
to be “thy frequent infirmities.”

“We may cast in such seeds and principles, as we judge most likely to
take soonest and deepest root.” Here, as in the preceding example,
the adverb “soonest” is used as an adjective; for the connexion is,
“_soonest_ root,” and “_deepest_ root.” Now, we cannot say “soon
root,” the former term being incapable of qualifying the latter;
nor can we, therefore, say, “_soonest_ root.” It ought to be, “the
earliest and the deepest root.”

“After these wars, of which they hope for a soon and prosperous
issue.” _Soon issue_ is another example of the same error.

“His lordship inveighed, with severity, against the conduct of the
then ministry.” Here _then_, the adverb equivalent to _at that time_,
is solecistically employed as an adjective, agreeing with _ministry_.
This error seems to gain ground; it should therefore be vigilantly
opposed, and carefully avoided. “The ministry of that time,” would be
correct.

“He tells them, that the time should come, that the temple should be
graced with the presence of the Messias.” Here _that_ is incorrectly
used for _when_, _i.e._ “at which time the temple should be graced.”


IMPROPRIETY.

“By letters, dated the third of May, we learn that the West India
fleet arrived safely.” Here _safely_ is improperly used for _safe_.
The adverb is equivalent to “in a safe manner;” and when it is said,
“that the fleet arrived _safely_,” it signifies that the manner of
the arrival, rather than the fleet itself, was safe or free from
accident. If I say, “he carried the parcel as safely as possible,”
it implies merely his great attention to the manner of carrying it;
but this does not infallibly exclude accident; for I may add, “but
he unluckily fell,” or, “he was unfortunately thrown down, and the
glass was broken.” But if I say, “he carried it as safe as possible,”
or, “he carried it safe,” it implies that it came safe, or escaped
all accidents. We should, therefore, say “that the West India fleet
arrived safe.” In disapproving the expression, “he arrived _safely_,”
I concur with Baker; but the judicious reader will perceive, that my
reason for reprehending it, does not entirely coincide with his. The
author’s words are these: “If a man says, that he arrived safely, or
in a safe manner, he seems to suppose, that there is danger of some
mischance in arriving. But what danger is there to be apprehended in
the circumstance of arriving? The danger is only during the journey,
or voyage; in the arrival there is none at all. The proper way of
speaking is, therefore, ‘I arrived safe,’ that is, ‘having escaped
all the dangers of the passage.’”

“The poor woman carried them to the person to whom they were
directed; and when Lady Cathcart recovered her liberty, she received
her diamonds safely.” It should be, “she received her diamonds safe.”

Errors like the one on which I have now animadverted, frequently
arise from a desire to avoid the opposite mistake; I mean the
improper use of the adjective for the adverb.--_See_ _Syntax, Rule
V. Note_ 16. Hence many, when they employ such phraseologies as I
have here exemplified, conceive that they express themselves with the
strictest accuracy, thus verifying the poet’s observation,

      “In vitium ducit culpæ fuga, si caret arte.”

In order to avoid this error, it should be remembered, that many
English verbs, while they affirm some action, passion, or state of
the subject, frequently serve as a copula, connecting the subject
with another predicate. This is one of those idioms, in the grammar
of our language, which demand the particular attention of the
classical scholar. For, though an acquaintance with the learned
languages will not seduce him into an improper use of an adjective
for the adverb, it may, as in the example now before us, betray
him into the converse error. And I am inclined to think, that
from a propensity almost irresistible in the classical scholar to
assimilate our language with the Latin tongue, our lexicographers
have designated many of our words as adverbs, which are strictly
adjectives. When it is said, for example, “it goes hard,” Johnson
considers _hard_ as an adverb. Yet when we say, “it goes contrary,”
he considers _contrary_ as an adjective. There appears to me to be
more of caprice than of reason, more of prejudice than of truth, in
this classification. Both words, I am persuaded, belong to one and
the same species. Nay, I might venture to assert, that no person,
who had studied the principles of the English language, and of that
only, would pronounce the one to be an adverb, and the other an
adjective. It is to be observed, likewise, that we have the regular
adverb _hardly_ to express the manner. When we say, “he reasoned
concerning the rule,” “we argued respecting the fact,” “he lives
according to nature,” is there not something extremely arbitrary and
unphilosophical, in calling _concerning_ a preposition, _according_
a preposition, followed by _to_, but properly a participle, and
_respecting_ a participle? Are not all the three participles? Yet
Johnson has classed them, as I have now mentioned. But the farther
illustration of this subject would lead us into a field much too
large for the limits of the present treatise. We must therefore
revert to our primary observation, in which we cautioned the reader
against the improper use of the adjective for the adverb. It should
be remembered that, when it is intended to predicate something
of the subject, beside the attribute of the verb, the adjective
should be employed; but, when it is intended to express merely some
modification of the attribute of the verb, we should then use the
adverb. The difference may be illustrated by the following examples.
When Gustavus says to his troops, “your limbs tread vigorous and your
breasts beat high,” he predicates with the act of treading their
physical strength; but had he said, “your limbs tread vigorously,”
it would merely modify their treading, and express an act, not a
constitutional habit. The same distinction may be made between saying
with Arnoldus in the same play, “the tear rolls graceful down his
visage,” and “the tear rolls gracefully.” The former predicates grace
of the tear itself, the latter merely of its rolling. When we say,
“he looks sly,” we mean he has the look or the appearance of being
a sly man; when it is said, “he looks slyly,” we signify that he
assumes a sly look. When we say, “it tastes good,” we affirm that
the subject is of a good quality, whether the taste be pleasant or
unpleasant; if we say, “it tastes well,” we affirm the taste of it to
be pleasant.

“The manner of it is thus.” The adverb _thus_ means “in this manner.”
The expression, therefore, amounts to “the manner of it is in this
manner.” It should be, “the manner of it is this,” or, “this is the
manner of it.” “This much is certain.” Better, “thus much,” or “so
much.”

“It is a long time since I have been devoted to your interest.”
_Since_ properly means “from the time when,” and not “during which
time.” The expression might be construed into a meaning the reverse
of that which is intended, implying, that the attachment had ceased
for a long time. It should be, “it is a long time since I became
devoted,” or, “it is a long time, that I have been devoted to your
interest.”

“It is equally the same.” _Equally_ is here redundant; it ought to
be, “it is the same.”

“Whenever I call on him, he always inquires for you.” _Whenever_
means “at what time soever,” “always when,” or “as often as;”
_always_, therefore, is redundant.

“They will not listen to the voice of the charmer, charm he never
so wisely.” _Never_ is here improperly used for _ever_. It ought to
be, “charm he ever so wisely;” that is, “_however wisely_,” or “_how
wisely soever_, he may charm.”

“And even in those characteristical portraits, on which he has
lavished all the decorations of his style, he is seldom or ever
misled.”--_Stewart’s Life of Robertson._ This error is the converse
of the former. It ought to be, “seldom or never;” that is, “seldom,
or at no time.” “Seldom or ever” is equivalent to “seldom or always,”
or to “seldom or at any time;” expressions evidently improper.

“Whether thou be my son or not.”--_Bible._ “Whether you will keep
his commandments, or no.” Both these phraseologies are in use; but I
am inclined to agree with those grammarians, who prefer the former,
as more consistent with the ellipsis--“Whether thou be, or be not.”
“Whether you will keep his commandments, or will not keep.”

“Some years after being released from prison, by reason of his
consummate knowledge of civil law, and military affairs, he was soon
exalted to the supreme power.” The first clause of this sentence is
ambiguous; for the sentence may imply, either that he gained the
supremacy, some years after he was released from prison, that period
being left indeterminate; or that some years after a time previously
mentioned, he was released from prison, and attained the chief
power. The latter being the author’s meaning, it ought to be, “some
years _afterwards_ being released from prison.” Another ambiguity is
here involved by improper arrangement; for, as the sentence stands,
it is somewhat doubtful, whether his consummate knowledge was the
cause of his releasement, or the cause of his elevation. This error,
however, belongs more to the rhetorician, than the grammarian. The
French term this ambiguity, “construction louche,” or a _squinting
construction_.

The following error consists in wrong collocation: “The Celtiberi in
Spain borrowed that name from the Celtæ and Iberi, from whom they
were jointly descended.” Jointly, with whom? It should be, “from whom
(the Celtæ and Iberi) jointly they were descended.”

“And the Quakers seem to approach nearly the only regular body of
Deists in the universe, the literati, or the disciples of Confucius
in China.”--_Hume’s Essays._ The adverb _nearly_, which is synonymous
with _almost_, is here improperly used for _near_[147]. It should be,
_approach near_.

“This is the Leviathan, from whence the terrible wits of our age are
said to borrow their weapons.”--_Swift._ _From_ is here redundant;
_whence_, denoting “from which place.”

“An ancient author prophecies from hence.”--_Dryden._ Here a similar
impropriety is involved. It should be, _hence_.

      “E’er we can offer our complaints,
      Behold him present with his aid.”

_E’er_, a contraction for _ever_, which is synonymous with _always_,
and also _at any time_, is here improperly used for _ere_ or _before_.

In the two following passages, there appears to me to be a similar
error: “Or ever the silver cord be loosed, or the golden bowl
be broken.”--_Bible._ “I was set up from everlasting, from the
beginning, or ever the earth was.”--_Ibid._

“And, as there is now never a woman in England, I hope, I may talk of
women without offence.”--_Steele._

“He spake never a word.”--_Bible._

This usage of the word “never,” is now, I believe, entirely confined
to the vulgar.

“As for conflagrations and great droughts, they do not merely
dispeople and destroy.”--_Bacon._ _Merely_ is here used, as it
is uniformly by Bacon, and very frequently by Shakspeare, for
_entirely_. In this sense, it is obsolete; and it now signifies
_purely_, _simply_, _only_, _nothing more than_. From inattention
to this, the passage, now quoted, has been corrupted in several
editions. They have it, “do not merely dispeople, but destroy,”
conveying a sentiment very different from what the author intended.


SECTION VI.

THE PREPOSITION.


SOLECISM.

“Who do you speak to?” Here the preposition is joined with the
nominative, instead of the objective case. It should be, “whom do you
speak to?” or “to whom do you speak?” _To who_ is a solecism.

“He talked to you and I, of this matter, some days ago.” It should
be, “to _you_ and _me_;” that is, “to you and to me.”

      “Now Margaret’s curse is fallen upon our heads,
      When she exclaim’d on Hastings you and I.”
                                          _Shakspeare._

It ought to be, “on Hastings _you_ and _me_,” the pronouns being
under the government of the preposition understood.

“Neither do I think, that anything could be more entertaining, than
the story of it exactly told, with such observations, and in such a
spirit, style, and manner, as you alone are capable of performing
it.” This sentence is extremely faulty. “To perform a story” is not
English; and the relative clause is ungrammatical, the preposition
being omitted. It should be, “performing it in,” which would be
grammatically correct, but inelegant, as well as improper. It would
be better expressed thus, “in that spirit, style, and manner, in
which you alone are capable of narrating it.”

“Notwithstanding of the numerous panegyrics on the ancient English
liberty.”--_Hume’s Essays._ The error here in the use of the
preposition after _notwithstanding_, is, I believe, peculiar to
Scotland. _Notwithstanding_ is a compound word of the same import as
_not preventing_. The grammatical construction therefore is, “the
numerous panegyrics notwithstanding,” that is, “not hindering,” the
noun and the participle being in the absolute case. _Of_ renders the
expression solecistical.


IMPROPRIETY.

“If policy can prevail upon force.”--_Addison._ Here _upon_ is
improperly used for _over_. _To prevail on_, is “to persuade;” _to
prevail over_, is “to overcome.”

“I have set down the names of several gentlemen, who have been robbed
in Dublin streets, for these three years past.”--_Swift._ It should
be, “within these three years past.” Swift’s expression implies, as
Baker observes, that these gentlemen had been robbed during the whole
three years.

“Ye blind guides, who strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel.” In this
sentence, the preposition _at_ is very improperly used for _out_. It
should be, “strain out a gnat;” that is, exclude it from the liquor
by straining.

“Oliver Proudfute, a freeman and burgess, was slain upon the streets
of the city.”--_Scott._ This form of expression is almost universal
in Scotland. An Englishman says, “in the streets.”

“I have several times inquired of you without any
satisfaction.”--_Pope._ We say, “inquire of,” when we ask a
question; and “inquire for,” or “after,” when we desire to know the
circumstances, in which any object is placed. He should have employed
the latter expression.

“The greatest masters of critical learning differ among one
another.”--_Spectator._ If the ellipsis be supplied, the sentence
proceeds thus: “The greatest masters of critical learning differ, one
differs among another.” Here the preposition _among_, which implies
a number, or a plurality, is joined to a term significant of unity.
It ought to be, “from one another;” that is “one from another,” or
“differ among themselves.”

“I intended to wait _of_ you this morning.” The preposition _of_ is
here improperly used for _on_. We say, _to wait on_, not _to wait of_.

“He knows nothing _on_ it.” This is a vile vulgarism for “he knows
nothing _of_ it.”

“He is now much altered to the better.” _To_ is here improperly used
instead of _for_. “Altered to the better,” may, I believe, be deemed
a Scotticism. It ought to be, “he is altered for the better.”

Ambiguity is sometimes produced by putting the preposition in an
improper place. “A clergyman is, by the militia act, exempted from
both serving and contributing.” This, though intended to express a
different meaning, strictly implies, that he is not obliged both to
serve and to contribute, but does not exclude his liability to do the
one, or the other. If we say, “he is exempted both from serving and
contributing,” we express an exemption from both.

“Such of my readers, as have a taste of fine writing.”--_Addison’s
Spect._ “To have a taste of a thing,” is “to feel how it affects the
sensitive or perceptive faculty;” “to have a taste for a thing,” is
“to relish its agreeable qualities;” “to have a taste in a thing,”
which is the expression used by Addison in the same paper, is “to
have a discriminative judgment in examining the object.” The first
expression is incorrect, as not conveying his meaning.

Swift, speaking of Marlborough’s dismission from the queen’s
ministry, as a bad requital of his public services, says, “If a
stranger should hear these furious outcries of ingratitude against
our general, he would be apt to inquire,” &c. One would naturally
conclude from the author’s expression, that Marlborough, and not
the nation, was charged with ingratitude. He should have said,
“ingratitude towards our general.”

“I received the sword in a present from my brother.” This is a very
common colloquial Scotticism, and occurs occasionally in written
language. The sword was not received _in_, but _as_ a present.

In the use of prepositions, a distinction is properly made between
their literal and figurative meaning. “Wit,” says Shakspeare,
“depends _on_ dilatory time.” Here the verb is employed
figuratively, and the idea involved in the primitive meaning is
dismissed.

      “From gilded roofs depending lamps display.”--_Dryden._

Here the verb is used in its literal acceptation, denoting “to hang,”
and is followed, therefore, by _from_.

To the same purpose it has been remarked by Campbell, that the
verb “to found,” used literally, is followed by _on_ preferably to
_in_, as, “the house was founded _on_ a rock;” but, when employed
metaphorically, is better followed by _in_, as, “dominion is founded
in grace.”

“There is no need _for_ your assistance.” It should be, “_of_ your
assistance.” We say, “occasion _for_,” and “need _of_.” _Need
for_ may likewise be pronounced a Scotticism, as, I believe, this
phraseology is seldom or never used by English writers.

“For, what chiefly deters the sons of science and philosophy
from reading the Bible, and profiting of that lecture, but the
stumbling-block of absolute inspiration?”--_Geddes._ “To profit of”
is a Gallicism; it should be, “profiting by.”


SECTION VII.

THE CONJUNCTION.


SOLECISM.

“A system of theology, involving such absurdities, can be maintained,
I think, by no rational man, much less by so learned a man as him.”
Conjunctions having no government, the word _as_ ought not to be
joined with an objective case. It should be, “so learned a man as
_he_,” the verb _is_ being understood.

“Tell the cardinal, that I understand poetry better than
him.”--_Smollett._ According to the grammatical construction of
the latter clause, it means, “I understand poetry better than I
understand him.” This, however, is not the sentiment which the writer
intended to convey. The clause should proceed thus, “I understand
poetry better than _he_;” that is, “than _he_ understands it.” Those
who contend for the use of _than_ as a preposition, and justify the
phraseology which is here censured, must at least admit, that to
construe _than_ as a preposition, creates ambiguity. Thus, when it
is said, “you think him handsomer than _me_,” it would be impossible
to determine whether the meaning is, “you think him handsomer than I
think him,” or “you think him handsomer than you think me.”

“There is nothing more pleases mankind, as to have others to admire
and praise their performances, though they are never so trivial.”
Here there are two errors. The comparative _more_ is followed by
_as_, instead of _than_; and the adverb _never_ is improperly used
for _ever_. “How trivial so ever.” It should be, “There is nothing
that pleases mankind more, than,” &c.

Conjunctions having no government, the scholar, desirous to avoid
error, should carefully observe, whether the predicate be applicable
to the two subjects, connected by the conjunction, or, to speak
more generally, whether the two nouns be dependent on the same verb
or preposition, expressed or understood. “The lover got a woman of
greater fortune than her he had missed.”--_Addison_, _Guardian_.
This sentence, if not acknowledged to be ungrammatical, is at least
inelegant. The pronoun should have been introduced. If _than_ be
considered as having the power of a preposition, the charge of
solecism is precluded; but if _than_ be a conjunction, he should have
said, “than she, whom he had missed.” For, as Lowth observes, there
is no ellipsis of the verb _got_, so that the pronoun _her_ cannot
be under its government. The meaning is not, “The lover got a woman
of greater fortune, than he got her, whom he missed,” for this would
be a contradiction, but, “of greater fortune, than she was.” In like
manner, in the following passage:

      “Nor hope to be myself less miserable,
      By what I seek, but _others_ to make
      Such _as I_.”--_Milton._

Bentley says, that it should be _me_. We concur with Dr. Lowth in
rejecting this correction, and approving the expression of Milton.
There is no ellipsis of the verb _make_; _others_ and _I_ are not
under the government of the same word. The meaning is not, “to make
others such, as to make me,” but, “such as I _am_” the substantive
verb being understood.

In the following passage, on the contrary, the ellipsis seems
evident: “I found none so fit as _him_ to be set in opposition to the
father of the renowned city of Rome.” It has been contended, that the
author should have said, “as he,” and not “as him:” but it appears
to me, that the verb _found_ is understood in the secondary clause,
and that the expression is correct, the sense being, “I found none so
fit, as I found him.”

In the following passage the two subjects belong to the same verb:

      “The sun, upon the calmest sea,
      Appears not half so bright as thee.”--_Prior._

It ought to be, “as thou;” that is, “as thou appearest.”

“So as,” and “as, as,” though frequently, have not always the same
import. “These things,” said Thales to Solon, who was lamenting
the supposed death of his son, “which strike down _so firm a man
as you_, have deterred me from marriage.” The expression clearly
refers to Solon; but, if he had said “as firm a man as you,” it might
have referred to a different person from Solon, but a man of equal
fortitude.

      “For ever in this humble cell,
      Let thee and I, my fair one, dwell.”

The second line of the couplet is ungrammatical, the conjunction
connecting an objective with a nominative case, or, to speak more
correctly, the pronoun of the first person, which should be a regimen
to the verb understood, being here in the nominative case. Thus, “let
thee,” and, “let I, my fair one, dwell,” instead of “let _thee_, and
let _me_.”

“Let us make a covenant, I and thou.”--_Bible._ The error here,
though similar, does not come under precisely the same predicament
with the former. The pronoun _us_ is very properly in the objective
case, after the verb _let_; _I_ and _thou_ should therefore be in
the same case, according to Rule vii. of Syntax. The expression is
in fact elliptical, and when completed proceeds thus, “Let us make
a covenant: let me and thee make.”

“Though he were a son, yet learned he obedience by the things which
he suffered.” The first clause is intended to express a fact, not a
hypothesis; the verb, therefore, should be in the indicative mood.
Conjunctions have no government, either of cases or moods.


IMPROPRIETY.

“If in case he come, all will be well.” _If_ and _in case_ are
synonymous, the one meaning “suppose,” and the other, “on the
supposition.” One of them, therefore, is redundant.

“The reason of my desiring to see you was, because I wanted to talk
with you.” _Because_ means “by reason;” the expression, therefore, is
chargeable with redundancy. It should be, “that I wanted to talk with
you.”

“No sooner was the cry of the infant heard, but the old gentleman
rushed into the room.”--_Martinus Scrib._ The comparative is here
improperly followed by _but_, instead of _than_.

“Scarce had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, than it was
attacked.” _Than_ is employed after comparatives only, and the word
_other_. It ought to be “scarce,” or, for reasons formerly given,
“scarcely had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, _when_ it was
attacked,” or “no sooner--than.”

“The resolution was not the less fixed, that the secret was as yet
communicated to very few, either in the French or English court.”
This passage from Hume I have not been able to find. Priestley
observes, that it involves a Gallicism, the word _that_ being used
instead of _as_. If the meaning intended be, that some circumstances,
previously mentioned, had not shaken the resolution, because the
secret was as yet known to few, then Priestley’s observation was
correct, and the word _as_ should be substituted for _that_, to
express the cause of the firmness. But, if the author intended to
say, that the very partial discovery of the secret had not shaken
the resolution, the clause is then perfectly correct. According
to the former phraseology, the circumstance subjoined operated as
a cause, preventing the resolution from being shaken: according
to the latter, it had no effect, or produced no change of the
previous determination. In other words, “the less fixed that,”
implies that the subject of the following clause did not affect that
of the preceding; “the less fixed _as_” denotes, that the latter
circumstance contributed to the production of the former. As it is
obvious, that, in such examples, the definite article may refer
either to the antecedent or the subsequent clause, the distinction,
here specified, should, for the sake of perspicuity, be carefully
observed[148].

“His donation was the more acceptable, that it was given without
solicitation.” That the word _that_ is frequently used for _because_
cannot be questioned; thus, “I am glad _that_ you have returned
safe,” that is, “_because_ you have returned safe.”

      “’T is not _that_ I love you less
      Than when before your feet I lay.”--_Waller._

Here _that_ is equivalent to _because_. English writers, however,
after a comparative, employ _as_ or _because_, to denote that the
circumstance subjoined was the cause of the preceding one. The use
of _that_ in such examples is accounted a Scotticism; it should,
therefore, be, “his donation was the more acceptable, _as_” or
“_because_ it was given without solicitation.”

“His arguments on this occasion had, it may be presumed, the greater
weight, that he had never himself entered within the walls of a
playhouse.”--_Stewart’s Life of Robertson._

“A mortification, the more severe, that the joint authority
of the archduke and the infanta governed the Austrian
Netherlands.”--_Thomson’s Continuation of Watson’s History._

These sentences are chargeable with the same error; and, it is not a
little remarkable, though the impropriety has been pointed out again
and again, that there is scarcely a Scotch writer, not even among
those of the highest name, who is not chargeable with the frequent
commission of this error.

“On the east and west sides, it (America) is washed by the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans.”--_Robertson._ This mode of expression is
incorrect; and, though to the geographer intelligible, it strictly
conveys a conception not intended by the author. The copulative joins
the two sides, which ought to be separated; and combines the two
seas, instead of the two facts, implying, that both sides are washed
by the same two oceans. It should be rather, “On the east side it is
washed by the Atlantic, and on the west (is washed) by the Pacific
ocean.”

“Will it be believed, that the four Gospels are as old, or even older
than tradition?”--_Bolingbroke._ Here there is a faulty omission of
the particle corresponding to _as_; for the positive and comparative
cannot be followed by the same conjunction. It ought to be, “as old
_as_, or even older _than_ tradition;” or, perhaps, better, “as old
as tradition, or even older.”

“The books were to have been sold as this day.” This is a most
offensive vulgarism. The conjunction _as_ can have no regimen; nor
can it be properly used as equivalent to _on_. It ought to be, “sold
this day,” or “on this day.”

“It is supposed, that he must have arrived at Paris as yesterday.”
This sentence is chargeable with the same error. Construed strictly,
it is, “he must have arrived at Paris _as_, or _in like manner as_,
he arrived yesterday.”

“The duke had not behaved with that loyalty, as he ought to have
done.” Propriety of correspondence here requires _with that_ to be
followed by _with which_, instead of _as_. The sentence, even thus
corrected, would be still inelegant and clumsy. “The duke had not
behaved with becoming loyalty,” would be much better.

“In _the_ order _as_ they lie in his preface.” This involves a
similar impropriety. It should be, “in order as,” or “in the order,
in which they lie in his preface.”

“No; this is not always the case neither.”--_Beattie._

“Men come not to the knowledge of ideas which are thought innate,
till they come to the use of reason; nor then neither.”--_Locke._

In old English two negatives denied; hence, perhaps, this phraseology
originated. Johnson remarks, that the use of _neither_, after a
negative, and at the end of a sentence, though not grammatical,
renders the expression more emphatic. Analogy, however, is decidedly
in favour of the affirmative term; I, therefore, prefer the word
“either.” Were Johnson’s argument admitted, such expressions as
these, “I forbade you _not_ to go;” “I won’t suffer no such thing;”
“He would not have none of my assistance,” might, I apprehend, be
justified on the same principle. Those who employ them, doubtless,
believe them to be more emphatic, than if they included a single
negative.

“This I am the rather disposed to do, that it will serve to
illustrate the principles above laid down.”--_Campbell on
Rhetoric._ This sentence involves an error, on which I have already
animadverted. “_The rather_” should be followed by _as_, not _that_.

“This is another use, that in my opinion contributes rather to make
a man learned than wise: and is neither capable of pleasing the
understanding, or imagination.” Lowth justly observes, that _or_
is here improperly used for _nor_, the correlative words being
_neither_, _nor_. In addition to this observation, I remark, that
the word _neither_ is erroneously placed. To render this collocation
of the conjunction correct, there should be another attributive
opposed to the word “capable,” as, “neither capable of pleasing the
understanding, nor calculated to gratify the imagination.” But,
as the author intended to exclude two subjects, these should have
been contrasted by the exclusive conjunctions, thus, “is capable of
pleasing neither the understanding, nor the imagination.”

A similar error occurs in the following sentence: “Adversity both
taught you to think and reason.”--_Steele._ The conjunction, which
is, in truth, the adjective _both_, is improperly placed. It should
be, “taught you both,” _i.e._ the two things, “to think and reason.”

It has been already observed, that the conjunction _or_ is used
disjunctively, and subdisjunctively, sometimes denoting a diversity
of things, and sometimes merely a difference of names. Hence often
arises ambiguity, where the utmost precision of expression is
necessary[149]. When Ruddiman delivers it as a rule, that “verbal
adjectives, _or_ such as signify an affection of the mind, require
the genitive,” I have known the scholar at a loss to understand,
whether there be two distinct classes of adjectives, here intended,
or one class under two designations. The ambiguity might here be
avoided, by using _and_ or _with_ instead of _or_. It may also be
prevented in many cases, by more forcibly marking the distinction
by the use of _either_. Thus, if we say, “whosoever shall cause, or
occasion a disturbance,” it may be doubtful, whether the latter of
the two verbs be not designed as explanatory of the former, they,
though their meanings be distinct, being often used as synonymous
terms. If we say, “shall either cause or occasion,” all doubt
is removed. Sometimes ambiguity may be precluded either by the
insertion, or the omission, of the article. Thus, if we say, “a
peer, or lord of parliament,”[150] meaning to designate only one
individual, or one order, the expression is correct. But if it be
intended to signify two individuals, every peer not being a lord of
parliament, and every lord of parliament not being a peer, we should
say, “a peer, or a lord of parliament,” or “either a peer, or lord of
parliament.”

Having now endeavoured to explain and illustrate the etymology and
syntax of the English language, I cannot dismiss the subject without
earnestly recommending to the classical student to cultivate a
critical acquaintance with his native tongue. It is an egregious,
but common error, to imagine, that a perfect knowledge of Greek and
Latin precludes the necessity of studying the principles of English
grammar. The structure of the ancient, and that of modern languages,
are very dissimilar. Nay, the peculiar idioms of any language,
how like soever in its general principles to any other, must be
learned by study, and an attentive perusal of the best writers in
that language. Nor can any imputation be more reproachful to the
proficient in classical literature, than, with a critical knowledge
of Greek and Latin, which are now dead languages, to be superficially
acquainted with his native tongue, in which he must think, and speak,
and write.

The superiority of Greek and Latin over the English language in
respect of harmony, graceful dignity, conciseness, and fluency,
will be readily admitted. Our language is, comparatively, harsh
and abrupt. It possesses strength, indeed; but unaccompanied with
softness, with elegance, or with majesty. It must be granted also,
that the Greek is, perhaps, a more copious, and is certainly a more
ductile[151] and tractable language. But though, in these respects,
the English be inferior to the languages of Greece and Rome, yet
in preciseness of expression, diversity of sound, facility of
communication, and variety of phrase, it may claim the pre-eminence.
It would be easy to evince the truth of this assertion, did the
limits, which I have prescribed to myself permit. The fact is, that
analogous languages almost necessarily possess a superiority in these
respects over those, which are transpositive.

It is to be remembered, also, that our language is susceptible of
high improvement; and though its abrupt and rugged nature cannot
be entirely changed, much may be done to smooth its asperities and
soften its harshness.

As a further inducement to the study of the English language, I
would assure the young reader, that a due attention to accuracy of
diction is highly conducive to correctness of thought. For, as it
is generally true, that he, whose conceptions are clear, and who
is master of his subject, delivers his sentiments with ease and
perspicuity[152]; so it is equally certain, that, as language is not
only the vehicle of thought, but also an instrument of invention,
if we desire to attain a habit of conceiving clearly and thinking
correctly, we must learn to speak and write with accuracy and
precision.

It must, at the same time, be remembered, that to give our chief
attention to mere phraseology, or to be more solicitous about the
accuracy of the diction than the value of the sentiment, is a sure
indication of a nerveless and vacant mind. As we estimate a man,
not by his garb, but by his intellectual and moral worth, so it is
the sentiment itself, not the dress in which it is exhibited, that
determines its character, and our opinion of its author.

      “True expression, like th’ unchanging sun,
      Clears and improves whate’er it shines upon;
      It gilds all objects, _but it alters none_.”--_Pope._

In short, the precept of Quintilian should be studiously observed:
“curam ergo verborum, rerum volo esse solicitudinem.”--_Inst. Orat._
lib. viii.


THE END.


  G. Woodfall and Son, Printers, Angel Court, Skinner Street, London.




FOOTNOTES:

[1] Beattie seems to think that the antediluvians had an alphabet,
and that hieroglyphical was posterior to alphabetical writing. “The
wisdom and simple manners of the first men,” says he, “would incline
me to think, that they must have had an alphabet; for hieroglyphic
characters imply quaintness and witticism.” In this reasoning I
cannot concur. Alphabetic writing is indeed simple, when known; so
also are most inventions. But, simple and easy as it appears to us,
we have only to examine the art itself, to be fully convinced, that
science, genius, and industry, must have been combined in inventing
it. Nay, the learned author himself acknowledges, “that though of
easy acquisition to us, it is in itself neither easy nor obvious.” He
even admits, “that alphabetical writing must be so remote from the
conceptions of those who never heard of it, that without divine aid
it would seem to be unsearchable and impossible.” I observe also that
in passing from picture-writing to hieroglyphical expression, and
in transferring the signs of physical to intellectual and invisible
objects, fanciful conceits would naturally take place. It is true
also that the manners of the antediluvians were simple; but it is
not from prudence nor simplicity of manners, but from human genius,
gradually improved, that we are to expect inventions, which require
the greatest efforts of the human mind.

[2] Cicero regards the invention of alphabetic writing as an evidence
of the celestial character of the soul; and many have ascribed its
origin to the inspiration of the Deity. To resort to supernatural
causes, to account for the production of any rare or striking event,
is repugnant to the principles of true philosophy. And how wonderful
soever the art of alphabetical writing may appear, there can be no
necessity for referring its introduction to divine inspiration, if
the inventive powers of man be not demonstrably unequal to the task.
Picture-writing is generally believed to have been the earliest
mode of recording events, or communicating information by permanent
signs. This was probably succeeded by hieroglyphical characters.
How these pictures and hieroglyphical devices would, either through
negligence or a desire to abbreviate, gradually vary their form, and
lose their resemblance to the objects which they represented, may
be easily conceived. Hence that association, which existed between
the sign and the thing signified, being founded in resemblance,
would in process of time be entirely dissolved. This having taken
place, hieroglyphical characters would naturally be converted
into a mere verbal denotation, representative of words and not of
things. Hence, as Goguet, in his work, “De l’Origine des Loix,” &c.,
reasonably conjectures, would arise by a partial and easy analysis,
a syllabic mode of denotation, which would naturally introduce a
literal alphabet. This conjecture must seem highly probable, when it
is considered, that both a verbal and syllabic mode of notation are
still practised by some Eastern nations.

[3] I am aware, that in considering the letters _y_ and _w_ to be
the same with _i_ and _u_ (_oo_), I maintain an opinion, the truth
of which has been disputed. The reasons, however, which have been
assigned for rejecting it do not appear to me satisfactory.

[4] The mouth is not the proper organ for producing sound; but merely
the organ for modulating and articulating the specific sounds.

[5] The sound of _th_ in _thin_, is usually marked with a stroke
through the _h_, to distinguish it from its other sound; thus,
_tħick_. This distinction is by some writers reversed.

[6] Hutton’s Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, vol. ii.
p. 688.

[7] Plato and Aristotle, when they treat of prepositions, considered
the noun and the verb as the only essential parts of speech; these,
without the aid of any other word, being capable of forming a
sentence. Hence they were called τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τοῦ λόγου, “the
most animated parts of speech.” The latter of these philosophers, in
his Poetics, admits four, adding to the noun and the verb the article
and the conjunction. The elder Stoics made five, dividing the noun
into proper and appellative.

[8]

  Noun, Nomen de quo loquimur.

  Verb, Verbum seu quod loquimur.--_Quint._ _lib._ i. 4.

Horace has been thought by some to countenance this doctrine when he
says,

      “Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,
      Nominaque invenere.”--_Lib._ i. _Sat._ 3.

[9] The plural number, and the genitive singular, seem to have been
originally formed by adding _er_ to the nominative singular, as
_you, you-er, your_; _they, they-er, their_; _we, we-er, our_. This
termination was afterwards changed into _en_, and then into _es_
or _s_. Thus we have still in provincial usage, though now almost
entirely obsolete, _childer_ for the plural of _child_, and the
double plural in _child-er-en, children_, with the double genitive in
_west-er-en, western_.

[10] _Brethren_, in Scripture, is used for _brothers_.

[11] The obsolete plural occurs in the Bible. “These men were bound
in their hosen and hats.”--_Dan._ iii. 21.

[12] Baker inclines also to this usage in preference to the other;
but does not affirm it to be a plural noun.

[13] _Much_ is sometimes joined with collective nouns; but these
denote number in the aggregate; thus, _much company_.

[14] The gender of _mors_, _virtus_, _sol_, θάνατος, ἀρετή, ἥλιος,
was unalterably fixed.

[15] It seems, however, to be more applicable to the English language
than to any other with which I am acquainted.

[16] These observations will sufficiently explain the reason why
we cannot concur with Dr. Johnson in thinking that there is “an
impropriety in the termination,” when we say of a woman, “She is
a philosoph_er_.” The female termination in such examples is not
wanted; it would be pleonastic and improper. The meaning is, “She is
a person given to the study of nature.” If we had been speaking of a
lady devoted to philosophy, and had occasion afterwards to mention
her by an appellative, we should feel the want of the appropriate
termination; and instead of saying “the philosopher,” we should
wish, for the sake of discrimination, to be able to say, “the
philosophress,” or to employ some equally distinctive term. In the
example adduced by the learned lexicographer, the female termination
is superfluous; and would intimate a distinction of philosophic
character, instead of a distinction of sex, the latter being denoted
by the female pronoun.

[17] We remark, in some instances, a similar phraseology in Greek
and Latin. Θεὸς and θεὰ, _deus_ and _dea_, are contradistinguished
as in English, _god_ and _goddess_; the former of each pair strictly
denoting the male, and the latter the female. But the former, we
find, has a generical meaning, expressing “a deity,” whether male
or female; and is frequently used when the female is designed, if
divinity in the abstract be the primary idea without regard to the
sex, thus,

                     ... “τὸν δ’ ἐξήρπαξ’ Ἀφροδίτη,
      Ῥεῖα μάλ’ ὥστε θεός.”--_Hom. Il._ iii. 380.

Here the term θεός is applied to Venus, the character of divinity,
and not the distinction of sex, being the chief object of the poet’s
attention. Θεός is, therefore, to be considered as either masculine
or feminine.

  “Ἀλλά μ’ ἁ Διός γ’ ἀλκίμα θεός.”--_Soph. Aj._ 401.

  “Μήτε τις οὖν θήλεια θεός.”--_Hom. Il._ Θ. 7.

  “Descendo, ac ducente deo, flammam inter et hostes
  Expedior.”--_Virg. Æn._ ii. 632.

Here, also, _deo_ is applied to Venus, as likewise in the following
passage, “_deum_ esse indignam credidi.”--_Plaut. Pœn._ 2, l. 10.

[18] Πτῶσις γενική: general case. It has been supposed by some that
the Latins, mistaking the import of the Greek term, called this the
genitive case. See _Ency. Brit., Art. Grammar_.

[19] _Amor Dei_ denotes either _amor quo Deus amat_, or _quo Deus
amatur_. _Reformatio Lutheri_, either _qua reformavit_, or _qua
reformatus est_. _Injuria patris, desiderium amici_, with many other
examples which might be produced, have either an active or passive
sense. ἡ ἀγαπὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ, אהבת יהוה, l’amore de Dio, l’amour de Dieu,
severally involve the same ambiguity with “the love of God.”

[20] Of the six declensions, to one or other of which the learned
Dr. Hickes conceives the inflexion of almost all the Saxon nouns may
be reduced, three form their genitive in _es_, as, _word, wordes_;
_smith, smithes_. In the Mœsogothic, a kindred language, the genitive
ends in _s_, some nouns having _is_, some _ns_, and others _as_, as,
_fan, fanins_; _faukagagja, faukagagjis_.

[21] It must be obvious, that the terms general and universal belong
not to real existences, but are merely denominations, the result of
intellect, generalising a number of individuals under one head.

[22] Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere
curandum.--_Inst._ _lib._ viii. _cap._ 4.

I am inclined to think that our language possesses a superiority in
this respect over the Greek itself. Ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος
παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ may signify either “man in the species, or an
individual, was sent from God.” The author of the article Grammar,
in the Encyc. Brit., observes, “that the word ἄνθρωπος is here
restricted to an individual by its concord with the verb and the
participle.” If he mean by this that the term must be significant
of only one individual, (and I can annex no other interpretation
to his words,) because a singular verb and participle singular are
joined with it, he errs egregiously. Numberless examples might be
produced to evince the contrary. Job. v. 7. ἄνθρωπος γεννᾶται κόπῳ
“man (mankind) is born unto trouble;” where the subject is joined to
a verb singular. Psal. xlix. 12. ἄνθρωπος ἐν τιμῇ ὢν οὐ συνῆκε, “man
being in honour abideth not.” Here also _man_ for _mankind_ is joined
with a participle and verb singular. And here it may be pertinently
asked, would not the term _one_ for _a_ in the first example somewhat
alter the meaning, and convey an idea different from that intended by
the evangelist?

[23] They are the Saxon words _this_ or _thes_, “hic, hæc, hoc,”
_that_ or _thæt_, “ille, illa, illud,” which were frequently used
by the Saxons for what we term the definite article, as, _send us
on thas swyn_, “send us into the swine.” Mark v. 21, _tha eodon tha
unclænan gastas on tha swyn_, “then the unclean spirits entered into
the swine.”

The Saxon definites are _se_, _seo_, _thæt_, for the three genders
severally; and _tha_ in the plural, expressing _the_ or _those_, as,
_thæt goed sæd_, the good seed. _Thæt_ is also joined to masculine
and feminine nouns, as, _thæt wif_, the woman; _thæt folc_, the
people. _Thæ_ (pronounced _they_) still obtains in Scotland, as, “thæ
men” for “these men.”

[24] ארץ‏‎ ‎‏הארץ.

[25] אשרי האיש.

[26] Horne Tooke appears to me to have erred in deriving _odd_
from _ow’d_. His words are these: “_Odd_ is the participle _ow’d_.
Thus, when we are counting by couples or pairs, we say, ‘one pair,’
‘two pairs,’ &c., and ‘one ow’d,’ ‘two ow’d,’ to make up another
pair. It has the same meaning when we say, ‘an odd man,’ ‘an odd
action,’ it still relates to pairing; and we mean ‘without a
fellow,’ ‘unmatched.’” Now, I must own, this appears to me a very
odd explanation; for, in my apprehension, it leads to a conclusion
the very reverse of that which the author intends. The term _odd_ is
applied to the one which stands by itself, and not to that which is
absent, or ow’d, to complete the pair. If I say, “there are three
pairs, and an odd one,” the word _odd_ refers to the single one,
over and above the three pairs, and not to the one which is wanting;
yet Mr. Tooke refers it to the latter. His explanation seems at
once unnatural and absurd. Had he substituted, according to his own
etymology, _add_ for _and_, saying, “three pairs, add an ow’d one,”
he must, I think, have perceived its inaccuracy. It is the _odd_ and
_present one_, of which the singularity is predicated, and not the
_absent_ or _ow’d one_.

[27] “_Quivis_ seu _quilibet_ affirmat; _quisquam_, _quispiam_,
_ullus_, aut negat aut interrogat,” are the words of an ancient
grammarian. It is observable also, that in Latin, _ullus_, any, is a
diminutive from _unus_, one; as _any_ in English is from _ane_, the
name of unity, as formerly used.

[28] In Anglo-Saxon _ic_, in German _ich_, in Greek ἐγὼ, in Latin
_ego_. Mr. Webb delivered it as his opinion, that the pronoun of the
first person was derived from the Hebrew ech or ach, _one_, used by
_apocope_ for _achad_ or _ahad_, he added, “oned,” or “united.” It is
doubtless true, that _ech_ occurs in one or two passages for _one_:
see Ezek. xviii. 10, and Ps. xlix. 8; in which latter passage it is
rendered in our translation, _brother_, and by R. Jonah, _one_; but
we apprehend that this fact will by no means justify his conclusion.
And as he considered that the pronoun of the first person radically
denoted _one_, he imagined that the pronoun of the second person came
from the numeral _duo_, _du_, _tu_, _thu_. Now, it must be granted
that there is an obvious resemblance between _ic_ and _ech_, and also
between _duo_, _tu_, and _thu_; but were we to draw any conclusion
from this similarity, it would be the reverse of that which the
author has deduced. It seems quite preposterous to suppose, that
the necessity for expressing a number would present itself, before
that of discriminating between the person speaking and the person
addressed. The rude savage could not converse with his fellow without
some sign of this distinction; and if visible signs (as is probable)
would be first adopted, we may reasonably presume, on several
grounds, that these would soon give place to audible expressions.

The pronoun _ic_ is in Saxon declined thus:

  _Sing. Nom._  Ic    _Gen._  Min    _Dat._  Me    _Acc._  Me
  _Plur. Nom._  We    _Gen._  Ure    _Dat._  Us    _Acc._  Us.

[29] The pronoun of the second person is thus declined:

  _Sing. Nom._  Thu        _Gen._  Thin    _Dat._  The   _Acc._  The
  _Plur. Nom._  Ge (hard)  _Gen._  Eower   _Dat._  and   _Acc._  Eow.

[30] The Anglo-Saxon he is declined thus:

  _Sing. Nom._  He    _Gen._  His    _Dat._ and _Acc._  Him.

[31]

  _Sing. Nom._  Heo   _Gen._  Hire   _Dat._  Hire.   _Acc._  Hi.

[32] This pronoun is from the Anglo-Saxon _hyt_ or _hit_, “i” _or_
“that.”

[33] In Anglo-Saxon _hi_, in Teutonic _die_.

[34] In Anglo-Saxon, hwa, hua; _Gen._ hwæs; _Dat._ hwam; _Acc._
hwæne, hwone. Also _hwilc_, whence, says Hickes, proceeded _which_,
the letter _l_ being elided.

[35] Mr. Tooke contends, that this part of speech is properly termed
adjective noun, and “that it is altogether as much the name of a
thing, as the noun substantive.” Names and designations necessarily
influence our conceptions of the things which they represent. It
is therefore desirable, that in every art or science, not only
should no term be employed which may convey to the reader or hearer
an incorrect conception of the thing signified, but that every
term should assist him in forming a just idea of the object which
it expresses. Now, I concur with Mr. Tooke in thinking, that the
adjective is by no means a necessary part of speech. I agree with
him also in opinion, that, in a certain sense, all words are nouns
or names. But, as this latter doctrine seems directly repugnant to
the concurrent theories of critics and grammarians, it is necessary
to explain in what sense the opinion of Mr. Tooke requires to be
understood; and in presenting the reader with this explanation,
I shall briefly state the objections which will naturally offer
themselves against the justness of this theory. “_Gold_, and
_brass_, and _silk_, is each of them,” says Mr. Tooke, “the name of
a thing, and denotes a substance. If, then, I say, _a gold-ring_,
a brass-tube, a silk-string; here are the substantives _adjectivè
posita_, yet names of things, and denoting substances.” It may be
contended, however, that these are not substantives, but adjectives,
and are the same as _golden_, _brazen_, _silken_. He proceeds: “If
again I say, _a golden ring_, _a brazen tube_, _a silken string_; do
_gold_, and _brass_, and _silk_, cease to be the names of things, and
cease to denote substances, because instead of coupling them with
_ring_, _tube_, and _string_, by a hyphen thus (-), I couple them to
the same words, by adding the termination _en_?” It may be answered,
they do not cease to imply the substances, but they are no longer
names of those substances. _Hard_ implies hardness, but it is not
the name of that quality. _Atheniensis_ implies _Athenæ_, but it is
not the name of the city, any more than _belonging to Athens_ can be
called its name. He observes: “If it were true, that adjectives were
not the names of things, there could be no attribution by adjectives;
for you cannot attribute nothing.” This conclusion may be disputed.
An adjective may imply a substance, quality, or property, though it
is not the name of it. _Cereus_, “waxen,” implies _cera_, “wax;” but
it is the latter only which is strictly the name of the substance.
_Pertaining to wax, made of wax_, are not surely names of the thing
itself. Every attributive, whether verb or adjective, must imply
an attribute; but it is not therefore the name of that attribute.
_Juvenescit_, “he waxes young,” expresses an attribute; but we should
not call _juvenescit_ the name of the attribute.

It may be asked, what is the difference between _caput hominis_,
“a man’s head,” and _caput humanum_, “a human head?” If _hominis_,
“man’s,” be deemed a noun, why should not _humanum_, “human,” be
deemed a noun also? It may be answered, that _hominis_ does, in
fact, perform the office of an adjective, expressing not only the
individual, but conjunction also; and that Mr. Wallis assigns to the
English genitive the name of adjective. Besides, does not Mr. Tooke
himself maintain, “that case, gender, and number, are no parts of
the noun”? and does it not hence follow, that the real nouns are not
_hominis_, but _homo_,--not _man’s_, but _man_? for such certainly
is their form when divested of those circumstances which, according
to Mr. Tooke, make no part of them. If the doctrine, therefore, of
the learned author be correct, and if the real noun exclude gender,
case, and number, as any part of it, neither _hominis_ nor _humanum_,
_man’s_ nor _human_, can with consistency be called nouns.

But let Mr. Tooke’s argument be applied to the verb, the τὸ ῥῆμα,
which he justly considers as an essential part of speech. “If verbs
were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by verbs,
for we cannot attribute nothing.” Are we then to call _sapit_,
_vivit_, _legit_, names? If so, we have nothing but names; and to
this conclusion Mr. Tooke fairly brings the discussion; for he says,
that all words are names.

Having thus submitted to the reader the doctrine of this sagacious
critic, with the objections which naturally present themselves, I
proceed to observe, that the controversy appears to me to be, in a
great degree, a mere verbal dispute. It is agreed on both sides,
that the adjective expresses a substance, quality, or property; but,
while it is affirmed by some critics, it is denied by others, that
it is the name of the thing signified. The metaphysician considers
words merely as signs of thought, while the grammarian regards
chiefly their changes by inflexion: and hence arises that perplexity
in which the classification of words has been, and still continues
to be, involved. Now, it is evident that every word must be the
sign of some sensation, idea, or perception. It must express some
substance or some attribute: and in this sense all words may be
regarded as names. Sometimes we have the name of the thing simply,
as _person_. Sometimes we have an accessary idea combined with
the simple sign, as “possession,” “conjunction,” “action,” and so
forth, as _personal_, _personally_, _personify_. This accessary
circumstance, we have reason to believe, was originally denoted by a
distinct word, significant of the idea intended; and that this word
was, in the progress of language, abbreviated and incorporated with
the primary term, in the form of what we now term an affix or prefix.
Thus _frigus_, _frigidus_, _friget_, all denote the same primary
idea, involving the name of that quality, or of that sensation,
which we term _cold_. _Frigus_ is the name of the thing simply;
_frigidus_ expresses the quality _in concreto_, or conjunction.
Considering, therefore, all words as names, it may be regarded as a
complex name, expressing two distinct ideas,--that of the quality,
and that of conjunction. _Friget_ (the subject being understood)
may be regarded as a name still more complex; involving, first, the
name of the quality; secondly, the name of conjunction; thirdly, the
sign of affirmation, as either expressed by an appropriate name,
or constructively implied, equivalent to the three words, _est cum
frigore_. According, then, to this metaphysical view of the subject,
we have first _nomen simplex_, the simple name; secondly, _nomen
adjectivum_ or _nomen duplex_, the name of the thing, with that of
conjunction; thirdly, _nomen affirmativum_, the name of the thing
affirmed to be conjoined.

The simple question now is, whether all words, not even the verb
excepted, should be called nouns; or whether we shall assign them
such appellations as may indicate the leading circumstances by which
they are distinguished. The latter appears to me to be the only mode
which the grammarian, as the teacher of an art, can successfully
adopt. Considering the subject in this light, I am inclined to say
with Mr. Harris, that the adjective, as implying some substance or
attribute, not _per se_, but _in conjunction_, or _as pertaining_,
is more nearly allied to the verb than to the noun; and that though
the verb and the adjective may, in common with the noun, denote the
thing, they cannot strictly be called its name. To say that _foolish_
and _folly_ are each names of the same quality, would, I apprehend,
lead to nothing but perplexity and error.

It is true, if we are to confine the term noun to the simple name
of the subject, we shall exclude the genitive singular from all
right to this appellation; for it denotes, not the subject simply,
but the subject _in conjunction_--the inflexion being equivalent
to “belonging to.” This indeed is an inconsistency which can in
no way be removed, unless by adopting the opinion of Wallis, who
assigns no cases to English nouns, and considers _man’s_, _king’s_,
&c., to be adjectives. And were we to adopt Mr. Tooke’s definition
of our adjective, and say, “It is the _name of a thing_ which is
directed to be joined to another _name of a thing_,” it will follow,
that _king’s_, _man’s_, are adjectives. In short, if the question
be confined to the English language, we must, in order to remove
all inconsistency, either deny the appellation of _noun_ to the
adjective, and, with Wallis, call the genitive case an adjective; or
we must first call _man’s_, _king’s_, &c., adjectives; secondly, we
must term _happy_, _extravagant_, _mercenary_, &c., nouns, though
they are not names; and thirdly, we must assign the appellation of
noun to the verb itself.

From this view of the subject the reader will perceive that the
whole controversy depends on the meaning which we annex to the term
_noun_. If by this term we denote simply the thing itself, without
any accessary circumstance, then nothing can be called a noun but
the name in its simple form. If to the term noun we assign a more
extensive signification, as implying not only the thing itself simply
and absolutely, but also any accessary idea, as conjunction, action,
passion, and so forth, then it follows, that all words may be termed
names.

[36] The Saxons formed their comparative by _er_ or _ere_, _ar_
or _ære_, _er_, _or_, _ur_, _yr_, and their superlative by _ast_,
_aste_, _est_, _ist_, _ost_, _ust_, _yst_. Now _ar_ means _before_;
hence the English words _ere_ and _erst_. Thus, in Saxon, _riht
wisere_ means “righteous _before_,” “just _before_,” or “_more
than_.” The suffix is equivalent to the Latin _præ_, and the Hebrew
preposition _min_, signifying also _before_; the only difference
being this, that what is a suffix to the Saxon adjective is in Hebrew
a prefix to the consequent subject of comparison, and that in Latin
the preposition following the positive stands alone.

Mr. Bosworth, in his “Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar,” a work
displaying sound philological principles, has remarked, that the
Gothic superlative in _itsa_ bears an obvious resemblance to some of
the Greek superlatives, as, ἄριστος, κάλλιστος, βράδιστος.

[37] _Up_ and _in_ are now used as adverbs and prepositions.

[38] This phraseology is Hebraistic--“more than all his children”
is the literal translation of the original, מְּכל־בניו præ omnibus
filiis, seu, magis omnibus filiis suis.

[39] See a valuable little volume on English Grammar, by Mr. Grant.
The “Institutes of Latin Grammar,” by the same author, we would
recommend to the attention of every classical student.

[40] _I, hi, hie_, “to go,” he considers to be from Ἰ-έναι, the Greek
verb; and hence to be derived the Latin verb _I-re_, “to go,” “to
hie.”

[41] Intransitive verbs sometimes are used transitively, as, when we
say, “to walk the horse,” “to dance the child.” They also admit a
noun of their own signification, as, “to run a race.”

[42] Conformably to general opinion I here consider the English
language as having a passive voice. How far this opinion is well
founded shall be the subject of future inquiry.

[43] Mr. Bosworth seems to think, that the word _tense_ is derived
from the Latin _tensus_, “used to denote that extension or inflexion
of the word, by which difference in time is implied, or difference in
action is signified.” I am rather inclined to consider it as derived
from the French _tems_ or _temps_, and that from _tempus_.

[44] “Some,” says Dr. Beattie, “will not allow anything to be a
tense, but what, in one inflected word, expresses an affirmation
with time; for, that those parts of the verb are not properly called
tenses, which assume that appearance, by means of auxiliary words. At
this rate, in English, we should have two tenses only, the present
and the past in the active verb, and in the passive no tenses at
all. But this is a needless nicety; and, if adopted, would introduce
confusion into the grammatical art. If _amaveram_ be a tense, why
should not _amatus fueram_? If _I heard_ be a tense, _I did hear_,
_I have heard_, and _I shall hear_, must be equally entitled to that
appellation.”

How simplicity can introduce confusion I am unable to comprehend,
unless we are to affirm that the introduction of Greek and Latin
names, to express nonentities in our language, is necessary to
illustrate the grammar, and simplify the study of the language to
the English scholar. But the author’s theory seems at variance
with itself. He admits, that “we have no cases in English, except
the addition of _s_ in the genitive;” whence we may infer, that
he considers inflexion as essential to a case. Now, if those
only be cases, which are formed by inflexion, those only should,
grammatically, be deemed tenses, which are formed in the same manner.
When he asks, therefore, if _amaveram_ be a tense, why should not
_amatus fueram_ be a tense also? the answer on his own principles is
sufficiently obvious, namely, because the one is formed by inflexion,
the other by combination. And, I would ask, if _king’s_ be a genitive
case, why, according to this theory, is not of _a king_ entitled
to the same appellation? I apprehend the answer he must give,
consistently with his opinion respecting cases, will sufficiently
explain why _amaveram_, and _I heard_, are tenses, while _amatus
fueram_, and _I had heard_, are not.

Nay, further, if it be needless nicety to admit those only as
tenses, which are formed by inflexion, is it not equally a needless
nicety to admit those cases only, which are formed by varying the
termination? And if confusion be introduced by denying _I had heard_
to be a tense, why does not the learned author simplify the doctrine
of English nouns, by giving them six cases, _a king_, _of a king_,
_to_ or _for a king_, _a king_, _O king_, _with, from, in_, or _by a
king_? This surely would be to perplex, not to simplify. In short,
the inconsistency of those grammarians, who deny that to be a case,
which is not formed by inflexion, yet would load us with moods and
tenses, not formed by change of termination, is so palpable, as to
require neither illustration nor argument to expose it. If these
authors would admit, that we have as many cases in English, as there
exists relations expressed by prepositions, then, indeed, though they
might overwhelm us with the number, we should at least acknowledge
the consistency of their theory. But to adopt the principle of
inflexion in one case, and reject it in another, precisely parallel,
involves an inconsistency which must excite amazement. _Nil fuit
sic unquam impar sibi._ Why do not these gentlemen favour us with a
dual number, with a middle voice, and with an optative mood? Nay,
as they are so fond of tenses, as to lament that we rob them of all
but two, why do they not enrich us with a first and second aorist,
and a paulo post future? and, if this should not suffice, they will
find in Hebrew a rich supply of verbal forms. We should then have
kal and niphal, pihhel and pyhhal, hiphhil and hophhal, hithpahhel
and hothpahhel, and numerous other species and designations. What a
wonderful acquisition this would be to our stock of moods, tenses,
and voices!

One of these grammarians, indeed, reverencing the old maxim _est
modus in rebus_, observes, that “it is necessary to set bounds to
this business, so as not to occasion obscurity and perplexity,
when we mean to be simple and perspicuous.” This is so far good;
because, though it vindicates the impropriety, it modestly would
confine it within decent bounds. But surely it cannot be necessary
to remind this writer, that when the boundary between right and
wrong, propriety and impropriety, is once passed, it is extremely
difficult to prescribe limits to the transgression; and that
arbitrary distinctions, resting on no other foundation than prejudice
or fashion, must ever be vague, questionable, and capricious. These
are truths of which, I am persuaded, the author to whom I allude
needs not to be reminded. But it may be necessary to impress on his
attention another truth equally incontestable, that no authority,
how respectable soever, can sanction inconsistency; and that great
names, though they may be honoured by ignorance and credulity with
the most obsequious homage, will never pass with the intelligent
reader, either for demonstration or for argument. This author, in
defence of his theory of cases and tenses, observes, “that the proper
form of a tense, in the Greek and Latin languages, is certainly that
which it has in the grammars of these languages.” On what evidence
is this assumption founded? Here is exhibited a _petitio principii_,
too palpable to escape the detection of the most inattentive reader.
He proceeds: “But in the Greek and Latin grammars we uniformly find
that some of the tenses are formed by variations of the principal
verb, and others by the addition of helping verbs.” It is answered
that the admission of these forms in Greek and Latin grammars is a
question of mere expediency, and nowise affects the doctrine for
which we contend, any more than the admission of six cases in all the
Latin declensions affects the doctrine of cases; though in no one
declension have all the cases dissimilar terminations. This position
it would be easy to demonstrate: it would be easy likewise to show
why, notwithstanding this occasional identity of termination, six
cases are admitted in all the declensions; but the subject is foreign
to our present purpose. It is important, however, to observe, what
has escaped the notice of the author, that the principle, on which
the admission just mentioned may be expedient in a Latin grammar, has
no existence whatever in the English language.

“It is, therefore,” he continues, “indisputable, that the principal,
or the participle, and an auxiliary, constitute a regular tense
in the Greek and Latin languages.” This, as I have remarked, is a
palpable _petitio principii_. It is to say, that because _amatus
fueram_ is a tense, therefore “I had been loved” is a tense also.
The author forgets that the premises must be true, to render the
conclusion legitimate. He forgets, that a circular argument is a
mere sophism, because it assumes as true what it is intended to
prove. Whether _amatus fueram_ be or be not a tense, is the very
point in question; and so far am I from admitting the affirmative
as unquestionable, that I contend, it has no more claim to the
designation of tense, than ἔσομαι τετυφώς--no more claim than
_amandum est mihi_, _amari oportet_, or _amandus sum_, have to be
called moods. Here I must request the reader to bear in mind the
necessary distinction between the grammar of a language and its
capacity of expression.

In answer to the objection of inconsistency, in admitting tenses
where there is no inflexion, yet rejecting cases where there is
no change of termination, the author says, “that such a mode of
declension cannot apply to our language.” But why can it not apply?
Why not give as English cases, _to a king_, _of a king_, _from a
king_, _with a king_, _by a king_, _at a king_, _about a king_,
&c. &c.? The mode is certainly applicable, whatever may be the
consequences of that application. A case surely is as easily formed
by a noun and preposition, as a tense by a participle and auxiliary.
But the author observes, “the English language would then have a much
greater number of cases than the Greek and Latin languages.” And why
not? Is the number of cases in English, or any other language, to
be limited by the number in Greek or Latin? or does the author mean
to say, that there is any peculiar propriety in the number five or
six? The author, to be consistent with himself, ought to acknowledge
as many cases as there are prepositions to be found in the English
language. This, it may be said, would encumber our grammar, and
embarrass the learner. This is, indeed, an argument against the
expediency of the application, but not against the practicability
of the principle in question. Besides, it may be asked, why does
the author confine his love of simplification to cases? Why not
extend it to tenses also? Why maintain, that inflexion only makes a
case, and that a tense is formed without inflexion? Why dismiss one
encumbrance, and admit another?

The author observes, that “from grammarians, who form their ideas
and _make_ their decisions respecting this part of grammar, on the
principles and construction of languages, which in these points do
not suit the peculiar nature of our own, but differ considerably from
it, we may naturally expect grammatical schemes that are neither
perspicuous nor consistent, and which will tend more to perplex
than inform the learner.” Had I been reprehending the author’s own
practice, I should have employed nearly the same language. How these
observations, certainly judicious and correct, can be reconciled
with the doctrine of the writer himself, I am utterly at a loss
to conceive. His ideas of consistency and simplicity are to me
incomprehensible. He rejects _prepositional_ cases for the sake of
simplicity, and he admits various moods and tenses, equally foreign
to the genius of our language, in order to avoid perplexity. Surely
this is not a “consistent scheme.” Nay, he tells us, “that on the
principle of imitating other languages in names and forms (I beseech
the reader to mark the words), without a correspondence in nature and
idiom, we might adopt a number of declensions, as well as a variety
of cases, for English substantives: but,” he adds, “this variety does
not at all correspond with the idiom of our language.” After this
observation, argument surely becomes unnecessary.

I have here, the reader will perceive, assailed the author’s doctrine
merely on the ground of inconsistency. It is liable, however, to
objections of a more serious nature; and were I not apprehensive
that I have already exhausted the patience of the reader, I should
now proceed to state these objections. There is one observation,
however, which I feel it necessary to make. The author remarks, that
to take the tenses as they are commonly received, and endeavour to
ascertain their nature and their differences, “is a much more useful
exercise, as well as a more proper, for a work of this kind, than to
raise, as might be easily raised, new theories on the subject.” If
the author by this intends to insinuate that our doctrine is new,
he errs egregiously. For Wallis, one of the oldest, and certainly
one of the best of our English grammarians, duly attentive to
the simplicity of that language whose grammar he was exhibiting,
assigned only two tenses to the English verb. He says, _Nos duo
tantum habemus tempora Præsens et Præteritum_; and on this simple
principle his explanation of the verb proceeds. In the preface to
his grammar, he censures his few predecessors for violating the
simplicity of the English language, by the introduction of names and
rules foreign to the English idiom. _Cur hujusmodi casuum, generum,
modorum, temporumque fictam et ineptam plane congeriem introducamus
citra omnem necessitatem, aut in ipsa lingua fundamentum, nulla
ratio suadet._ And so little was he aware that the introduction of
technical names for things which have no existence, facilitates the
acquisition of any art or science, that he affirms it in regard
to the subject before us to be the cause of great confusion and
perplexity. _Quæ (inutilia præcepta) a lingua nostra sunt prorsus
aliena, adeoque confusionem potius et obscuritatem pariunt, quam
explicationi inserviunt._

[45] Mr. Gilchrist, in his “Philosophic Etymology,” represents
the terminations _ath_, _eth_, _ad_, _ed_, _et_, _en_, _an_, as
conjunctives, equivalent to the sign +, denoting _add_, or _join_
(see p. 162). In another part of the same work, he considers _did_
to be _do_ doubled, as _dedi_ from the Latin _do_, which he believes
to be the very same word with our _do_. Repetition, he observes, is
a mode of expressing complete action. Hence we have _do_, _do-ed_,
_dede_, _did_, in English. This explanation is ingenious, and
furnishes a probable account of the origin of the word _did_, which
he remarks was formerly spelled _dede_.

[46]

  I be       Thou beest        He, she, or it be
  We be      Ye or you be      They be,
                 from the Saxon
  Ic beo     Thu beest         He beeth,

are obsolete, unless followed by a concessive term. Thus, instead
of saying, “Many there _be_ that go in thereat,” we should now
say, “Many there _are_.” For “to whom all hearts _be_ open,” we
should now write, “to whom all hearts _are_ open.” We find them,
however, used with the conjunctions _if_ and _though_; thus, “If
this be my notion of a great part of that high science, divinity,
you will be so civil as to imagine, I lay no mighty stress upon the
rest.”--_Pope._ That this was his notion the author had previously
declared; the introductory clause, therefore, is clearly affirmative,
and is the same as if he had said, “As this is my notion.” “Although
she _be_ abundantly grateful to all her protectors, yet I observe
your name most often in her mouth.”--_Swift._ “The paper, although
it _be_ written with spirit, yet would have scarce cleared a
shilling.”--_Swift._ In the two last sentences the meaning is
affirmative; nothing conditional or contingent being implied.

In the following examples, it expresses doubt or contingency. “If
thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down:” _i.e._ “shouldst be.” “If
I be in difficulty, I will ask your aid;” _i.e._ “If I should be.”

[47] Though the authority of Milton, Dryden, Pope, and Swift, can
be pleaded in favour of _wert_, as the second person singular of
this tense, I am inclined to agree with Lowth, that in conformity
to analogy, as well as the practice of the best ancient writers, it
would be better to confine _wert_ to the imperfect conditional.

[48] If the expression of time with an attribute “be sufficient to
make a verb, the participle must be a verb too, because it signifies
time also. But the essence of a verb consisting in predication, which
is peculiar to it, and incommunicable to all other parts of speech,
and these infinitives never predicating, they cannot be verbs.
Again, the essence of a noun consisting in its so subsisting in the
understanding, as that it may be the subject of predication, and
these infinitives being all capable of so subsisting, they must of
necessity be nouns.”--_R. Johnson’s Gram. Comment._

[49] The variety of form which this verb assumes, clearly shows that
it has proceeded from different sources.

_Am_ is from the Anglo-Saxon _eom_, and _is_ from the Anglo-Saxon
_ys_ or _is_; and these have been supposed to have come from the
Greek εἰμὶ, εἶς.

The derivation of _are_ is doubtful. It may, perhaps, have proceeded
directly from _er_ or _erum_ of the Icelandic verb, denoting “to
be.” By Mr. Gilchrist it is considered as “the same with the
infinitive termination _are, ere, ire_.” Mr. Webb conjectured, that
it might have some relation to the Greek ἔαρ, _spring_. Both these
explanations appear to us somewhat fanciful.

_Art_ is from the Anglo-Saxon _eart_. “Thou eart,” _thou art_.

_Was_ is evidently the Anglo-Saxon _wæs_; and _wast_, _wert_,
probably from the Franco-Theatisc, _warst_; and _were_ from the
Anglo-Saxon _wære_, _wæron_.

_Be_ is from the Anglo-Saxon _Ic beo_, _I am_, which, with the Gaelic
verb _bi_, _to be_, Mr. Webb considered to be derived from βίος,
_life_, as the Latin _fui_, from φύω, _to grow_. This conjecture
he supports by several pertinent quotations. See Mr. Bosworth’s
“Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar,” p. 164.

[50] The words _did_, _hast_, _hath_, _has_, _had_, _shall_, _wilt_,
are evidently, as Wallis observes, contracted for _doed_, _haveth_,
_haves_, _haved_, _shall’st_, _will’st_.

[51] This verb is derived from the Saxon magan, _posse_, the present
of which is _Ic mæg_, and the preterite _Ic miht_. Hence also _Ic
mot_.

      “For as the fisshe, if it be drie,
      Mote in defaute of water die.”--_Gower._

[52] This verb is derived from cunnan, _scire_, _posse_, _sapere_.
Hence is derived the verb “to ken,” or “to know;” or more probably,
indeed, they were one and the same word: hence also the word
_cunning_. “To ken” is still used in Scotland; and in the expression
of Shakspeare, “I ken them from afar,” is erroneously considered by
some critics to mean, “I see them.”

[53] This verb is, unquestionably, a derivative from the Saxon ꞅceal,
_I owe_ or _I ought_, and was originally of the same import. _I
shall_ denoted “it is my duty,” and was precisely synonymous with
_debeo_ in Latin. Chaucer says, “The faith I shall to God;” that is,
“the faith I owe to God.” “Thou shalt not kill,” or “thou oughtest
not to kill.” In this sense _shall_ is a present tense, and denoted
present duty or obligation. But, as all duties and all commands,
though present in respect to their obligation and authority, must
be future in regard to their execution; so by a natural transition,
observable in most languages, this word, significant of present duty,
came to be a note of future time. I have considered it, however, as
a present tense; 1st, because it originally denoted present time;
2dly, because it still retains the form of a present, preserving
thus the same analogy to _should_ that _can_ does to _could_, _may_
to _might_, _will_ to _would_; and 3dly, because it is no singular
thing to have a verb in the present tense, expressive of future time,
commencing from the present moment; for such precisely is the Greek
verb μέλλω, _futurus sum_. Nay, the verb _will_ denotes present
inclination, yet in some of its persons, like _shall_, expresses
futurition. I have considered, therefore, the verb _shall_ as a
present tense, of which _should_ is the preterperfect.

Johnson’s explanation of the meaning of this verb is so perspicuous,
that, as foreigners are apt to mistake its use, I shall here
transcribe his words. _I shall love_: “it will be so that I must
love,” “I am resolved to love.” _Shall I love?_ “will it be permitted
me to love?” “will it be that I must love?” _Thou shalt love_: “I
command thee to love;” “it is permitted thee to love;” “it will be,
that thou must love.” _Shalt thou love?_ “will it be, that thou must
love?” “will it be permitted thee to love?” _He shall love_: “it will
be, that he must love;” “it is commanded that he love.” _Shall he
love?_ “is it permitted him to love?” The plural persons follow the
signification of the singular.

I transcribe also the same author’s explanation of the verb _I will_.
_I will come_: “I am willing to come,” “I am determined to come.”
_Thou wilt come_: “it must be, that thou must come,” importing
necessity; or “it shall be, that thou shalt come,” importing choice.
_Wilt thou come?_ “hast thou determined to come?” importing choice.
_He will come_: “he is resolved to come;” or “it must be, that he
must come,” importing choice or necessity.

Brightland’s short rule may be of some service in assisting
foreigners to distinguish the use of these two verbs. It is this:

      “In the first person simply _shall_ foretels:
      In _will_ a threat, or else a promise, dwells;
      _Shall_ in the second and the third does threat;
      _Will_ simply then foretels the future feat.”

In addition to these directions for the use of _shall_ and _will_,
it is to be observed, that, when the second and third persons are
represented as the subjects of their own expressions, or their own
thoughts, _shall_ foretels, as in the first person, thus, “he says
he shall be a loser by this bargain:” “do you suppose you shall go?”
“He hoped he should recover,” and “he hoped he would recover,” are
expressions of different import. In the former, the two pronouns
necessarily refer to the same person; in the latter, they do not.

[54] This verb is derived from the Saxon verb willan, _velle_, the
preterite of which is Ic wold.

[55] The preterite _would_ is frequently employed, like the Latin
preterimperfect tense, to denote what is usual or customary. Thus,

      Quintilio si quid recitares, corrige, sodes,
      Hoc, aiebat, et hoc; melius te posse negares,
      Bis terque expertum frustra; delere jubebat,
      Et malè tornatos incudi reddere versus:
      Si defendere delictum quàm vertere, malles,
      Nullum ultra verbum, aut operam insumebat inanem.
                                            _Horace._

where the verbs aiebat, jubebat, insumebat, may be translated, “he
would say,” “he would desire,” “he would spend.” Thus also in English,

      Pleas’d with my admiration, and the fire
      His speech struck from me, the old man _would_ shake
      His years away, and act his young encounters:
      Then having show’d his wounds, _he’d_ sit him down.

[56] In Latin the imperfect potential is frequently employed in the
same manner to denote present time; thus, _irem si vellem_, expresses
present liberty and inclination. And the same analogy obtains in
Latin; for we say, either, _tu, si hic sis, aliter sentias_, or _tu,
si hic esses, aliter sentires_. In such examples, it is intended
to signify either the coexistence of two circumstances, or the one
as the immediate consequence of the other. An identity of tense,
therefore, best expresses contemporary events.

[57] If it should be said, that the participle may properly be
considered as a verb, since it implies an attribute with time,
I would ask, whether _affirmation_, the most important of all
circumstances, and without which no communication could take place,
should be overlooked in our classification of words agreeably to
their import, or the offices which they perform. If the verb and
participle be referred to one class, the principal part of speech
which has been pre-eminently distinguished by the name of verb,
or _the word_, is degraded from its rank, and confounded with a
species of words which are not even necessary to the communication of
thought. Surely, if any circumstance can entitle any sort of words to
a distinct reference, it is that of _affirmation_.

If it should be objected that the participle, like the verb, governs
a case, I would ask, because _lectio_, _tactio_, and many other
substantives, are found sometimes joined with an accusative case,
were they ever on this account considered as verbs? Besides, if the
government of a case be urged as an argument, what becomes of those
participles which govern no case? Nay, if the government of a case be
deemed the criterion of a verb, what name shall we assign to those
verbs which have no regimen at all? If any species of words is to be
distinguished from another, the characteristic difference must surely
belong, not to part only, but to the whole.

[58] The termination _ing_ is from the Anglo-Saxon _ande_, _ænde_,
_ende_, _ind_, _onde_, _unde_, _ynde_, and corresponds to the
termination of the Latin gerunds in _andum_ and _endum_, expressing
continuation, _Amandum_, _Lufiande_, _Loving_.

[59] Here I would be understood to reason on their own principles;
for the truth is, that each of these tenses admits a definitive.

[60] See the _Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy_, vol. iii.

[61] Dr. Beattie observes, “that the fundamental error of those
philosophers who deny the existence of present time is, that they
suppose the present instant to have, like a geometrical point,
neither parts nor magnitude. But as nothing is, in respect of our
senses, a geometrical point, (for whatever we see or touch must of
necessity have magnitude,) so neither is the present, or any other
instant, wholly unextended.” His argument amounts to this, that as
a mathematical point is not an object of sense, nor has any real
existence, so neither has a metaphysical instant. It is granted.
They are each ideal. But does this prove the author’s position, that
philosophers have erred in asserting their similarity? or does it
evince that no analogy subsists between them? Quite the reverse.
The truth is, a geometrical point is purely ideal; it is necessary
to the truth of mathematical demonstration, that it be conceived
to have no parts. Finding it convenient to represent it to sense,
we therefore give it magnitude. A metaphysical instant, or present
time, is in like manner ideal; but we find it convenient to assume as
present an extended space. The doctor observes, that sense perceives
nothing but what is present. It is true; but it should be remembered
that not time, but objects which exist in time, are perceived by
the senses. It may enable a person to form a correct idea of this
matter, if he will ask himself, what he means by present time. If it
be the present hour, is it not obvious that part of it is past, and
part of it future? If it be the present minute, it is equally clear,
that the whole of it cannot be present at once. Nay, if it be the
present vibration of the pendulum, is it not obvious that part of
it is performed, and part of it remains to be performed? Nor is it
possible to stop in this investigation, till present time, strictly
speaking, be proved to have no existence. Did it exist, it must be
extended; and if extended, it cannot be present, for past and future
must necessarily be included in it. If it should be answered, that
this proves time, like matter, infinitely divisible, and that the
most tedious process will still leave something capable of division,
I reply, that as whatever may be left in the one case must be figure,
and not a point, so the remainder, in the other, must be a portion of
extended time, how minute soever, and not an instant. The process,
therefore, must be continued, till we arrive in idea at a point and
an instant, incapable of division, being not made up of parts.

[62] When we say, _God is good_, I would ask Dr. Browne whether the
verb be definite or indefinite, whether it denote perfection or
imperfection, or have no reference to either. It appears to me that
neither of the terms is in his sense applicable; for that the verb
denotes simple affirmation with time; or, if applicable, that the
tense is, contrary to his opinion, indefinite, the idea of completion
or imperfection being entirely excluded.

[63] These phraseologies, as the author last quoted justly observes,
are harsh to the ear, and appear exceedingly awkward; but a little
attention will suffice to show that they correctly exhibit the ideas
implied by the tense which we have at present under consideration.

[64] See Encyc. Brit., Art. Grammar.

[65] I consider that no language, grammatically examined, has more
cases, tenses, or moods, than are formed by inflexion. But if any
person be inclined to call these forms of expression by the name of
imperative mood, I have no objection. Only let him be consistent,
and call “Dost thou love?” an interrogative mood, adopting also
the precative, the requisitive, the optative, the hortative, &c.,
together with the various cases in nouns, and tenses in verbs,
which are formed by prepositions and auxiliary verbs: I should only
apprehend, that language would fail him to assign them names.

If it should be asked, “Agreeably to your doctrine of the verb,
as implying affirmation, what part of speech would you make the
verbs in the following sentences, _Depart instantly_, _improve
your time_, _forgive us our sins_? Will it be said that the verbs
in these phrases are assertions?” I should answer that all moods,
metaphysically considered, are, in my apprehension, equally
indicative. Every possible form of speech can do nothing but express
the sentiment of the speaker, his desire, his wish, his sensation,
his perception, his belief, &c. Whatever form, therefore, the
expression may assume, it must be resolvable into assertion; and
must be considered as expressing, in the person of the speaker,
what he desires, wishes, feels, thinks, and so forth. No one surely
will deny, that “thou oughtest not to kill,” “thou shalt not kill,”
“thou art forbidden to kill,” are affirmations. And are not these
expressions so nearly equivalent to “do not kill,” that in Greek
and Latin they are rendered indifferently either by οὐ φονεύσεις,
or, μὴ φόνευε; _non occides_, or _ne occidito_? If then we say,
“kill thou,” will it be contended that, though the prohibition
implies an affirmation of the speaker, the command does not? The
expression I conceive to be strictly equivalent to “thou shalt kill,”
“thou art ordered to kill.” Hence _ave_ and _jubeo te avere_, are
deemed expressions of the same import. If the question be examined
grammatically, or as a subject of pure grammar, I am inclined to
think that where there is no variety of termination, there cannot be
established a diversity of mood.

[66] This verb is derived from the Saxon verb Ic most, _ego debeo_.

[67] It belongs not to my province to inquire, how _amarem_ came to
signify _I might_ or _could love_, or whether it be strictly in the
potential or the subjunctive mood. I here take it for granted that
_amarem_ does, without an ellipsis, signify, _I might, could, would_,
or _should love_, implying _licet_, _possum_, _volo_, _debeo_.--See
_Johnson’s Comment_.

[68] Why this verb forms an exception, it would be easy to explain.

[69] See Webster’s Dissertations, p. 263.

[70] A similar phraseology in the use of the pluperfect indicative
for the same tense subjunctive, obtains in Latin, as

      “Impulerat ferro Argolicas fœdare latebras.”--_Virgil._

[71] The Latins used _si_ in both cases: and though their poets
did not attend to this distinction, their prose writers generally
observed it, by joining _si_ for _quoniam_ with the indicative mood.

[72] Where R is added, the verb follows also the general rule.

[73] Some have excluded _bore_ as the preterite of this verb. We have
sufficient authority, however, for admitting it; thus,

      “By marrying her who bore me.”--_Dryden._

[74] _Beholden_ is obsolescent in this sense.

[75] “So kept the diamond, and the rogue was bit.”--_Pope._

“There was lately a young gentleman bit to the bone.”--_Tatler._

[76] _Brake_ seems now obsolescent.

[77] Though Johnson has not admitted the regular form of the
participle in this verb, I think there is sufficient authority for
concurring with Lowth in receiving _builded_ as the participle as
well as _built_, though it be not in such general use.

[78] _Chode_, which occurs twice in the Bible, is now obsolete.

[79] Lowth has given _clomb_ as the preterite of climb. I can find,
however, no authority later than Spenser, and am inclined to think it
is now obsolete.

[80] The irregular preterite _clad_ is obsolescent.

[81] I know no example in which the preterite, which analogically
would be _forwent_, is to be found. It may be here remarked that this
verb, in violation of analogy, is generally spelled _forego_, as if
it meant “to go before.” This is equally improper as it would be to
write _forebid, foresake, foreswear_, for _forbid, forsake, forswear_.

[82] _Fraught_ is more properly an adjective than participle.

[83] This verb, Lowth says, when employed as an active verb, “may
perhaps, most properly be used in the regular form.” Here the learned
author appears to me, if he be not chargeable with error, to have
expressed his meaning incorrectly; for it cannot be disputed that the
irregular form of this verb is frequently, and with unquestionable
propriety, used in an active sense. Thus we say, “the servant hung
the scales in the cellar;” and passively, “the scales were hung by
the servant.” I should, therefore, rather say that, when this verb
denotes suspension, for the purpose of destroying life, the regular
form is far preferable. Thus, “the man was hanged,” not “hung.”

[84] The irregular preterite and participle of this verb are employed
in sea language; but the latter rarely.

[85] Lowth has given _holpen_ as the participle; it is now
obsolescent, if not obsolete. It belonged to the verb _to holp_,
which has been long out of use.

[86] Several grammarians have rejected _hid_ as a participle.
It rests, however, on unquestionable authority; but _hidden_ is
preferable.

[87] _Holden_, which was some years ago obsolescent, is now returning
into more general use.

[88] _Laden_, like _fraught_, may be deemed an adjective.

[89] Priestley, I apprehend, has erred in giving _lain_ as the
participle of this verb.

[90] _Lien_, though not so generally used as _lain_, is not destitute
of unexceptionable authority. I have, therefore, with Johnson and
Lowth, given it as the participle. Murray has omitted it.

[91] Some grammarians have rejected _lit_. It can plead, however,
colloquial usage in its favour, and even other authority. “I lit my
pipe with the paper.”--_Addison._

[92] With Priestley and Lowth, I have given this verb a regular
participle; for which, I believe, there is sufficient authority,
without adducing the example of Shakspeare. Most other grammarians
have rejected it.

[93] _Quitted_ is far more generally used as the preterite than
_quit_.

[94] Priestley has rejected _rid_, and Murray _ridden_, as the
participle, while Johnson makes _rid_ the preterite of _ride_.
As _rid_ is the present and preterite of another verb, it would,
perhaps, be better to dismiss it entirely from the verb _to ride_,
and conjugate, with Priestley, _ride, rode, ridden_.

[95] Our translators of the Bible have used _roast_ as the perfect
participle. In this sense it is almost obsolete. _Roast beef_ retains
its ground.

[96] Story, in his Grammar, has most unwarrantably asserted, that the
participle of this verb should be _shaked_. This word is certainly
obsolete, and, I apprehend, was never in general use. I have been
able to find only one example of _shaked_ as the participle, “A sly
and constant knave, not to be _shaked_.”--_Shakspeare._ And two as
the preterite, “They shaked their heads.”--_Psal._ cxi. 55. “I shaked
my head.”--_Steele_, _Spectator_, No. iv.

[97] Of these preterites, the latter is now more generally used. Our
translators of the Bible used the former.

[98] A. Murray has rejected _sung_ as the preterite, and L. Murray
has rejected _sang_. Each preterite, however, rests on good authority.

The same observation may be made respecting _sank_ and _sunk_.

[99] _Sitten_, though formerly in use, is now obsolescent. Laudable
attempts, however, have been made to restore it. “To have _sitten_ on
the heads of the apostles.”--_Middleton._

“Soon after the termination of this business, the parliament, which
had now _sitten_ three years,” &c.--_Belsham’s Hist._

“And he would gladly, for the sake of dispatch, have called together
the same parliament, which had _sitten_ under his father.”--_Hume_,
vol. vi. p. 199.

Respecting the preterites which have _a_ or _u_, as _slang_, or
_slung_, _sank_, or _sunk_, it would be better were the former
only to be used, as the preterite and participle would thus be
discriminated.

[100] Pope has used the regular form of the preterite:

      “In the fat age of pleasure, wealth, and ease,
      Sprung the rank weed, and thrived with large increase.”
                                              _Essay on Crit._

Horsley, with one or two other writers, have employed the regular
participle.

[101] _Washen_ seems obsolescent, if not obsolete. The compound
_unwashen_ occurs in our translation of the Bible.

[102] Pope, and our translators of the Bible, have used _winded_ as
the preterite. The other form, however, is in far more general use.

[103] _Wrote_, as the participle, is generally disused, and likewise
_writ_. The latter was used as a preterite by Pope, Swift, and other
writers of the same period.

[104] _Wit_ is now confined to the phrase _to wit_, or _namely_. It
is an abbreviation from the Anglo-Saxon verb þiꞇan, to know.

[105] This verb, as an auxiliary, is inflexible; thus we say, “he
will go,” and “_he wills to go_.”

[106] This verb, which signifies “to think,” or “to imagine,” is now
obsolete.

[107] This verb is now used as significant of present duty. It was
originally the preterite, and the perfect participle of the verb _to
owe_; and is corruptedly used in Scotland still to express a past
debt. “Apprehending the occasion, I will add a continuance to that
happy motion, and besides give you some tribute of the love and duty
I long have ought you.”--_Spelman._

      “This blood, which men by treason sought,
      That followed, sir, which to myself I ought.”--_Dryden._

It is now used in the present tense only; and, when past duty or
obligation is to be signified, we note, as I formerly mentioned, the
past time by the preterite sense of the subsequent verb; thus, “I
ought to read,” “I ought to have read.” The classical scholar knows
that the reverse takes place in Latin. _Debeo legere, debui legere_.
Cicero, however, though very rarely indeed, uses the preterite of the
infinitive after the preterite tense of this verb.

Murray has told us, that _must_ and _ought_ have both a present and
past signification, and, in proof of this, he adduces the following
examples:--“I must own, that I am to blame.” “He must have been
mistaken.” “Speaking things which they ought not.” “These ought ye
to have done.” This is truly a strange, and, I verily believe, a
singular opinion. Its inaccuracy is so manifest, that every reader of
discernment must intuitively perceive it. The opinion itself, indeed,
is not more surprising, than the ground on which it is maintained by
the author. It surely requires but a moderate portion of sagacity
to perceive, that the past time, in the second and fourth examples,
is not denoted by _must_ and _ought_, but by the expressions “have
been” and “have done.” In Latin, as I have just observed, _necessity_
and _duty_ are expressed as either present, past, or future, the
verbs denoting these having the three correspondent tenses; and the
object of the necessity or duty is expressed as contemporary, or
relatively present. In English, on the contrary, the two verbs _must_
and _ought_ having only the present tense, we are obliged to note
the past time by employing the preterite tense of the subsequent
verb. Thus, _Me ire oportet_, “I ought to go,” “I must go.” _Me
ire oportuit_, “I ought to have gone,” “I must have gone.” As well
may it be affirmed, that the past time is denoted by _ire_ and not
_oportuit_, as that it is signified by _must_ and not by “have gone.”

In the time of Wallis, the term _must_, as a preterite tense, was
almost obsolete. “_Aliquando_,” he remarks, “_sed rarius in præterito
dicitur_.” And when it was employed as a preterite, it was followed
by the present tense. This verb in German has, I understand, a
preterite tense.

[108] _Firstly_, is used by some writers.

[109] Denominativa terminantur in _lic_ vel _lice_, ut þeꞃlic
virilis, ælic legitimus, ꞃælic marinus, þiꝼlic muliebris, &c. Hanc
terminationem hodie mutavimus in _like_ vel _ly_, ut in _godlike_ vel
_godly_. Hickesii Thes.

The correctness of this explanation has been controverted by Mr.
Gilchrist, who contends that, though it may answer in some cases,
it will fail “in nine times out of ten.” In the expressions “weekly
wages,” “daily labour,” “yearly income,” he observes, that the
meaning cannot be, “wages like a week,” “labour like a day,” “income
like a year.” He rejects, therefore, this explanation, and considers
the termination _lic_ to be the same with _lig_ in the Latin verb
_ligo_, “to tie,” or “join,” and to have the same effect as other
conjunctive particles, as “a friendly part,” “a friend’s part,”
“yearly produce,” “year’s produce.” Though a copious induction of
examples justifies us in refusing our assent to Mr. Gilchrist’s
exaggerated statement, that the derivation proposed by Hickes will
fail in nine cases out of ten; we candidly acknowledge, that in many
instances it is inadmissible; and that Mr. Gilchrist’s suggestion
is ingenious, though it will be found, we apprehend, opposed by the
same objection as he urges against Hickes’s explanation. Nor does it
appear to us, that Mr. Gilchrist’s argument subverts the doctrine
generally received. The termination may have been originally what
Hickes supposed, and the principle of analogy may, in time, have
introduced similar compositions, when this meaning of the termination
ceased to be regarded. Thus the term _candidly_, which we have just
now used, was probably introduced, in conformity to _analogy_, with
no reference whatever to the meaning of the termination. It may be
here also observed, that the import of this term seems inexplicable
on the hypothesis that _ly_ is a mere term of conjunction.

[110] These three adverbs, denoting motion or rest in a place, are
frequently employed by us, in imitation of the French, to denote
motion to a place in the same sense with the three following adverbs.
It would be better, however, were the distinction observed. The
French use _ici_ for _here_ and _hither_, _là_ for _there_ and
_thither_, _où_ for _where_ and _whither_.

[111]

      “For blithesome Sir John Barleycorn
      Had sae allur’d them i’ the morn,
      That, what wi’ drams, and mony a horn,
          And reaming bicker,
      The ferly is, _withouten_ scorn,
      They wauk’d sae sicker.”
                         _Mayne’s Siller Gun._

This animated little poem will be read with no common pleasure by
every admirer of the Scottish muse. In felicity of description the
author is not inferior to Burns, while in delicacy of humour he may
claim the superiority.

This preposition is supposed by Mr. Gilchrist to be derived from
_forth_, or rather to be a different form of that word. See his
“Philosophic Etymology,” a work exhibiting considerable ingenuity
and philological knowledge, combined with many fanciful and
unphilosophical opinions.

[112] It is possible that the Greek ἀπό, and the Latin _ab_ derived
from it, had their origin in אב _pater principium_, “author,” or
“principle of existence.”

[113] The verb, “to twin,” is still used in Scotland for “to part,”
or “separate.”

[114] That the Saxon word _ægther_ signified _each_, is sufficiently
evident from a variety of examples; and the adjective _either_ has
continued to be used in that sense by reputable writers. Lowth, who,
I apprehend, did not advert to its primitive signification, condemns
the use of it as equivalent to _each_; and notwithstanding its
original import, I agree with him in thinking, that it is much better
to confine its meaning to “one of two.” The reason will be assigned
hereafter.

[115] _Bot_ ser that Virgil standis _but_ compare.--_Gawin Douglass._

[116] _An_ occurs frequently for _if_ in the earliest English
writers. Bacon frequently uses it in this sense. “Fortune is to be
honoured and respected, _an_ it be but for her daughters, Confidence
and Reputation.” “And certainly it is the nature of extreme
self-lovers, as they will set their house on fire, _an_ it were, but
to roast their eggs.”--_Bacon’s Essays, Civ. and Mor._ In the folio
edition, printed in 1740, it is improperly spelled _and_. _An_ for
_if_ is still retained in our address to royalty, _An ’t please your
majesty_: and in Scotland is in general use.

[117] The correctness of most of these, and several other of
Tooke’s etymologies, has been disputed, in a learned and ingenious
article in the Quarterly Review (No. 108). In many of the critic’s
animadversions it is impossible not to concur; but we do not agree
with him, when he rejects the derivation of _if_ from the Anglo-Saxon
verb _gifan_, “to give;” nor do we consider that Jamieson’s argument,
to which he refers, is such as to justify the critic’s conclusion.
The distinction between _bot_ and _but_ he confidently pronounces
to be “a mere chimera,” and maintains that _but_ is in every
instance _be utan_, “be out,” without corresponding to the Latin
words _sed_, _vero_, _autem_, _sine_. It must be acknowledged that
Tooke’s derivation is erroneous, there being no such Anglo-Saxon
verb as “botan,” of which _bot_ could be the imperative. But we
agree with Dr. Jamieson in thinking, whatever may be the etymology,
that _but_ and _bot_ are originally distinct words. Indeed, it
appears to us, that the reasoning of the critic is neither correct,
nor quite consistent with itself. We do not consider _but_ for
_bot_ to be discriminative; nor can we allow, that, if _but_ be
equivalent to _sed_, _se_, _sine_, implying separation, it can also
be equivalent to _autem_, “moreover,” to which _bot_ corresponds,
implying adjection, or subjunction. Nor can we admit, that the
synonymous words _mais_ (French), _maar_ (Dutch), _ma_ (Italian),
imply preference, as the critic affirms, but something to be added,
corresponding with what has been previously said.

[118] The critic to whom we have alluded in the preceding note
contends, that _except_ cannot be an imperative, “because it has
no subject; and that a verb could not be employed, in any language
that distinguishes the different persons, without a gross violation
of idiom.” He considers the word to be an abbreviated participle.
The correctness of this opinion I am disposed to question. In our
Anglo-Saxon translation, the term _except_ is rendered by _buton_,
which is no participle; moreover, to place the participle perfect
before the noun, the clause being absolute, is irreconcilable with
the idiom of our language. “‘All were involved in this affair,
except one;’ that is,” says Webster, who seems divided between the
imperative and the participle, “‘one excepted.’” Now “one excepted,”
and “excepting one,” are perfectly consonant with analogy; but
“excepted one” is sanctioned by no authority. I am inclined to think
that our translators, without regarding the Latin or the Icelandic
idiom, to which the reviewer refers, used the word _except_ as an
imperative, without a subject. He denies, however, that it can be so
employed. He surely will not deny, that usage warrants us in saying,
“His arguments, take them as here exhibited, amount to nothing.” The
use of the imperative, infinitive, and participles, in an absolute
sense, or without a subject, is a common idiom in our language, and
recommends itself, as shall be afterwards shown, by some peculiar
advantages.

[119] This phraseology has been censured by Buchanan and the author
of the British Grammar; but, as I apprehend, without the shadow of
authority. To ask a question with a principal verb, as _burns he_,
the latter affirms to be a barbarism. To disprove the assertion, I
shall only, in addition to the one quoted from Macbeth, produce these
examples. “Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me?”--_Bible._ “Died he
not in bed?”--_Shakspeare._ “Or flies the javelin swifter to its
mark?”--_Ib._ “And live there men who slight immortal fame?”--_Pope._

[120] Our translators, as the judicious critic last quoted observes,
have totally enervated the strength of the original, which runs thus,
ἔπεσε, ἔπεσε, Βαβυλὼν ἡ πόλις ἡ μεγάλη, and which they have rendered,
“Babylon is fallen, is fallen, that great city.”

[121] The ellipsis of the copulative, in such examples, was
termed by the ancients _asyndeton_; and this deviation from the
established rules of syntax they referred to a grammatical figure
termed _syllepsis indirecta_, or “indirect comprehension of several
singulars under one plural,” opposed to the _syllepsis directa_, or
that expressed by a copulative.

[122] It is sometimes used for _every_, and applied to more than two.

[123] In the vulgar translation of the Bible, this mode of expression
frequently occurs, thus, “I am thy exceeding great reward.” “I will
make thee exceeding fruitful.”

Wallis’s admission of this phraseology proves it to have been good
English when he wrote, or that, in his opinion at least, it was
unobjectionable. His translation of _vir summe sapiens_, is “a man
exceeding wise.” This, and similar modes of expression, appear to
have been in his time very common, thus,

“Although he was exceeding wealthy.”--_Peers._

“He was moreover extraordinary courteous.”--_Ibid._

“The Athenians were extreme apprehensive of his growing
power.”--_Tully._

And in our version of the Bible we find a few such expressions as the
following: “The house I am to build, shall be _wonderful_ great.”

Addison likewise often uses the phrase “exceeding great;” and Swift,
less pardonably, writes “extreme unwilling,” “extreme good.”

[124] We say, indeed, “Messrs. Thomson;” but we seldom or never say,
“the two Messrs. Thomson,” but “the two Mr. Thomsons.”

[125] Horne Tooke observes, that Lowth has rejected much good
English: and it is to be apprehended, that the classical scholar is
too prone to condemn in his own language whatever accords not with
the Latin idiom.

[126] See Johnson’s Comm. p. 351, and Seyer on the Latin Verb, p.
174. To the arguments there offered, many others might be added.

[127] The propriety of this collocation of the _negative_ will be
more evident, if we attend to the two very different meanings of the
word _but_. According to the former construction of the sentence,
_but_ is the imperative of _beutan_, “to be out,” and is synonymous
with _unless_ or _except_; thus, “but with the approbation,” or
_except_ with the approbation. According to the latter construction,
it is properly _bot_, the imperative of _botan_, “to add.” Thus, “he
was honoured not with (_i.e._ exclude or except) this reward, but
(add) with the approbation of the people.”

[128] It is to be observed that a different collocation is sometimes
admissible without any risk of ambiguity, especially when the clause
is negative. Thus we may say, “His thoughts were entertained with not
only,” _i.e._ “with not one thing,” viz. “the joys” with which he was
surrounded; or, “not only with the joys; but (_bot_ or _add_) a noble
gratitude and divine pleasure.”

Usage in common conversation, and in familiar language, inclines to
this arrangement, and many of our best writers frequently adopt it.

[129] The omission of the auxiliary in such examples tends much to
produce ambiguity: for, as the adverb, when placed between the noun
and the attributive, may qualify either the former or the latter,
perspicuity requires the insertion of the auxiliary.

[130] Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non
intelligere, curandum.

[131] In this and similar examples, the word _only_ has been
generally considered as an adjective, equivalent to _solus_. Thus, if
we say, _ille solum erat dives_, it means, “he was only rich,” or “he
was nothing but rich.” If we say, _ille solus erat dives_, it means,
“he only,” or “he alone was rich.” In the latter example, the word
_only_ has been termed an adjective. It is from the equivalence of
the words _only_ and _alone_, in such examples as the latter, that
several writers have employed them, as if, in all cases, synonymous.
They are by no means, however, of the same import. Thus, if we say,
“virtue alone is true nobility,” it means “virtue singly, or by
itself, is true nobility;” if we say, “virtue only is true nobility,”
it implies that nothing but virtue is true nobility. The expressions,
therefore, are not equivalent. Both sentiments are conveyed in the
following passage:

    ... “Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus.”--_Juvenal_, Sat. viii.

The same observations are applicable to the collocation of the
numeral term _first_, as equivalent either to _primus_ or _primum_;
and also to the position of many other words, which are used
adjectively and adverbially. The classical scholar needs not to
be informed, that _Annibal primus_, and _Annibal primum--Alpes
transiit_, are not expressions mutually convertible.

[132] Addison, Pope, Swift, Steele, and Johnson, very generally place
the adverb before the attributive, to which it refers, and very often
also, before the substantive. “What he said, was only to commend my
prudence.”--_Addison._ “He did not pretend to extirpate French music,
but only to cultivate and civilise it.”--_Addison._ “I was only
scribbling.”--_Johnson._ “Not only the thought, but the language is
majestic.”--_Addison._ “Known only to those, who enjoy.”--_Johnson._
“Lay the blame only on themselves.”--_Johnson._ “Witty only by the
help of speech.”--_Steele._

Our translators of the Bible have almost uniformly observed the
same collocation in respect to the predicate; but have, with few
or no deviations, preferred a different arrangement in regard to
the subject, placing the adverb after, and not before it. It is in
conformity to their practice, that we have recommended the rule here
given. From the following examples, to which many more might be
added, it will appear that when the adverb referred to a sentence,
they made it the introductory word; when it affected an attributive,
they placed the adverb before it; and when it referred to a
substantive, or the name of a subject, they put the adverb after it.
“Only take heed to thyself.” “Only he shall not go in unto the vail.”
“Only thou shalt not number the tribe of Levi.” ... “The thoughts of
his heart are only evil.” “Thou shalt be only oppressed.” “They might
only touch the hem of his garment.” ... “None followed David, but
Judah only.” “He only of Jeroboam shall come to the grave.” “Against
thee only have I sinned.” “Take nothing for your journey, but a staff
only.” “David did that only which was right.” “They only shall be
delivered.” “This only have I found.” “If in this life only we have
hope.”

[133] In colloquial language, but chiefly among the vulgar,
prepositions are prefixed to verbs indicative.

[134]

      “Est vetus, atque probus, centum qui perficit annos.
      Quid? qui deperiit minor uno mense, vel anno;
      Inter quos referendus erit? veteresne poetas,
      An quos et præsens et postera respuet ætas?
      Iste quidem veteres inter ponetur honestè,
      Qui vel mense brevi, vel toto est junior anno.
      Utor permisso, caudæque pilos ut equinæ
      Paulatim vello; et demo unum, demo etiam unum;
      Dum cadat elusus ratione ruentis acervi,
      Qui redit ad fastos.”
                            _Horace_, Ep. I. Lib. 2.

[135] The Saxon word is _awiht_, contracted _auht_, _aliquid_.

[136] We have remarked the same violation of common sense, as
occurring in Cicero, oftener than once. “Alium alio nequiorem.”--_Ep.
Fam._ “Aliam alia jucundiorem.”--_Att._

[137] Deprehendat, quæ barbara, quæ impropria, quæ contra legem
loquendi composita.--_Quintil._ lib. i. cap. 5.

[138] In conformity to the example of most of our grammarians, I
have employed the term _etymology_ in the title of this work, and
wherever else it occurs, as denoting that part of grammar, which
teaches the inflection of words. In its primitive acceptation, it
means an exposition of their derivation, and is still employed in
that sense, as well as in the signification in which it is here
used. Some writers have preferred the term _analogy_ to express the
doctrine of inflection. If the principle of analogy or similitude
were confined to inflection, the designation might be proper; but,
as this principle extends to the concord, the government, and the
collocation, generally termed the _syntax_ of words, it cannot be
considered an appropriate name for that part of grammar, which
teaches merely inflection or verbal termination. Analogy is the
leading principle, on which every grammatical rule is founded; and
those, who have employed the term for etymology, it would be easy to
show, have not been observant of strict consistency.

[139] The reader is requested to observe, that under “solecism,” I
have included several phraseologies, which, though not consistent
with syntactical propriety, may be justly called by the softer name
of “inaccuracies.”

[140] See Canon I., p. 229.

[141] We perceive intuitively the error of Milton, when he calls
Adam “the comeliest of men since born,” Eve also “the fairest of
her daughters,” and we laugh, perhaps, when the Cork almanack-maker
gravely tells us, “that the principal republics in Europe, are
Venice, Holland, and America;” yet the error here reprehended is
precisely of the same species, though it passes frequently unnoticed.
See p. 74.

[142] It has been already offered as the opinion of the writer, (see
p. 47,) that the English word _other_ is the Saxon oðeꞃ, and that
this word with the Arabic _ahd_, the Hebrew _had_ or _ahad_, the
Saxon oððe, the Teutonic _odo_, the Swedish _udda_, and probably
the Latin _aut_, have all sprung from the same source, or that one
of these is the parent of the rest, denoting _unus_ or _singulus_,
“one,” or “one by itself.” Of the origin of the Saxon _other_, Lye
has hazarded no opinion. It appears to me to be a comparative from
oððe. To those who have carefully examined, and have approved the
theory of Mr. Tooke, it will furnish no valid objection against this
opinion, that the word oððe is uniformly found in Saxon, signifying
_aut_. Such can have little or no difficulty in perceiving, not only
from the similarity of the elements, but from the affinity in point
of sense, that _had_, _ahd_, _aut_, oððe, oðeꞃ, _other_, _or_, are
all members of one and the same family.

[143] In French the article and the adjectives admitting a plural
termination, the expression “les uns et les autres” joined to a
plural verb is in perfect consistence with analogy. So also, in
Latin, are _utrique_ and _alteri_, referring to a plurality. But
_unus_ was never in this sense used as a plural.

[144] “Utrumque fecisse, dicimus, si et hic et ille fecerit
divisim; ambos fecisse dicimus, si duo conjunctim aliquid
fecerint.”--_Stephan._ This distinction, however, as the learned
critic acknowledges, is not uniformly observed.

[145] “The truth is, that _as_ is also an article; and however
and whenever used in English, means the same as _it_, or _that_,
or _which_. In the German, where it still evidently retains its
original signification and use, (as _so_ also does,) it is written
_es_.”--_Tooke’s Diversions._

[146] The error here involved suggests a few observations, which
it may be useful to offer, concerning the distinctive character of
active and neuter verbs. A neuter verb has been defined to be that,
which denotes neither doing nor suffering. An active verb, as its
name imports, denotes, that the subject is doing something. Johnson,
however, in his Dictionary, gives every active verb the designation
of _neuter_, unless followed by an objective case, that is, unless
the object or subject of the action be expressed. In the following
instances, for example, he considers the verbs as neuter. “’T is
sure, that Henry _reads_;” “so I _drank_; and she made the camels
_drink_ also;” “if you _plant_ where savages are;” “the priests
_teach_ for hire;” “nor feel him where he _struck_;” “they that _sow_
in tears, shall _reap_ in joy.” These are a few out of numberless
examples, which might be produced. Indeed, Johnson’s idea seems to
be, as has been just now observed, that the verb must be regarded as
neuter, unless followed by an objective case. This is certainly a
great inaccuracy, and tends to introduce perplexity and confusion.
The verb surely does not the less denote action, because it expresses
it absolutely, or because the subject acted upon is not particularly
specified. In the examples now quoted, can it be questioned, when we
say _he struck_, that _he_ was active; or when we say, _they that sow
shall reap_, will it be affirmed that _they_ are not active? This
would be to confound distinctions not merely acknowledged in theory,
and adopted in definition, but also founded in the very nature of
things. This matter, I conceive, may be shortly explained, and very
easily understood. It is admitted by every grammarian, that an active
verb denotes, that the subject is acting, and that a neuter verb
signifies that the subject is neither doing nor suffering. Now, of
active verbs there are two kinds, transitive and intransitive. The
latter is that which denotes immanent action, or that which does
not pass from the agent to anything else, as, _I walk_, _I run_.
Transitive verbs are such as denote that the action passes from
the agent to something acted upon, as, “Hector wounded him,” “Cain
slew his brother.” But the subject to which the energy passes, may
not always be expressed; the verb, however, is not the less active.
Whether we say, “the drummer beats his drum,” or “the drummer beats
every day,” it surely will not be contended, that there is less of
action implied in the one case than in the other. The reader, then,
is requested to observe, that it is not necessary to the active
transitive verb, that the subject acted upon should be expressed.
The active verb may predicate of its subject merely the action
generally and absolutely, as, “he reads in the morning, and writes
in the evening;” or with the action may be expressed the subject or
object, as, “he reads Homer in the morning, and writes letters in the
evening;” or the object or subject may be implied, and not expressed,
as, “the drummer beats at night,” namely, his drum. But in all these
cases the verb is equally active.

[147] In justice to this respectable sect, it is incumbent on me to
observe, that the Quakers are not Deists, nor does their religious
creed approach to Deism.

[148] A similar ambiguity sometimes occurs in Latin by the
indiscriminate use of _quod_. This may be prevented by employing
_quoniam_ when the succeeding member of the sentence expresses the
cause of the preceding subject. Thus, “Nec consilium eo minus erat
firmum, quoniam secretum cum perpaucis adhuc erat communicatum,”
where the _eo_ refers to a preceding circumstance. “Nec consilium
eo minus erat firmum, quod” where the _eo_ refers to the subsequent
clause. The former phraseology affirms, the latter denies, the
influence of the circumstance subjoined.

[149] In our penal statutes, which should be precisely worded,
because they are literally interpreted, much ambiguity frequently
arises from the loose and incorrect manner in which this conjunction
is used.

[150] The issue of a question, respecting a contested election at
Rochester in 1820, depended on the construction of this designation,
“a peer, or lord of parliament.”

[151] The superior ductility of the Greek, above every other
language, must appear from its singular aptitude to form new words
by composition or derivation, so as immediately to communicate
any new idea. Hence the names of most of our modern discoveries
and inventions are of Greek extraction. Thus we have the terms
“microscope,” “telegraph,” “panorama,” “odometer,” and many others.

[152]

              “Cui lecta potenter erit res,
      Nec facundia deseret hunc, nec lucidus ordo.

      Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.”
                                _Hor. de Art. Poet._




  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
  corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
  the text and consultation of external sources.

  Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
  and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

  Pg 44: ‘primary preception’ replaced by ‘primary perception’.
  Pg 46: ‘hartez, illa’ replaced by ‘ha’aretz, illa’.
  Pg 46 Footnote [24]: ‘ארצ’ replaced by ‘ארץ’.
  Pg 46 Footnote [24]: ‘הארצ’ replaced by ‘הארץ’.
  Pg 87 Footnote [45]: ‘eo-ed, dede’ replaced by ‘do-ed, dede’.
  Pg 102: missing subheading ‘OF THE PARTICIPLE.’ added.
  Pg 115: ‘I  written’ replaced by ‘I have written’.
  Pg 150: ‘siginifies against’ replaced by ‘signifies against’.
  Pg 155: ‘I did confess”...’ replaced by ‘I did confess...”’.
  Pg 173 Footnote [123]: ‘Athough he was’ replaced by ‘Although he was’.
  Pg 191: ‘the arrrangement is’ replaced by ‘the arrangement is’.
  Pg 209: ‘The bridegrooms its’ replaced by ‘The bridegroom sits’.
  Pg 246: ‘I know.” Addison.’ replaced by ‘I know.”--Addison.’.
  Pg 249: ‘being accasioned’ replaced by ‘being occasioned’.
  Pg 262: ‘οἱ duo’ replaced by ‘οἱ δύο’.
  Pg 297: ‘before you feet’ replaced by ‘before your feet’.



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